Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 27

Reply Obj. 2: Hope and every movement of the appet.i.te proceed from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from G.o.d, as from a friend.

Reply Obj. 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.

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QUESTION 18

OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?

(2) Whether it is in the blessed?

(3) Whether it is in the d.a.m.ned?

(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 1]

Whether Hope Is in the Will As Its Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1). Now the arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.

Obj. 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another.

Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.

Obj. 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.

_On the contrary,_ The soul is not apprehensive of G.o.d save as regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Now hope is a theological virtue having G.o.d for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is in the will as its subject.

_I answer that,_ As shown above (I, Q. 87, A. 2), habits are known by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appet.i.tive faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold appet.i.te in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appet.i.te, called the will, as stated in the First Part (Q. 82, A. 5), those movements which occur in the lower appet.i.te, are with pa.s.sion, while those in the higher appet.i.te are without pa.s.sion, as shown above (I, Q. 87, A.

2, ad 1; I-II, Q. 22, A. 3, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive appet.i.te, since the good which is the princ.i.p.al object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good.

Therefore hope resides in the higher appet.i.te called the will, and not in the lower appet.i.te, of which the irascible is a part.

Reply Obj. 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible, or rather superintelligible.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of hoping.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity are mutually related, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8). Hence there is no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the First Part (Q. 85, A. 4).

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 2]

Whether in the Blessed There Is Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.

Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.

Obj. 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to continue in its possession.

Obj. 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above (Q. 17, A.

3). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be hope in them.

Obj. 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10; Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of G.o.d.

Therefore hope has no place in them.

_I answer that,_ If what gives a thing its species be removed, the species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same specifically. Now hope takes its species from its princ.i.p.al object, even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q. 17, AA. 5, 6; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2): and its princ.i.p.al object is eternal happiness as being possible to obtain by the a.s.sistance of G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 2).

Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.

Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore blessed as to the enjoyment of G.o.d, nevertheless He was, at the same time, a wayfarer, as regards the pa.s.sibility of nature, to which He was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of impa.s.sibility and immortality, yet not so as to have the virtue of hope, the princ.i.p.al object of which is not the glory of the body but the enjoyment of G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal life, because through enjoying G.o.d they become partakers, as it were, of G.o.d's eternity which surpa.s.ses all time: so that the continuation of happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future.

Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as regards this there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.

Reply Obj. 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others.

But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor, without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.

Reply Obj. 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having G.o.d for its object, its princ.i.p.al object is the glory of the soul, which consists in the enjoyment of G.o.d, and not the glory of the body. Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of the body.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 3]

Whether Hope Is in the d.a.m.ned?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the d.a.m.ned. For the devil is d.a.m.ned and prince of the d.a.m.ned, according to Matt. 25:41: "Depart ... you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." But the devil has hope, according to Job 40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him." Therefore it seems that the d.a.m.ned have hope.

Obj. 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope.

But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the d.a.m.ned, according to James 2:19: "The devils ... believe and tremble." Therefore it seems that lifeless hope also can be in the d.a.m.ned.

Obj. 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be." Now many who are d.a.m.ned, in this life hoped and never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.

_On the contrary,_ Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12, "Rejoicing in hope." Now the d.a.m.ned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according to Isa. 65:14, "My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit." Therefore no hope is in the d.a.m.ned.

_I answer that,_ Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will: wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could not be perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not rest.

In like manner, since the everlastingness of d.a.m.nation is a necessary condition of the punishment of the d.a.m.ned, it would not be truly penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their d.a.m.nation.

Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the d.a.m.ned, that they should know that they cannot by any means escape from d.a.m.nation and obtain happiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not that he may return from darkness to light." It is, therefore, evident that they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope either in the blessed or in the d.a.m.ned. On the other hand, hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.

Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xiii, 20) this is said of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before (Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth": this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and concerning oneself." Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in the d.a.m.ned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them future possible things, but far removed from them.

Reply Obj. 3: Lack of hope in the d.a.m.ned does not change their demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their respective states.

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