Slavery and Four Years of War Part 69

In discharging the duties of Speaker I had no strong parliamentary leader of my party on the floor to aid me, and I had had but little experience as a presiding officer. Of the opposite party were Mr.

Randall, who had been Speaker of the three preceding Congresses; Mr. c.o.x of New York, the pugnacious, who had acted as Speaker for a time in the Forty-third; Mr. Carlisle (my successor as Speaker), and Mr. Knott of Kentucky, and others who laid just claim to much parliamentary learning. The House was hardly Republican; and in my own party were disappointed aspirants who often thought they saw opportunities to gain a little cheap applause.(17) Notwithstanding this situation, no parliamentary decision of mine was overruled by the House, though many appeals were taken, and more than the usual number of important questions were raised by members and decided by me. The most memorable of the decisions was the one which put an end to dilatory motions to prevent the House from making or amending its rules of procedure. The occasion of this holding arose on the consideration of a report of the Committee on Rules whereby it was proposed to so amend the rules as to prevent filibustering and dilatory motions in the consideration of contested election cases. It may be observed that for the first time in the history of Congress, dilatory methods were resorted to, to prevent the _consideration_ of election cases. I was then ready to hold (and so stated) that dilatory motions were not in order to prevent the consideration of such cases, as their disposition affected the organization of the House for business; and I was also prepared to count a quorum when a quorum of members was present not voting, but these questions did not arise, and it was then understood that leading Republicans (Mr. Reed of Maine among the number (18)) did not agree with my views on these two points. A point of order was made against a dilatory motion, which was debated at much length, and with some heat, by the ablest parliamentarians of all parties in the House. My opinion on the question made is quoted from the _Record_ of May 29, 1882.

"Mr. Reed, as a privileged question, called up the report of the Committee on Rules made on Sat.u.r.day last; when Mr. Randall raised the question of consideration; pending which, Mr. Kenna moved that the House adjourn; pending which Mr. Blackburn moved that when the House adjourn it be to meet on Wednesday next; and the question being put thereon, it was decided in the negative.

"The question recurring on the motion of Mr. Kenna that the House adjourn; pending which Mr. Randall moved that when the House adjourn it be to meet on Thursday nest;

"Mr. Reed made the point of order that the said motion was not in order at this time, on the ground that pending a proposition to change the rules of the House, dilatory motions cannot be entertained by the Chair.

"After debate on said point of order,

"The Speaker. The question for the Chair to decide is briefly this: The gentleman from Maine (Reed) has called up for present consideration the report of the Committee on Rules made on the 27th inst., and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Randall) raised, as he might under the practice and the rules of the House, the question of consideration. The gentleman from West Virginia (Mr.

Kenna) then moved that the House adjourn, and the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Blackburn) moved that when the House adjourn it be to meet on Wednesday next, which last motion was voted down; and thereupon the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Randall) moved that when the House adjourn it be to meet on Thursday next. The gentleman from Maine (Mr. Reed) then raised the point of order that such motions are mere dilatory motions, and therefore, as against the right of the House to consider a proposition to amend the rules, not in order.

"It cannot be disputed that the Committee on Rules have the right to report at any time such changes in the rules as it may decide to be wise. The right of that committee to report at any time may be, under the practice, a question of privilege; but if it is not, resolutions of this House, adopted December 19, 1881, expressly give that right.

"The Clerk will read the resolutions.

"The Clerk read as follows:

'_Resolved_, That the rules of the House of Representatives of the Forty-sixth Congress shall be the rules of the present House until otherwise ordered; and,

'_Resolved_ further, That the Committee on Rules when appointed shall have the right to report at any time all such amendments or revisions of said rules as they may deem proper.'

