Sound Military Decision Part 13

The nature of the particular problem has also an unquestioned bearing on this subject. In instances where no single course of action can be found which is adequately expressive of complete attainment of the objective, the final selection of a method of attaining the objective will necessarily be through a combination of the courses of action under study (page 93).

For example, if the a.s.signed task were to "protect trade in sea area ABCD", the extent of the area, together with its geographical position relative to locations from which enemy attacks could be launched, might not be such as to permit the attainment of the objective by a single course of action such as "to escort trade in convoys" or "to patrol the trade routes". Both of these courses of action might be necessary, and, in addition, perhaps, the further course "to cover focal points M and N".

Each of these courses of action has, as its objective, the establishment of a protected area or areas, stationary or moving, for the safe pa.s.sage of merchant vessels. However, for purposes of expressing the course of action involved, the contemplated procedure is in this case better indicated by a combination expressed in terms of action, the objective being inferred as a matter of mutual understanding. The less particularized expression of the course of action in terms of the objective would, in this instance, convey a less definite idea of the procedure under consideration.

Similar considerations pertain frequently to naval problems, more especially to those involving naval engagements of considerable scope.

The solution of such a problem takes, typically, the form of an operation consisting, not of a single "act", but of "a series of acts", i.e., of a number of stages or phases of battle, each being a preparation for the one following, until the final stage provides for the attainment of the a.s.signed objective.

For example, a first consideration might be "to reduce enemy carrier aircraft strength by" certain pertinent operations. A second consideration might be "to reduce enemy battle-line speed by" certain operations in order to force the enemy to accept battle. A third might be "to reduce enemy battle-line speed, life, and hitting power by gunfire" within certain range bands, in order to exploit own strength and enemy weakness at those ranges. A fourth might be "to continue reduction of enemy battle-line strength by gunfire, closing to" such a range as is suitable to that end. Finally, a fifth consideration might be "to inflict conclusive damage on enemy battle-line with torpedoes".

All of the foregoing partial courses (other possibilities having been studied and discarded) might then be combined into one operation as the selected course of action "in order to destroy the enemy battleship strength",--such destruction being the a.s.signed objective.

The degree of detail in which a course of action may be visualized for purposes of the estimate will vary with the same factors, i.e., personal facility and the nature of the problem. Practice in the solution of problems appears to develop such facility that entire plans can be visualized as courses of action, each plan reasonably complete as to details with reference to physical objectives, relative positions, apportionment of fighting strength, and provision for freedom of action. However, it is rarely, if ever, necessary to visualize courses of action minutely in an estimate of a basic problem; the extent to which they are viewed mentally, as detailed plans, need only be such as to fulfill the requirements of the particular problem (see Section I of Chapter IV).

The statement of a course of action, for purposes of the estimate, will naturally be along broad and comprehensive lines, although some important matters of detail (relatively speaking) may be added if this is found desirable as the estimate proceeds. It is with these considerations in mind that the standard practice has been developed of formulating courses of action, while under study as tentative solutions of the problem, in broad terms, appropriate to general plans of action.

The commander may find, on occasion, what appears, on first examination, to be an exception to the rule, herein treated as valid, that a course of action, correctly conceived, always contains the two elements (1) objective, specific or inferred, and (2) action for its attainment. However, apparent exceptions to this principle are due to special conditions which, on proper a.n.a.lysis, reveal no actual exceptions. Certain examples, now to be discussed, demonstrate this fact.

For instance, when the higher commander deems such procedure advisable (page 86), he may make his subordinate's estimate of the situation, as well as his own, and may accordingly indicate both a task and a predetermined course of action for the subordinate to pursue: for example:

"Deny enemy base sites in area ABCD by capturing X Island."

In such a case the higher commander has indicated the predetermined course of action in the words "by capturing X Island". This expression indicates a specific objective, the capture of X Island. The expression also indicates, though not in any detail, the action to be taken, i.e., it specifies "capture", rather than "occupation", "isolation", or some other form of control (page 8). Any further development of the action is left for the subordinate to determine.

The procedure to be followed by the subordinate commander in solving such a problem is described hereafter (page 102) in the discussion of the a.n.a.lysis of courses of action. In any event, it is manifest that there is here no exception to the rule that a course of action, correctly conceived, contains the two elements of objective and action for its attainment.

A further example may occur when the higher commander, instead of indicating both the task and the predetermined course of action, indicates only the latter (page 86), by directing "Capture X Island".

Once the subordinate has recognized this directive as containing a predetermined course of action, but not a normal task, he realizes that the objective so indicated would ordinarily be left for him to select. He also realizes that the action to be taken for its attainment is left for him to determine, in further detail.

