Slavery and Four Years of War Part 43

John W. Warrington, Private, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1899.]

John B. Elam, Private, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1899.]

Brevet Major-General J. Warren Keifer and Staff, 1865, Third Division, Sixth Army Corps

J. Warren Keifer, Major-General of Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1898.]

President McKinley and Major-Generals Keifer, Shafter, Lawton, and Wheeler [From a photograph taken on ship-deck at Savannah, Ga., December 17, 1898.]

SLAVERY AND FOUR YEARS OF WAR

CHAPTER I General Observations on Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville --Battles at Winchester under General Milroy--His Defeat and Retreat to Harper's Ferry--With Incidents

The Confederate Army, under Lee, invaded Maryland in 1862, and after the drawn battle of Antietam, September 17th, it retired through the Shenandoah Valley and the mountain gaps behind the Rappahannock.

McClellan had failed to take Richmond, and although his army had fought hard battles on the Chickahominy and at Malvern Hill, it won no victories that bore fruits save in lists of dead and wounded, and his army, on being withdrawn from the James in August, 1862, did not effectively sustain General John Pope at the Second Bull Run. On being given command of the combined Union forces at and about Washington, McClellan again had a large and splendidly equipped army under him. He at first exhibited some energy in moving it into Maryland after Lee, but by his extreme caution and delays suffered Harper's Ferry to be taken (September 15, 1862), with 10,000 men and an immense supply of arms and stores, and finally, when fortune smiled on his army at Antietam, he allowed it to lay quietly on its arms a whole day and long enough to enable Lee to retreat across the Potomac, where he was permitted to leisurely withdraw, practically unmolested, southward. The critical student of the battle of Antietam will learn of much desperate fighting on both sides, with no clearly defined general plan of conducting the battle on either side. As Lee fought on the defensive, he could content himself with conforming the movements of his forces to those of the Union Army. Stonewall Jackson, after maintaining a short, spirited battle against Hooker's corps, withdrew his corps from the engagement at seven o'clock in the morning and did not return to the field until 4 P.M.( 1)

Generally the Union Army was fought by divisions, and seldom more than two were engaged at the same time, often only one. In this way some of the divisions, for want of proper supports, were cut to pieces, and others were not engaged at all. Acting on interior lines, Lee was enabled to concentrate against the Union attacks and finally to repulse them. Notwithstanding this mode of conducting the battle, the Confederate Army was roughly handled and lost heavily.

General Ambrose E. Burnside late in the day succeeded in crossing Antietam Creek at the Stone Bridge and planting himself well on the Confederate right flank. McClellan also had, at night, many fresh troops ready and eager for the next day's battle. Considerable parts of his army had not been engaged, and reinforcements came.

The two armies confronted each other all day on the 18th, being partly engaged in burying the dead, as though a truce existed, and at night Lee withdrew his army into Virginia.( 2)

Indecisive as this battle was, it is ever to be memorable as, on its issue, President Lincoln kept a promise to "himself and his Maker."( 3) On September 22, 1862, five days later, he issued a preliminary proclamation announcing his purpose to promulgate, January 1, 1863, a war measure, declaring free the slaves in all States or parts of States remaining at that time in rebellion. He had long before the battle of Antietam contemplated taking this action, and hence had prepared this proclamation, and promised himself to issue it on the Union Army winning a victory. The driving of Lee's army out of Maryland, and thus relieving Washington from further menace, was accepted by him as a fulfilment of the self-imposed condition.

McClellan was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac while at Orleans, Virginia, November 7, 1862, and Burnside became his successor. McClellan never again held any command.

Burnside moved the army to Falmouth, Virginia, opposite Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock. Though only urged to prepare for the offensive, he precipitated an attack on the Confederate Army, then strongly intrenched on the heights of Fredericksburg. He suffered a disastrous repulse (December 14, 1862) and next day withdrew his army across the Rappahannock to his camps.

Burnside was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac January 25, 1863, and Major-General Joseph Hooker succeeded him.

The battle of Chancellorsville was fought, May 1 to 5, 1863, in the Wilderness country, south of the Rapidan, and resulted in the defeat of the Union Army and its falling back to its former position at Falmouth.

The defeats at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville led to a general belief that another invasion of the North would be made by Lee's army. Such an invasion involved Milroy's command at Winchester, then in the Middle Department, commanded by Major-General Robert C. Schenck, whose headquarters were at Baltimore.

This much in retrospect seems necessary to give a better understanding of the events soon to be mentioned.