"The Speaker. It will be seen that these resolutions not only give the right to that committee to report at any time, but the committee is authorized to report any change, etc., in the rules. The right given to report at any time carries with it the right to have the proposition reported considered without laying over. The resolutions are the ones adopting the present standing rules of the House for its government; and it will be observed that they were only conditionally adopted; and the right was expressly reserved to the House to order them set aside. Paragraph 1 of Rule xxviii provides that.--

'No standing rule of the House shall be rescinded or changed without one day's notice of the motion therefor.'

"This clause of the rule, if applicable at all, may fairly be construed to make it in order under the standing rules of the House to consider any motion to rescind or change the rules after one day's notice.

"But the question for the Chair to decide is this: Are the rules of this House to be so construed as to give to the minority of the House the absolute right to prevent the majority or a quorum of the House from making any new rules for its government; or in the absence of anything in the rules providing for any mode of proceeding in the matter of consideration, when the question of changing the rules is before the House, shall the rules be so construed as to virtually prevent their change should one-fifth of the House oppose it? It may be well to keep in mind that paragraph 2 of section 5 of article 1 of the Const.i.tution says that--

'Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings.'

"The same section of the Const.i.tution provides that--

'A majority of each House shall const.i.tute a quorum to do business.'

"The right given to the House to determine the rules of its proceedings is never exhausted, but is at all times a continuing right, and in the opinion of the Chair gives a right to make or alter rules independent of any rules it may adopt. Dilatory motions to prevent the consideration of business are comparatively recent expedients, and should not be favored in any case save where absolutely required by some clear rule of established practice.

"In any case it is a severe strain upon common sense to construe the rules so as to prevent a quorum of the House from taking any proceedings at all required by the Const.i.tution; and it is still more difficult to find any justification for holding that the special resolutions of this House adopted December 19th last, or the standing rules even of the House, were intended to prevent the House, if a majority so desired, from altering or abrogating the present rules of the House.

"There seems to be abundant precedent for the view the Chair takes.

The Clerk will read from the _Record_ of the Forty-third Congress, volume ix, page 806, an opinion expressed by the distinguished Speaker, Mr. Blaine, which has been repeatedly alluded to to-day.

"The Clerk read as follows:

'The Chair has repeatedly ruled that pending a proposition to change the rules dilatory motions could not be entertained, and for this reason he has several times ruled that the right of each House to determine what shall be its rules is an organic right expressly given by the Const.i.tution of the United States. The rules are the creature of that power, and, of course, they cannot be used to destroy that power. The House is incapable by any form of rules of divesting itself of its inherent const.i.tutional power to exercise its functions to determine its own rules. Therefore the Chair has always announced upon a proposition to change the rules of the House he never would entertain a dilatory motion.'

"The Speaker. It will be observed that the then Speaker says he has frequently held that pending a proposition to change the rules dilatory motions could not be entertained. The precedents for ruling out dilatory motions where an amendment of the rules is under consideration are many.

"During the electoral count my immediate predecessor (Mr. Randall) decided, in principle, the point involved here. On February 24, 1877, after an obstructive motion had been made, the following language was used, as found in the _Record_ of the Forty-fourth Congress, page 1906.

'The Speaker. The Chair is unable to recognize this in any other light than as a dilatory motion.

'The mover then denied that he made the motion as such.

'The Speaker. The Chair is unable to cla.s.sify it in any other way.

Therefore he rules that when the Const.i.tution of the United States directs anything to be done, or when the law under the Const.i.tution of the United States enacted in obedience thereto directs an act of this House, it is not in order to make any motion to obstruct or impede the execution of that injunction of the Const.i.tution and laws.'

"While this decision is not on the precise point, it clearly covers the principle involved in the case with which we are now dealing.

"The Chair thinks the Const.i.tution and the laws are higher than any rules, and when they conflict with the rules the latter must give way. There is not one word in the present rules, however, which prescribes the mode of proceeding in changing the standing rules except as to the reference of propositions to change the rules, with the further exception that--

'No standing rule or order of the House shall be rescinded or changed without one day's notice.'

