Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 40

In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty.

Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement, except the appet.i.te's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a pa.s.sion of the concupiscible faculty.

Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.

From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]

Whether in the Same Power, There Are Any Pa.s.sions, Specifically Different, but Not Contrary to One Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different pa.s.sions that are not contrary to one another.

For the pa.s.sions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's pa.s.sions are good and evil; and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the pa.s.sions. Therefore no pa.s.sions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ specifically.

Obj. 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of form.

But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as stated in _Metaph._ x, 8. Therefore pa.s.sions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.

Obj. 3: Further, since every pa.s.sion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every difference in the pa.s.sions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the pa.s.sions of the soul, as stated above (A. 2): whereas the third difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul's pa.s.sions would be infinite. Therefore it is not possible for pa.s.sions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.

_On the contrary,_ Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are pa.s.sions that differ in species without being contrary to one another.

_I answer that,_ Pa.s.sions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the pa.s.sions of the soul, are their objects. Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the pa.s.sions of the soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the patient an inclination or apt.i.tude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that it has an inclination or apt.i.tude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion.

Now, in the movements of the appet.i.tive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appet.i.tive power, a certain inclination, apt.i.tude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the pa.s.sion of _love:_ the corresponding contrary of which is _hatred_ in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appet.i.te a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the pa.s.sion of _desire_ or _concupiscence:_ and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the pa.s.sion of _aversion_ or _dislike._ Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appet.i.te to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the pa.s.sion of _delight_ or _joy;_ the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is _sorrow_ or _sadness._

On the other hand, in the irascible pa.s.sions, the apt.i.tude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.

And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have _hope_ and _despair._ In respect of evil not yet present we have _fear_ and _daring._ But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible pa.s.sion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above (A. 3). But evil already present gives rise to the pa.s.sion of _anger._

Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of pa.s.sions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has no contrary pa.s.sion.

Consequently there are altogether eleven pa.s.sions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the pa.s.sions of the soul are contained.

From this the replies to the objections are evident.

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QUESTION 24

OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE Pa.s.sIONS OF THE SOUL (In Four Articles)

We must now consider good and evil in the pa.s.sions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the pa.s.sions of the soul?

(2) Whether every pa.s.sion of the soul is morally evil?

(3) Whether every pa.s.sion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?

(4) Whether any pa.s.sion is good or evil specifically?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 1]

Whether Moral Good and Evil Can Be Found in the Pa.s.sions of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that no pa.s.sion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc.

Prolog.). But pa.s.sions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other animals. Therefore no pa.s.sion of the soul is morally good or evil.

Obj. 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.

iv). Now the pa.s.sions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appet.i.te, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are neither praised nor blamed for our pa.s.sions." But we are praised and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the pa.s.sions are not morally good or evil.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the pa.s.sions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good."

_I answer that,_ We may consider the pa.s.sions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the pa.s.sions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appet.i.te, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appet.i.te is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the pa.s.sions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.

Reply Obj. 1: These pa.s.sions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are proper to man.

Reply Obj. 2: Even the lower appet.i.tive powers are called rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i, 13).

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our pa.s.sions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears or is angry, is not praised ... or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason."

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 2]

Whether Every Pa.s.sion of the Soul Is Evil Morally?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the pa.s.sions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call the soul's pa.s.sions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Cf. Q.

22, A. 2, footnote]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every pa.s.sion of the soul is evil morally.

Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature is pa.s.sion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature." Therefore these pa.s.sions are morally evil.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these pa.s.sions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the pa.s.sions of sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed ...

For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works."

_I answer that,_ On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all pa.s.sions are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate pa.s.sions are good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual and sensitive appet.i.te. Hence they did not discriminate the pa.s.sions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the pa.s.sions of the soul are in the sensitive appet.i.te, while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual appet.i.te: but every rational movement of the appet.i.tive part they call will, while they called pa.s.sion, a movement that exceeds the limits of reason.

Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all pa.s.sions "diseases of the soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we speak of those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound."

On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "pa.s.sions" to all the movements of the sensitive appet.i.te. Wherefore they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the pa.s.sions, when he says that "every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or pa.s.sions of the soul, is not sound." For pa.s.sions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.

Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 2: In every pa.s.sion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of pa.s.sion. But there is no need for pa.s.sion to deviate always from the order of natural reason.

Reply Obj. 3: The pa.s.sions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.

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