In this case, then, what is really a predetermined course of action appears in the guise of a task. When the commander, receiving the directive, has recognized this fact, he proceeds in the manner hereafter indicated (page 103) in the discussion of the a.n.a.lysis of courses of action.

In any event, it is manifest that here, also, there is no exception to the rule that a course of action, correctly conceived, contains the two elements of objective and action for its attainment.

In such a case as the foregoing, how does the commander recognize that the apparent task is really a predetermined course of action? He could easily go astray because the directive, until a.n.a.lyzed, appears to contain a normal task. The directive indicates an objective, thereby resembling a task. The directive will usually indicate, at least in some degree, the action which the subordinate is to take. Hence, so far as superficial appearance is concerned, the subordinate commander may easily mistake the predetermined course of action for a normal task. However, he discovers the difference when he endeavors to find courses of action which are appropriate to this apparent task.

The commander will then discover that, while he can visualize actions whose accomplishment will attain the objective indicated in the apparent task, he cannot visualize any objective completely suitable to the case (page 93), intermediate between the a.s.signed objective and the indicated action. He can state the a.s.signed objective in other words and adopt such a statement as an expression of his general objective, but the two objectives, the one he selects and the a.s.signed one, will really be identical.

This inability to visualize an objective of the commander's own selection, suitable to the case, is inevitable, because higher authority has already done this for him. He may find it advisable to develop further the action needed for the attainment of the indicated objective. On occasion this, also, will have been predetermined by the higher commander.

The foregoing considerations have been given special emphasis and deserve careful study, because an appreciation of these facts is necessary to a true understanding of the nature of correctly conceived courses of action.

a.n.a.lysis and Selection of Courses of Action. After one or more courses of action have been determined as tentative solutions of his problem, the commander will be confronted with the necessity of deciding upon that course of action, or combination of courses of action, which will best attain the a.s.signed objective, i.e., be the best way out of the seeming difficulty. The a.n.a.lysis, in each case, will settle suitability on the basis of the appropriate effect desired, feasibility on the basis of relative fighting strength as established by a survey of means available and opposed, influenced by the characteristics of the theater, and acceptability on the basis of consequences as to costs.

In connection with these considerations, the detailed operations involved in each course will be a.n.a.lyzed so far as may be necessary (page 95) and with respect to correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions, proper apportionment of fighting strength, and adequate freedom of action (see the Fundamental Military Principle--page 41). A selection shown to be best, from the standpoint of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of the consequences, will be adopted as the decision.

The tests of courses of action to determine whether they fulfill the requirements of suitability, of feasibility, and of acceptability as to consequences take account of the usual included determinants as listed and explained below. The list is not rigid, and the commander, according to the nature of his problem, may desire to omit certain of the items or to include any other considerations which may be applicable.

With respect to suitability, the commander considers the following:

(1) General. The test for suitability (see also page 31) calls for conformity as to both the nature and the scope of the motivating task. With respect to conformity in nature, the test leads to a conclusion as to whether the course of action, if carried out successfully, will or will not contribute to the accomplishment of the task. As to scope, the test leads to a conclusion as to whether the course of action, if carried out successfully, will or will not accomplish the task in full; and, if not in full, to what extent. The factor of urgency is also considered here.

It is frequently possible for the commander, merely by concentrating his thought on this particular perplexity, to conclude at once that the course of action is suitable. In other cases, a considerable amount of study may be needed.

This a.n.a.lytical study consists in breaking down the course of action into its component parts, i.e., the detailed operations which naturally grow out of it. This procedure is similar to that described later (Chapter VII), with respect to formulating a plan, but during the basic estimate the procedure, when utilized, is for a different reason--solely that of a.s.sisting in the a.n.a.lysis.

(2) Details, (a) Conformity as to nature. Will the course of action, if successfully carried out, contribute, at least in some degree, to the accomplishment of the task? If not, such a course is rejected. Courses that do contribute, however, are not rejected until the possibilities of combination have been examined, later.

(b) Completeness. If the course of action is successfully carried out, will it accomplish in full the motivating task?

If not, how much will it contribute towards such accomplishment? With what other courses of action can it be combined, to accomplish the motivating task in full? With what others can it be combined to accomplish the motivating task in part, and in such case how nearly does the combination contribute to full accomplishment?

This examination may lead to combinations of certain partial solutions.

(c) Desirability as to Urgency. The commander now considers the element of time. Complete accomplishment of the motivating task within his own theater may come too late to meet the requirements of the common effort of the entire force.

Synchronization with the action of other task-group commanders may be so important that timing becomes vital. As to this consideration, two courses of action, equally competent, may differ greatly in their qualification relating to urgency; one may be found highly desirable and the other completely unsatisfactory.

