Slavery and Four Years of War Part 57

He promptly rose, mounted his horse, and said: "If this army goes forward I will fill that gap, with or without orders." Unfortunately, orders came to him to withdraw, and with others of his corps (Eighth) form in reserve near the turnpike. His withdrawal left, at the last moment, a gap which could only be filled by obliqueing my division to the left as it was moving forward. This produced some unsteadiness in the line, and the right brigade (Emerson's) continued the movement too long, causing some ma.s.sing of troops in the centre of the division, and some disorder resulted while they were under a severe infantry and artillery fire. This necessary movement also caused an interval between Wheaton's division and mine, thereby imperilling my right. Our attack, however, was not checked until we had gone forward about one mile. The enemy's centre was driven back upon his partially intrenched line on the heights mentioned.

This brought my division under a most destructive fire of artillery and infantry from front and flanks. My right flank was especially exposed, as it had gone forward farther than the troops on the right.

The loss in the division was severe, and it became impossible to hold the exposed troops to the charge. They had not fired as they advanced. The division retired a short distance, where it was halted and promptly faced about. In less than five minutes it was again charging the Confederate left centre. The right of Getty's division and Wheaton's left went forward with the second charge, and an advance position in close rifle range of the enemy was gained and held. My division was partly protected by a stone fence located on the north of an open field, while the Confederates held the farther side of the field, about three hundred yards distant, and were also protected by a stone fence as well as by some temporary breastworks. The enemy occupied the higher ground, and the field was lower in the centre than on either side. The battle here was obstinate and, for a time, promised to extend into the night.

Early's artillery in my front did little execution, as it was located on the crest of the hills behind his infantry line, and the gunners, when they undertook to work their guns, were exposed to our infantry fire. Wheaton's division and that part of the Nineteenth Corps to his right, though not keeping pace with the centre, steadily gained ground; likewise the cavalry. Getty, though under orders to hold his left on the pike, moved his division forward slowly, making a left half wheel. In this movement Getty's left reached Middletown, and his right swung somewhat past it on the west.

Merritt's cavalry pushed around east of Middletown. At this juncture, Kershaw's division and part of Gordon's division were in front of my right and part of Ramseur's in front of my left.

Pegram's and Wharton's divisions were in front of Getty, Wharton being, in part, east of the pike confronting our cavalry. Early's left was held by Gordon's troops, including some of his cavalry.(17) Early now made heroic efforts to hold his position, hoping at night he could withdraw with some of the fruits of victory. Sheridan made every possible exertion to dislodge the enemy, and to accomplish this he was much engaged, personally, on the flanks with the cavalry.

Wright, calm, confident, and unperturbed, gave close attention to his corps, and was constantly exposed. I frequently met him at this crisis. He ordered a further charge upon the enemy's centre.

This seemed impossible with the tired troops. Preparation was, however, made to attempt it. The firing in this last position had continued for about an hour, during which both sides had suffered heavily. As the sun was going down behind the mountains that autumnal evening it became apparent something decisive must take place or night would end the day of blood leaving the enemy in possession of the princ.i.p.al part of the battle-field.

So confident was Early of final victory that, earlier, in the day, he ordered up his headquarters and supply trains, and by 4 P.M.

they commenced to arrive on the field.

It must be remembered that the two armies had been manoeuvring and fighting for twelve hours, with little food or rest and an insufficient supply of water. Exhausted troops may be held in line, especially when under some cover, but it is difficult to move then in a charge with the spirit essential to success. There remained a considerable interval between Wheaton's left and my right. An ill.u.s.trative incident again occurred here in resupplying our men with ammunition.

Three mules loaded with boxes filled with cartridges were conducted by an ordnance sergeant through the interval on my right in open view of both armies, and with indifferent leisure to and behind the stone wall occupied by the Confederates. The sergeant and his party were not fired on. Word was pa.s.sed along the line for my division to make a charge on a given signal, and all subordinate officers were instructed to use the utmost exertion to make it a success. The incident of the sergeant and his party going into the enemy's line served to suggest to me the possibility of penetrating it with a small body of our soldiers.

Before giving an order to charge, I instructed Colonel Emerson, commanding the First Brigade, to hastily form, under a competent staff officer, a small body of men, and direct them to advance rapidly along the west of a stone wall extending traversely from my right to the enemy's position, and to penetrate through a gap between two of the enemy's brigades, with instructions to open an enfilading fire on him as soon as his flank was reached. The gap was between two of Gordon's brigades. The order was promptly and handsomely executed, and its execution produced the desired effect.

