Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 14

Objection 1: It would seem that a circ.u.mstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circ.u.mstance is that from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument." But oratorical arguments are derived princ.i.p.ally from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which also Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a circ.u.mstance is not an accident of a human act.

Obj. 2: Further, "to be in" is proper to an accident. But that which surrounds (_circ.u.mstat_) is rather out than in. Therefore the circ.u.mstances are not accidents of human acts.

Obj. 3: Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the circ.u.mstances are not accidents of acts.

_On the contrary,_ The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic.

iii, 1) calls the circ.u.mstances particular things [*_ta kath'

ekasta_], i.e. the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the circ.u.mstances are individual accidents of human acts.

_I answer that,_ Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words are the signs of what we understand," it must needs be that in naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the less known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are transferred so as to signify things less obvious: and hence it is that, as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4, "the notion of distance has been transferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of opposition": and in like manner words that signify local movement are employed to designate all other movements, because bodies which are circ.u.mscribed by place, are best known to us. And hence it is that the word "circ.u.mstance" has pa.s.sed from located things to human acts.

Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circ.u.mstances. Now what is outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. Wherefore the circ.u.mstances of human acts should be called their accidents.

Reply Obj. 1: The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the circ.u.mstances of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently, or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and so forth. And so in the pa.s.sage quoted, it is said pointedly that the orator "adds strength to his argument," as though this were something secondary.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing is said to be an accident of something in two ways. First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said to be an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that thing in the same subject: thus, whiteness is an accident of the art of music, inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch one another, as it were. And in this sense circ.u.mstances are said to be the accidents of human acts.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (ad 2), an accident is said to be the accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in the same subject. But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two accidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation to one another; as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates.

Secondly, when such accidents are related to one another; as when the subject receives one accident by means of the other; for instance, a body receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one accident said to be in another; for we speak of color as being in the surface.

Accordingly, circ.u.mstances are related to acts in both these ways. For some circ.u.mstances that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner in which the act is done.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 2]

Whether Theologians Should Take Note of the Circ.u.mstances of Human Acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of the circ.u.mstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil.

But it seems that circ.u.mstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it; but by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should not take note of the circ.u.mstances of acts.

Obj. 2: Further, circ.u.mstances are the accidents of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers accidental being, except only the art of sophistry." Therefore the theologian has not to consider circ.u.mstances.

Obj. 3: Further, the consideration of circ.u.mstances belongs to the orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not a theologian's business to consider circ.u.mstances.

_On the contrary,_ Ignorance of circ.u.mstances causes an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. x.x.xi.]. But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian. Therefore circ.u.mstances also should be considered by the theologian.

_I answer that,_ Circ.u.mstances come under the consideration of the theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian considers human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to Happiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due circ.u.mstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the circ.u.mstances. Secondly, because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and this diversity depends on circ.u.mstances, as we shall see further on (Q. 18, AA. 10, 11; Q. 73, A. 7). Thirdly, because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary, according to knowledge or ignorance of circ.u.mstances, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8). Therefore the theologian has to consider circ.u.mstances.

Reply Obj. 1: Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.

i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.

Reply Obj. 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such like accidents are not what we call circ.u.mstances; because circ.u.mstances although, as stated above (A. 1), they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art.

Reply Obj. 3: The consideration of circ.u.mstances belongs to the moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as with respect to circ.u.mstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and pa.s.sions. To the politician and to the orator, in so far as circ.u.mstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways, however: because where the orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts according as they are deserving of reward or punishment.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 3]

Whether the Circ.u.mstances Are Properly Set Forth in the Third Book of Ethics?

Objection 1: It would seem that the circ.u.mstances are not properly set forth in _Ethic._ iii, 1. For a circ.u.mstance of an act is described as something outside the act. Now time and place answer to this description. Therefore there are only two circ.u.mstances, to wit, "when" and "where."

Obj. 2: Further, we judge from the circ.u.mstances whether a thing is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore all the circ.u.mstances are included under one, which is the "mode of acting."

Obj. 3: Further, circ.u.mstances are not part of the substance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.

Therefore no circ.u.mstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself. Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about what," are circ.u.mstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to the final cause, and "about what" to the material cause.

On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in _Ethic._ iii, 1.

_I answer that,_ Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives seven circ.u.mstances, which are contained in this verse:

"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando--

"Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when."

For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or "instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he did it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in _Ethic._ iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, "about what," which Tully includes in the circ.u.mstance "what."

The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a circ.u.mstance is described as something outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as "time" and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting."

It touches the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circ.u.mstance "why"; as to the material cause, or object, in the circ.u.mstance "about what"; as to the princ.i.p.al efficient cause, in the circ.u.mstance "who"; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circ.u.mstance "by what aids."

Reply Obj. 1: Time and place surround (_circ.u.mstant_) the act by way of measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.

Reply Obj. 2: This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circ.u.mstance, but results from all the circ.u.mstances. But the mode which refers to a quality of the act is a special circ.u.mstance; for instance, that a man walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 3: A condition of the cause, on which the substance of the act depends, is not a circ.u.mstance; it must be an additional condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circ.u.mstance of theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to the substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same applies to the other circ.u.mstances which are considered in reference to the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a circ.u.mstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act _valiantly for the sake of_ the good of the virtue o[f] fort.i.tude, is not a circ.u.mstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to be said with regard to the circ.u.mstance "what"; for that a man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a circ.u.mstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him; heal him or harm him, these are circ.u.mstances.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 4]

Whether the Most Important Circ.u.mstances Are "Why" and "In What the Act Consists"?

Objection 1: It would seem that these are not the most important circ.u.mstances, namely, "why" and those "in which the act is, [*_hen ois e praxis_]" as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1. For those in which the act is seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most important of the circ.u.mstances, since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things in which the act is are not the most important circ.u.mstances.

Obj. 2: Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it is not the most important circ.u.mstance.

Obj. 3: Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done. Therefore these two circ.u.mstances seem to be of the greatest importance.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. x.x.xi.]

says that "the most important circ.u.mstances" are "why it is done" and "what is done."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), acts are properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. Therefore that circ.u.mstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circ.u.mstance "why": and the second in importance, is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circ.u.mstance "what he did." As to the other circ.u.mstances, they are more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these.

Reply Obj. 1: By those things "in which the act is" the Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circ.u.mstances that are affixed to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. x.x.xi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the Philosopher, instead of the latter's term--"in which the act is"--said, "what is done."

Reply Obj. 2: Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.

Reply Obj. 3: The person that does the act is the cause of that act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in this respect that he is directed to the act; while other conditions of the person have not such an important relation to the act. As to the mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial form depends on the object and term or end; but it is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.

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