"But it will be observed that there is an entire absence from all these standing rules of anything that looks to giving directions as to the procedure when the rule is under consideration by the House. This only refers to the time of considering motions to rescind or change a standing rule to the reference of propositions submitted by members, and to the time and manner of bringing them before the House for consideration, and not to the method of considering them when brought before the House.

"It seems to purposely avoid saying one word as to the forms of proceedings while considering such motions. This is highly significant.

"There is nothing revolutionary in holding that purely dilatory motions cannot be entertained to prevent consideration or action on a proposition to amend the rules of the House, as this right to make or amend the rules is an organic one essential to be exercised preliminary to the orderly transaction of business by the House.

It would be more than absurd to hold otherwise.

"Rule XLV undertakes to fasten our present standing rules on the present and all succeeding Congresses. It reads as follows:

'These rules shall be the rules of the House of Representatives of the present and succeeding Congresses, unless otherwise ordered.'

"If this rule is of binding force on succeeding Congresses, and the rules apply and can be invoked to give power to a minority in the House to prevent their abrogation or alteration, they would be made perpetual if only one-fifth of the members of the House so decreed.

"The fallacy of holding that the standing rules can be held to apply to proceedings to amend, etc., the rules will more sharply appear when we look to the case in hand. The proposition is to so amend the rules in contested-election cases as to take away the right to make and repeat dilatory motions, to prevent consideration, etc. And the same obstructive right is appealed to to prevent its consideration. To allow this would be to hold the rules superior not only to the House that made them but to the Const.i.tution of the United States.

"The wise remarks quoted in debate, made long since by the distinguished speaker, Mr. Onslow of the House of Commons, about the wisdom of adhering to fixed rules in legislative proceedings, were made with no reference to the application of rules which it was claimed were made to prevent any proceedings at all by the body acting under them.

"The present occupant of the chair has tried, and will try, to give full effect to all rules wherever applicable, and especially to protect the rights of the minority to the utmost extent the rules will justify.

"The Chair is not called upon to hold that any of the standing rules of the House are in conflict with the Const.i.tution, as it is not necessary to do so. It only holds that there is nothing in the rules which gives them application pending proceedings to amend and rescind them. It also holds that under the first of the resolutions adopted by the House on December 19, 1881, the right was reserved to order the standing rules set aside at any time this House so decided, and without regard to dilatory forms of proceedings provided for in them. The Chair does not hold that pending the question of consideration no motion shall be in order. It is disposed to treat one motion to adjourn as proper at this time, as it is a well-known parliamentary motion, and that such motion may be liable at some stage of the proceedings to be repeated if made for a proper and not a dilatory purpose.

"The Chair feels better satisfied with its ruling in this case, because the rule proposed to be adopted is one which looks to an orderly proceeding in the matter of taking up and disposing of contested-election cases, a duty cast directly on the House by the Const.i.tution of the United States, and an essential one to be performed before it is completely organized.

"The Chair is unable to find in the whole history of the government that any dilatory motions have ever been made or entertained to prevent the consideration or disposition of a contested-election case until this Congress. The point of order has not yet been made against obstructive motions to prevent the consideration of a contested-election case, and the Chair is not now called on to decide whether such motions are in order or not where they would prevent a complete organization of the House. The principle here involved will suffice to indicate the opinion of the Chair on that question.

"The question here decided the Chair understands to be an important one, because it comprehends the complete organization of the House to do business, but it feels that on principle and sound precedents the point of order made by the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Reed) must be sustained to the extent of holding that the motion made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Randall), which is in effect a dilatory motion, is not at this time in order.

"It has been, in debate, claimed that on January 11, 1882, the present occupant of the chair made a different holding. The question then made and decided arose on a matter of reference of a proposition to amend the rules to an appropriate committee as provided for under the rules, and not on the consideration of a report when properly brought before the House for its action. The two things are so plainly distinguishable as to require nothing further to be said about them.

"Mr. Randall. From your decision, Mr. Speaker, just announced, I appeal to the House, whose officer you are.