Slavery and Four Years of War Part 53

( 1) _Memoirs of Grant_, vol. ii., p. 151.

( 2) _War Records_, vol. x.x.xvi., Part II., p. 273, 291. _Butler's Book_, p. 677.

( 3) _Ibid_., vol. xl., p. 168.

( 4) _War Records_, vol. xl., Part II., p. 169.

( 5) The memorable "Mine explosion," under the immediate direction of Burnside, occurred July 30, 1864.

( 6) _War Records_, vol. x.x.xvii., Part I., p. 97.

( 7) _War Records_, vol. x.x.xvii., Part I., p. 99, 101, 618-19, 683.

( 8) _Ibid_., 346, 347.

( 9) _Ibid_., 302.

(10) _War Records_, vol. x.x.xvii. Part I., p. 102.

(11) _Ibid_., 200.

(12) _War Records_, vol. x.x.xvii., Part I., p. 201-2.

(13) _Ibid_., pp. 206-7.

(14) _War Records_, vol. x.x.xvii., Part I., pp. 348-9.

(15) _War Records_, vol. x.x.xvii., Part I., pp. 349, 767, 769.

(16) _Ibid_., Part II., pp. 261, 284.

(17) _Ibid_., Part I., p. 582.

(18) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 709, 719, 721.

CHAPTER VIII Personal Mention of Generals Sheridan, Wright, and Ricketts, and Mrs. Ricketts--Also Generals Crook and Hayes--Battle of Opequon, Under Sheridan, September, 1864, and Incidents

I had so far recovered from the wound received in the Wilderness as to enable me to reach Baltimore, August 25th, on the way to the army, though my arm was yet in splints and a sling. In response to a telegram, the War Department directed me to report to General Sheridan. I reached Harper's Ferry the next day. When I reported to Sheridan, he looked at me fiercely, and observed: "I want fighting men, not cripples. What can I do with you?" I asked him to order me to General Wright for a.s.signment to my old brigade.

He seemed to hesitate. I informed him of my familiarity with the Shenandoah Valley, and told him I thought I was able for duty. He gave the desired order reluctantly.

Sheridan did not impress me favorably then. He seemed restless, nervous, and petulant. I now think I somewhat misjudged him. He was thirty-three years of age,( 1) in full vigor of manly strength.

He had, both in infantry and cavalry commands, won renown as a soldier, though his highest fame was yet to be achieved. He was short of stature, especially broad across the shoulders, with legs rather short even for his height. His head was quite large, nose prominent, eyes full; he had a strong face, and was of a cheerful, social disposition, rather than retiring and taciturn. Irish characteristics predominated in him, and when not on duty he was disposed to be rollicking and free and easy. He was not hard to approach by his inferiors, but he was not always discriminating in the language he used to them. He did not seem to be a deliberate thinker or reasoner, and often gave the impression that his decisions or opinions were off-hand and not the result of reflection. In the quiet of camp he seemed to be less able to combine or plan great movements than in emergencies in the field. In a battle he often showed the excitement of his impetuous nature, but he never lost his head or showed any disposition save to push the enemy.

These are some opinions formed after seeing him in several great battles, and knowing him personally through all the later years of his life. It remains to say that he was an honest man, and devotedly loyal to his friends. His fame as a soldier of a high cla.s.s will endure.

Generals Wright and Ricketts each received me warmly, and, as always, showed me the utmost kindness.

Horatio G. Wright was a skilled and educated soldier, of the engineer cla.s.s. He, like the great Thomas, was of a most lovable disposition and temperament. He had held many important commands during the war; had failed in none, and yet uncomplainingly suffered himself to be a.s.signed from the command of a department to that of a division of troops. He was unfortunate once, as we shall see, and the glory of his chief shone so brightly as to dim the subordinate's well earned fame. But I must not antic.i.p.ate. Wright was especially fitted to command infantry--a corps or more in battle. His intercourse with his officers was kindly and a.s.suring under all circ.u.mstances. His characteristics as a soldier were of the una.s.suming, st.u.r.dy, solid kind--never pyrotechnic. He was modest, and not specially ambitious. In brief, he was a great soldier.

James B. Ricketts was also a highly educated soldier, and when I met him in the Valley he had been in many battles. He was a man of great modesty, of quiet demeanor, and of the most generous impulses. He never spoke unkindly of any person, and was always just to superiors and inferiors. He was wounded at Bull Run (1861), and captured and confined for many months in prison at Richmond.

His heroic wife, f.a.n.n.y Ricketts, on learning of his being wounded, joined him on the battle-field, and shared his six months' captivity to nurse him.( 2) The special mention of Wright and Ricketts and his wife must be pardoned by the reader, as they were of my best friends, not only during, but since the war. Mrs. Ricketts was often in camp with her husband, and though a most refined lady, was, by disposition, education, and spirit quite capable of commanding an army corps. She possessed great executive ability.

Two other officers whose acquaintance I formed in the Valley in 1864, and who were in after life my friends, I venture to mention also.