As to feasibility, the commander considers the following:

(1) General. The test for feasibility (see page 31) is concerned with whether the course of action is practicable.

Has it reasonable chances of success under the particular circ.u.mstances? Are the difficulties surmountable? Is it easily practicable, practicable with some difficulty, or very difficult?

The commander, if he concludes that the course of action is not a practicable one, rejects it from further consideration in the estimate of the situation. However, care is taken at this point not to dismiss, abruptly, courses of action which may later be combined advantageously with one or more others.

Here, again, as noted for the suitability test, the commander may sometimes profitably a.n.a.lyze the course of action by breaking it down into more detailed operations.

As a result of the tests discussed above, the commander is able to make a list of courses of action upon which his confirmed judgment has bestowed the qualities of suitability and feasibility.

He is also able to take stock to see how many of the solutions are complete, how many are incomplete, and in the latter case to what extent they const.i.tute partial solutions. It is, of course, desirable to have as many complete solutions as possible, and at this point it may be possible to merge two or more incomplete solutions into a single course of action which better fulfills the test of suitability. The commander can also take stock, similarly, of the degree of feasibility, already referred to, as to the retained courses of action.

(2) Details, (a) Prospects of Success. Here the several courses of action are considered relatively, with respect to the chance of success in each. In the rating of courses on this basis, the commander excludes consideration of losses except as they may influence success or failure. He notes, however, his considered expectations as to losses. Losses may appear to be so great that success is doubtful. Certain courses of action may be particularly vulnerable to enemy opposition because of the types of weapons involved or because of favorable enemy positions. Choice of such a course would permit the enemy an initial advantage.

(b) Facility of Execution. This subject has to do with the relative ease or difficulty of carrying out the several courses of action. On the basis of the existing situation, each course of action may be compared with all the others to determine their relative merits with regard to the facility of execution. Consideration is given to the action involved against the several physical objectives; to the movements needed in making new dispositions; to the relative adequacy of the forces as to numbers and types of weapons; and to the measures required for freedom of action.

A review of the previous discussion of these elements (Chapter IV) may be very helpful in connection with this comparison. As to freedom of action, for example, the commander may ask himself which course is best from the standpoint of using the initiative to advantage; and which course of action lends itself best to the advantageous use of surprise. As the commander reflects on these matters, other similar questions may be suggested.

(c) Utilization of Own Strength and Exploitation of Enemy Weakness. In his original visualization of each course of action, the commander has naturally considered how to utilize his own strength to best advantage, and how best to exploit enemy weakness. In fact, especially in a detailed tactical estimate, these considerations may have been predominant in envisaging the courses of action. A careful evaluation of the merits of each course of action in this respect is accordingly necessary before a choice is made.

With regard to acceptability of consequences as to costs, the commander considers the following:

(1) General. The process of putting a course of action to proof as a tentative solution of the problem remains incomplete until the course has been tested to determine its consequences as to costs, so far as these can be visualized in advance. The process involves an evaluation of the diminution in total advantage which will result in the event of failure, and a comparison of gains with losses in the event of success. The situation to be expected, if the course of action is carried out, is visualized in order to determine the future effect on the creation or maintenance of an ultimately favorable military situation.

In testing each course of action for acceptability as to its consequences (page 31), the commander considers the cost of success, the cost of failure, and the possible gain and loss in perspective with the united effort as a whole. Questions which he may pose include: If the course of action is successful, will the costs be so prohibitive as to adversely affect the successful accomplishment of the further effort? If a tactical situation is under consideration, will the costs prevent the accomplishment of the strategical aim? If the course of action fails, what will be its effect? Will it cause the entire plan to fail? Will its failure affect, for example, the national morale?

If the command--and ultimately the State--can afford the losses and other disadvantages which will be incurred as a result of either the success or the failure of the contemplated effort, a course of action may be considered as acceptable from the standpoint of consequences as to costs.

As previously noted with respect to suitability, it may be desirable to consider, with regard to consequences, the detailed operations which may be involved in each course of action.

Courses of action involving excessive consequences as to costs are rejected. Notation is made of the relative degree of acceptability, with respect to consequences as to costs, of those courses of action which are retained.

(2) Details. (a) The Results of Success and of Failure. Each course of action is examined to visualize the situation which would be brought about for the commander and for the enemy in case of success or of failure. The relative possibilities of recovery toward a more favorable situation are weighed. This consideration involves relative risks, for it may be that a certain course, otherwise satisfactory, might entail intolerable conditions should failure ensue.

The costs are measured in terms of fighting strength. It has to be considered whether the sacrifices involved are worth the gains which will follow; whether the objectives if attained will be sufficiently valuable when the need of fighting strength to accomplish further aims is considered.