Retribution_ The Battle For Japan, 1944-45 Part 9

Guards fled from Bibilid Prison, leaving behind 447 civilian and 828 military prisoners, most American. Some were men whom MacArthur had left behind on Corregidor in 1942. It was a merciful surprise that they were left alive, but beyond their emaciation, all the prisoners liberated in the Philippines proved traumatised. The world had changed so much, while they were isolated from it. Col. Bruce Palmer described seeing POWs freed at Cabanatuan: "I'll never forget the bewildered look449 on these men. They just could not believe they had been released. Our equipment-everything we had-helmets and everything else were so foreign to them. They just thought we were men from Mars." Krueger's staff officer Clyde Eddleman visited liberated POWs in their hospital tents. A sergeant was "sitting there on a cot, sort of dazed, and he looked at me and said: 'Didn't you command HQ Company on these men. They just could not believe they had been released. Our equipment-everything we had-helmets and everything else were so foreign to them. They just thought we were men from Mars." Krueger's staff officer Clyde Eddleman visited liberated POWs in their hospital tents. A sergeant was "sitting there on a cot, sort of dazed, and he looked at me and said: 'Didn't you command HQ Company450 the 19th Infantry back in 1938?' Yes, I did. 'Well, I was Corporal Greenwood who fought in the lightweight cla.s.s.'" Now, NCO and officer met as men from different universes. the 19th Infantry back in 1938?' Yes, I did. 'Well, I was Corporal Greenwood who fought in the lightweight cla.s.s.'" Now, NCO and officer met as men from different universes.

Block by block, ruin by ruin, dash by dash across streets swept by enemy fire, the Americans advanced through Manila. After the first days, j.a.panese senior commanders could exercise little control. Their improvised battle groups simply fought to the death where they stood. The baseball stadium was ferociously defended-j.a.panese sailors dug in even on its diamond. They held the post office until it was reduced to rubble. On Provisor Island in the Pasig, American soldiers played a deadly game of hide-and-seek amid the machinery of a power station. Maj. Chuck Henne reflected: "Such...are lonely, personal times451 during which the presence of other troops counts for little. Relaxing is impossible, for uncontrollably muscles tighten and teeth are clenched. The blast of a heavy sh.e.l.l is unforgettable, as is the dud that goes bouncing overhead down a cobblestone street. The close ones leave a chalky taste in one's mouth. Being bounced in the air and stung by blasted debris gets a trooper counting arms and legs and feeling for blood." during which the presence of other troops counts for little. Relaxing is impossible, for uncontrollably muscles tighten and teeth are clenched. The blast of a heavy sh.e.l.l is unforgettable, as is the dud that goes bouncing overhead down a cobblestone street. The close ones leave a chalky taste in one's mouth. Being bounced in the air and stung by blasted debris gets a trooper counting arms and legs and feeling for blood."

Americans were amazed by the fashion in which civilians wandered across the battlefield, apparently oblivious of the carnage. A company commander inspecting foxholes was disconcerted to discover some of his men clutched in the embraces of Filipino women. He sighed: "I hope they don't get VD452." The streets crawled with dest.i.tute children. A boy named Lee attached himself to the 3/148th Infantry, then after some days tearfully confessed to being a girl named Lisa. She was delivered to a Catholic orphanage.

Again and again, advancing troops suffered unwelcome surprises. When a jeep struck a mine dug into the street, not even body parts of its occupants were recovered-only the cha.s.sis of the vehicle reposed at the base of a crater. While a group of men was being briefed to fall back to a rest area, one of their number standing on a mound suddenly rolled to the ground, stone dead. A stray bullet, fired probably a mile away, had struck him without warning. A colonel from a reserve battalion visited a forward command post. Stepping up to a window, he fell dead to a j.a.panese bullet. "It was...so common in combat453," said an eyewitness. "One mistake and you're dead." Though there was much talk of snipers, in reality there were few marksmen among the j.a.panese navy contingent. They relied overwhelmingly on machine guns, for which they possessed almost unlimited quant.i.ties of ammunition.

Private Dahlum of the 3/148th454 was point man of a patrol moving down an alley when a j.a.panese officer and six men sprang out. Before any American could react, the officer swung his sword and delivered a fearsome, mortal blow at Dahlum's head. The patrol then shot down all the j.a.panese without further loss. The incident was over within seconds, leaving the survivors scarcely believing that it had taken place. "Suspecting that every closed door was point man of a patrol moving down an alley when a j.a.panese officer and six men sprang out. Before any American could react, the officer swung his sword and delivered a fearsome, mortal blow at Dahlum's head. The patrol then shot down all the j.a.panese without further loss. The incident was over within seconds, leaving the survivors scarcely believing that it had taken place. "Suspecting that every closed door455 and dark window screened a lurking j.a.p was nerve-racking," wrote an American officer, "and all too often the j.a.p was there. Once across the street and into a building the job seemed less risky as the men turned towards the offending emplacement using demolitions to open 'doors' through fences and building walls. The final move would be fast shooting to cover a demolition team which could close and blast the position using grenades or satchel charges." and dark window screened a lurking j.a.p was nerve-racking," wrote an American officer, "and all too often the j.a.p was there. Once across the street and into a building the job seemed less risky as the men turned towards the offending emplacement using demolitions to open 'doors' through fences and building walls. The final move would be fast shooting to cover a demolition team which could close and blast the position using grenades or satchel charges."

The most repellent aspect of the j.a.panese defence of Manila was their systematic slaughter of the city's civilians. The j.a.panese justified this policy by a.s.serting that everyone found in the battle area was a guerrilla. Over a hundred men, women and children were herded into Paco Lumber Yard along Moriones and Juan Luna Avenue, where they were bound, bayoneted and shot. Some bodies were burned, others left rotting in the sun. j.a.panese squads burst into buildings packed with refugees, shooting and stabbing. There were ma.s.sacres in schools, hospitals and convents, including San Juan de Dios Hospital, Santa Rosa College, Manila Cathedral, Paco Church and St. Paul's Convent.

Some civilians found themselves herded out of their homes by j.a.panese who a.s.serted that sh.e.l.lfire made them unsafe. They were taken to an a.s.sembly area on Plaza Ferguson, where there were soon 2,000 under guard. Young girls were then separated and removed first to the Coffee Pot Cafe, then to the Bay View Hotel, where brothels were established. The j.a.panese sought to give their men who were soon to die a final exalting s.e.xual experience. One twenty-four-year-old named Esther Garcia later gave evidence about the experiences of her fifteen-and fourteen-year-old sisters, Priscilla and Evangeline: "They grabbed my two sisters456. They were in back of me. And we didn't know what they were going to do. So my two sisters started fighting them, but they couldn't do anything. So they grabbed my sisters by the arm and took them out of the room. And we waited and waited and waited and finally my younger sister came back and she was crying. And I asked her, 'Where is Pris? Where is Pris?' And she said: 'Oh! They are doing things to her, Esther!' So everybody in the room knew what was going to happen to us. When Priscilla came back, she said: 'Esther, they did something to me. I want to die. I want to die!'" A j.a.panese soldier had cut open her v.a.g.i.n.a with a knife.

