Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 49

59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your G.o.d." Now sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able to love G.o.d immediately than to know Him immediately.

_On the contrary,_ Knowledge of G.o.d, through being mediate, is said to be "enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor.

13:12. But charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same pa.s.sage (1 Cor. 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to G.o.d immediately.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 3; Q. 84, A. 7), the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the knower, whereas the act of an appet.i.tive power consists in the appet.i.te being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows that the movement of the appet.i.tive power is towards things in respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows the mode of the knower.

Now in itself the very order of things is such, that G.o.d is knowable and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.

Accordingly, we must a.s.sert that to love which is an act of the appet.i.tive power, even in this state of life, tends to G.o.d first, and flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves G.o.d immediately, and other things through G.o.d. On the other hand, with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know G.o.d through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.

I, Q. 12, A. 12).

Reply Obj. 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known through another thing.

Reply Obj. 2: Since to love G.o.d is something greater than to know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of G.o.d presupposes knowledge of G.o.d. And because this knowledge does not rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to G.o.d, and love begins with G.o.d as the last end, and pa.s.ses on to creatures.

Reply Obj. 3: Aversion from G.o.d, which is brought about by sin, is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by loving G.o.d, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of spiritual union.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 5]

Whether G.o.d can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q. 184, A. 2]

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot be loved wholly. For love follows knowledge. Now G.o.d cannot be wholly known by us, since this would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved by us.

Obj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div.

Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to G.o.d, because "G.o.d is greater than our heart" (1 John 3:20). Therefore G.o.d cannot be loved wholly.

Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as G.o.d loves Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore G.o.d cannot be wholly loved by a creature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy G.o.d with thy whole heart."

_I answer that,_ Since love may be considered as something between lover and beloved, when we ask whether G.o.d can be wholly loved, the question may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification "wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus G.o.d is to be loved wholly, since man should love all that pertains to G.o.d.

Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the lover: and thus again G.o.d ought to be loved wholly, since man ought to love G.o.d with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of G.o.d, according to Deut. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy G.o.d with thy whole heart."

Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the thing loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion to its goodness, G.o.d is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is infinite. Now no creature can love G.o.d infinitely, because all power of creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the last takes it in the second sense.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 6]

Whether in Loving G.o.d We Ought to Observe Any Mode?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving G.o.d. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of G.o.d is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all ... things, have charity." Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee, tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable service," so also the interior love of G.o.d requires a mode.

_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "G.o.d is the cause of our loving G.o.d; the measure is to love Him without measure."

_I answer that,_ As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (Obj. 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure.

Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess.

Now in all matters of appet.i.te and action the measure is the end, because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9).

Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), "in every art, the desire for the end is endless and unlimited," whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not give as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be immoderate.

Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of G.o.d, whereby princ.i.p.ally we attain to our last end, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 6), wherefore the mode in the love of G.o.d, must not be taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love G.o.d the better our love is.

Reply Obj. 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence of that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine adds in the same pa.s.sage, "the measure of our love for G.o.d is to love Him with our whole heart," that is to love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode which is proper to the measure.

Reply Obj. 3: An affection, whose object is subject to reason's judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine love which is G.o.d surpa.s.ses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man's ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to G.o.d, according to Ps.

72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to my G.o.d"; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both according to charity and according to reason.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 7]

Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love an Enemy Than to Love a Friend?

Objection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend. For it is written (Matt. 5:46): "If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have?" Therefore it is not deserving of reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same pa.s.sage proves, to love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.

Obj. 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of G.o.d to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.

Obj. 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.

_On the contrary,_ The better an action is, the more meritorious it is. Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love a better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy who hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend than to love one's enemy.

_I answer that,_ G.o.d is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of charity, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). When therefore it is asked which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or one's enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason for which we love him.

In the first way, love of one's friend surpa.s.ses love of one's enemy, because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so that he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of love that pa.s.ses over this matter, is better, and therefore its opposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.

In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than one's friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible to love one's friend for another reason than G.o.d, whereas G.o.d is the only reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose that both are loved for G.o.d, our love for G.o.d is proved to be all the stronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it throws its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for G.o.d is proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so much the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable matter.

Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor those who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more ardent and better than the love of one's enemy.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in G.o.d's sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way that we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is meritorious, if we love them for G.o.d's sake, and not merely because they are our friends.

The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said in the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the reason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part of those who are loved.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 8]

Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love One's Neighbor Than to Love G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love G.o.d. For the more meritorious thing would seem to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of our neighbor to the love of G.o.d, according to Rom. 9:3: "I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren." Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love G.o.d.