Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 19

Now in both of these, human knowledge is a.s.sisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Matt. 3:17).

Reply Obj. 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of G.o.d "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that G.o.d is Three and One.

Reply Obj. 2: From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.

Reply Obj. 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles.

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QUESTION 13

THE NAMES OF G.o.d (In Twelve Articles)

After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names.

For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.

Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:

(1) Whether G.o.d can be named by us?

(2) Whether any names applied to G.o.d are predicated of Him substantially?

(3) Whether any names applied to G.o.d are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?

(4) Whether any names applied to G.o.d are synonymous?

(5) Whether some names are applied to G.o.d and to creatures univocally or equivocally?

(6) Whether, supposing they are applied a.n.a.logically, they are applied first to G.o.d or to creatures?

(7) Whether any names are applicable to G.o.d from time?

(8) Whether this name "G.o.d" is a name of nature, or of the operation?

(9) Whether this name "G.o.d" is a communicable name?

(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying G.o.d, by nature, by partic.i.p.ation, and by opinion?

(11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of G.o.d?

(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about G.o.d?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 1]

Whether a Name Can Be Given to G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to G.o.d. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (Prov. 30:4).

Obj. 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to G.o.d, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; p.r.o.nouns the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to G.o.d, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative p.r.o.nouns. Therefore G.o.d cannot in any way be named by us.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name."

_I answer that,_ Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above (Q. 12, AA. 11, 12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of G.o.d; but we know G.o.d from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition.

Reply Obj. 1: The reason why G.o.d has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about G.o.d, and signify in word.

Reply Obj. 2: Because we know and name G.o.d from creatures, the names we attribute to G.o.d signify what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as G.o.d is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He is.

Reply Obj. 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify the _suppositum_ with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.

Hence, as some things are said of G.o.d in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to G.o.d signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative p.r.o.nouns are applied to G.o.d as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative p.r.o.nouns are applicable to G.o.d, so far can He be signified by relative p.r.o.nouns.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 2]

Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to G.o.d Substantially?

Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to G.o.d substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of G.o.d signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation."

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of G.o.d."

Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising G.o.d are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.

Therefore the names applied to G.o.d are not said of Him substantially.

Obj. 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But G.o.d is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of G.o.d is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.

_I answer that,_ Negative names applied to G.o.d, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.

But as regards absolute and affirmative names of G.o.d, as "good,"

"wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to G.o.d affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from G.o.d, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they a.s.sert that when we say that G.o.d lives, we mean that G.o.d is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.

Others say that these names applied to G.o.d signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "G.o.d is good," we mean, G.o.d is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons.

First because in neither of them can a reason be a.s.signed why some names more than others are applied to G.o.d. For He is a.s.suredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words "G.o.d is good," signified no more than, "G.o.d is the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that G.o.d is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to G.o.d would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of G.o.d. For in saying that G.o.d lives, they a.s.suredly mean more than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine--viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of G.o.d, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express G.o.d, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows G.o.d from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above (Q. 4, A. 2) that G.o.d prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (Q. 4, A. 3), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "G.o.d is good," the meaning is not, "G.o.d is the cause of goodness," or "G.o.d is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in G.o.d," and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that G.o.d is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we are."

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify what G.o.d is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

Reply Obj. 2: In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word _lapis,_ which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of G.o.d, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names G.o.d according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "G.o.d lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

Reply Obj. 3: We cannot know the essence of G.o.d in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 3]