At night, Americans on the line were bemused to hear sounds of chanting and singing, shouts and laughter, as j.a.panese conducted final carouses. These were sometimes succeeded by grenade explosions, as soldiers killed either themselves or hapless Filipinos. Some of the worst j.a.panese atrocities took place, ironically enough, at the city's German Club, where five hundred people died, five of them Germans. Twelve members of one family, the Rocha Beeches, were bayoneted and then burned alive, along with their nursemaid. A fifteen-year-old was raped in the street amid gunfire and screaming people. The j.a.panese responsible then rose and used his bayonet to open her body from groin to chest. Twelve German Christian Brothers were killed in the chapel of La Salle College. Doctors, nurses and patients at the Red Cross centre were all ma.s.sacred on 9 February. The Irish fathers at the Malate Church who had been tortured earlier in the month were now rearrested, and never seen again.

A pregnant woman, Carmen Guerrero, walked into the American lines, clutching a child in her arms. She had seen her husband tortured before her eyes, then removed to be shot. She had neither eaten nor slept for a week. She wrote later: "I had seen the head of an aunt457 who had taught me to read and write roll under the kitchen stove, the face of a friend who had been crawling next to me on the pavement as we tried to reach shelter under the Ermita Church obliterated by a bullet, a legless cousin dragging himself out of a shallow trench in the churchyard and a young mother carrying a baby plucking at my father's sleeve-'Doctor, can you help me? I think I'm wounded'-and the shreds of her ribs and her lungs could be seen as she turned around." who had taught me to read and write roll under the kitchen stove, the face of a friend who had been crawling next to me on the pavement as we tried to reach shelter under the Ermita Church obliterated by a bullet, a legless cousin dragging himself out of a shallow trench in the churchyard and a young mother carrying a baby plucking at my father's sleeve-'Doctor, can you help me? I think I'm wounded'-and the shreds of her ribs and her lungs could be seen as she turned around."

The big villa of Dr. Rafael Moreta on Isaac Pearl Street had become a sanctuary housing sixty people. At midday on 7 February, twenty j.a.panese sailors burst in with fixed bayonets, led by a short, stocky officer with a heavy moustache. Men and women were separated, searched for arms and stripped of their valuables. The men were then forced into a bathroom, and grenades tossed in with them. Those who remained alive heard the screams of women, the sobbing of children. When silence descended and the j.a.panese had gone, the surviving men stumbled out to find thirty women, all of whom had been raped, dead or dying, along with their children in like condition.

It quickly became plain that murders on such a scale represented not spontaneous acts by individual j.a.panese, but the policy of local commanders. If their own men were to perish, the victors were to be denied any cause for rejoicing. A captured j.a.panese battalion order stated: "When Filipinos are to be killed458 they must be gathered into one place and disposed of in a manner that does not demand excessive use of ammunition or manpower. Given the difficulties of disposing of bodies, they should be collected in houses scheduled for burning, demolished, or thrown into the river." Oscar Griswold of XIV Corps they must be gathered into one place and disposed of in a manner that does not demand excessive use of ammunition or manpower. Given the difficulties of disposing of bodies, they should be collected in houses scheduled for burning, demolished, or thrown into the river." Oscar Griswold of XIV Corps459 was bewildered to read a translation of a diary found on a dead j.a.panese, in which the soldier wrote of his love for his family, eulogised the beauty of a sunset-then described how he partic.i.p.ated in a ma.s.sacre of Filipinos during which he clubbed a baby against a tree. was bewildered to read a translation of a diary found on a dead j.a.panese, in which the soldier wrote of his love for his family, eulogised the beauty of a sunset-then described how he partic.i.p.ated in a ma.s.sacre of Filipinos during which he clubbed a baby against a tree.

It seems purposeless further to detail the slaughter, which continued until early March. The incidents described above are representative of the fates of tens of thousands of helpless people. A child emerging from a hospital saw a j.a.panese corpse and spat on it. His father said gently: "Don't do that460. He was a human being." By now, however, few Manileros were susceptible to such sentiments. In considering the later U.S. firebombing of j.a.pan and decision to bomb Hiroshima, it is useful to recall that by the spring of 1945 the American nation knew what the j.a.panese had done in Manila. The killing of innocents clearly represented not the chance of war, nor unauthorised actions by wanton enemy soldiers, but an ethic of ma.s.sacre at one with events in Nanjing in 1937, and with similar deeds across Asia. In the face of evidence from so many different times, places, units and circ.u.mstances, it became impossible for j.a.pan's leaders credibly to deny systematic inhumanity as gross as that of the n.a.z.is.

Yet the U.S. Army took little pride in its own role. To overcome the j.a.panese defences, it proved necessary to bombard large areas of the city into rubble. Before the Philippines landings, MacArthur dispatched a message to all American forces, emphasising the importance of restraint in the use of firepower. Filipinos, he wrote, "will not be able to understand461 liberation if it is accompanied by indiscriminate destruction of their homes, their possessions, their civilization, and their lives...this policy is dictated by humanity and our moral standing throughout the Far East." In consequence, and much to the dismay of his subordinates, MacArthur refused to allow air power to be deployed over Manila. Only after the 37th Division suffered 235 casualties in one day on 9 February did the theatre commander reluctantly lift restrictions on the use of artillery. "From then on, to put it crudely liberation if it is accompanied by indiscriminate destruction of their homes, their possessions, their civilization, and their lives...this policy is dictated by humanity and our moral standing throughout the Far East." In consequence, and much to the dismay of his subordinates, MacArthur refused to allow air power to be deployed over Manila. Only after the 37th Division suffered 235 casualties in one day on 9 February did the theatre commander reluctantly lift restrictions on the use of artillery. "From then on, to put it crudely462, we really went to town," said the 37th's commander. A hundred American guns and forty-eight heavy mortars delivered 42,153 sh.e.l.ls and bombs. The U.S. official historian shrugged: "American lives were undoubtedly far more valuable463 than historic landmarks." than historic landmarks."

One post-war estimate suggests that for every six Manileros murdered by the j.a.panese defenders, another four died beneath the gunfire of their American liberators. Some historians would even reverse that ratio. "Those who had survived j.a.panese hate464 did not survive American love," wrote Carmen Guerrero. "Both were equally deadly, the latter more so because sought and longed for." Artillery killed four hundred civilians around the Remedios Hospital. A local man, Antonio Rocha, approached a U.S. mortar line and told its officer that his bombs were falling on civilians, not j.a.panese. The American impatiently gestured him away. The columns of the neocla.s.sical Legislature Building collapsed into heaps of rubble. On 14 February, MacArthur's headquarters announced: "The end of the enemy's trapped garrison is in sight." Yet death and destruction continued unabated as Krueger's men approached the last j.a.panese stronghold, the old Spanish city. did not survive American love," wrote Carmen Guerrero. "Both were equally deadly, the latter more so because sought and longed for." Artillery killed four hundred civilians around the Remedios Hospital. A local man, Antonio Rocha, approached a U.S. mortar line and told its officer that his bombs were falling on civilians, not j.a.panese. The American impatiently gestured him away. The columns of the neocla.s.sical Legislature Building collapsed into heaps of rubble. On 14 February, MacArthur's headquarters announced: "The end of the enemy's trapped garrison is in sight." Yet death and destruction continued unabated as Krueger's men approached the last j.a.panese stronghold, the old Spanish city.

