Retribution_ The Battle For Japan, 1944-45 Part 6

BY A CHARACTERISTIC irony of war, American victory at Leyte Gulf exercised far less influence upon the last phase of the struggle than another, at first apparently marginal, series of events. On 15 October 1944, five days before MacArthur landed on Leyte, Rear-Admiral Masafumi Arima removed his badges of rank and clambered into the c.o.c.kpit of a plane at Clark Field on Luzon. He then took off at the head of his fliers to attack Halsey's fleet off Formosa. The commander of 26th Naval Air Flotilla, Arima was an impeccably dignified figure who defied the clammy Philippine heat to wear full uniform at all times. A slender, gentle, soft-spoken warrior, he came from a family of Confucian scholars. He cherished a book on tactics written by his own grandfather, which had become a minor military cla.s.sic. That morning of the fifteenth, he sought to make a personal contribution to the art of war by crashing his plane into an American aircraft carrier. He left Clark untroubled by the apprehension, common to most pilots, that he might not come back. He intended not to do so. irony of war, American victory at Leyte Gulf exercised far less influence upon the last phase of the struggle than another, at first apparently marginal, series of events. On 15 October 1944, five days before MacArthur landed on Leyte, Rear-Admiral Masafumi Arima removed his badges of rank and clambered into the c.o.c.kpit of a plane at Clark Field on Luzon. He then took off at the head of his fliers to attack Halsey's fleet off Formosa. The commander of 26th Naval Air Flotilla, Arima was an impeccably dignified figure who defied the clammy Philippine heat to wear full uniform at all times. A slender, gentle, soft-spoken warrior, he came from a family of Confucian scholars. He cherished a book on tactics written by his own grandfather, which had become a minor military cla.s.sic. That morning of the fifteenth, he sought to make a personal contribution to the art of war by crashing his plane into an American aircraft carrier. He left Clark untroubled by the apprehension, common to most pilots, that he might not come back. He intended not to do so.

Arima's melodramatic gesture ended in bathos. He plunged into the sea alongside a carrier, without damaging it. But he was one among many desperate men who concluded in those days that new methods were required to offer the j.a.panese any possibility of overcoming their enemy's overwhelming might. Two army fliers based on Negros Island had already made a suicide attempt on 13 September, meeting the same fate as Arima before they reached a target. Several j.a.panese fighter pilots314 deliberately rammed American bombers in what were known as deliberately rammed American bombers in what were known as tai-atari tai-atari-"body-bashing" attacks. Since the Marianas disaster, many j.a.panese officers, including a naval aide to the emperor, had discussed the possibilities of launching a systematic suicide campaign. Captain Renya Inoguchi, senior air staff officer of 1st Air Fleet on the Philippines, wrote gloomily in his diary: "Nothing is more destructive to morale than a belief that the enemy possesses superiority."

Conventional j.a.panese air forces were being devastated by the Americans. Haruki Iki and his squadron landed at Clark on 14 October to find that a sister unit which arrived only the previous day had already lost its commanding officer and most of its planes. "In the Philippines, every day315 was desperate," said Iki. "At night, the work of the ground crews preparing aircraft for next day's strikes was constantly interrupted by American bombing. Even when we drove from the mess up to the strip in darkness, if we showed headlights we were liable to be shot up by American night-fighters, which was no fun at all." Every time Iki flew out, he penned a last letter for his wife, Yoshiko, living with their two children at her parents' house on Kyushu. "If I did not leave a letter, she might never even have known where I died, because n.o.body would have told her," said the pilot. When the decision was made to launch suicide missions, Iki welcomed it: "At the time, this seemed the only option we had." was desperate," said Iki. "At night, the work of the ground crews preparing aircraft for next day's strikes was constantly interrupted by American bombing. Even when we drove from the mess up to the strip in darkness, if we showed headlights we were liable to be shot up by American night-fighters, which was no fun at all." Every time Iki flew out, he penned a last letter for his wife, Yoshiko, living with their two children at her parents' house on Kyushu. "If I did not leave a letter, she might never even have known where I died, because n.o.body would have told her," said the pilot. When the decision was made to launch suicide missions, Iki welcomed it: "At the time, this seemed the only option we had."