Soon after Chancellorsville, the Confederate forces in the upper Shenandoah Valley became more active, and frequent indecisive conflicts between them and our scouting parties took place. Our regular scouts, who generally travelled by night in Confederate dress, brought in rumors almost every day of an intended attack on Winchester by troops from Lee's army. In May I was given special charge of these scouts. So uniform were their reports as to the proposed attacks that I gave credence to them, and advised Milroy that unless he was soon to be largely reinforced it would be well to retire from his exposed position. He refused to believe that anything more than a cavalry raid into the Valley or against him would be made, and he felt strong enough to defeat it. He argued that Lee would not dare to detach any part of his infantry force from the front of the Army of the Potomac. But in addition to the reports referred to, I learned as early as the 1st of June, through correspondence secretly brought within our lines from an officer of Lee's army to which I gained access, that Lee contemplated a grand movement North, and that his army would reach Winchester on June 10, 1863. The Secessionists of Winchester generally believed we would be attacked on that day. I gave this information to Milroy, but he still persisted in believing the whole story was gotten up to cause him to disgracefully abandon the Valley.( 4)

The 10th of June came, and the Confederate Army failed to appear.

This confirmed Milroy in his disbelief in a contemplated attack with a strong force, and my credulity was ridiculed. As early, however, as June 8th, Milroy wired Schenck at Baltimore that he had information that Lee had mounted an infantry division to join Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper; that the cavalry force there was "probably more than twice 12,000," and that there was "doubtless a mighty raid on foot."( 5) Colonel Don Piatt, Schenck's chief of staff, visited and inspected the post at Winchester on the 10th and 11th, and when he reached Martinsburg, Va., on his return on the 11th, he dispatched Milroy to immediately take steps to remove his command to Harper's Ferry, leaving at Winchester only a lookout which could readily fall back to Harper's Ferry.( 6) This order was sent in the light of what Piatt deemed the proper construction of a dispatch of that date from Halleck to Schenck, and from the latter to him. Milroy at once wired Schenck of the receipt of the Piatt dispatch, saying:

"I have sufficient force to hold the place safely, but if any force is withdrawn the balance will be captured in twenty-four hours.

All should go, or none."

This brought, June 12th, a dispatch from Schenck to Milroy in this language:

"Lt.-Col. Piatt has ... misunderstood me, and somewhat exceeded his instructions. You will make all the required preparations for withdrawing, but will hold your position in the meantime."

On the 12th Milroy reported skirmishes with Confederate cavalry on the Front Royal and Strasburg roads, adding:

"I am perfectly certain of my ability to hold this place. Nothing but cavalry appears yet. Let them come."

As late as the 13th, Halleck telegraphed Schenck, in answer to an inquiry, that he had no reliable information as to rebel infantry being in the Valley, and the same day Schenck wired his chief of staff at Harper's Ferry to "Instruct General Milroy to use great caution, risking nothing unnecessarily, and be prepared for falling back in good order if overmatched."

Milroy advised Schenck of fighting at Winchester on the 13th, and from General Kelley, on the same day, Schenck learned for the first time that General Lee was on his way to drive Milroy out of Winchester. Schenck at once _attempted_ to telegraph Milroy to "fall back, fighting, if necessary, and to keep the road to Harper's Ferry."

Halleck wired Schenck on the 14th: "It is reported that Longstreet and Ewell's corps have pa.s.sed through Culpeper to Sperryville, towards the Valley."( 7)

This was the first intimation that came from Halleck or Hooker that Lee's army contemplated moving in the direction of the Valley, or that there was any apprehension that it might escape the vigilance of the Army of the Potomac, supposed to be confronting it or at least watching its movements. Another dispatch came on the 14th to General Schenck as follows:

"Get Milroy from Winchester to Harper's Ferry if possible. He will be 'gobbled up' if he remains, if he is not already past salvation.

"A. Lincoln, "President United States."

It remains to narrate what did take place at Winchester, and then, in the full light of the facts, to decided upon whom censure or credit should fall.

When, on the 14th, Halleck announced that Longstreet and Ewell's corps "have pa.s.sed through Culpeper to Sperryville towards the Valley," we had been fighting Ewell's corps, or parts of it, for two days at Winchester, three days' march from Culpeper, and other portions of Lee's army had reached the Valley and Martinsburg.

The report that Winchester was to have been attacked on June 10th was true, but the advance of the Union cavalry south of the Rappahannock, and its battle on the 9th at Brandy Station, north of Culpeper Court House (Lee's then headquarters), so disorganized the Confederate cavalry as to cause a delay in the movement of Ewell's corps into the Valley, then proceeding _via_ Front Royal.