Oscar Griswold of XIV Corps wrote on 28 February: "C-in-C refused my request465 to use air on Intramuros. I hated to ask for it since I knew it would cause death of civilians held captive by j.a.ps. We know, too, that the j.a.ps are burning large numbers to death, shooting and bayoneting them. Horrid as it seems, probably death from bombing would be more merciful...I fear that the C in C's refusal to let me have bombing will result in more casualties to my men...I understand how he feels about bombing people-but it is being done all over the world-Poland, China, England, Germany, Italy-then why not here! War is never pretty. I am frank to say I would sacrifice Philipino [ to use air on Intramuros. I hated to ask for it since I knew it would cause death of civilians held captive by j.a.ps. We know, too, that the j.a.ps are burning large numbers to death, shooting and bayoneting them. Horrid as it seems, probably death from bombing would be more merciful...I fear that the C in C's refusal to let me have bombing will result in more casualties to my men...I understand how he feels about bombing people-but it is being done all over the world-Poland, China, England, Germany, Italy-then why not here! War is never pretty. I am frank to say I would sacrifice Philipino [sic] lives under such circ.u.mstances to save the lives of my men. I feel quite bitter about this tonight."

In the last days of February, the Americans began the final and most brutal phase of the struggle to overcome the defenders of the old city. Griswold wrote: "The a.s.sault upon Intramuros was unique466 in modern warfare in that the entire area was mediaeval in structure, and its defense combined the fortress of the Middle Ages with the firepower of modern weapons." Granite walls twenty feet thick were breached with heavy artillery. The 145th Infantry then attacked, supported by a company of medium tanks, a company of tank destroyers, an a.s.sault-gun platoon, two flamethrower tanks and self-propelled artillery. Once inside Fort Santiago, American demolition teams sealed deep recesses, dungeons and tunnels, after throwing in white phosphorus grenades or pumping down gasoline and igniting it. To its end, the battle remained fragmented, confused, pitiless. in modern warfare in that the entire area was mediaeval in structure, and its defense combined the fortress of the Middle Ages with the firepower of modern weapons." Granite walls twenty feet thick were breached with heavy artillery. The 145th Infantry then attacked, supported by a company of medium tanks, a company of tank destroyers, an a.s.sault-gun platoon, two flamethrower tanks and self-propelled artillery. Once inside Fort Santiago, American demolition teams sealed deep recesses, dungeons and tunnels, after throwing in white phosphorus grenades or pumping down gasoline and igniting it. To its end, the battle remained fragmented, confused, pitiless.

Only on 3 March could Manila be deemed secure. Some 3,500 j.a.panese escaped across the Marikina river. Weary and exasperated, Oscar Griswold wrote: "General MacArthur had announced [Manila's] capture several days ahead of the actual event. The man is publicity crazy publicity crazy. When soldiers are dying and being wounded, it doesn't make for their morale to know that the thing they are doing has been officially announced as finished days ago." MacArthur picked a path through the debris of his old quarters in the penthouse of the Manila Hotel, where he found his library destroyed, a dead j.a.panese colonel on the carpet: "It was not a pleasant moment467...I was tasting to the acid dregs the bitterness of a devastated and beloved home," he wrote later. It seems bizarre that he paraded his own loss of mere possessions in the midst of a devastating human catastrophe. He wrote to his wife, Jean, reporting the good news that he had recovered all the family silver. He took over a mansion, Casa Blanca in the smart Santa Mesa district, established residence, and defied widespread criticism by summoning Jean to join him there.

American soldiers were not merely exhausted, but also deeply depressed by all that they had seen, done and suffered in Manila. The 3/148th Infantry, for instance, had lost 58 percent of its strength. Many of the casualties were veterans of the Solomons campaigns. Among new replacements there was an outbreak of self-inflicted wounds, which caused the perpetrators to be court-martialled. To relieve his men's gloom, the battalion's colonel ordered an "organised drunk468." Two truckloads of Suntory whiskey were procured, and issued at a rate of three bottles per man. One day was devoted to drinking, a second to "healing." This may not have been a good answer to the battalion's morale problem, but its officers were unable to think of better ones.

The victors counted 1,000 American dead, together with 16,665 j.a.panese-and 100,000 Manileros. In those days, other Luzon cities also suffered ma.s.sacres by the occupiers: 984 civilians were killed in Cuenca on 19 February; 500 in Buang and Batangas on 28 February; 7,000 civilians were killed in Calamba, Laguna. In all, a million Filipinos are estimated to have died by violence in the Second World War, most of them in its last months. There was intense debate about whether MacArthur should have bypa.s.sed Manila, rather than storm it. What is certain is that he was mistaken in his belief that he could serve the best interests of the Philippine people by committing an army to liberate them. Whatever Filipinos might have suffered at the hands of the j.a.panese if the Americans had contented themselves with seizing air bases for their advance on Tokyo, and held back from reoccupying the entire Philippines archipelago, would have been less grievous than the catastrophe they suffered when MacArthur made their country a battlefield. And in March 1945, the struggle for the islands was far from ended.

2. Yamas.h.i.ta's Defiance

EVEN AS the battle for Manila was being fought, senior U.S. officers speculated about the looming end of the war in Europe, and its implications for the defeat of j.a.pan. Lt.-Gen. Robert Eichelberger of Eighth Army wrote on 16 February: "I believe the BC [Big Chief] would fight against the battle for Manila was being fought, senior U.S. officers speculated about the looming end of the war in Europe, and its implications for the defeat of j.a.pan. Lt.-Gen. Robert Eichelberger of Eighth Army wrote on 16 February: "I believe the BC [Big Chief] would fight against469 any attempt to bring the European crowd over here, even if they should desire to do so. I personally hope that the j.a.panese will quit if and when Stalin begins to push down along the Manchuria railway. They will realize they cannot hope to stand against that pressure...If we ever get Russia on our side out here the j.a.panese will be in a horrific position and therefore I think they will quit before having their towns bombed out." Eichelberger added on 5 March: "I never expect the BC to change. He will never want anybody on the stage but himself." any attempt to bring the European crowd over here, even if they should desire to do so. I personally hope that the j.a.panese will quit if and when Stalin begins to push down along the Manchuria railway. They will realize they cannot hope to stand against that pressure...If we ever get Russia on our side out here the j.a.panese will be in a horrific position and therefore I think they will quit before having their towns bombed out." Eichelberger added on 5 March: "I never expect the BC to change. He will never want anybody on the stage but himself."