George Crook was an ideal soldier. He was born near Dayton, Ohio, September 8, 1828, and was a West Point graduate. He was of medium stature, possessed of a gentle but heroic spirit, and justly won renown in the War of the Rebellion, and subsequently in Indian wars. He died suddenly in Chicago, March 21, 1890. His body is buried at Arlington in the midst of his fallen war-comrades. He left no children. His fame as a patriot and soldier belongs to history.

Rutherford B. Hayes, a brigade commander in the opening of Sheridan's Valley campaign, was born at Delaware, Ohio, October 4, 1822. He was not educated for a soldier. He was a man of medium height, strong body, sandy hair, sanguine temperament, and was always self- possessed, and gentle in his intercourse with others. He was a most efficient officer and had the power to inspire his men to heroic deeds. He was twice wounded, and retired at the end of the war distinguished as a volunteer soldier. Subsequently he served a term in Congress, three terms as Governor of Ohio, and was President of the United States 1877 to 1881.

I a.s.sumed command of my old brigade on the 26th of August, near Halltown. Its ranks had been much depleted, yet it numbered about 2000 effective men, including recruits. It was then composed of the 6th Maryland, 110th, 122d, and 126th Ohio, 67th and 138th Pennsylvania, and 9th New York Heavy Artillery serving as infantry.

I found still with it, in command of regiments, Colonels John W.

Horn and Wm. H. Ball, Lieutenant-Colonels Otho H. Binkley and Aaron W. Ebright, who had each pa.s.sed safely through the recent b.l.o.o.d.y campaigns.

Sheridan's cavalry made daily reconnoissances, and frequently engaged the enemy in advance of Charlestown. A cavalry reconnoissance was made on the 29th which brought on an attack, near Smithfield, by Fitz Lee's cavalry supported by infantry. The report came that our cavalry under General Wesley Merritt were being driven back, and Ricketts was ordered to go to its relief. As I was familiar with the roads and country, he sent me forward with my brigade and some attached troops. We met our cavalry about two miles from Smithfield retiring in a somewhat broken condition. I deployed my command on its left and pushed the enemy back to a ridge about a mile north of that place. Here he made a stand, displaying considerable force. I decided to attack at once. While preparing for an advance, I discovered what appeared to be a considerable body of cavalry forming for a charge on my left flank. My line was single, and I was without support in that direction. At this juncture a small number of mounted officers and men appeared on a knoll to my rear. I supposed them to be a body of cavalry sent forward to partic.i.p.ate in the engagement. I rode to advise the officer in command of the threatened danger. I found there Sheridan and his staff and escort; also Merritt and some of his staff.

Sheridan had ridden to the front to see the situation. He seemed surprised to see me, and asked sharply, "What are _you_ doing here?"

There was no time then for parley, as my command had already begun to advance. I told him of the danger, and pointed out to him the enemy's cavalry on our left, and asked for a force to meet it. He responded that he had no force on hand. I suggested that the cavalry with him, if immediately thrown well out to the left in a threatening position, would answer the purpose. He replied: "---- ----, that is my escort." I rejoined that it was needed badly, and might save disaster. With a somewhat amused expression on his face he ordered it to move as I indicated.( 3)

About the time of this incident a puff of smoke from a rifle, fired on the heights held by the enemy about a mile distant, was seen.

Almost instantly a familiar _thud_ was heard, and all looked around to see who of the a.s.sembled officers had been hit. Major (Surgeon) W. H. Rulison (9th New York Cavalry), serving as Medical Director of the Cavalry, was killed by the shot.( 4)

The enemy was driven from the ridge and we were soon in possession of Smithfield.( 5) Merritt's cavalry took post at the bridge, and the infantry were withdrawn to camp near Charlestown.

Sheridan threw his whole army forward on September 3d, the infantry stretching from Clifton farm on the right to Berryville on the left. On this day there was short but fierce fighting between Averell and McCausland's cavalry at Bunker Hill, in which the latter was defeated with loss in prisoners, wagons, and supplies, and also between Crook's command and Kershaw's division. The latter seems to have run, at nightfall, unexpectedly, into Crook, near Berryville, and was severely punished. Kershaw was of Longstreet's corps and was then under orders to return to Lee's army at Petersburg. No other event of greater importance than a reconnoissance occurred until the 19th.

Sheridan's army was then composed of the Sixth Corps, under Wright --three divisions, commanded, respectively, by Generals David A.

Russell, George W. Getty, and James B. Ricketts, and an artillery brigade of six batteries; the Nineteenth Corps under Emory--two divisions and four batteries; Eighth Corps (Army of West Virginia) under Crook--two divisions, and an artillery brigade of three batteries. Besides the troops mentioned, there were three divisions of cavalry and eight light or horse artillery batteries, commanded by General Alfred A. T. Torbert. The cavalry divisions were commanded, respectively, by Generals Wesley Merritt, Wm. W. Averell, and James H. Wilson.( 6) Although there were in Sheridan's command about 50,000 men present for duty, they were so scattered, guarding railroads and various positions, that he was not able to take into battle more then 25,000 men of all arms.( 7) Early had in the Valley District Ewell's corps, Breckinridge's command, and at least one division of Longstreet's corps, Fitz Lee's and McCausland's cavalry divisions and other cavalry organizations, and it is probable that he was not able to bring into battle more then 25,000 effective men. These estimates will hold good through the months of September and October, though some additions and changes took place in each army. Grant met Sheridan at Charlestown the 16th, to arrange a plan for the latter to attack Early. Sheridan drew from his pocket a plat showing the location of the opposing armies, roads, streams, etc., and detailed to Grant a plan of battle of his own, saying he could whip Early. Grant approved the plan, and did not even exhibit one of his own, previously prepared. This meeting was on Friday.