On the night of the 12th of June my scouts found it impossible to advance more than four or five miles on the Front Royal, Strasburg, and Cedar Creek roads before encountering Confederate cavalry pickets. This indicated, as was the fact, that close behind them were heavy bodies of infantry which it was desired to closely mask.

At midnight I had an interview at my own solicitation with Milroy at his headquarters, when the whole subject of our situation was discussed. I was not advised of the orders or dispatches he had received, nor of his dispatches to Schenck expressing confidence in his ability to hold Winchester. Milroy persisted in the notion that only cavalry were before him, and he was anxious to fight them and especially averse to retreating under circ.u.mstances that might subject him to the charge of cowardice. He also sincerely desired to hold the Valley and protect the Union residents. He reminded me fiercely that I had believed in the attack coming on the 10th, and it had turned out that I was mistaken. I could make no answer to this save to suggest that the cavalry battle at Brandy Station had operated to postpone the attack.

During my acquaintance with Milroy he had evinced confidence in and friendship for me; now he manifested much annoyance over my persistence in urging him to order a retreat at once, and finally he dismissed me rather summarily.( 8)

Early the next morning I received an order to report with my regiment near Union Mills on the Strasburg pike, and to move upon the Cedar Creek road, located west of and extending, in general, parallel with the Strasburg pike. It was soon ascertained that the enemy had ma.s.sed a heavy force upon that road about three miles south of Winchester. A section of Carlin's battery under Lieutenant Theaker reported to me, and with it my regiment moved about a mile southward, keeping well on the ridge between the pike and the Cedar Creek road. The enemy kept under cover, and not having orders to bring on an engagement I retired the troops to the junction of the two roads. About 2 P.M. I was informed that Milroy desired me to make a strong reconnoissance and develop the strength and position of the enemy. To strengthen my forces, the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Moss, and a squadron of the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry, were a.s.signed to me. I moved forward promptly with the 12th on the left on the plain, the infantry and artillery in the centre covering the Strasburg pike, and the squadron on the ridge to my right, which extended parallel with the pike. We proceeded in this order about a mile, when my skirmishers became closely engaged with those of the enemy. It was soon apparent to me that the enemy extended along a wide front, has advance being only a thin cover. But as my orders were to develop the enemy, I brought my whole command into action, drove in his advance line and with the artillery sh.e.l.led the woods behind this line. We suffered some loss, but pressed forward until the enemy fell back to the woods on the left of Kearnstown. My artillery opened with canister, and for a few moments our front seemed to be cleared. But my flankers now reported the enemy turning my right with at least a brigade of infantry. I therefore withdrew slowly and in good order, embracing every possible opportunity to halt and open fire. Reinforcements were reported on the way. I directed that they should, on their arrival, be posted on the high ground to the right of the pike in front of the bridge at Union (or Barton's) Mills to cover our retreat, which must be made with the artillery and infantry over this bridge.

Colonel Moss, not believing he could cross the tail-race with its embankments and the stream below the Mills, commenced moving his cavalry towards the bridge. I turned him back with imperative orders to cover the left flank as long as necessary or possible, then find a crossing below the Mills. Unfortunately, when the artillery reached the bridge in readiness to cross, it was found occupied by the 123d Ohio, Colonel T. W. Wilson commanding, marching by the flank to my relief under the guidance of Captain W. L. Shaw, a staff officer of General Elliott. This regiment was directed, as soon as it cleared the bridge, to deploy to the right, advance upon the high ground, and engage the enemy then pressing forward in great numbers. Before Colonel Wilson could get his regiment into battle-line it was under a destructive fire and lost heavily.

Nevertheless, though the regiment was a comparatively new one, it soon successfully engaged the enemy, and drove back his advance.

A more gallant fight, under all the circ.u.mstances, was never made.

It enabled me to take the artillery over the bridge, and to withdraw to a new position from which we could cover the bridge with our artillery and easily repulse the enemy. Colonels Wilson and Moss were each withdrawn in good order, the former above and the latter below the bridge. Gordon's brigade of Early's division, in an attempt to cross the bridge, was driven back with considerable loss, and night came to end this opening battle of Winchester. A Confederate prisoner was taken to General Milroy (who, with General Elliott, joined me at nightfall), who frankly said he was of Hays'

Louisiana brigade, Early's division, Ewell's corps; that Ewell was on the field commanding in person. Milroy until then was unwilling to believe that troops other than cavalry were in his front.