A j.a.panese instructor wrote of his efforts to train pilots: "Everything was urgent316. We were told to rush men through. We abandoned refinements, just tried to teach them how to fly and shoot. One after another, singly, in twos and threes, training planes smashed into the ground, gyrated wildly through the air. For long, tedious months, I tried to create fighter pilots. It was a hopeless task. Our resources were too meagre, the demand too great." Before entering combat, American pilots had received two years of training and flown at least three hundred hours, often many more. In 1944, j.a.panese fliers' previous hundred hours of pre-operational experience was cut to forty. Navigation training was abolished. Pilots were told simply to follow their leaders. A j.a.panese after-action report on the poor performance of their fliers in the Marianas declared: "Chapter 49 of the Combat Sutra Combat Sutra says that 'Tactics are like sandals. Those who are strong should wear them'...[The consequence of lack of pilot training, however, is that] it looks...as if good sandals were put on the feet of cripples." says that 'Tactics are like sandals. Those who are strong should wear them'...[The consequence of lack of pilot training, however, is that] it looks...as if good sandals were put on the feet of cripples."

Suicide attack offered a prospect of redressing the balance of forces, circ.u.mventing the fact that j.a.panese pilots were no longer capable of challenging their American counterparts on conventional terms. Instead, their astonishing willingness for self-sacrifice might be exploited. Here was a concept which struck a chord in the j.a.panese psyche, and caught the Imperial Navy's mood of the moment. Officers cherished a saying: "When a commander is uncertain317 whether to steer to port or starboard, he should steer towards death." An alternative aphorism held that "One should take care to make one's own dying as meaningful as possible." The suicide concept appeared to satisfy both requirements. Four days after Arima's death, Vice-Admiral Takijiro Onishi, new commander of 5th Air Base on the Philippines, held a meeting with Captain Inoguchi, his staff and some fliers. They agreed that Zeroes fitted with five-hundred-pound bombs and crashed headlong into targets could achieve much greater accuracy than conventional bombing. A one-way trip also doubled the range of a plane. Inoguchi proposed calling the movement whether to steer to port or starboard, he should steer towards death." An alternative aphorism held that "One should take care to make one's own dying as meaningful as possible." The suicide concept appeared to satisfy both requirements. Four days after Arima's death, Vice-Admiral Takijiro Onishi, new commander of 5th Air Base on the Philippines, held a meeting with Captain Inoguchi, his staff and some fliers. They agreed that Zeroes fitted with five-hundred-pound bombs and crashed headlong into targets could achieve much greater accuracy than conventional bombing. A one-way trip also doubled the range of a plane. Inoguchi proposed calling the movement shimpu shimpu, a word for "divine wind." Another word of much the same meaning, however, soon pa.s.sed into the vernacular of the Second World War: kamikaze kamikaze.

On 20 October, Onishi addressed men of the first designated "special attack" unit: "j.a.pan is in grave danger318. The salvation of our country is now beyond the power of the ministers of state, the general staff and humble commanders like myself. It can come only from spirited young men like you. Thus, on behalf of your hundred million countrymen, I ask this sacrifice of you, and pray for your success." A few months and several hundred suicide attacks later, genuine kamikaze volunteers became hard to find. But in those first weeks, a substantial number of j.a.panese aircrew eagerly embraced the concept, offering themselves for "useful death." When an officer flew to the Philippines base of Cebu and invited applicants for suicide missions, the entire unit came forward except two pilots in the sickbay. One flier, Uemura, had just written off a precious aircraft in an accident. He acknowledged miserably that he was the worst pilot in the squadron. His commander rea.s.sured him: "Don't worry, Uemura, I'll find a chance for you. Stop worrying and go to bed." The pilot bowed deeply, saying, "Thank you sir. I shall be waiting."

When Commander Tamai of the 201st Air Group put the idea to his twenty-three pilots, all professed enthusiasm. Lt. Yukio Seki said: "You've absolutely got to let me do it." Seki was just three months married, after a correspondence romance. He had received a random parcel from a girl, one of many dispatched by civilian well-wishers to j.a.pan's soldiers, sailors and airmen. This one, unusually, contained the sender's name and address. The officer began exchanging letters with her. They met on his leave, fell in love, married. Before Seki left on his last mission, instead of a.s.serting that he was sacrificing himself for his country, he told war correspondents: "I'm doing this for my beloved wife." To a Western mind, self-immolation in such circ.u.mstances is incomprehensible. To some j.a.panese of the time, however, it seemed intensely romantic.