While three American divisions were fighting for Manila through February, others recaptured the great symbolic place-names of Bataan and Corregidor. Zig-Zag Pa.s.s, on the approaches to the Bataan Peninsula, became the scene of some of the most painful fighting of the campaign. Before the area was secured several senior officers, including a divisional commander, were sacked for alleged inadequacy. An American parachute a.s.sault on the fortress island of Corregidor surprised the j.a.panese defenders in advance of an amphibious landing, but cost heavy jump casualties, and days of b.l.o.o.d.y mopping-up. A tank fired into the Malinta Tunnel, hitting munitions which exploded, blasting the vehicle bodily fifty yards backwards and overturning it. On the islands of Corregidor and nearby Caballo, the Americans disposed of the most stubborn underground defenders by pumping oil into their bunkers, then setting this ablaze. "Results," said the divisional report, "were most gratifying." Some j.a.panese chose to end their ordeal by detonating underground ammunition stores, killing Americans unlucky enough to be standing above. It was a messy, horrible business. Even MacArthur felt unable to display much triumphalism about the recapture of these famous symbols, though he led a flotilla of PT-boats to a ceremony on Corregidor.

Sixth Army's drive north and eastwards meanwhile continued, in the face of dogged resistance. Through the months that followed, Yamas.h.i.ta conducted a highly effective defence of the mountain areas in which he had fortified himself. j.a.panese units fought; inflicted American casualties; caused days of delay, fear and pain; then withdrew to their next line. Krueger's engineers toiled under fire to improve steep tracks sufficiently to carry tanks and vehicles. Disease took its toll of attackers and defenders alike. j.a.panese soldiers endured hunger always, starvation latterly. "Of the forty-nine men who are left470, only seventeen are fit for duty," wrote Lt. Inoue Suteo of the j.a.panese 77th Infantry on 19 March. "The other two-thirds are sick. Out of fourteen men of the grenade discharger section, only three are fit...43rd Force [to which his unit belonged] is called 'the malaria unit'...The quality of j.a.panese soldiers has fallen dramatically. I doubt if they could carry on the fight. Few units in the j.a.panese army are as lacking in military discipline as this one."

Private Shigeki Hara of the 19th Special Machine-Gun Unit described the misery of retreating in a column of sick men. They abandoned all personal possessions, though Hara sought to sustain the custom of taking home to j.a.pan some portion of every dead fellow soldier: "After daybreak, removed arm471 from the dead body of a comrade and followed the main body...was attacked by a company of guerrillas and suffered one casualty. Killed one enemy with the sword." In addition to the usual tropical afflictions, men discovered that scrub typhus was carried by a small local red mite. Its symptom was a high fever, which inflicted heart damage from which some victims never recovered. "Practically every day from the dead body of a comrade and followed the main body...was attacked by a company of guerrillas and suffered one casualty. Killed one enemy with the sword." In addition to the usual tropical afflictions, men discovered that scrub typhus was carried by a small local red mite. Its symptom was a high fever, which inflicted heart damage from which some victims never recovered. "Practically every day472 two or three men fall out and [are] instantly shot by the officers," said Private First Cla.s.s Bunsan Okamoto, a twenty-four-year-old apprentice salesman serving with the 30th Recce Regiment. He was fortunate enough to be captured by the Americans and kept alive for intelligence purposes. A U.S. officer met an attractive young Filipino woman who said she had been in flight for weeks with three j.a.panese soldiers. "The last few days," she reported, "they were in tears most of the time." Americans found a pencilled note among supplies abandoned by the enemy, signed by a despairing j.a.panese: "To the brave American soldier who finds this-tell my family I died bravely." two or three men fall out and [are] instantly shot by the officers," said Private First Cla.s.s Bunsan Okamoto, a twenty-four-year-old apprentice salesman serving with the 30th Recce Regiment. He was fortunate enough to be captured by the Americans and kept alive for intelligence purposes. A U.S. officer met an attractive young Filipino woman who said she had been in flight for weeks with three j.a.panese soldiers. "The last few days," she reported, "they were in tears most of the time." Americans found a pencilled note among supplies abandoned by the enemy, signed by a despairing j.a.panese: "To the brave American soldier who finds this-tell my family I died bravely."

All over the Philippine archipelago in the early spring of 1945, j.a.panese garrisons waited with varying degrees of enthusiasm for Americans to come. On Lubang, for instance, an island some eighteen miles by six within sight of Luzon, 150 of Yamas.h.i.ta's men shifted supplies into the hills, in readiness to maintain a guerrilla campaign. "They all talked big473 about committing suicide and giving up their lives for the emperor," said their commander, Lt. Hiroo Onoda. "Deep down they were hoping and praying that Lubang would not be attacked." A small American force landed on 28 February, inflicting a slight wound on Onoda's hand as he and his men retreated. Thereafter, hunger and sickness progressively worsened their circ.u.mstances. One day, high in the hills, a pale young soldier came to Onoda from the sick tent, asking for explosives. He said: "We can't move. Please let us kill ourselves." Onoda thought for a moment, then agreed: "All right, I'll do it. I'll set a fuse to the charges." He looked into twenty-two faces, "all resigned to death about committing suicide and giving up their lives for the emperor," said their commander, Lt. Hiroo Onoda. "Deep down they were hoping and praying that Lubang would not be attacked." A small American force landed on 28 February, inflicting a slight wound on Onoda's hand as he and his men retreated. Thereafter, hunger and sickness progressively worsened their circ.u.mstances. One day, high in the hills, a pale young soldier came to Onoda from the sick tent, asking for explosives. He said: "We can't move. Please let us kill ourselves." Onoda thought for a moment, then agreed: "All right, I'll do it. I'll set a fuse to the charges." He looked into twenty-two faces, "all resigned to death474," and did his business. When he returned after the explosion, there was only a gaping crater where the sick tent had been.

In those months, more j.a.panese in the Philippines died from hunger and disease than the U.S. Army killed. In some degree, this must be attributed to a psychological collapse, overlaid upon physical weakness. Onoda, whose life on Lubang became that of a hunted wild animal, prowled the mountains struggling for survival, rather than making much attempt to injure the enemy. One day he glimpsed American gum wrappers beside a road, and found a wad stuck to a weed. He felt a surge of bitterness and frustration: "Here we were, holding on for dear life, and these characters were chewing gum while they fought! I felt more sad than angry. The chewing gum tinfoil told me just how miserably we had been beaten."

A military surgeon in the Philippines, Tadashi Moriya, ate bats:

We tore off the wings475, roasted them until they were done brown, flayed and munched their heads holding them by their legs. The brain was delicious. The tiny eyes cracked lightly in the mouth. The teeth were small but sharp, so we crunched and swallowed them down. We ate everything, bones and intestines, except the legs. The abdomen felt rough to the tongue, as they seemed to eat small insects like mosquitoes...Hunger is indeed the best sauce, for I ate fifteen bats a day.An officer reported that he saw a group of soldiers cooking meat. When he approached, they tried to conceal the contents of the mess tins, but he had a peep at them. A good deal of fat swam on the surface of the stew they were cooking, and he saw at once that it couldn't be karabaw karabaw [animal] meat. Then I had the news that an officer of another unit was eaten by his orderly as soon as he breathed his last. I believe the officer was so devoted to his orderly that he bequeathed him his body. This loyal servant fulfilled his lord and master's final wishes by burying him in his belly instead of the earth. [animal] meat. Then I had the news that an officer of another unit was eaten by his orderly as soon as he breathed his last. I believe the officer was so devoted to his orderly that he bequeathed him his body. This loyal servant fulfilled his lord and master's final wishes by burying him in his belly instead of the earth.