Sheridan was to move the next Monday.( 8)

Sheridan gives much credit to Miss Rebecca M. Wright of Winchester for sending him information by a messenger that Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's artillery, under General Anderson, had started to rejoin General Lee.( 9)

The enemy was in camp about five miles north of Winchester at Stephenson's Depot, his cavalry extending eastward to the crossing of the Opequon by the Berryville pike. Our camps were, in general, about six miles to the northward of Opequon Creek. Sheridan's plan submitted to Grant was to avoid Early's army, pa.s.s to the east of Winchester, and strike the Valley pike at Newtown, seven miles south of Winchester, and there, being in Early's rear, force him to give battle.(10) Early moved two divisions to Martinsburg on the 18th, which caused Sheridan suddenly to change his plan and determine to attack the remaining divisions at Stephenson's Depot.

Early, however, did not tarry at Martinsburg, but learning there of Grant's visit to Sheridan, and fearing some aggressive movement, returned the same night, leaving Gordon's division at Bunker's Hill with orders to start at daylight the next morning for the Depot.

Gordon reached the Depot about the time the battle opened.(11)

Sheridan's final plan for the expected battle was set forth in orders issued on the 18th. It was for Wilson's cavalry and Wright's corps to force a crossing of Opequon Creek on the Berryville pike.

Emory was to report to Wright and follow him. As soon as the open country, south of the Opequon, was reached, Wright was to put both corps in line of battle fronting Stephenson's Depot. Crook's command was to move to the same crossing of the Opequon and be held there as a reserve. Merritt and Averell's cavalry divisions under Torbert were to move to the right in the direction of Bunker Hill.(12)

The army moved at 2 A.M. of the 19th as ordered. Wilson's cavalry succeeded in crossing the creek and driving the enemy's cavalry through a deep defile some two miles towards Winchester. Wright followed, Getty's division leading, Ricketts and Russell following.

When the defile was pa.s.sed, Getty went into position on the left of the pike, Ricketts on the right, both in two lines, and Russell's division was held in reserve. My brigade was the right of the corps as formed for battle. The only battery up was put in position on the right. The Nineteenth Corps was ordered to form on the right of the Sixth and to connect with it. Up to this time no severe fighting had taken place. Early was forced to move the main part of his army to his right to cover the Berryville and Winchester pike. Upon our side much delay occurred in getting up the artillery and the Nineteenth Corps, during which time we were exposed to an incessant fire from the enemy's guns. The Nineteenth did not make a close connection on the right of the Sixth. Not until 11.40 A.M.

was the order given for a general attack. Ricketts' division was to keep its left on the pike. As soon as the advance commenced the Sixth Corps was exposed to a heavy artillery fire from the enemy's batteries, but it went forward gallantly for about one mile, driving or capturing all before it. General Ricketts, in his report of September 27th, described what took place:

"The Nineteenth Corps did not move and keep connection with my right, and the turnpike upon which the division was dressing bore to the left, causing a wide interval between the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps. As the lines advanced the interval became greater. The enemy, discovering this fact, hurled a large body of men towards the interval and threatened to take my right in flank. Colonel Keifer at once caused the 138th and 67th Pennsylvania and 110th Ohio to break their connection with the right of the remainder of his brigade and move towards the advancing columns of the enemy.

These three regiments most gallantly met the overwhelming ma.s.ses of the enemy and held them in check. As soon as the Nineteenth Corps engaged the enemy the force in my front commenced slowly retiring. The three regiments named were pushed forward until they came upon two batteries (eight guns), silencing them and compelling the enemy to abandon them. The three regiments had arrived within less than two hundred yards of the two batteries when the Nineteenth Corps, after a most gallant resistance, gave way. These guns would have been taken by our troops had our flanks been properly protected.

The enemy at once came upon my right flank in large force; successful resistance was no longer possible; the order was given for our men to fall back on our second line, but the enemy advancing at the time in force threw us temporarily in confusion."

The repulse of the Nineteenth, and consequently of my three regiments, left Breckinridge's corps full on our right flank, threatening disaster to the army. Wright promptly put in Russell's division, until then in reserve, and the progress of the enemy was arrested.

Here the brave David A. Russell lost his life. My report, written September 27, 1864, described, in general, a further part taken by my brigade:

"The broken troops of my brigade were halted and reformed in a woods behind troops from the reserve, which had come forward to fill up the interval. As soon as reformed, they were moved forward again over the same ground they had traversed the first time.