Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 149

But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the _Politics,_ that wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpa.s.sed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. 4:10, "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another." Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): "Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel": and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "The natural order of things requires this; and thus did G.o.d make man."

From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership.

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QUESTION 97

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (In Four Articles)

We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as regards the preservation of the species.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?

(2) Whether he was impa.s.sible?

(3) Whether he stood in need of food?

(4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Immortal?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined.

Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.

Obj. 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there can be no pa.s.sing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state.

Obj. 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to Wis. 10:2: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

Obj. 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to Apoc. 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward.

Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:12): "By sin death came into the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin.

_I answer that,_ A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter--that is to say, either because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "G.o.d made man's soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beat.i.tude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption."

Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author], among the supposit.i.tious works of St.

Augustine): "G.o.d made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by G.o.d to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to G.o.d. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpa.s.ses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained (Q. 76, A. 1), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpa.s.sing the capacity of corporeal matter.

Reply Obj. 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.

Reply Obj. 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (III, Q. 14, A. 4, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 4: The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 2]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Pa.s.sible?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was pa.s.sible. For "sensation is a kind of pa.s.sion." But in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been pa.s.sible.

Obj. 2: Further, sleep is a kind of pa.s.sion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to Gen. 2:21, "G.o.d cast a deep sleep upon Adam." Therefore he would have been pa.s.sible.

Obj. 3: Further, the same pa.s.sage goes on to say that "He took a rib out of Adam." Therefore he was pa.s.sible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body.

Obj. 4: Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally pa.s.sible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was pa.s.sible.

_On the contrary,_ Had man been pa.s.sible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive suffering wastes the very substance."

_I answer that,_ "Pa.s.sion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. For pa.s.sion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or pa.s.sive, according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, "pa.s.sion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation are said to be pa.s.sions. In this second sense, man was pa.s.sible in the state of innocence, and was pa.s.sive both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impa.s.sible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his pa.s.sion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.

Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare.

Reply Obj. 3: As already explained (Q. 92, A. 3, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the s.e.m.e.n in man, who is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib.

Reply Obj. 4: Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 3]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Had Need of Food?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible.

Therefore he had no need of food.

Obj. 2: Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves pa.s.sibility. Since, then, man's body was impa.s.sible; it does not appear how food could be needful to him.

Obj. 3: Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore he did not require food.

Obj. 4: Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:16): "Of every tree in paradise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat."

_I answer that,_ In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls--that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written (Gen. 2:7): "Man was made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body.

But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power.

Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called "animal" [*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 seqq.], through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone, impa.s.sibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Works of an anonymous author], among the supposit.i.tious works of St.

Augustine): "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." For we have explained (A. 1) that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food.

Reply Obj. 2: A certain pa.s.sion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was pa.s.sible, but that the food taken was pa.s.sible; although this kind of pa.s.sion conduced to the perfection of the nature.

Reply Obj. 3: If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise.

Reply Obj. 4: Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by G.o.d as to be decorous and suitable to the state.