Col. Russell Volckmann, an American officer who had been leading guerrillas against the j.a.panese on Luzon since 1942, provided a report to Sixth Army a.s.sessing the enemy's tactical strengths and weaknesses. He admired j.a.panese powers of endurance, skill in moving men and equipment over harsh terrain. He thought well of their junior officers and NCOs. More senior commanders, however, impressed him little with their "absurd orders476, a.s.signment of impossible missions in relation to a unit's strength, utter disregard for the lives of subordinates, refusal to admit defeat or even face the fact that events are going against him [sic] and inability to adjust to a changing situation, p.r.o.neness to exaggerate success and minimize failure causes higher echelons to get a false picture. j.a.p small unit tactics are tops but there is seldom any coordination between units. To sum it up-the j.a.p officer generally has no idea of modern methods of fighting in large ma.s.s." This seems fair. The j.a.panese showed themselves superb soldiers in defence, yet often failed in attack because they relied upon human spirit to compensate for lack of numbers, firepower, mobility and imagination. When the j.a.panese counterattacked, they were almost always repulsed with heavy loss. But when they merely held ground, as did Yamas.h.i.ta's men for most of the Luzon campaign, they performed superbly.

To the dismay of Krueger's Sixth Army, after the fall of Manila MacArthur launched the five divisions of Eichelberger's Eighth Army on the progressive recapture of the lesser Philippine islands. Strategically, this decision had nothing to recommend it. American forces struggling to defeat Yamas.h.i.ta on Luzon were left grievously shorthanded. Eichelberger's formations, which carried out fourteen major and twenty-four minor amphibious landings in forty-four days all over the Philippines Archipelago, thereafter spent weeks pursuing small j.a.panese forces which hit and ran, inflicted casualties, then retreated, day after day and month after month, with worsening weather and American morale. Samuel Eliot Morison notes that the joint chiefs of staff in Washington strongly questioned the necessity for the further extension of ground operations in the Philippines. "It is still something of a mystery477," the great naval historian remarks acidly, "how and whence, in view of these wishes of the JCS, MacArthur derived his authority to liberate one Philippine island after another." The simple explanation is that MacArthur's manic will to fulfil his personal mission was stronger than that of the chiefs of staff to stop him doing so.

In this second phase of the Luzon campaign, the general's behaviour became bizarre. During the advance on Manila he had a.s.sumed personal command of American forces and repeatedly risked his life in forward areas, hustling his generals on. When the capital fell, however, he seemed to lose interest in subsequent operations, only once visiting a Sixth Army front before the war's end. He constantly criticised Krueger for sluggishness, but successfully recommended his subordinate to Washington for promotion to a fourth star. Most senior Americans on Luzon thought it would have been more appropriate to sack Krueger. It was the familiar story. MacArthur was loyal to his own, right or wrong, competent or otherwise. Promotion for Krueger represented an endors.e.m.e.nt of his own performance.

Robert Sherwood of the Office of War Information visited MacArthur on 10 March and reported in some alarm to Roosevelt: "There are unmistakable478 evidences of an acute persecution complex at work. To hear some of the staff officers talk, one would think that the War Department, the State Department, the joint chiefs of staff-and, possibly, even the White House itself-are under the domination of 'Communists and British Imperialists.'" Sherwood thought the atmosphere at SWPA headquarters profoundly unhealthy. While MacArthur's demeanour became ever more autocratic, his interest in accepting responsibility for military operations in the Philippines diminished. The clearance of Luzon was a mess, because he and Krueger showed themselves far less competent commanders than was Yamas.h.i.ta. evidences of an acute persecution complex at work. To hear some of the staff officers talk, one would think that the War Department, the State Department, the joint chiefs of staff-and, possibly, even the White House itself-are under the domination of 'Communists and British Imperialists.'" Sherwood thought the atmosphere at SWPA headquarters profoundly unhealthy. While MacArthur's demeanour became ever more autocratic, his interest in accepting responsibility for military operations in the Philippines diminished. The clearance of Luzon was a mess, because he and Krueger showed themselves far less competent commanders than was Yamas.h.i.ta.

"It was a long, slow and costly operation479," said Maj.-Gen. William Gill, commanding the 32nd Division. "Morale was poor, because the men were tired-they'd been in there in combat for months...We killed a lot of [ j.a.panese], of course, killed many more of them than they killed of us, but we lost too many...Our engineers that were building roads often came under machine gun fire." On the steep mountains, progress was painfully laborious. Gill watched admiringly one day as a soldier driving a bulldozer worked under fire beside a sheer precipice, manoeuvring his blade to deflect bullets which whanged off the steel. The fruits of such labour were often doubtful. "We sometimes reported480 enemy losses as ten times our own when we did not know the correct number," admitted an American officer. enemy losses as ten times our own when we did not know the correct number," admitted an American officer.

BY A APRIL, some infantry regiments were reduced to half strength. Salvatore Lamagna returned late from a home furlough in Thompsonville, Connecticut, an offence for which he found himself busted from sergeant to private. When he reached his old unit, he sought out his comrades from the New Guinea campaign: "I looked around to see some infantry regiments were reduced to half strength. Salvatore Lamagna returned late from a home furlough in Thompsonville, Connecticut, an offence for which he found himself busted from sergeant to private. When he reached his old unit, he sought out his comrades from the New Guinea campaign: "I looked around to see481 if I could find anyone I knew. Most of the guys were new to me. 'Where's Tietjen?' 'He was killed by a j.a.p artillery sh.e.l.l,' Farmer says. I felt bad. I asked if any of the original 4th Platoon guys that left from Hartford, Ct. were left. 'Just you and I,' he says." if I could find anyone I knew. Most of the guys were new to me. 'Where's Tietjen?' 'He was killed by a j.a.p artillery sh.e.l.l,' Farmer says. I felt bad. I asked if any of the original 4th Platoon guys that left from Hartford, Ct. were left. 'Just you and I,' he says."

Discipline lapsed badly in some units. Maj. Chuck Henne was walking beside a train one day in April when he heard shooting from the cars. Soldiers were firing at buffalo in the fields. He identified himself as a battalion executive officer: "They laughed and kept on482 shooting...I then shouted up to the men and told them to get their a.s.ses back in the car or I would shoot them off the roof...They came off the roof handing their rifles down b.u.t.t first...I asked the lieutenant if he could now control his men...He sulked and vowed he could handle his troops. If he had been mine, I would have relieved him on the spot." shooting...I then shouted up to the men and told them to get their a.s.ses back in the car or I would shoot them off the roof...They came off the roof handing their rifles down b.u.t.t first...I asked the lieutenant if he could now control his men...He sulked and vowed he could handle his troops. If he had been mine, I would have relieved him on the spot."