Captain H. W. Day (151st New York, Acting Brigade Inspector) was charged with the execution of this order.(18)

The party consisted of about 125 men, each of whom knew that if unsuccessful death or capture must follow. Colonel Moses H. Granger (122d Ohio) voluntarily aided, and, in some sense, directed the movement of this small party. The gap was penetrated on the run and a fire opened on the exposed flanks of the Confederates which started them from the cover of their works and the stone wall. At this juncture the division, as ordered, poured a destructive fire upon the now exposed Confederates, and at once charging across the field, drove the enemy in utter rout. A panic seized Gordon's troops, who were the first struck, then spread to Kershaw's and Ramseur's divisions, successively on Gordon's right.(19)

I quote from the report of Colonel Emerson, commanding my First Brigade, in which he describes the final battle, including the breaking of Early's line:

"The brigade lay here under a fire of sh.e.l.l until about 4 P.M., when Captain Smith came with an order to move forward connecting on the left with the Second Brigade. The brigade moved through the woods, when it received a very heavy fire on the right flank, under which it was broken, but soon reformed in its old position, and again moved forward to a stone fence, the enemy being behind another stone wall in front with a clear field intervening. There was a stone wall running from the right flank of the brigade to the wall behind which the enemy lay. Some of my men lay scattered along this last named wall. The First Division lay to the right and in advance, nearly parallel with the enemy. Everything appeared to be at a deadlock, with heavy firing of artillery and musketry.

At this stage Colonel Keifer, commanding division, came to me and inquired what men were those lying along the wall running from our line to the enemy's, and ordered me to send them forward to flank the enemy and drive them from their position. The execution of the order was entrusted to Captain H. W. Day, Inspector of the [Second] Brigade, who proceeded along the wall, and getting on the enemy's flank dislodged them, when the brigade was moved rapidly forward, in connection with the Second Brigade, and did not stop until we arrived in the works of the Nineteenth Corps, when, in accordance with orders from Colonel Keifer, the brigade went into its position of the morning, got its _breakfast_, and encamped, satisfied that it had done a good day's work before breakfast."(20)

Also from a report of Colonel Ball, commanding Second Brigade:

"About 3 P.M. the whole army advanced in one line upon the enemy.

Immediately before advancing the troops were withdrawn to the left, and my left connected with the Second Division, Sixth Army Corps, while my right connected with the First Brigade, Third Division.

We advanced half a mile to the edge of the woods, when we were met by a well-directed fire from the right flank. This fire was returned with spirit some fifteen minutes, when the troops wavered and fell back a short distance in some disorder. The Second and Third Divisions gave way at the same time. The line was speedily reformed and moved forward and became engaged with the enemy again, each force occupying a stone wall. Advantage was taken of a wall or fence running perpendicular to and connecting with that occupied by the enemy. After the action had continued here about three quarters of an hour a heavy volley was fired at the enemy from the transverse wall. A hurried and general retreat of the enemy immediately followed, and our troops eagerly followed, firing upon the retreating army as it ran, and giving no opportunity to the enemy to reform or make a stand.

"Several efforts were made by the enemy during the pursuit to rally, but the enthusiastic pursuit foiled all such efforts. Our troops were subject to artillery fire of solid shot, sh.e.l.l, and grape during the pursuit, and we reached the intrenchments of the Nineteenth Army Corps (which were captured in the morning) as the sun set.

Here the pursuit by the infantry was discontinued. The first and second, and probably the third colors planted on the recovered works of the Nineteenth Army Corps were of regiments composing this brigade."(21)

General Early tells the effect on his army of penetrating his line by the small body of our troops:

"A number of bold attempts were made during the subsequent part of the day, by the enemy's cavalry, to break our line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed. Late in the afternoon, the enemy's infantry advanced against Ramseur, Kershaw, and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ramseur and Kershaw's front was handsomely repulsed in my view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours, but a portion of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between Evans' brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the line, when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon followed. General Gordon made every possible effort to rally his men and lead them back against the enemy, but without avail. The information of this affair, with exaggerations, pa.s.sed rapidly along Kershaw and Ramseur's lines, and their men, under the apprehension of being flanked, commenced falling back in disorder, though no enemy was pressing them, and this gave me the first intimation of Gordon's condition. At the same time the enemy's cavalry, observing the disorder on our ranks, made another charge on our right, but was again repulsed. Every effort was made to stop and rally Kershaw and Ramseur's men, but the ma.s.s of them resisted all appeals, and continued to go to the rear without waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial disaster."(22)

The charge of the division resulted in the total overthrow of Early's army. Pegram and Wharton's divisions on our extreme left near Middletown were soon involved in the disaster, and our whole army went forward, meeting little resistance, taking many prisoners and guns, only halting when Early's forces were either destroyed, captured, or driven in the wildest disorder beyond Cedar Creek.(23) Our cavalry under Merritt and Custer pursued until late in the night to Fisher's Hill, south of Strasburg, and made many captures.