On 21 October 1944, as the first suicide section took off from Luzon, their comrades stood by the flight path singing, "If duty calls me to the mountain, a verdant greensward will be my pall." The mission ended in anticlimax, for the planes returned without finding a target. But that day a j.a.panese aircraft from another field crashed into the cruiser HMAS Australia Australia off Leyte, killing thirty men and inflicting major damage. On 25 October, in the aftermath of the Leyte Gulf naval battle, kamikazes led by Seki achieved their first important successes, sinking off Leyte, killing thirty men and inflicting major damage. On 25 October, in the aftermath of the Leyte Gulf naval battle, kamikazes led by Seki achieved their first important successes, sinking St. Lo St. Lo, damaging Santee Santee and and Suwanee Suwanee. The carrier Intrepid Intrepid was struck off Luzon four days later. Onishi now secured the consent of his superior, Admiral f.u.kudome, to recruit kamikaze volunteers in large numbers. f.u.kudome had at first resisted, arguing that suicide missions would not play well with aircrew. Most of 2nd Air Fleet's 24 and 25 October attacks on the American fleet employed conventional tactics. Only after these resulted in further disastrous losses did suicide a.s.saults become inst.i.tutionalised. was struck off Luzon four days later. Onishi now secured the consent of his superior, Admiral f.u.kudome, to recruit kamikaze volunteers in large numbers. f.u.kudome had at first resisted, arguing that suicide missions would not play well with aircrew. Most of 2nd Air Fleet's 24 and 25 October attacks on the American fleet employed conventional tactics. Only after these resulted in further disastrous losses did suicide a.s.saults become inst.i.tutionalised.

Captain Inoguchi flew into Manila on 26 October to confer with Onishi about expanding "special attack" squadrons. The staff officer was dismayed by the squalor of the Philippines' capital: "People in the streets319 appeared haunted and nervous; many were leaving the city, carrying huge bundles on their shoulders. Heavy smoke...hung over the harbour. At AA positions along the waterside, soldiers were busy clearing sh.e.l.l cases and debris from the last raid...I was shocked to see so many sunken vessels, only their mast tips showing above the surface." The two j.a.panese officers found themselves meeting in an air-raid shelter. With bleak understatement, Onishi observed: "This is certainly an unorthodox command." A young suicide volunteer arrived at naval air headquarters to say farewell, greeting the admiral with the words: "h.e.l.lo, uncle." In truth there was no blood relationship, but Onishi was his father's closest friend. In this strange, indeed ghastly little world, death was everywhere around them. Inoguchi's brother had been lost two days before, commanding the battleship appeared haunted and nervous; many were leaving the city, carrying huge bundles on their shoulders. Heavy smoke...hung over the harbour. At AA positions along the waterside, soldiers were busy clearing sh.e.l.l cases and debris from the last raid...I was shocked to see so many sunken vessels, only their mast tips showing above the surface." The two j.a.panese officers found themselves meeting in an air-raid shelter. With bleak understatement, Onishi observed: "This is certainly an unorthodox command." A young suicide volunteer arrived at naval air headquarters to say farewell, greeting the admiral with the words: "h.e.l.lo, uncle." In truth there was no blood relationship, but Onishi was his father's closest friend. In this strange, indeed ghastly little world, death was everywhere around them. Inoguchi's brother had been lost two days before, commanding the battleship Musashi Musashi. His nephew died a week later as a kamikaze.

Onishi's vision for achieving j.a.pan's salvation through the "divine wind" soon attained demented proportions: "If we are prepared to sacrifice twenty million j.a.panese lives in 'special attacks,'" he said, "victory will be ours." Not all officers shared his enthusiasm. Lt. Cmdr. Tadashi Min.o.be, who led a night-fighter group in the Philippines, was transferred back to j.a.pan after openly denouncing the kamikaze concept. Propaganda, however, immediately set about enn.o.bling this new ideal. The last letters of suicide pilots pa.s.sed into j.a.pan's national legend. Petty Officer Isao Matsuo wrote on 28 October: "Dear parents, please congratulate me. I have been given a splendid opportunity to die. This is my last day."