Besides Early's division of Ewell's corps, we fought Maryland troops which had long been operating in the upper Valley, consisting of a battalion of infantry (Colonel Herbert), a battalion of cavalry (Major W. W. Goldsborough), and a battery of artillery.( 9) I was not forced to order a retreat until the object of the advance had been fully attained, and then only when Hays' Louisiana brigade appeared on my right flank, and the cavalry there were broken and driven back. General John B. Gordon (10) (since Senator from Georgia), who confronted me with five infantry regiments, reports of this battle:

"About 4 o'clock in the afternoon I deployed a line of skirmishers, and moved forward to the attack, holding two regiments in reserve.

After advancing several hundred yards, I found it necessary to bring into line these two regiments on the right and on the left.

The enemy's skirmishers retreated on his battle-line, a portion of which occupied a strong position behind a stone wall, but from which he was driven. A battery which I had hoped to capture was rapidly withdrawn. In this charge my brigade lost seventy-five men, including some efficient officers."(11)

The total loss of the enemy in this engagement must have been at least as many more. The Union loss, of all arms, was not more than one hundred. It was now obvious Milroy's command could not hold Winchester. I a.s.sumed a retreat would be undertaken in the night, but in a brief interview with Milroy at the close of the battle he said nothing on the subject, and the reproof of the night before warned me to make no further suggestions to him with respect to his duty in this emergency.

General Elliott, my immediate superior, informed me, as I rode late at night through Winchester to my camp on the heights northwest of the city, that he thought it was too late to retreat on Harper's Ferry. I suggested that the Romney, Pughtown, and Apple-Pie Ridge, or Back Creek roads were open, and that we could safely retire over one or more of them. He said he would call Milroy's attention to my suggestion and recommend these lines of retreat, but if he did the suggestion was not favorably considered. At daybreak on the 14th of June I received a written order to take the 110th Ohio Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. N. Foster, one company of the 116th Ohio Infantry, commanded by Captain Arkenoe, and L Company of the 5th Regular Battery, six guns, commanded by Lieutenant Wallace F. Randolph, and occupy an open, isolated earthwork located three fourths of a mile west of the fortifications on the heights between the Romney and Pughtown roads, but in sight of the main works. The earthwork was barely sufficient for one regiment. The troops a.s.signed me were soon in position, and quiet reigned in my front. The enemy appeared to be inactive. Milroy advised me that the Pughtown and Romney roads were picketed and patrolled by cavalry, and I was not, therefore, charged with the duty of watching them.

About 3 P.M. I rode to the main fort, and directed my horse to be unsaddled and fed while I sought an interview with Milroy. I found him in high spirits. He complimented me on the strong fight I put up the previous day, and declared his belief that the enemy were only trying to scare him out of the Valley. He referred to the quiet of the day as evidence that they had no purpose to a.s.sail him in his works. He said the cavalry had just reported no enemy in my front on any of the roads.

About 4 P.M. I started leisurely to get my horse to return to the earthwork, when, from the face of Round Mountain, about one mile to the southwest of my command, not less than twenty guns opened fire on it. I dismounted a pa.s.sing wagon-master, and on his horse in less than five minutes reached the foot of the hill on which the earthwork was situated, and then, hastening on foot through a storm of shot and exploding sh.e.l.l, I was soon in it. Lieutenant Randolph with his six rifle guns replied to the enemy as long as possible, but his battery was soon largely disabled, the horses mostly killed, and most of the ammunition chests exploded. Two of his guns only could be kept in position for the antic.i.p.ated a.s.sault.

About 6 P.M., under cover of the cannonade, and protected by some timber and the nature of the ground, Hays' Louisiana brigade of five regiments, supported by Smith and Hoke's brigades, advanced to the a.s.sault. My men stood well to their work, and the two guns fired canister into the enemy. Many Confederate officers and men were seen to fall, and the head of the column wavered, but there were no trenches or abattis to obstruct the enemy's advance. There was stubborn fighting over the low breastworks, and some fighting inside of them, but not until our exposed flanks were attacked did I order a retreat. The battery was lost, but most of the command reached the main fortification safely, though exposed to the fire of the enemy for most of the distance. Captain Arkenoe was killed, and Lieutenant Paris Horney of the 110th Ohio was captured. Our loss in killed, wounded, and captured was small. General Milroy, from an observation-stand on a flag-staff at the main fort, witnessed this affair. In his report of it he says:

"The enemy opened upon me with at least four full batteries, some of his guns being of his longest range, under cover of which fire he precipitated a column at least _ten thousand_ strong upon the outer work held by Colonel Keifer, which, after a stubborn resistance, he carried."(12)