Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 14

Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

Obj. 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

Obj. 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel.

Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

_On the contrary,_ Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity one only.

_I answer that,_ A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things.

Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Physic. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others a.s.sert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other hand others a.s.sign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it.

Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their mult.i.tude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.

This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from G.o.d in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from G.o.d in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (Q. 47, A. 2); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.

Reply Obj. 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a s.p.a.ce of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.

Reply Obj. 3: All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.

Reply Obj. 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest.

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QUESTION 11

THE UNITY OF G.o.d (In Four Articles)

After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?

(2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?

(3) Whether G.o.d is one?

(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 1]

Whether "One" Adds Anything to "Being"?

Objection 1: It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates all _genera._ But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quant.i.ty. Therefore "one" adds something to "being."

Obj. 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many."

Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."

Obj. 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one"

and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is not an addition to "being."

_I answer that,_ "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it.

Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.

Reply Obj. 1: Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being"

is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being,"

but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quant.i.ty), thought that the "one"

convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its substance, since this again would be "one,"

supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quant.i.ty.

Reply Obj. 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many"

accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and "one"

accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally.

For mult.i.tude itself would not be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div.

Nom., cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of mult.i.tude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle."

Reply Obj. 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 2]

Whether "One" and "Many" Are Opposed to Each Other?

Objection 1: It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed.

For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every _mult.i.tude_ is in a certain way _one,_ as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "mult.i.tude."

Obj. 2: Further, no opposite thing is const.i.tuted by its opposite. But _mult.i.tude_ is const.i.tuted by _one._ Therefore it is not opposed to "mult.i.tude."

Obj. 3: Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few"

is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."

Obj. 4: Further, if "one" is opposed to "mult.i.tude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes after "mult.i.tude," and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, "mult.i.tude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.

_On the contrary,_ Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility; and the idea of "mult.i.tude" contains division.

Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.

_I answer that,_ "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The _one_ which is the principle of number is opposed to _mult.i.tude_ which is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is _mult.i.tude_ measured by _one,_ as is clear from _Metaph._ x. But the _one_ which is convertible with _being_ is opposed to _mult.i.tude_ by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.

Reply Obj. 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that mult.i.tude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being.

Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely _one_ is relatively _many,_ and vice versa.

Reply Obj. 2: A _whole_ is twofold. In one sense it is h.o.m.ogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every h.o.m.ogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the const.i.tution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now mult.i.tude is such a kind of a whole.

Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the mult.i.tude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities const.i.tuted mult.i.tude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to mult.i.tude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not houses.

Reply Obj. 3: "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense.

Reply Obj. 4: "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line." "Mult.i.tude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of mult.i.tude except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one"