Slavery and Four Years of War Part 28

On the 10th of July the 4th and 9th Ohio Regiments with Capt. C.

O. Loomis' battery (Cold Water, Mich.), under the direction of Lieut. O. M. Poe of the engineers, made a reconnoissance on the enemy's front, which served to lead McClellan to believe the enemy's "intrenchments were held by a large force, with several guns in position to command the front approaches, and that a direct a.s.sault would result in heavy and unnecessary loss of life."

This belief, he says, determined him to make an effort to turn the enemy's flank and attack him in the rear.

Rosecrans, however, has the honor of submitting, about 10 P.M. of the night of July 10th, a plan for turning the enemy's position, which, with some reluctance, McClellan directed him to carry out.

Rosecrans' brigade consisted of the 8th, 10th, and 13th Indiana, 19th Ohio and Burdsell's company of cavalry, numbering in all 1917 men.

The plan proposed by Rosecrans and approved by McClellan was first suggested by a young man by the name of Hart, whose father's house stood on the pike near the summit of Rich Mountain, two miles in the rear of Pegram's position. Young Hart had been driven from home by the presence of Confederates, and was eager to do what he could for the Union cause. He sought Rosecrans, and proposed to lead him by an unfrequented route around the enemy's _left_, and under cover of the dense timber, by a considerable circuit, to the crest of Rich Mountain, thence to the road at his old home in the enemy's rear. He so impressed himself on Rosecrans and those around him as to secure their confidence in him and his plan. In arranging details it was ordered that Rosecrans, guided by Hart, should, at daylight of the 11th, leave the main road about one mile in front of the enemy's fortifications, keep under cover of the declivities of the mountain spurs, avoid using an axe or anything to make a noise, reach the road at the mountain summit, establish himself there as firmly as possible, and from thence attack the enemy's rear by the main road. While Rosecrans was doing this McClellan was to move the body of the army close under the enemy's guns and be in readiness to a.s.sault the front on its being known that Rosecrans was ready to attack in the rear.

The whole distance the flanking column would have to make was estimated to be five miles, but it proved to be much greater. The mountain was not only steep, but extremely rocky and rugged.

Pegram, after inspection, had regarded a movement by his left flank to his rear as absolutely impossible.( 3)

His right flank, however, was not so well protected by nature, and to avoid surprise from this direction he kept pickets and scouts well out to his right. Hart regarded a movement around the enemy's right as certain of discovery, and hence not likely to be successful.

Promptly at day-dawn Rosecrans pa.s.sed into the mountain fastness, whither the adventurous hunter only had rarely penetrated, accompanied by Col. F. W. Lander, a volunteer aide-de-camp of McClellan's staff --a man of much frontier experience in the West. In a rain lasting five hours the column slowly struggled through the dense timber, up the mountain, crossing and recrossing ravines by tortuous ways, and by 1 P.M. it had arrived near the mountain top, but yet some distance to the southward of where the Beverly road led through a depression, over the summit. After a brief rest, when, on nearing the road at Hart's house, it was discovered and fired on unexpectedly by the enemy.

To understand how it turned out that the enemy was found near the summit where he was not expected, it is necessary to recur to what McClellan was doing in the enemy's front. Hart had a.s.sured Rosecrans there was no hostile force on the summit of the mountain, and on encountering the Confederates there, Rosecrans for the time suspected his guide of treachery.

But first an incident occurred in the 3d Ohio Regiment worth mentioning. I. H. Marrow, its Colonel, who professed to be in confidential relations with McClellan, returned from headquarters about midnight of the 10th, and a.s.suming to be possessed of the plans for the next day, and pregnant with the great events to follow, called out the regiment, and solemnly addressed it in substance as follows:

"Soldiers of the Third: The a.s.sault on the enemy's works will be made in the early morning. The Third will lead the column. The secessionists have ten thousand men and forty rifled cannon. They are strongly fortified. They have more man and more cannon than we have. They will cut us to pieces. Marching to attack such an enemy, so intrenched and so armed, is marching to a butcher-shop, rather than to a battle. There is b.l.o.o.d.y work ahead. Many of you, boys, will go out who will never come back again."( 4)

This speech, thus delivered to soldiers unused to battle was calculated to cause the credulous to think of friends, home--death, and it certainly had no tendency to inspire the untried volunteers with hope and confidence. The speech was, of course, the wild, silly vaporings of a weak man.