Through the weeks that followed, as Onishi and Inoguchi mustered more volunteers, suicide attacks and American losses in the seas around the Philippines mounted dramatically. On 30 October, a hit on the carrier Franklin Franklin killed fifty-six men. Vernon Black, manning a .50-calibre machine gun on killed fifty-six men. Vernon Black, manning a .50-calibre machine gun on Belleau Wood Belleau Wood, watched a green-nosed j.a.panese attacker diving on his own ship: "He was afire in the engine320, then something hit me. Burning gasoline sprayed all over. It got awfully hot...my clothes began to burn." Black, like many others, leapt into the sea to escape the flames: "There was a lot of screaming in the water and whistles blowing." His life jacket immediately burst, burnt through. He scrambled onto a raft with a dozen other men, and forty minutes later was picked up by a "merciful can"-a destroyer. Down in Belleau Wood Belleau Wood's engine room, at first news of the strike "n.o.body got particularly excited as flight-deck fires were no novelty, and none of us up to that time had heard of the word 'kamikaze,'" in the words of Ensign Bob Reich. But the damage was grave: the carrier lost twelve planes, ninety-two crew killed and fifty-four seriously injured. Like Intrepid Intrepid, Belleau Wood Belleau Wood was forced to withdraw to Ulithi for repair. was forced to withdraw to Ulithi for repair.

Many j.a.panese attackers were shot down, but an alarming number broke through to the fleet. The balance of the air battle seemed to be tilting in favour of the enemy. Some U.S. carriers were obliged to leave station for rest and resupply. More j.a.panese planes arrived from Formosa and Kyushu. Tacloban airfield was still only marginally operational for U.S. fighters. Escorts began to take heavy punishment. When a kamikaze hit a destroyer's hull, a Brooklyn sailor said wonderingly: "You could of drove a Mack321 truck tru duh hole." "This type of attack is quite different truck tru duh hole." "This type of attack is quite different322 from what we have been combating before," said Cmdr. Arthur Purdy of the destroyer from what we have been combating before," said Cmdr. Arthur Purdy of the destroyer Abner Read Abner Read, lost at Leyte on 1 November. "This j.a.panese needs merely to get up there and get into his power dive with fixed controls to solve a very simple problem, because a ship's ability to turn during a thirty-or forty-second approach is so limited." Purdy argued that nothing smaller than five-inch gunfire could stop such a plane. He urged the need for increased fire protection on upper decks. Blazing fuel, rather than the initial explosion, doomed his own ship. Three other destroyers were damaged in the same series of raids.

The Americans quickly perceived that the attacks represented a systematic campaign, rather than the whim of individual pilots. The enemy was also mounting conventional fighter, bomber and torpedo attacks against troops, airfields and ships by day and night. A smokescreen was laid across the San Pedro anchorage whenever an air threat was identified-in 1945 this became a navy SOP, Standard Operating Procedure. The light cruiser Honolulu Honolulu survived a torpedo hit which killed sixty men as a result of heroic exertions by her crew, but mechanic Leon Garsian found himself trapped alone far belowdecks in a radio compartment. Watertight doors protected his own position, but those above were flooded. Garsian used mattress padding to check water trickling in, and at last attracted attention by shouting through a ventilation duct. Rescuers had to cut through four inches of armour with acetylene torches before he was finally rescued, after sixteen hours in what he feared would prove his tomb. More j.a.panese raiders approached while the crew was labouring to save survived a torpedo hit which killed sixty men as a result of heroic exertions by her crew, but mechanic Leon Garsian found himself trapped alone far belowdecks in a radio compartment. Watertight doors protected his own position, but those above were flooded. Garsian used mattress padding to check water trickling in, and at last attracted attention by shouting through a ventilation duct. Rescuers had to cut through four inches of armour with acetylene torches before he was finally rescued, after sixteen hours in what he feared would prove his tomb. More j.a.panese raiders approached while the crew was labouring to save Honolulu Honolulu. Reckless anti-aircraft fire from neighbouring ships killed a further six of the cruiser's men and wounded eleven. Off Leyte, promiscuous American shooting became almost as alarming a hazard as the j.a.panese, with thousands of nervous gunners striving to engage low-level attackers.

