Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill Entitled Part 3

[Footnote 8: Euripid Hippol., 10--

(Aph) oh gar me thaeseos pais, 'Amazonos tokos monos politon taesde gaes Troizaenias legei kakistaen daimonon pep.h.u.kenai Phoibou d' adelphaen Artemin,-- tima, megiotaen daimonon aegoumenos--

(Hipp.) taen saen dhe Khyprin pholl' hego Chairein lhego-- (112.)

See also v. 1328--1402.]

[Footnote 9: Herodot. t. 32. O Kroise, epistumenon me to theion pan eohn phthonerohn te kai taraxodes, epeirotas ahnthropaeion pragmhaton pheri; also iii. 40]

[Footnote 10: See Eurip. Hipp., 6-96-149. The language of the attendant, after his affectionate remonstrance to Hippolytus had been disregarded, supplicating Aphrodite to pardon the recalcitrancy of that virtuous but obstinate youth, is characteristic and touching (114-120.)]

[Footnote 11: See especially his chapter ii. on the Sensations of Sight, pp. 222, 241--247, in the second edition of this work.]

[Footnote 12: Descartes says, in his 'Principia Philosophiae,' i 51--'Et quidem substantia quae nulla plane re indigeat, unica tantum potest intelligi--nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concurss Dei existere posse perspicimus. Atque ideo nomen substantiae non convenit Deo et illis _univoce_, ut dici solet in scholis, hoc est, nulla ejus nominis significatio potest distincte intelligi, quae Deo et creaturis sit communis.']

[Footnote 13: At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr Mill in the following affirmation (p. 201):--

'This natural probability is converted into certainty when we take into consideration that universal law of our experience which is termed the Law of Causation, and which makes us _unable to conceive the beginning of anything without_ an antecedent condition, _or cause.'_ Such 'inability to conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts.

First, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until agreement is obtained what the word _cause_ means. If three persons, A, B, and C, agree in affirming it--A adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of Sir William Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill--the agreement is purely verbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency pressing for satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis which satisfies it.

Next, if we reason upon Mr Mill's theory as to Cause, certainly those who deny his theory can have no difficulty in conceiving events without any cause (in that sense): nor have those who adopt this theory any greater difficulty. These latter _believe_ that there are, throughout, constant and uniform conditions on which the occurrence of every event depends; but they can perfectly _conceive_ events as occurring without any such uniform sequence. In truth, the belief in such causation, as pervading _all nature_, is an acquired result of scientific training.

The greater part of mankind believe that some events occur in regular, others in irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the metaphysical world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and consider that all volitions occur without any cause at all.]

[Footnote 14: Among the various authorities (upon this question of quantifying the predicate) collected by Sir W. Hamilton in the valuable Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' we find one (p. 311) which takes the same ground of objection as Mr Mill, in these words:--'The cause why the quant.i.tative note is not usually joined with the predicate, is, that there would thus be two _quaesita_ at once; to wit, whether the predicate were affirmed of the subject, and whether it were denied of everything beside. For when we say, _all man is all rational_, we judge that _all man is rational_, and judge likewise _that rational is denied of everything but man_. But these are, in reality, two different _quaesita_; and therefore it has become usual to state them, not in one, but in two several propositions. And this is self-evident, seeing that a _quaesitum_, in itself, asks only--_Does or does not this inhere in that?_ and _not_ Does or does not this inhere in that, _and at the same time inhere in nothing else?_'

The author of this just and sagacious remark--much surpa.s.sing what the other writers quoted in the Appendix say--was a Jew who died at Perpignan in or near 1370, named Levi Ben Gerson or Gersonides. An interesting account of this man, eminent as a writer and thinker in his age, will be found in a biography by Dr Joel, published at Breslau in 1862, 'Levi Ben Gerson als Religions--philosoph.' He distinguished himself as a writer on theology, philosophy, and astronomy; he was one of the successors to the free speculative vein of Maimonides, and one of the continuators of the Arabic Aristotelian philosophy. He both commented on and combated the doctrines of Averroes. Dr Joel thinks that he died earlier than 1370.]