Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy Part 21

Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war and to force our will upon him.

_Various Conditions of Command_

1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.

(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of pa.s.sage and communication or to use or defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.

This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send squadrons to sea.

(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our pa.s.sage and communication in one or more theatres of operation.

2. Both general and local command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.

(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our pa.s.sage and communication in all or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining the object in view (_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first action. It was also that at which Napoleon aimed in his instructions to Villeneuve in 1805.

(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition existed after Tsushima.

_Command in Dispute_

The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.

The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._, till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.

_It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of dispute by seeking a decision._ Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with England.

It must be remembered that _general command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations_.

In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate or be induced to concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view, while the weaker Power takes advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere.

Thus in a state of dispute, although the weaker Power may not be able to obstruct the pa.s.sage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own.

EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three years of the Seven Years' War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and De la Clue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar.

When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._, leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.

METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL.

1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions.

2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by--

(a) An action not necessarily entirely successful (containing).

(b) Inducing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).

(c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).

(d) Blockade.

_Action of a Fleet off an Enemy's Port_

A belligerent fleet off an enemy's port may carry out three different operations, for certain purposes; each quite separate from the others, and intended to obtain an entirely different result:--

(1) _Close Blockade._--This is to prevent the enemy's fighting ships from putting to sea. In this case the object is to secure local control for some purpose that is not purely naval, such as was carried out by the j.a.panese off Port Arthur in 1904, so as to enable their transports to cross the Yellow Sea without fear of molestation from any of the Russian ships in Port Arthur. Since the cruisers in Vladivostok were able to emerge (that port not being blockaded), the operation was not complete, and a danger of interference always existed.

This method of blockade is far more difficult to carry out in the present day, than formerly; owing to the existence of submarines and torpedo craft, the blockading ships have to remain further away from the port; there have to be inner lines of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; and quick concentration takes longer owing to the greater s.p.a.ce covered by the blockading force, and more ships of all natures are required for the same reason.

Greater and more vigilance are required than in former days, because the enemy's ships can come out regardless of weather (thick weather would be their opportunity), and it is most important that not a single craft, from a battleship to a torpedo boat, be allowed to escape.

This method of blockade includes the commercial blockade, and all countries would be informed of its having been established.

(2) _Commercial Blockade._--To prevent floating commerce from entering or leaving the blockaded harbour. The blockading force would not be powerful enough to prevent a squadron of battleships or cruisers from entering or leaving the port blockaded; and it would not be inst.i.tuted outside a fortified military port, or one containing a strong naval force. But it would be able to stop scouts and torpedo craft from entering or emerging, unless in very great numbers; and if unable to stop them from emerging, would give warning of their escape and the direction in which they are going.

In both these forms of blockade it is usual, as a matter of courtesy, to allow neutral armed ships belonging to foreign navies to enter and leave for their own purposes, presumably connected with the subjects of their own country who are in the blockaded port. This, however, is not a right, and the country to which the blockading ships belong has a right to refuse it, and to back her refusal by force.

All countries must be notified of a properly inst.i.tuted commercial blockade, in accordance with International Agreement.

(3) _Observing a Port._--This, with its subsidiary operations, should be conducted in such a way as to induce the enemy to put to sea, the object of observing the port being primarily a naval one, viz., to bring him to decisive action.

The princ.i.p.al observing force (consisting of battleships and cruisers) would be either in one squadron, or more, provided that they were in supporting reach of each other, and so placed as to be able to cut off the enemy's fleet on emerging from the port observed before it can get dangerously near its probable objective, and yet sufficiently far out to ensure a battle before it can regain the shelter of its own ports. It is also worth noting that the battle should, if possible, be fought so as to make it difficult for the enemy's damaged ships to obtain the shelter of a friendly neutral's harbours before being captured.

The observed port must be watched closely, so that immediate notice of the enemy's exit may be given; and this would be done by small cruisers, scouts and destroyers, which should be strong and numerous enough to attack any torpedo craft trying to get to sea.

In order to induce the enemy's main force to put to sea it is important that every means be used to prevent his knowing that our fleet is observing the port, or if that be impossible, to do nothing which will lead him to suppose that his port is being observed.

This operation is not a blockade.

Subsidiary operations to induce the enemy's fleet to put to sea, may take the form of a diversion on the enemy's coast, or against some important part of his sea-borne trade, either by the observing fleet or by a force affiliated to it, or by any oversea movements calculated to interfere seriously with the enemy's war plan.

_Concentration_

The guiding feature of modern preparation for war is to be ready for rapid action. It is true at sea, more even than on land, that upon the first movements depend the initiative, the power of controlling the enemy's strategy, and of making him conform to our movements. This readiness for rapid action will depend on a proper distribution of the fleet so as to meet all the requirements.

The distribution of the fleet should be dominated by the idea of concentration, but it must be understood clearly what concentration means.

Clausewitz says:--"The best strategy is always to be sufficiently strong, at first generally, then at the decisive point. There is therefore no higher or simpler law for strategy than this--keep your forces together."

The maxim "Keep your forces together" does not, however, necessarily mean keeping them all concentrated in one ma.s.s, but rather keeping them so disposed that they can unite readily at will. At sea it is more difficult than on land to foretell where the decisive point will be; but since it is quicker and easier at sea to concentrate forces at any particular point than on land, in applying this maxim for our purposes, the rule should be to dispose the forces at sea so as to be able to concentrate them in time at the decisive point so soon as this point is determined, and also so as to conceal from the enemy what it is intended to make the decisive point.

If the forces are rightly disposed within due limits, adequate control of all the lines of pa.s.sage and communication can be a.s.sured, and if the enemy undertakes any operations it should be possible to ensure that sufficient forces can be concentrated in time to defeat his object. On the other hand, if the forces are concentrated in one ma.s.s, there can be little chance of deceiving or confusing the enemy, while it gives him an opportunity of successfully carrying out some operation by evasion.

THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

Since the whole idea of command of the sea rests on the control of communications, it cannot be fully apprehended without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications.

Ash.o.r.e, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend as a rule to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point.

At sea, the reverse is frequently the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent often tend to run approximately parallel if, indeed, they are not identical.