I was sent with a detachment of the 3d Ohio to picket the road in front of the enemy and in advance of the point from whence Rosecrans had left it to ascend the mountain. My small force took up a position less than one half mile from the enemy's fortified position, driving back his pickets at the dawn of day through the dense timber on each side of the road. About 9 A.M. a mounted orderly from McClellan came galloping from camp carrying a message for Rosecrans, said to be a countermand of former orders, and requiring him to halt until another and better plan of movement could be made. The messenger was, as he stoutly insisted, directed to overtake Rosecrans by pursuing a route to the enemy's _right_, whereas Rosecrans had gone to our _right_ and the enemy's _left_. Of this the orderly was not only informed by me, but he was warned of the proximity of the Confederate pickets. He persisted, however, in the error, and presented the authority of the commanding General to pa.s.s all Union pickets. This was reluctantly respected, and the ill-fated orderly galloped on in search of a route to his _left_. In a moment or two the sharp crack of a rifle was heard, and almost immediately the horse of the orderly came dashing into our picket lines, wounded and riderless. The story was told. The dispatch, with its bearer, dead or alive, was in the enemy's hands. The orderly was, however, not killed, but had been seriously hurt by a rifle ball. He and his dispatch for Rosecrans gave Pegram his first knowledge of the movements of the column to the mountain summit.

For reasons already stated, Pegram entertained no fear of an attack on his left and rear, but was somewhat apprehensive that his right was not equally secure, and hence, early on the 11th, he had sent a small picket to near Hart's house and taken the further precaution to have his right vigilantly watched. The message found on the captured orderly informed Pegram that Rosecrans was leading a column to his rear.( 5) The latter thereupon sent a strong reinforcement under Captain Julius A. De Lagnel to the picket already on the mountain summit. By reason of the expected approach of a force around the right, breastworks were hastily thrown up and two pieces of artillery put in position to repel an attack from that direction.

Pegram, in his uncertainty, concluded that Rosecrans might take a still wider circuit around his right and thus pa.s.s over the mountain by a pathway or road leading into the turnpike one and a half miles from Beverly; and to guard against this he ordered Col. Wm. C.

Scott, with the 44th Virginia, then at Beverly, to take position with two pieces of artillery at the junction of the roads mentioned, and to scout well the flanking road.( 6)

The unexpected presence of the enemy at the summit of the mountain is thus explained, and the reliability and faithfulness of the guide vindicated. Captain De Lagnel, as well as Rosecrans, was doomed also to a surprise.

Rosecrans' command debouched from the wooded mountain and along its crest upon the rear of De Lagnel's position, and new dispositions of the Confederate force had to be made to meet the attack.

The position of De Lagnel's force was on and near the line of the turnpike as it pa.s.sed over the mountain, and hence Rosecrans'

column, in its approach from the southward, having gained the heights some distance from the road, was from a greater elevation.

The 10th Indiana, under Colonel Manson, was in advance and received the first fire of the enemy.

After a delay of some forty minutes, during which time the enemy was receiving reinforcements, and both sides rectifying their positions to the real situation, the order to advance and attack was given by Rosecrans, and though the troops were new and little drilled, they were well led and responded gallantly. The battle proper did not last beyond fifteen minutes. The Confederates made a brave resistance, but they were not exceeding 800 strong, and though they had the advantage of artillery, they were not advantageously posted, consequently were soon overthrown, their commander being shot down, and 21 prisoners, about 50 stand of arms, 2 pieces of artillery, and some supplies taken. The Union loss was 12 killed and 69 wounded, and the Confederate loss probably about the same.

Captain De Lagnel was, by both sides, reported killed, and his gallantry was highly lauded.( 7) General McClellan and others of the regular army officers a.s.sumed next day to recognize his body and to know him, and to deplore his early death. He had been shortly before, as we have seen, captured as a _Union_ officer at Fayetteville, N. C., and had at a still later date resigned from the U.S.A. His alleged death, being generally reported through the Confederacy, was made the occasion of many funeral sermons and orations, eulogizing his _Southern_ loyalty and glorious sacrifice of life "on the heights of Rich Mountain" in the cause of human slavery, called Southern rights, or Southern freedom.