The struggle to cut and hold Yamas.h.i.ta's princ.i.p.al supply route, the Villa Verde Trail, became one of the most bitter of the campaign. "The price that the...trail cost483 in battle casualties was too high for value received," said Gill of the 32nd Division. There was heroism. Lt. Van Pelt and a platoon of the 3/148th Infantry tried to work forward to deal with a j.a.panese 150mm gun. Pelt fell mortally wounded by machine-gun fire, which also hit two others beside him. One of these, Private Fred Ogrodkick, dragged himself into a cave, then realised that his buddy still lay in the open. He struggled out again, braved the fire to drag his friend into shelter, then sat trying to bandage both their wounds. Private Melvin Kidd, a K Company truck driver, saw what had happened. He jumped onto the engine deck of an M4 tank, rode forward under fire, jumped down and began to treat the wounded men in the cave. A j.a.panese sh.e.l.l blew down the entrance, trapping all three inside. An American infantry squad followed the tanks forward, and hacked open the cave mouth with bayonets and entrenching tools. Others rushed the j.a.panese positions. An officer later asked Kidd why he had joined a fight that was not his business. He shrugged: "It seemed the right thing to do in battle casualties was too high for value received," said Gill of the 32nd Division. There was heroism. Lt. Van Pelt and a platoon of the 3/148th Infantry tried to work forward to deal with a j.a.panese 150mm gun. Pelt fell mortally wounded by machine-gun fire, which also hit two others beside him. One of these, Private Fred Ogrodkick, dragged himself into a cave, then realised that his buddy still lay in the open. He struggled out again, braved the fire to drag his friend into shelter, then sat trying to bandage both their wounds. Private Melvin Kidd, a K Company truck driver, saw what had happened. He jumped onto the engine deck of an M4 tank, rode forward under fire, jumped down and began to treat the wounded men in the cave. A j.a.panese sh.e.l.l blew down the entrance, trapping all three inside. An American infantry squad followed the tanks forward, and hacked open the cave mouth with bayonets and entrenching tools. Others rushed the j.a.panese positions. An officer later asked Kidd why he had joined a fight that was not his business. He shrugged: "It seemed the right thing to do484."

Higher commanders had worries of their own. Col. Bruce Palmer485, chief of staff of 6th Division, was dismayed by the conduct of his general, Edwin Patrick, who behaved recklessly when sober, and worse when drunk, which was alarmingly often. A j.a.panese machine gunner solved this problem by killing Patrick when he exposed himself while visiting a battalion observation post. Soldiers were startled to discover how cold it became at night, when the sun dropped behind the mountains. There were mornings when they found water buckets covered with ice-and nights when the heavens opened. "With the torrents of rain486 beating down only a few were able to sleep," wrote Chuck Henne. "Helmets were large enough only to keep the rain out of one's eyes. The issue poncho held back the flood for a time and then became nearly as wet on the inside as on the outside. Worst of all, as the torrent continued, foxholes and slit trenches started to fill, and when bailing failed to keep up...a man could choose between sitting in a water-filled hole or getting out to sit in the mud. It was a bad night, and no doubt the j.a.ps were as miserable as we were." beating down only a few were able to sleep," wrote Chuck Henne. "Helmets were large enough only to keep the rain out of one's eyes. The issue poncho held back the flood for a time and then became nearly as wet on the inside as on the outside. Worst of all, as the torrent continued, foxholes and slit trenches started to fill, and when bailing failed to keep up...a man could choose between sitting in a water-filled hole or getting out to sit in the mud. It was a bad night, and no doubt the j.a.ps were as miserable as we were."

Yamas.h.i.ta held out until the end of the war in his mountain fastnesses on Luzon, though the Americans had destroyed most of his forces. By August 1945 his Shobu group had been driven back into a forty-two-square-mile redoubt near Bontoc, and its supplies were almost exhausted. In the last six weeks of the war, these remnants killed some 440 American soldiers and Filipino guerrillas-but themselves lost 13,000 men. The general gave an interview at his headquarters to the Domei News Agency, in which he said-surprisingly to those who suppose all j.a.panese commanders to have been brutes: "I think j.a.pan has made a big mistake, in the way it has conducted foreign occupations. We lack any experience of this, and it is one of our weaknesses. We simply haven't tried to understand other societies. Relatively speaking, j.a.pan is poor. We can't compete scientifically with the West. Nor do we use the skills of our women as we might. They should be educated, albeit differently from men." For Yamas.h.i.ta and his comrades, however, such revelations of sensitivity came too late. He himself was burdened with the appalling crimes of the j.a.panese occupiers of the Philippines, and would soon be called to account for them.

It is a striking feature of the Second World War that the populist media of the democracies made stars of some undeserving commanders, who thereafter became hard to sack. MacArthur's Philippines campaign did little more to advance the surrender of j.a.pan than Slim's campaign in Burma, and was conducted with vastly less competence. Its princ.i.p.al victims were the Philippine people, and MacArthur's own military reputation. Before the landing at Leyte, this stood high, probably higher than it deserved, following the conquest of Papua New Guinea. The early blunderings of that campaign were forgotten, and the general received laurels for the daring series of amphibious strokes which achieved victory. In the Philippines, however, instead of achieving the cheap, quick successes he had promised, his forces became entangled in protracted fighting, on terms which suited the j.a.panese. MacArthur's contempt for intelligence was a persistent, crippling defect. On Luzon, where he sought to exercise personal field command, his opponent Yamas.h.i.ta displayed a nimbleness in striking contrast to the heavy-footed advance of Sixth Army. Stanley Falk has written of MacArthur: "On those occasions487 when the j.a.panese faced him with equal or greater strength, he was unable to defeat them or to react swiftly or adequately to their initiatives." "The...South-West Pacific commitment when the j.a.panese faced him with equal or greater strength, he was unable to defeat them or to react swiftly or adequately to their initiatives." "The...South-West Pacific commitment488 was an unnecessary and profligate waste of resources, involving the needless loss of thousands of lives, and in no significant way affecting the outcome of the war." was an unnecessary and profligate waste of resources, involving the needless loss of thousands of lives, and in no significant way affecting the outcome of the war."

j.a.panese barbarism rendered the battle for Manila a human catastrophe, but MacArthur's obsession with seizing the city created the circ.u.mstances for it. The U.S. lost 8,140 men killed on Luzon. Around 200,000 j.a.panese died there, many of disease. If the exchange ran overwhelmingly in America's favour, those same enemy forces could have gone nowhere and achieved nothing had the Americans contented themselves with their containment. SWPA's supreme commander compounded his mistakes by embarking upon the reconquest of the entire Philippines Archipelago, even before Luzon had fallen. MacArthur presided over the largest ground campaign of America's war in the Pacific in a fashion which satisfied his own ambitions more convincingly than the national purposes of his country.

