Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 42

Obj. 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3, 4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible pa.s.sions.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9) that all the pa.s.sions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible pa.s.sions.

_I answer that,_ Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the pa.s.sions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, each precedes its contrary pa.s.sion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil.

Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible pa.s.sions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an apt.i.tude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very apt.i.tude or proportion of the appet.i.te to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.

Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 3, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible pa.s.sions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.

Reply Obj. 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an apt.i.tude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an apt.i.tude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.

Reply Obj. 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 3]

Whether Hope Is the First of the Irascible Pa.s.sions?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible pa.s.sions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger. Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic" (cf. A. 2, Obj. 1), it seems that anger precedes and surpa.s.ses hope.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to be a stronger pa.s.sion than daring, and daring, than hope. And consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.

Obj. 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring.

_On the contrary,_ The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the pa.s.sions. Therefore hope is the first of the pa.s.sions in the irascible faculty.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) all irascible pa.s.sions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere apt.i.tude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred; [the other is the presence of good or evil itself,] and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no pa.s.sion in the irascible, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 3, 4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the pa.s.sion of anger.

Since then in the order of generation or execution, proportion or apt.i.tude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible pa.s.sions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his _Physics._ Accordingly, it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible pa.s.sions.

And if we wish to know the order of all the pa.s.sions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the pa.s.sions, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.

Reply Obj. 1: Because anger arises from the other pa.s.sions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other pa.s.sions, that the power takes its name.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the appet.i.te is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from evil results from this. For the movement of the appet.i.tive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining the end.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 4]

Whether These Are the Four Princ.i.p.al Pa.s.sions: Joy, Sadness, Hope and Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3, 7 sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place.

Obj. 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the pa.s.sions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. The princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final pa.s.sions, will be the princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion.

Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions.

Obj. 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned as princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions, says:

"Banish joys: banish fears: Away with hope: away with tears."

_I answer that,_ These four are commonly called the princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be princ.i.p.al because in them all the other pa.s.sions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other pa.s.sions, as is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5. Fear and hope are princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appet.i.te towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four pa.s.sions in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.

As to the other pa.s.sions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that these four are the princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions, because they are general pa.s.sions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the appet.i.te's common tendency to desire or shun something.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.

Reply Obj. 2: These are called princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last pa.s.sions simply, yet they are the last of those pa.s.sions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion, as we shall state further on (Reply Obj. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be princ.i.p.al. And so neither can anger be called a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion, because it arises from daring.

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QUESTION 26

OF THE Pa.s.sIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (In Four Articles)

We have now to consider the soul's pa.s.sions in particular, and (1) the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty.

The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and sadness.

Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?

(2) Whether love is a pa.s.sion?

(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?

(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 1]

Whether Love Is in the Concupiscible Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being a part of the sensitive appet.i.te, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible power.

Obj. 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every pa.s.sion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is sadness." But not every pa.s.sion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this pa.s.sage, is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible power.

Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love."

But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power."

_I answer that,_ Love is something pertaining to the appet.i.te; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference of appet.i.tes. For there is an appet.i.te which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appet.i.te, but in some other: and this is called the _natural appet.i.te._ Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of their nature, as stated in the First Part (Q. 6, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 103, A. 1, ad 1, 3). And there is another appet.i.te arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appet.i.te, but from necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the _sensitive appet.i.te,_ which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appet.i.te following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appet.i.te. And this is the rational or intellectual appet.i.te, which is called the _will._