Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 94

Reply Obj. 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 3, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or G.o.dlike virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appet.i.te.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 5]

Whether There Are Four Cardinal Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues.

For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 58, A. 4). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a princ.i.p.al virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the princ.i.p.al virtues are, in a way, moral virtues.

Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and by a right appet.i.te, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be princ.i.p.al, it needs not to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more princ.i.p.al virtues.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues."

_I answer that,_ Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.

For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one princ.i.p.al virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into pa.s.sions, and then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the pa.s.sions is due to their thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the pa.s.sions inciting to something against reason, and then the pa.s.sions need a curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the pa.s.sions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fort.i.tude."

In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational by partic.i.p.ation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of "Fort.i.tude."

Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is the princ.i.p.al of all the virtues simply.

The others are princ.i.p.al, each in its own genus.

Reply Obj. 2: That part of the soul which is rational by partic.i.p.ation is threefold, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 3]

Whether Any Other Virtues Should Be Called Princ.i.p.al Rather Than These?

Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called princ.i.p.al rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the princ.i.p.al in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a princ.i.p.al virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a princ.i.p.al virtue. But such is humility: for Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind."

Therefore humility seems above all to be a princ.i.p.al virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be princ.i.p.al.

But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a princ.i.p.al virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and pa.s.sions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 6). Again, good as defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the pa.s.sions is found chiefly in those pa.s.sions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of pa.s.sion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.

Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.

First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they are called princ.i.p.al, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the pa.s.sions, be called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any pa.s.sions whatever, be called fort.i.tude. Many, both holy doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the objections fail.

Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called princ.i.p.al in comparison with the other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fort.i.tude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other virtues may be princ.i.p.al in some other way, but these are called princ.i.p.al by reason of their matter, as stated above.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 4]

Whether the Four Cardinal Virtues Differ from One Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1): "There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound fort.i.tude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fort.i.tude and temperance." But this would not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the different species of one genus do not qualify one another.

Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.

Obj. 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance is attributed to fort.i.tude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. x.x.xvi): "Rightly do we call it fort.i.tude, when a man conquers himself, and is not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that these virtues are not distinct from one another.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rect.i.tude of reason in things to be done; the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his pa.s.sions on the curb, acts, not from pa.s.sion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rect.i.tude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs to fort.i.tude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from one another.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rect.i.tude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rect.i.tude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any pa.s.sions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fort.i.tude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any a.s.saults of the pa.s.sions, or the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fort.i.tude are distinct virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a _habit,_ should be accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fort.i.tude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a _virtue,_ it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a _moral virtue_ partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to pa.s.sions or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and moral virtue.

Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken as stated above (A.

3). In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fort.i.tude is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fort.i.tude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fort.i.tude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by l.u.s.t, after showing himself to be unconquered by toil."

From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fort.i.tude keeps the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 5]

Whether the Cardinal Virtues Are Fittingly Divided into Social Virtues, Perfecting, Perfect, and Exemplar Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of G.o.d." Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fort.i.tude, temperance, and prudence to G.o.d." Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar.

Obj. 2: Further, the _perfect_ virtues are those which are without any pa.s.sion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fort.i.tude knows nothing about the pa.s.sions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above (Q. 59, A. 5) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without pa.s.sions.

Therefore there is no such thing as _perfect_ virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of G.o.d." But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz. power and office." Therefore there are no "perfecting" virtues.

Obj. 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social."

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf.

Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself ... He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common weal."]

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is G.o.d: if we follow Him we shall live aright."

Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in G.o.d, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in G.o.d, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in G.o.d the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of G.o.d's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appet.i.te to reason. G.o.d's fort.i.tude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf.

Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).