TEN.

b.l.o.o.d.y Miniature: Iwo Jima

PLACE-NAMES which pa.s.s into history often identify locations so unrewarding that only war could have rendered them memorable: Dunkirk and Alamein, Corregidor and Imphal, Anzio and Bastogne. Yet even in such company, Iwo Jima was striking in its wretchedness. The tiny island lay 3,000 miles west of Pearl Harbor and less than seven hundred south of j.a.pan. It was five miles long, two and a half wide. Dominated at the southern tip by the extinct volcano of Mount Suribachi, five hundred feet high, in the north it rose to a plateau, thick with jungle growth. Iwo had been claimed by j.a.pan in 1861, and desultorily employed for growing sugarcane. A j.a.panese garrison officer described it sourly as "a waterless island of sulphur springs which pa.s.s into history often identify locations so unrewarding that only war could have rendered them memorable: Dunkirk and Alamein, Corregidor and Imphal, Anzio and Bastogne. Yet even in such company, Iwo Jima was striking in its wretchedness. The tiny island lay 3,000 miles west of Pearl Harbor and less than seven hundred south of j.a.pan. It was five miles long, two and a half wide. Dominated at the southern tip by the extinct volcano of Mount Suribachi, five hundred feet high, in the north it rose to a plateau, thick with jungle growth. Iwo had been claimed by j.a.pan in 1861, and desultorily employed for growing sugarcane. A j.a.panese garrison officer described it sourly as "a waterless island of sulphur springs489, where neither swallows nor sparrows flew."

The perceived importance of this pimple derived, as usual, from airfields. During the last months of 1944 and the early weeks of 1945, American aircraft pounded Iwo Jima on seventy-two days. As fast as j.a.panese squadrons reached the island, their planes were destroyed in the air or on the ground. The usefulness of the base to Tokyo thus shrank to the vanishing point. Yet, in the boundless ocean, the U.S. Navy coveted Iwo as one of the few firm footholds on the central axis of approach to j.a.pan. In the autumn of 1944 the joint chiefs mandated the island's seizure. After various American hesitations and delays, which served the defenders' interests much better than those of the invaders, an armada was ma.s.sed. Even as MacArthur's soldiers battered their way across the Philippines, three Marine divisions were embarked.

One of the island's garrison, Lt.-Col. Kaneji Nakane, wrote to his wife a few weeks before the U.S. landing, with the ba.n.a.lity common to so many warriors' letters: "We are now getting enemy490 air raids at least ten times a day, and enemy task forces have struck the island twice. We suffered no damage. Everybody is in good shape, so you don't have to worry about me. The beans brought from our house were planted and are now flowering. Harvest time is approaching, and the squashes and eggplants look very good. Yesterday we had a bathe, and everybody was in high spirits. We get some fish, because every time the enemy bombs us a lot of dead ones are washed ash.o.r.e...We have strong positions and G.o.d's soldiers, and await the enemy with full hearts." air raids at least ten times a day, and enemy task forces have struck the island twice. We suffered no damage. Everybody is in good shape, so you don't have to worry about me. The beans brought from our house were planted and are now flowering. Harvest time is approaching, and the squashes and eggplants look very good. Yesterday we had a bathe, and everybody was in high spirits. We get some fish, because every time the enemy bombs us a lot of dead ones are washed ash.o.r.e...We have strong positions and G.o.d's soldiers, and await the enemy with full hearts."

Another j.a.panese on Iwo Jima was a teenager named Harunori Ohkoshi. The youngest of five children of a Tokyo roofing contractor, he had cherished illusions about the glories of service life. In 1942, at the age of fourteen, he applied to the navy to become a boy sailor, forging a letter of parental consent, for which he sneaked access to the family seal. When all was revealed, his mother was distraught, his father supportive. Less than two years later, at sixteen, he was serving as flight engineer on a navy transport plane, carrying engine parts from Kyushu to Saipan, when it was bounced by h.e.l.lcats. Easy meat, the transport ditched in the sea. Four men died, but Ohkoshi and two others were retrieved by a pa.s.sing fishing boat, and eventually deposited on Iwo Jima. When the local command found that the survivor was a qualified engineer, he was posted to a maintenance unit.

Ohkoshi and his comrades grew accustomed to being strafed by American P-38s, which approached too low and fast to offer warning. They were also bombed from high alt.i.tude by B-24s, and sh.e.l.led by warships. Comrades taught the teenager to lie across the line of attack when he prostrated himself before machine-gunning fighters claiming that he thus presented a smaller target. By February 1945, because length of service counted for more than age, at seventeen he found himself a technical sergeant-and no longer an aircraft mechanic. Every man on Iwo Jima was pressed into combat infantry service. Ohkoshi was given command of a fourteen-man group. They were issued with helmets and equipment, together with a makeshift a.s.sortment of weapons ranging from machine guns to hunting rifles and pistols. Along with 7,500 other naval personnel, the teenager was trained to address tanks by thrusting pole charges into their tracks. Ohkoshi's group dug bunkers deep, deep into the hills and rock of Tanana Mountain, at the centre of the island. He covered his own hole with the wing of a wrecked Zero, overlaid with timber and camouflage. On 16 February 1945, as the final American bombardment began, Ohkoshi was sent with a patrol to view the coast. He returned awed, saying: "You can hardly see sea491 for ships." Then he and his squad took up positions which they scarcely left through the next seventeen days. for ships." Then he and his squad took up positions which they scarcely left through the next seventeen days.

Watching from offsh.o.r.e the devastation wrought by the bombardment, Marine lieutenant Patrick Caruso felt a stab of pity for defenders like Ohkoshi: "I...thought of the helpless feeling492 those poor j.a.panese must have had on that island." Another lieutenant bet Caruso, whose unit was in reserve, a bottle of brandy that they would not need to land. William Allen of the 23rd Marines "couldn't understand why we needed three divisions to take this piddling island." Private First Cla.s.s Arthur Rodriguez, a BAR man, offered a tortured figure of speech: "My first impression of Iwo Jima was that it looked like a termite nest in the shape of a turkey drumstick with Suribachi as its kneecap." What followed became the most famous, or notorious, battle of the Pacific war. those poor j.a.panese must have had on that island." Another lieutenant bet Caruso, whose unit was in reserve, a bottle of brandy that they would not need to land. William Allen of the 23rd Marines "couldn't understand why we needed three divisions to take this piddling island." Private First Cla.s.s Arthur Rodriguez, a BAR man, offered a tortured figure of speech: "My first impression of Iwo Jima was that it looked like a termite nest in the shape of a turkey drumstick with Suribachi as its kneecap." What followed became the most famous, or notorious, battle of the Pacific war.

