Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 85

Reply Obj. 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is one, but also as regards the pa.s.sions of the sensitive appet.i.te, which are still more imperfect.

It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which are contingent.

Reply Obj. 3: In no sinner as such is _euboulia_ to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also other circ.u.mstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due circ.u.mstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 2]

Whether _Euboulia_ Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the "prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now this belongs to _euboulia_ as stated above. Therefore _euboulia_ is not distinct from prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are specified chiefly by their end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q.

18, AA. 4, 6). Now _euboulia_ and prudence are directed to the same end, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end, but to the common end of all life. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue from prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to _euboulia,_ while decision belongs to prudence. There _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue from prudence.

_On the contrary,_ Prudence is preceptive, according to _Ethic._ vi, 10. But this does not apply to _euboulia_. Therefore _euboulia_ is a distinct virtue from prudence.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), virtue is properly directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ according to different acts, especially when there is a different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all these belong to the same virtue of charity.

Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another.

Consequently _euboulia_ which makes man take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which is princ.i.p.al, so _euboulia_ is directed to prudence as to a princ.i.p.al virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding it, to _euboulia_ by eliciting it.

Reply Obj. 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees to the one end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty.

Hence this proves not that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue from prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a princ.i.p.al virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science of dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 3]

Whether _Synesis_ Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that _synesis_ is not a virtue. Virtues are not in us by nature, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1. But _synesis_ is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11).

Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), _synesis_ is nothing but "a faculty of judging." But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it seems that _synesis_ is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore _synesis_ be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable.

Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But _euboulia_, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is _synesis_ a virtue, as being good judgment.

_I answer that,_ _synesis_ signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of _synesis_ are said to be _synetoi,_ i.e. "persons of sense," or _eusynetoi,_ i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand, those who lack this virtue are called _asynetoi,_ i.e. "senseless."

Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides _euboulia_, for another virtue, which judges well, and this is called _synesis._

Reply Obj. 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to _synesis_ which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, through the good disposition of the appet.i.tive power, the result being that one judges well of the objects of appet.i.te: and thus a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this judgment is about the ends, whereas _synesis_ is rather about the means.

Reply Obj. 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the particular matter of action, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13).

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges aright there is a further need of a final and princ.i.p.al virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 4]

Whether _Gnome_ Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that _gnome_ is not a special virtue distinct from _synesis._ For a man is said, in respect of _synesis,_ to have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore _synesis_ extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good judgment called _gnome._

Obj. 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. _euboulia,_ and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. _synesis._

Obj. 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 5.

Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is no intellectual virtue about such matters.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that _gnome_ is a special virtue.

_I answer that_ cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could not p.r.o.nounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider Divine Providence.

Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws, according to which _synesis_ judges: and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of judgment, which is called _gnome,_ and which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.

Reply Obj. 1: _Synesis_ judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence _euboulia_ to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all, but not so _synesis_ whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such things by his reason: this belongs to _gnome,_ which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.

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QUESTION 52

OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?

(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?

(4) Whether the fifth beat.i.tude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc.

corresponds to the gift of counsel?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 1]