Admiral Kinkaid signalled Nimitz, asking for urgent carrier strikes against the kamikaze bases: "Air situation now appears critical." He also pressed Kenney, in a stream of messages: "If adequate fighter cover not maintained323 over combatant ships their destruction is inevitable. Can you provide the necessary protection?" No, Kenney could not. The lack of usable fields on Leyte, together with steady losses to j.a.panese strafing, rendered the U.S. Army's airmen incapable of deploying sufficient force to stave off attacks, as well as providing support for Krueger's ground forces. Before commencing the Philippines operations, MacArthur a.s.sured the chiefs of staff that Kenney's squadrons, together with the aircraft of Seventh Fleet under his own command, would easily be able to handle the air situation after the first few days ash.o.r.e. Instead, in early November the general found himself obliged to ask for the return of Halsey's carriers. Third Fleet's aircraft rejoined the battle, and inflicted a level of attrition quite unsustainable by the j.a.panese. But in the first weeks of the Leyte campaign, the Americans suffered more heavily from enemy air power than at any time since 1942. over combatant ships their destruction is inevitable. Can you provide the necessary protection?" No, Kenney could not. The lack of usable fields on Leyte, together with steady losses to j.a.panese strafing, rendered the U.S. Army's airmen incapable of deploying sufficient force to stave off attacks, as well as providing support for Krueger's ground forces. Before commencing the Philippines operations, MacArthur a.s.sured the chiefs of staff that Kenney's squadrons, together with the aircraft of Seventh Fleet under his own command, would easily be able to handle the air situation after the first few days ash.o.r.e. Instead, in early November the general found himself obliged to ask for the return of Halsey's carriers. Third Fleet's aircraft rejoined the battle, and inflicted a level of attrition quite unsustainable by the j.a.panese. But in the first weeks of the Leyte campaign, the Americans suffered more heavily from enemy air power than at any time since 1942.

On 27 November, kamikazes struck the light cruisers St. Louis St. Louis and and Montpelier Montpelier and the battleship and the battleship Colorado Colorado. By some freak, as a j.a.panese plane on its death ride streaked between the foremast and forward stack of Colorado Colorado, blood from its wounded pilot showered down on sailors manning 20mm gun tubs. "I was standing in the open324 and was so scared I was paralysed," wrote James Hutchinson. "I couldn't come to my senses enough to move until it was all over." Two days later, kamikazes got to the battleship and was so scared I was paralysed," wrote James Hutchinson. "I couldn't come to my senses enough to move until it was all over." Two days later, kamikazes got to the battleship Maryland Maryland and the destroyer and the destroyer Aulick Aulick, inflicting major damage and casualties, and hitting another destroyer. Third Fleet's fast carrier force was attacked on 25 November. Two suicide aircraft inflicted fresh damage on Intrepid Intrepid, another struck Cabot Cabot, yet another Ess.e.x Ess.e.x. The j.a.panese sneaked in amidst a cloud of American aircraft returning from a mission, becoming indistinguishable on saturated radar screens.

Even when enemy planes were identified, their pilots were taught to veer constantly, so that American gunners remained uncertain which ship was targeted. "You just don't know which one's325 coming at you," said Louis Erwin of the cruiser coming at you," said Louis Erwin of the cruiser Indianapolis Indianapolis, a turret gunner. A destroyer of Desron 53 rammed a sister ship while taking drastic evasive action, one of several such incidents. Crews learned to curse low cloud, which shielded suicide attackers from combat air patrols. "The first thing I saw that day326 was a plane with meatb.a.l.l.s on the wings just rolling into a dive," wrote a destroyer crewman on 29 November. For a dismaying number of Americans serving in the ships off Leyte, such a sight was their last. was a plane with meatb.a.l.l.s on the wings just rolling into a dive," wrote a destroyer crewman on 29 November. For a dismaying number of Americans serving in the ships off Leyte, such a sight was their last.

Fire, always fire, was the princ.i.p.al horror unleashed by a kamikaze strike on an aircraft carrier, laden with up to 200,000 gallons of aviation gas. An airman on Ess.e.x Ess.e.x "rushed over to help get a man "rushed over to help get a man327 out of a 20mm gun mount. I tried to pull him out of the fire but part of his arm came off...I got sick." Another ran onto the flight deck: "I seen these fellows with short sleeves out of a 20mm gun mount. I tried to pull him out of the fire but part of his arm came off...I got sick." Another ran onto the flight deck: "I seen these fellows with short sleeves328, the flesh hanging. I grabbed a big tube of Ungentine and tried to rub it on one guy's arms. The skin came off in my hands." In action, men learned to ensure that every possible inch of their flesh was covered by anti-flash hoods, rolled-down sleeves, denims. Yet still men burned. "We buried fifty-four people, mostly officers, the same day, and several each day for almost a week who died from burns," wrote Cmdr. Ted Winters of Lexington Lexington, which was. .h.i.t on 5 November. "Seven of our bomber pilots329 were up there [on the bridge island] watching us come in and five were blown off the ship. Part of the j.a.p pilot was hanging from the radar...it was rugged." were up there [on the bridge island] watching us come in and five were blown off the ship. Part of the j.a.p pilot was hanging from the radar...it was rugged."

For the loss of ninety aircraft, the j.a.panese had put three carriers out of action. Suicide missions inflicted far more damage upon the U.S. Navy in their first weeks than had been achieved by the Shogo operation of the Combined Fleet. The emperor was told of the "special attack force's" achievements. Hirohito said squeamishly: "They certainly did a magnificent job. But was it necessary to go to such extremes?" When his words were reported to Onishi, the admiral was crestfallen. He himself was now convinced that, because of the desperate shortage of planes and pilots, only suicide tactics could make a serious impression on the Americans, and he was surely right.

The kamikaze squadrons evolved procedures as they went, or rather as they died. Initially, commanders dispatched attackers in threes, each flight escorted by two fighters, which were intended to return to report results. Later, when sufficient planes were available, pack tactics were adopted, to swamp the defences. Fliers were urged to take time, to ensure that they impaled themselves on a suitable ship: "An impatient pilot is apt to plunge into an unworthy target." The forward elevator of an aircraft carrier was defined as the ideal aiming point. It was too dangerous for aspirant pilots to practice a steep dive onto their targets. They were invited to perform this manoeuvre just once, in the last seconds of their lives.

A squadron officer said: "There were new faces and missing faces at every briefing...The instructor and the mission remained the same, but the audience constantly changed...There were no theatrics or hysterics-it was all in the line of duty." Ground crews polished planes almost obsessively. "It was [one technician's] theory that the c.o.c.kpit was the pilot's coffin, and as such should be spotless," said an officer. It was a point of honour among the suicide crews themselves that they should take off laughing. Tears were deemed appropriate for spectators watching take-offs, and the doomed pilots seemed to agree. One kamikaze wrote crossly in his diary how irked were he and his companions when they glimpsed staff officers exchanging jokes as planes started up.

The most difficult problem for the j.a.panese in the last months of 1944 was not to find volunteers for suicide missions, but to convey them alive to the Philippines despite American fighters and the poverty of trainees' airmanship. Of the first 150 homeland aircrew a.s.signed to the islands, only half arrived. Among one group of fifteen, just three reached the battlefield. Planes remained desperately short. By mid-December, Inoguchi's unit possessed twenty-eight pilots, but only thirteen Zeroes. Crews worked day and night to make them more airworthy.

For the remainder of the war, kamikaze attacks represented by far the gravest threat faced by U.S. forces in the Pacific. In Samuel Eliot Morison's words, "The j.a.panese had perfected330 a new and effective type of aerial warfare that was hard for the Western mind to comprehend, and difficult to counteract." A British Royal Navy staff study, drafted in 1945, observed: "Logically, suicide attack a new and effective type of aerial warfare that was hard for the Western mind to comprehend, and difficult to counteract." A British Royal Navy staff study, drafted in 1945, observed: "Logically, suicide attack331 in any of the forms, air or sea, practised by the j.a.panese, differed only in kind from the last-ditch defence enjoined upon the British after Dunkirk, and only in degree from such missions as the [RAF's 1943] air attack on the Moehne Dam." Yet Americans were bewildered, indeed repelled, by the psychology of an enemy capable of inst.i.tutionalising such tactics. "I could imagine myself in the heat in any of the forms, air or sea, practised by the j.a.panese, differed only in kind from the last-ditch defence enjoined upon the British after Dunkirk, and only in degree from such missions as the [RAF's 1943] air attack on the Moehne Dam." Yet Americans were bewildered, indeed repelled, by the psychology of an enemy capable of inst.i.tutionalising such tactics. "I could imagine myself in the heat332 of battle where I would perhaps instinctively take some sudden action that would almost surely result in my death," wrote a destroyer officer, Ben Bradlee. "I could not imagine waking up some morning at 5 a.m., going to some church to pray, and knowing that in a few hours I would crash my plane into a ship on purpose." of battle where I would perhaps instinctively take some sudden action that would almost surely result in my death," wrote a destroyer officer, Ben Bradlee. "I could not imagine waking up some morning at 5 a.m., going to some church to pray, and knowing that in a few hours I would crash my plane into a ship on purpose."

It was never plausible that suicide attacks could alter the outcome of the war, but American casualties increased as tactics were refined. The j.a.panese noted that their own losses were no worse than those incurred by conventional bombing or torpedo missions. Between October 1944 and August 1945, 3,913 kamikaze pilots are known to have died, most of them navy pilots, in a campaign that peaked with 1,162 attacks in April. Around one in seven of all suicidalists. .h.i.t a ship, and most inflicted major damage.

Some j.a.panese were deeply dismayed by the kamikaze ethic. The letters and diaries of more than a few pilots reveal their own reluctance. Yet the young men who agreed to sacrifice themselves became celebrated as national heroes. One day the wife of a high court judge, whose pilot son had fallen ill and died in training, appeared at Kijin base. She brought a lock of the boy's hair and a scarf, and asked that these should be carried as mementoes by a kamikaze on his mission. She had inscribed the scarf with the words: "I pray [that you will achieve] a direct hit." A group leader duly carried the relics to his own death. Mamoru Shigemitsu, one of the more rational among j.a.pan's political leaders, nonetheless wrote in stubborn admiration after the war: "Let no man belittle333 these suicide units and call them barbaric." these suicide units and call them barbaric."

The cultural revulsion which kamikazes inspired in Americans was intensified by sailors' bitterness at finding themselves exposed to increased peril of mutilation or death, when the war was almost won. "If you were below decks, you could tell when the fight moved in closer by the type of gunfire," wrote Emory Jernigan. "First the five-inch, then the 40mm, and then the 20mm would cut loose. When the 20mm fired all sixty shots and stopped for a second to reload, you could tell the fight was close and getting closer. There was nothing to do except suck your gut and, in my case, I would recite my own little motto from boyhood: 'I don't give a d.a.m.n if I do die, do die; just so I see a little juice fly, juice fly.'"

It can be argued, in the spirit of the Royal Navy's staff study, that only a narrow line separated the deeds of j.a.pan's suicide pilots from the sort of actions for which the Allies awarded posthumous Medals of Honor and Victoria Crosses. A significant number of American and British sailors, fliers and soldiers were decorated after their deaths for hurling themselves upon the enemy in a fashion indistinguishable from that of the kamikazes. But Western societies cherish a distinction between spontaneous individual adoption of a course of action which makes death probable, and inst.i.tutionalisation of a tactic which makes it inevitable. Thus, the Allies regarded the kamikazes with unfeigned repugnance as well as fear. In the last months of the war, this new terror prompted among Americans an escalation of hatred, a diminution of mercy.

Rear-Admiral Robert Carney, Third Fleet's chief of staff, shared Halsey's disdain for wasting humanity on the enemy: "We ran afoul of j.a.panese334 hospital ships, some were sunk, some couldn't be identified, some were adjacent to proper military targets and suffered as a result...It would seem to be an unnecessary refinement to worry too much over these incidents. The j.a.panese hospital ships have undoubtedly been used for illegal purposes and they are caring for Nips which we failed to kill in the first attempt. Every one who is restored to duty potentially costs the life of many of our people." hospital ships, some were sunk, some couldn't be identified, some were adjacent to proper military targets and suffered as a result...It would seem to be an unnecessary refinement to worry too much over these incidents. The j.a.panese hospital ships have undoubtedly been used for illegal purposes and they are caring for Nips which we failed to kill in the first attempt. Every one who is restored to duty potentially costs the life of many of our people."

Captain Tom Inglis of the cruiser Birmingham Birmingham glimpsed enemy sailors in the water off Mindanao: "I was somewhat puzzled glimpsed enemy sailors in the water off Mindanao: "I was somewhat puzzled335 as to the proper treatment to accord these j.a.panese. I suggested that some should be taken prisoner. The admiral told me that would be done after we were sure the ships had been sunk, and I understand that a destroyer did pick up at least two of these j.a.panese sailors as samples of the rest. I guess I asked a very embarra.s.sing question in my action report, as I remarked that it would be helpful if a definite policy would be enunciated concerning the treatment of j.a.panese merchant sailors, suggesting that it should be stated whether they should be left swimming in the water or whether they should be taken prisoner or killed. I have received no answer to that question." A seaman wrote of his own att.i.tude to the enemy: "We came to believe as to the proper treatment to accord these j.a.panese. I suggested that some should be taken prisoner. The admiral told me that would be done after we were sure the ships had been sunk, and I understand that a destroyer did pick up at least two of these j.a.panese sailors as samples of the rest. I guess I asked a very embarra.s.sing question in my action report, as I remarked that it would be helpful if a definite policy would be enunciated concerning the treatment of j.a.panese merchant sailors, suggesting that it should be stated whether they should be left swimming in the water or whether they should be taken prisoner or killed. I have received no answer to that question." A seaman wrote of his own att.i.tude to the enemy: "We came to believe336 he was slime...not worthy of life; seeing dead j.a.panese in the water was like making love to a beautiful girl." As the kamikaze offensive intensified, the concept of offering quarter to an enemy who waged war in such a fashion came to seem to the Allies not merely inappropriate, but redundant. he was slime...not worthy of life; seeing dead j.a.panese in the water was like making love to a beautiful girl." As the kamikaze offensive intensified, the concept of offering quarter to an enemy who waged war in such a fashion came to seem to the Allies not merely inappropriate, but redundant.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

