Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy Part 22

Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines of communication would be identical.

This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.

_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly all our current maxims of Naval Strategy can be traced to the pressure it exerts on naval thought.

It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval Strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and confusion which have arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications and the operations against them in each case.

On land, the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications at once is that, as a rule, we cannot do so without exposing our own. At sea, on the contrary, when the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's.

Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get our fleet into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our attempting to get a fleet off Brest before the French could sail.

Hence the maxims "That the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's coast," "The enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.

But these maxims are not universally true; witness Togo's strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.

Take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here, again, Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.

The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action."

The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.

EXAMPLE.--Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines of pa.s.sage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened the common communications.

RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a naval position from which France could not eject us, and she abandoned the struggle for sea communications.

But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable--

(a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet.

(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to _dispute the control of the common communications_.

(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a blow which will solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir. Palmes Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703.

Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign.

This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon Fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of strategical law).

Practically all great naval actions have been brought about in this way, that is, they have been the outcome of an effort to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet; _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.

Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.

In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne in mind that if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it, except at very heavy cost.

It is far better to make it come to you, and this has often been done by merely sitting on the common communications.

Again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being certain of getting contact, you may merely a.s.sist it in evading you, and enable it to get into a position on your own communications, from which it may be very costly to dislodge it. It was for this reason that the Elizabethan Government kept the fleet in home waters in 1588. Sampson, in the Spanish-American War, was actually permitted to make this mistake. By going to seek out Cervera without being sure of contact, he left him a clear run into Cienfuegos or even Havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent.

Captain Mahan has since modified this maxim as follows:--"Seek out the enemy's fleet, if you are sure of getting contact." A truer maxim would seem to be "Seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and favourable manner that is open to you." To seek out the enemy's fleet is only one way of doing this, and not always the best way. It must be remembered that other conditions being equal, it is an obvious advantage to fight in your own waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely to ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive.

RN WAR COLLEGE PORTSMOUTH JANUARY 1909