But we shall hear of De Lagnel again.

Pegram, learning of the disaster on the mountain in his rear, called his best troops around him and in person started to attack and dislodge Rosecrans. He reached the proximity of the battlefield about 6 P.M., but being advised by his officers that his men were demoralized, and could not be relied on, desisted from attacking, and returned to his main camp and position.( 8)

Of the dispersed Confederate forces some escaped towards Beverly, joining Scott's 44th Virginia on the way, and some were driven back to the fortified camp and to join Pegram.

While Rosecrans was operating on the enemy's rear, McClellan was inactive in front. McClellan claimed he was to receive hourly word from Rosecrans during his progress through and up the rugged mountain, and not thus often hearing from him, he, in the presence of his officers, denounced the movement, and put upon Rosecrans the responsibility of its then predicted certain failure.

The only information received from Rosecrans during the day was a message announcing the successful progress of the column at 11 A.M.

on the 11th; it was then approaching Hart's house, and about one and a half miles distant from it.( 9)

The arrangement made in advance was that on Rosecrans gaining a position on the mountain he was to move down it upon Pegram's rear, and McClellan with the main army was to attack from the front. It was not contemplated that Pegram should be fully advised of the plan before it could be, in considerable part, executed. Rosecrans'

men, being much exhausted by the laborious ascent of the precipitous mountain, and having to fight an unexpected battle, did not advance to attack the enemy's intrenchments in the rear, but awaited the sound of McClellan's guns on the front. The day was too far spent the communicate the situation by messenger, and McClellan remained for the day and succeeding night in total ignorance of the real result of the battle; and though its smoke could be plainly seen, and the sound of musketry and artillery distinctly heard from his position, from circ.u.mstances which appeared to be occurring in the enemy's camp after the sound of the battle had ceased, McClellan reached the conclusion that Rosecrans was defeated, if not captured and destroyed, and this led McClellan and certain members of his staff to industriously announce that Rosecrans had disobeyed orders and would be held responsible for the disaster which had occurred.

McClellan remained with the main body of his army quietly in camp on Roaring Creek until about midday when, he states in his report, "I moved up all my available force to the front and remained in person just in rear of the advance pickets, ready to a.s.sault when the indicated movement arrived."

While the troops were waiting for the "indicated movement," the enemy had drawn in his skirmishers in expectation of an a.s.sault.

I was on the front with the skirmishers, and in my eagerness and inexperience naturally desired to see the real situation of the enemy's fortifications and guns. With two or three fearless soldiers following closely, and without orders, by a little detour through brush and timber to the left of the princ.i.p.al road, I came out in front of the fortifications close under some of the guns and obtained a good survey of them. The enemy, apprehending an a.s.sault, opened fire on us with a single discharge from one piece of artillery,(10) which he was not able to depress sufficiently to do us any harm.

We, however, withdrew precipitately, and I attempted at once to report to McClellan the situation and location of the guns of the enemy and the strength and position of his fortified camp, but, instead of thanks for the information, I received a fierce rebuke, and was sharply told that my conduct might have resulted in bringing on a general battle before the _General_ was ready. I never sinned in that way again while in McClellan's command.

Late in the afternoon of the 11th, when the sound of the battle on the mountain had ceased, an officer was seen to gallop into the camp of the enemy on the mountain side; he made a vehement address to the troops there, and the loud cheers with which they responded were distinctly heard in our camp.

This proceeding being reported to McClellan, at once settled him and others about him in the belief that Rosecrans had been defeated.

A little later Confederate troops were seen moving to the rear and up the mountain. This, instead of being as reinforcements for defeated troops, as it really was, was taken as a possible aggressive movement which, in some occult way, must a.s.sail and overthrow the main army in front. As the day wore away, Poe, of the engineers, was sent to our right to find a position on the immediate left of the enemy where artillery could be used. I was detailed with two companies of the 3d Ohio to accompany him. We climbed a mountain spur and soon reached a position within rifle-musket range of the enemy which completely commanded his guns and fortifications. So near was my command that I desired permission to open fire without awaiting the arrival of artillery, but this not being given by Poe, of the headquarters staff, and being fresh from a rebuke from that quarter, I gave a peremptory order _not_ to fire unless attacked.