It often has been claimed that the cavalry on the right is ent.i.tled to the credit of overthrowing Early's army. It is true Custer did make some attempts on Gordon's left and rear, but the appearance of Rosser's cavalry on Custer's right, north and east of Cedar Creek, called him off, and it was not until after Early's position had been penetrated and a general retreat had commenced that Custer again appeared on the enemy's flank and rear. His presence there had much to do with the wild retreat of Early's men. Custer, who claimed much for his cavalry, and insisted that it captured forty- five pieces of artillery, etc., did not in his report of the battle pretend that his division caused the final break in Early's forces.

Speaking of his last charge on the left, Custer says:

"Seeing so large a force of cavalry bearing rapidly down upon an unprotected flank and their line of retreat in danger of being intercepted, the lines of the enemy, already broken, now gave way in the utmost confusion."(24)

Part of Early's artillery and caissons, with ammunition and supply trains, also ambulances and many battle flags, were captured north of Cedar Creek. The cavalry, however, seized, south of the Creek, other substantial fruits of the great victory, including many guns and headquarters baggage and other trains, and some prisoners. A panic seized teamsters on the turnpike; they cut out mules or horses to escape upon, leaving the teams to mingle in the greatest disorder.

Drivers of ambulances filled with dead and wounded also fled, and the animals ran with them unguided over the field. The scene was of the wildest ruin. The gloom of night soon fell over the field to add to its appalling character.

The guns lost by the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps were taken in the morning to the public square of Strasburg and triumphantly parked on exhibition. Our cavalry found them there at night. Little that makes up an army was left to Early; the disaster reached every part of his army save, possibly, his cavalry which operated on the remote flanks. In a large sense, Rosser's cavalry, throughout the day, had been neutralized by a portion of Custer's, and Lomax had been held back by Powell on the Front Royal road. Dismay indescribable extended to the Confederate officers as well as the private soldiers.

Among the former were some of the best and bravest the South produced. Early himself possessed the confidence of General Lee.

Early had, as division commanders, General John B. Gordon (since in the United States Senate), Joseph B. Kershaw, Stephen D. Ramseur, John Pegram, and Gabriel C. Wharton, all of whom had won distinction.

Ramseur fell mortally wounded in attempting a last stand near the Belle Grove House, and died there. Early fled from the field, surrounded by a few faithful followers, deeply chagrined and dejected, and filled with unjust censure of his own troops.(25) The next day found him still without an organized army.(26) He seems to have deserved a better fate. His star of military glory had set. It never rose again. A few months later he reached Richmond with a single attendant, having barely escaped capture shortly before by a detachment of Sheridan's cavalry. He finally returned to Southwest Virginia, where Lee relieved him of all command, March 30, 1865.

His misfortunes in the Valley, doubtless, had much to do with his continued implacable hatred to the Union. Sheridan was his nemesis.

Just after Kirby Smith had surrendered in 1865 and Sheridan was on his way to the Rio Grande, the latter encountered Early escaping across the Mississippi in a small boat, with his horses swimming beside it. He got away, but his horses were captured.(27)

Sheridan, for his great skill and gallantry, justly won the plaudits of his country, and his fame as a soldier will be immortal, but not alone on account of his victory at Cedar Creek, nor on account of "Sheridan's Ride," as described by the poet Read.(28)

My division, at dark, resumed its camp of the night before, as did other divisions of the army.

When the fifteen hours of carnage had ceased, and the sun had gone down, spreading the gloom of a chilly October night over the wide extended field, there remained a scene more horrid than usual.

The dead and dying of the two armies were commingled. Many of the wounded had dragged themselves to the streams in search of the first want of a wounded man--_water_. Many mangled and loosed horses were straggling over the field to add to the confusion.

