Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 73

Obj. 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch, viz. for pleasures of the table and for s.e.xual pleasures. But these things are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is more natural than desire."

_I answer that,_ By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a particular pa.s.sion is more or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the cause of that pa.s.sion. Now the cause of a pa.s.sion, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 2), may be considered in two ways: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of s.e.xual pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance.

If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of the species and of the individual. If, however, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the individual, in respect of his particular temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is p.r.o.ne to ensue from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other pa.s.sion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies result from a man's individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a disposition to desire.

Reply Obj. 1: We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in anger or in any other pa.s.sion, on account of the moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of pa.s.sion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man "does not listen perfectly to the command of reason," as stated above (A. 4, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the object.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 6]

Whether Anger Is More Grievous Than Hatred?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred.

For it is written (Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous than hatred.

Obj. 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred.

Obj. 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence of several pa.s.sions, as stated above (A. 1): whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam," but anger to "a mote."

_I answer that,_ The species and nature of a pa.s.sion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry.

But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above (A. 2) that hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance.

Consequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger.

Reply Obj. 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy ... if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance.

Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never appeased."

As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through the heating of the bile. Hence the pa.s.sage quoted continues: "Who can bear the violence of one provoked?"

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, that an evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).

Reply Obj. 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as pa.s.sion is more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a pa.s.sion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 7]

Whether Anger Is Only Towards Those to Whom One Has an Obligation of Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself ... nor is there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written (Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not."

Therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire cla.s.s, or a whole community: for instance, when the state injures an individual. But anger is not towards a cla.s.s but only towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4).

Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice.

The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet.

ii, 2, 3).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), anger desires evil as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those to whom one is just or unjust.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 4, ad 2), anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by their imagination to something like rational action. Since then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that which occurs in animals against anything that injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since they can do us no harm.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself.

But properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, a man is never angry with himself.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) a.s.signs as one difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a cla.s.s, as we hate the entire cla.s.s of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards an individual." The reason is that hatred arises from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his action. Now all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual. When the whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf. Q. 29, A. 6].

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 8]

Whether the Species of Anger Are Suitably a.s.signed?

Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably a.s.signs three species of anger--"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor." For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because "the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath (_cholos_), if anger continue it is called ill-will (_menis_); while rancor (_kotos_) is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance."

Therefore these are not different species of anger.

Obj. 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "_excandescentia_ (irascibility) is what the Greeks call _thymosis_, and is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while according to Damascene _thymosis_, is the same as _kotos_ (rancor). Therefore _kotos_ does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by Our Lord (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother" (thus implying "anger without utterance"), and then, "whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'" (implying anger with utterance yet without full expression), and lastly, "whosoever shall say 'Thou fool'" (where we have "perfection of speech"). Therefore Damascene's division is imperfect, since it takes no account of utterance.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth.

ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.].

_I answer that,_ The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger.

This happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger _cholos_ (bile) because it quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to _menis_ (ill-will) which is derived from _menein_ (to dwell).

Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz.

vengeance; and this pertains to _kotos_ (rancor) which never rests until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: "Let all bitterness and anger and indignation ... be put away from you."]. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons _akrocholoi_ (choleric), because they are easily angered; some he calls _pikroi_ (bitter), because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls _chalepoi_ (ill-tempered), because they never rest until they have retaliated [*Cf. II-II, Q. 158, A. 5].

Reply Obj. 1: All those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness of temper, rather than to rancor (_furor_). And there is no reason why the Greek _thymosis_, which is denoted by the Latin _furor,_ should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged.

Reply Obj. 3: These degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the very movement of anger.

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QUESTION 47

OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (In Four Articles) [*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text, except in A. 4].

We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies.

Under this head there are four points of inquiry: