Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 81

(1) Which are the parts of prudence?

(2) Of its integral parts;

(3) Of its subjective parts;

(4) Of its potential parts.

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ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 48, Art.]

Whether Three Parts of Prudence Are Fittingly a.s.signed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are a.s.signed unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) a.s.signs three parts of prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight."

Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding,"

"circ.u.mspection," "foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 9, 10, 11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and "gnome" belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 80, Obj. 4] says that ten things are connected with prudence, namely, "good counsel,"

"shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative [*Regnativa]," "military,"

"political" and "domestic prudence," "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics." Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is either excessive or deficient.

Obj. 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore they are not parts of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility, belong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits.

Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence.

Obj. 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above (I-II, Q.

16, A. 1). Therefore, just as "eubulia" which refers to counsel, is connected with prudence, and "synesis" and "gnome" which refer to judgment, so also ought something to have been a.s.signed corresponding to use.

Obj. 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above (Q.

47, A. 9). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among the parts of prudence.

_I answer that,_ Parts are of three kinds, namely, _integral,_ as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; _subjective,_ as ox and lion are parts of animal; and _potential,_ as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be a.s.signed to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of prudence, namely, the six a.s.signed by Macrobius; with the addition of a seventh, viz. _memory_ mentioned by Tully; and _eustochia_ or _shrewdness_ mentioned by Aristotle. For the _sense_ of prudence is also called _understanding_: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.

vi, 11): "Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is understanding." Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a cognitive virtue, namely, _memory, reasoning, understanding, _docility_ and _shrewdness:_ while the three others belong thereto, as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, _foresight, circ.u.mspection_ and _caution._ The reason of their difference is seen from the fact that three things may be observed in reference to knowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of the past, is called _memory,_ if of the present, whether contingent or necessary, is called _understanding_ or _intelligence._ Secondly, the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to which pertains _docility,_ or by _discovery,_ and to this belongs to _eustochia_, i.e. "a happy conjecture," of which _shrewdness_ is a part, which is a "quick conjecture of the middle term," as stated in Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to _reasoning._ And the reason, in order to command aright, requires to have three conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the end, and this belongs to _foresight;_ secondly, to attend to the circ.u.mstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs to _circ.u.mspection;_ thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to _caution._

The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a mult.i.tude, which differ specifically as stated above (Q. 47, A. 11).

Again, the prudence whereby a mult.i.tude is governed, is divided into various species according to the various kinds of mult.i.tude. There is the mult.i.tude which is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called _military._ There is also the mult.i.tude that is united together for the whole of life; such is the mult.i.tude of a home or family, and this is ruled by _domestic prudence_: and such again is the mult.i.tude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is _regnative prudence_ in the ruler, and _political prudence,_ simply so called, in the subjects.

If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also speculative knowledge, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 2) then its parts include _dialectics,_ _rhetoric_ and _physics,_ according to three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to _physics_ (if physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, and this belongs to _dialectics._ The third method is to employ conjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to _rhetoric._ It may be said, however, that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.

The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it were, the whole power of the princ.i.p.al virtue. In this way the parts of prudence are _good counsel,_ which concerns counsel, _synesis,_ which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and _gnome,_ which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law: while _prudence_ is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.

Reply Obj. 1: The various enumerations differ, either because different kinds of parts are a.s.signed, or because that which is mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circ.u.mspection" under "foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under "understanding."

Reply Obj. 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply may be gathered from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with things pertaining to prudence.

Reply Obj. 4: Right command and right use always go together, because the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the lower powers, which pertain to use.

Reply Obj. 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.

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QUESTION 49

OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE (In Eight Articles)

We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Memory;

(2) Understanding or Intelligence;

(3) Docility;

(4) Shrewdness;

(5) Reason;

(6) Foresight;

(7) Circ.u.mspection;

(8) Caution.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 1]

Whether Memory Is a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience, whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2, 7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among the parts of prudence.

_I answer that,_ Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now in such like matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be concluded from like" (Ethic. vi [*a.n.a.l. Post. i. 32]). But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time." Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), prudence applies universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for prudence, and memory is one of them.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as apt.i.tude for prudence is in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16, 24], memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.

There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted ill.u.s.tration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these ill.u.s.trations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is a.s.signed to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pa.s.s easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason being that we pa.s.s quickly from the one to the other."

Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that "reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through pa.s.sing from one thing to another by a kind of natural order.

Reply Obj. 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to take good counsel for the future.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 2]