Wagons, gun-carriages, and caissons were strewn in disorder in the rear of the last stand of the Confederate Army. Abandoned ambulances, sometimes filled with dead and dying Confederates, were to be seen in large numbers, and loose teams dragged overturned vehicles over the hills and through the ravines. Dead and dying men were found in the darkness almost everywhere. Cries of agony from the suffering victims were heard in all directions, and the moans of wounded animals added much to the horrors of the night.

"_Mercy_ abandons the arena of battle," but when the conflict is ended _mercy_ again a.s.serts itself. The disabled of both armies were cared for alike. Far into the night, with some all the long night, the heroes in the day's strife ministered to friend and foe alike, where but the night before our army had peacefully slumbered, little dreaming of the death struggle of the coming day. To an efficient medical corps, however, belong the chief credit for the good work done in caring for the unfortunate.

The loss in officers was unusually great. Besides Colonel Thoburn, killed in the opening of the battle, General D. D. Bidwell fell early in the day, and Colonel Charles R. Lowell, Jr., was killed near its close while leading a charge of his cavalry brigade.

Eighty-six Union officers were killed or mortally wounded.

Many distinguished officers were wounded. Of the six officers belonging to my brigade staff who were turned over to Colonel Ball in the early morning, one only (Captain J. T. Rorer) remained uninjured at night. Two were dead.

All was peaceful enough on the 20th, though on every hand the evidence of the preceding day's struggle was to be seen. The dead of both armies were buried--the blue and the gray in separate trenches, to await the resurrection morn.

I have no purpose to speak of individual acts of bravery. The number of killed and wounded of each army was about the same. The casualties in my division, excluding 36 captured or missing, were, killed, 8 officers and 100 men; wounded, 34 officers and 528 men; total, 670. Wheaton lost, killed and wounded, 470; and Getty, 677.

The killed and wounded in the Sixth Corps were 1926, including 109 of its artillery.

Much credit for the victory was given by Sheridan to the cavalry.

Its total loss, in the three divisions under Torbert, was, killed, 2 officers and 27 men; wounded, 9 officers and 115 men; total, 153; not one fourth the number killed and wounded in my infantry division alone. The killed and wounded in my old brigade, under Colonel Ball, were 421.

The casualties of the Union Army are shown by the following official table:(29)

Killed. Wounded. Captured or Missing. Aggregate.

Officers. Officers. Officers.

| Men. | Men. | Men.

Sixth Army Corps 23 275 103 1525 6 194 2126 Nineteenth Army Corps 19 238 109 1127 14 776 2383 Army of West Virginia 7 41 17 253 10 530 858 Provisional Division 1 11 6 66 18 102 Cavalry 2 27 9 115 43 196 --- --- --- ---- --- ---- ---- Grand total 52 529 244 3186 30 1561 5665

The table includes 156 of the artillery, killed or wounded.

The total Union killed and wounded was 4074.

The dead and wounded in the Sixth Corps, and in some other of the infantry divisions approximated twenty per cent. of those engaged.

This was larger by six per cent. than similar losses in the French army at Marengo, where Napoleon won a victory which enabled him, later, to wear the iron crown of Charlemagne; by six per cent. than at Austerlitz, the battle of the "Three Emperors"; by eight per cent. than in Wellington's army at Waterloo, where Napoleon's star of glory set; or in either the German or French army at Gravelotte, or at Sedan, where Napoleon III. laid down his imperial crown; and larger by about fifteen per cent. than the average like losses in the Austrian and French armies at Hohenlinden.

"Where drums beat at dead of night, Commanding the fires of death to light."

The number killed and wounded in this battle is far below that in some other great battles of the Rebellion, yet the loss for the Union Army alone was only a little below the aggregate like losses in the American army from Lexington to Yorktown (1775-1781), and approximately the same as in the American army in the Mexican War, from Palo Alto to the City of Mexico (1846-1848).(30)

If either of two things had not occurred prior to the battle, the result of it might have been different. Had Early not precipitated an attack with an infantry division and Rosser's cavalry on the 13th of October, Wright, with the Sixth Corps, would have gone to Petersburg; and had the _fake_ (Longstreet) dispatch of the 16th not been flagged from the Confederate signal station on Three Top Mountain, Torbert, with the cavalry, would have been east of the Blue Ridge on the intended raid. But for the Longstreet dispatch, Sheridan most likely would have tarried in Washington or delayed his movements on his return trip. Could the Sixth Corps, could the cavalry, or could Sheridan have been spared from the battle?