Some of the men who began to land along the south-east coast on the morning of 19 February had been six weeks at sea, on pa.s.sage to an objective initially identified to them only as "Island X." Others had embarked at Saipan a few days earlier. When word came to "saddle up," the Marines of 4th and 5th Divisions found it hard to climb the ships' ladders, each of them being weighed down with at least fifty pounds, sometimes a hundred pounds, of weapons, kit and ammunition. The clumsy clamber down scrambling nets from a ship's side to an a.s.sault craft pitching on the swell was an alarming experience even for veterans. One man itemised his own load: clothing and helmet493, backpack and entrenching tool, poncho, three light and three heavy rations, two packs of cigarettes in a waxed paper sack, leather case of weapon-cleaning kit, extra socks, gas mask, cartridge belt, pistol and two clips, sterile canned compress, two water canteens, one GI knife, two fragmentation grenades, binoculars-and a Browning Automatic Rifle weighing thirty-six pounds. Men bent under such burdens made hard landings in the boats. James Shriver crushed his fingers in a hatch, and was nursing the pain as he looked towards Suribachi and thought miserably: "They expect me to get up that f.u.c.king mountain!" Shriver was an eighteen-year-old a.s.sistant BAR man from Escondido, California. His original gunner was removed by military police just before embarkation, having been discovered to be only fourteen. Now, with a subst.i.tute, Shriver prepared to land with the 28th Marines.

As amtracs splashed forth from the hulls of their parent transports, correspondent John Marquand likened the spectacle to "all the cats in the world having kittens." The first wave of sixty-nine hit the beach at 0902. From his landing craft, James Vedder glimpsed wrecked planes on the airstrip, terracing inland, and further south the sheer rock walls of Suribachi. Under the thunder of the bombardment, debris flew skywards, great clouds of smoke drifted across the sh.o.r.e. Vedder, a surgeon with the 3/27th Marines, watched as two Zeroes struggled off the ground, only to collide with the bombardment and plunge into the sea. As he touched the sh.o.r.e and stumbled through the clogging black ash underfoot, the first human he saw was a dead j.a.panese, obviously burnt by a flamethrower. The doctor noted curiously that half the corpse's moustache was scorched away.

As soon as the invaders began to scramble up the steep terrace behind the beach, sh.e.l.ls and mortar bombs fell in dense succession, maiming and killing with almost every round among the crowds of heavily laden Marines. Pillars of ash erupted into the air. Burning vehicles, dead and stricken men, unwounded ones hugging the earth, created traffic chaos. Some braver souls pressed on inland, but as these were cut down, the a.s.sault's momentum faltered. One of Vedder's corpsmen had been tasked to carry his instruments ash.o.r.e. In a moment of panic, the man simply ran forward, leaving the surgeon's bag on their boat. Vedder found fragments of hot steel smouldering on his clothes, and brushed away a splinter that was stinging his backside. Within seconds of landing he was at work, removing a large fragment of jawbone wedged in the back of a Marine's throat, to enable him to breathe freely again. He could do nothing, however, for the ruin of his face: "I wondered how our plastic surgeons494 would ever restore this man's ident.i.ty." would ever restore this man's ident.i.ty."

The bombardment had destroyed j.a.panese defences close to the beaches. The Marines were quickly able to stake out positions three hundred yards inland. Yet the entire perimeter remained within easy range of the enemy. When armour began to land, tracks thrashing for a grip in the ash, most was swiftly knocked out by anti-tank guns. Some 361 j.a.panese artillery pieces, together with plentiful heavy mortars and machine guns, were dug into Iwo Jima's defences. An ordeal began which persisted through the days and nights that followed. Sh.e.l.ling, mortar and small-arms fire inflicted casualties and relentless misery on every American unit from the sh.o.r.eline to the foremost positions.

Lt.-Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi, the slender, elegant, fifty-three-year-old commander of Iwo Jima, had no illusions about the outcome of the struggle to which he was committed. He had served in Canada and the U.S. in the 1930s, and knew the relative weakness of his own nation. "This war will be decided495 by industrial might, don't you agree?" he mused to a staff officer. Kuribayashi had opposed the conflict, because he did not think it winnable. Yet fatalism did not impair his meticulous preparations to defend Iwo Jima. He had no faith in the survivability of positions on the beaches or airfields, though he could not prevent the navy contingent, beyond his authority, from devoting heavy labour to such entrenchments. He concentrated upon defence in depth, exploiting rocky heights. In the months before the American landing, some fifteen hundred natural caves were sculpted and enlarged into an intricate system linked by sixteen miles of tunnels, centred upon Kuribayashi's command bunker, seventy-five feet underground. by industrial might, don't you agree?" he mused to a staff officer. Kuribayashi had opposed the conflict, because he did not think it winnable. Yet fatalism did not impair his meticulous preparations to defend Iwo Jima. He had no faith in the survivability of positions on the beaches or airfields, though he could not prevent the navy contingent, beyond his authority, from devoting heavy labour to such entrenchments. He concentrated upon defence in depth, exploiting rocky heights. In the months before the American landing, some fifteen hundred natural caves were sculpted and enlarged into an intricate system linked by sixteen miles of tunnels, centred upon Kuribayashi's command bunker, seventy-five feet underground.

If such burrowing represented a primitive response to the technological might of the invaders, it was also a formidably effective one. Most j.a.panese positions were proof against sh.e.l.ls and bombs. Guns were sited so that they could be rolled out from caves to fire, then withdrawn when the Marines responded. Much American historical hand-wringing has focused upon the restriction of the pre-landing naval bombardment to three days. Spruance chose to conduct carrier operations against j.a.pan while Iwo Jima was a.s.saulted, depriving the attackers of Fifth Fleet's firepower. However, given the limited effectiveness of low-trajectory naval gunfire against fixed defences of such strength, it is hard to believe that further bombardment would have altered events. By far the most significant American mistake was to delay an a.s.sault on Iwo Jima for so long. If the Marines had landed in late 1944, they would have found Kuribayashi's defences less formidable.

Iwo Jima, FebruaryMarch 1945 1945

As it was, even j.a.panese artillery sited in the midst of the island could fire on the beaches, while being too well camouflaged and protected to be easily suppressed. By nightfall on 19 February, 30,000 Marines were ash.o.r.e-but 566 were already dead or dying. The invaders held a perimeter 4,400 yards wide and 1,100 yards at its deepest point, within which every man was striving to sc.r.a.pe a shallow hole, or merely nursing his fear. There was no respite from j.a.panese sh.e.l.ling.

In a sh.e.l.lhole, a corpsman asked Private First Cla.s.s Arthur Rodriguez to hold a man's protruding intestines while he applied sulphur powder, then pushed them back into his abdomen. A nearby explosion caused body parts to rain down upon them. The young BAR man tried to focus his mind on his sweetheart, Sally, back home rather than upon the ghastly spectacle before him. Soon afterwards, "I saw my group leader496 Privett sitting there with his left arm dangling by the skin. He just grabbed it with his right arm and pulled it off and threw it away." Rodriguez and his squad blazed away at rocks and small bushes till someone demanded in puzzlement: "What are we shooting at?" Like so many men in their predicament, they were wasting ammunition simply to vent frustration, to convince themselves they were not mere targets. Corporal Jerry Copeland spent his first night ash.o.r.e in a hole with two American corpses and four dead j.a.panese, praying incessantly: "'G.o.d, if you save my life I'll go to church every Sunda