On discovering us in his rear, the enemy turned his guns and fired a few artillery shots at us, doing no harm, but affording a plausible excuse for a discharge of musketry that seemed to silence the enemy's guns, as their firing at once ceased.

Poe was a young officer of fine personal appearance, superb physique, a West Point graduate, and a grandson of one of the celebrated Indian fighters, especially noted for killing the Wyandot Chief, Big Foot, on the Ohio River in 1782.

Poe was on staff duty throughout the war; became a Brevet-Brigadier, corps of engineers, and died as a Colonel in the United States army at Detroit, Michigan, October 2, 1895.

My acquaintance with him commenced on the spur of Rich Mountain under the circ.u.mstances mentioned.

McClellan, in his report, says:

"I sent Lieutenant Poe to find such a position for our artillery as would enable us to command the works. Late in the afternoon I received his report that he had found such a place. I immediately detailed a party to cut a road to it for our guns, but it was too late to get them into position before dark, and as I had received no intelligence whatever of General Rosecrans' movements, I finally determined to return to camp, leaving merely sufficient force to cover the working party. Orders were then given to move up the guns with the entire available infantry at daybreak the following morning. _As the troops were much fatigued_, some delay occurred in moving from camp, and just as the guns were starting intelligence was received that the enemy had evacuated their works and fled over the mountains, leaving all their guns, means of transportation, ammunition, tents, and baggage behind.

"Then for the first time since 11 o'clock the previous day, I received a communication from General Rosecrans, giving me the first intimation that he had taken the enemy's position at Hart's farm."(11)

Here was a commanding general in the peculiar situation that he could almost see and could plainly hear a battle raging, but did not learn its successful result until fifteen hours after it ceased.

I remained on the mountain spur in command of a few companies of infantry with orders to keep the men standing in line of battle, without fires, during the entire night. It rained most of the time, and the weather becoming cold the men suffered intensely.

The rest of the army retired to its camp a mile and a half distant.

Pegram gathered his demoralized forces together, and with such as were supposed able to make a long march, started about midnight to escape by a mountain path around to the westward of the Hart farm, hoping to gain the main road and join Garnett's forces, still supposed to be at Laurel Hill.

On the morning of the 12th of July we found a few broken-down men in Pegram's late camp, and a considerable number of mere boys-- students from William and Mary and Hamden-Sidney colleges--too young yet for war.

McClellan and his staff, with dazzling display, rode through the deserted works, viewed the captured guns, gazed on the dejected prisoners, and then wired the War Department: "In possession of all the enemy's works up to a point in sight of Beverly. Have taken all his guns... . Behavior of troops in action and towards prisoners admirable."

The army moved up the mountain to the battle-field, and halted a few moments to view it. The sight of men with gunshot wounds was the first for the new volunteers, and they were deeply impressed by it; all looked upon those who had partic.i.p.ated in the battle as veritable heroes.

Late on the 12th the troops reached Beverly, the junction of the turnpike roads far in the rear of Laurel Hill, and there bivouacked.

Garnett, learning of Pegram's disaster at Rich Mountain, abandoned his intrenchments at Laurel Hill, and leaving his tents and other property hastily retreated towards Beverly, pursued rather timidly by Morris' command. Had Garnett pushed his army rapidly through Beverly he could have pa.s.sed in safety on the afternoon of the 12th, but being falsely informed that it was occupied in the morning of that day by McClellan's troops, he turned off at Leadsville Church, about five miles from Beverly, and retreated up the Leading Creek road, a very rough and difficult one to travel. A portion of Morris' command, led by Captain Benham of the regular army, followed in close pursuit, while other went quietly into camp under Morris' orders.

Pegram, with his fleeing men, succeeded in finding a way over the mountain, and at 7 P.M. of the 12th reached Tygart's Valley River, near the Beverly and Laurel Hill road, about three miles from Leadsville Church. They had travelled without road or path about twelve miles, and were broken down and starving. Pegram here learned from inhabitants of Garnett's retreat, the Union pursuit, and of the Union occupancy of Beverly. All hope of escape in a body was gone, and though distant six miles from Beverly, he dispatched a note to the commanding officer of the Union forces, saying: