Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 97

Objection 1: It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by G.o.d. Because G.o.d does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), "it is G.o.d's rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above (A.

2). Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us by infusion.

Obj. 2: Further, much less superfluity is found in G.o.d's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does G.o.d. But G.o.d sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to a gloss on Heb. 1 [*Cf. Jerome on Gal. 1: 15, 16].

Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fort.i.tude."

_I answer that,_ Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated (A. 1; Q. 51, A. 1): instead of which natural principles, G.o.d bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated (Q. 62, A.

1). Wherefore we need to receive from G.o.d other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from G.o.d immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to G.o.d Himself immediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 3: The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 4]

Whether Virtue by Habituation Belongs to the Same Species As Infused Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said (A. 3), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.

Obj. 3: Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by G.o.d immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature.

But the man whom G.o.d made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species.

_On the contrary,_ Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, "which G.o.d works in us without us," as stated above (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.

_I answer that,_ There is a twofold specific difference among habits.

The first, as stated above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into subjection" (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues.

The other specific difference among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of G.o.d"

(Eph. 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.

Reply Obj. 1: Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2: Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective acts are not identical.

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it was of the same species. It would be the same if G.o.d wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts.

But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.

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QUESTION 64

OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?

(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?

(3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?

(4) Whether the theological virtues do?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 1]

Whether Moral Virtues Observe the Mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in _De Coelo_ i that "virtue is the limit of power."

Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean.

Obj. 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2, 3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.

Obj. 3: Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus virginity, which abstains from all s.e.xual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chast.i.ty: and to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean."

_I answer that,_ As already explained (Q. 55, A. 3), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appet.i.tive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appet.i.tive movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the mean.

Reply Obj. 1: Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in pa.s.sions or operations. If therefore we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which it has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz.

deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes the pa.s.sion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the 'best' and the 'excellent, '" viz. as to its conformity with reason.

Reply Obj. 2: In actions and pa.s.sions the mean and the extremes depend on various circ.u.mstances: hence nothing hinders something from being extreme in a particular virtue as to one circ.u.mstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circ.u.mstances, through being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quant.i.ty of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and a maximum: but if we consider the quant.i.ty in relation to other circ.u.mstances, then it has the character of a mean: since these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. _where_ it is right, _when_ it is right, and for an _end_ that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum _when_ it is not right, or _where_ it is not right, or for an undue _end;_ and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto _where_ one ought, and _when_ one ought. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme in quant.i.ty, but the mean in the right mode of his action."

Reply Obj. 3: The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all s.e.xual matters, and poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e.

according to G.o.d's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superst.i.tion, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 2]

Whether the Mean of Moral Virtue Is the Real Mean, or the Rational Mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in _Metaph._ ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real mean.

Obj. 2: Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean between operations or pa.s.sions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.

Obj. 3: Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason."

_I answer that,_ The rational mean can be understood in two ways.