Ash.o.r.e: Battle for the Mountains

GEN. TOMOYUKI Y YAMAs.h.i.tA had intended to fight his main battle for the defence of the Philippines on Luzon. Yet he found his judgement summarily overruled by his superiors. Field Marshal Terauchi allowed himself to be deceived by the navy, which a.s.serted with shameless irresponsibility that its Leyte Gulf battles had ended in triumph. j.a.pan's fliers likewise reported that they were inflicting crippling attrition on American air forces. Fortified with such illusions, Terauchi and his staff became convinced that an important victory was within their grasp, if only j.a.pan's soldiers did their part to match the achievements of its sailors and airmen. In South Asia Army's perception, "the Navy succeeded had intended to fight his main battle for the defence of the Philippines on Luzon. Yet he found his judgement summarily overruled by his superiors. Field Marshal Terauchi allowed himself to be deceived by the navy, which a.s.serted with shameless irresponsibility that its Leyte Gulf battles had ended in triumph. j.a.pan's fliers likewise reported that they were inflicting crippling attrition on American air forces. Fortified with such illusions, Terauchi and his staff became convinced that an important victory was within their grasp, if only j.a.pan's soldiers did their part to match the achievements of its sailors and airmen. In South Asia Army's perception, "the Navy succeeded337 in the operations by sinking most of the enemy's carriers (nine out of twelve), several battleships etc., in the Formosa Sea...It [was also] believed that the sea and air battle on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth resulted in a 70 percent victory for us. All information received at area army headquarters was favourable." The navy's recklessness in launching the Combined Fleet against Leyte Gulf was now, therefore, to be matched by that of the army, in the name of honour but in the service of folly. in the operations by sinking most of the enemy's carriers (nine out of twelve), several battleships etc., in the Formosa Sea...It [was also] believed that the sea and air battle on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth resulted in a 70 percent victory for us. All information received at area army headquarters was favourable." The navy's recklessness in launching the Combined Fleet against Leyte Gulf was now, therefore, to be matched by that of the army, in the name of honour but in the service of folly.

Early in November, Lt.-Gen. Akira Muto arrived in Manila to a.s.sume the role of 14th Army chief of staff. "Nice to see you," said Yamas.h.i.ta. "I've been waiting for you a long time." Muto asked: "What's the plan?" The general responded: "I've no idea what we shall do. You'd better have a bath, then we'll talk." Muto said ruefully that every st.i.tch of spare clothing he possessed, down to his underwear, had just been incinerated in an American air raid. "Borrow mine," said his commander generously. Yet even freshly clad, Muto felt no better when he learned of Field Marshal Terauchi's insistence on a fight to the finish for Leyte. As Yamas.h.i.ta talked, Muto perceived that the general was furiously angry. Transferring units to Leyte by sea meant that many would be ravaged in transit, while those that got through could not be adequately supplied and supported. No reinforcement of Leyte could alter an outcome that was now inevitable. Yet there was nothing to be done. Terauchi was in charge. Yamas.h.i.ta's orders to Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, his subordinate commander on Leyte, continued to pay lip service to that familiar j.a.panese expression of purpose, "annihilation" of the enemy. Yamas.h.i.ta knew full well, however, that the only forces destined for annihilation were his own.

Meanwhile, his orders were to throw every possible man onto Leyte, and he did his utmost to fulfil them. Between 20 October and 11 December, though substantial numbers died or lost their equipment, some 45,000 j.a.panese troops landed in the west and north of the island. Private Eichi Ogita of the 362nd Independent Battalion experienced the sort of nightmare pa.s.sage familiar to many j.a.panese soldiers. He was dispatched from Luzon with his unit on a small wooden schooner, but on 25 October the vessel was sunk by an American submarine. Ogita and other survivors somehow struggled ash.o.r.e on the north-west coast of Leyte. When daylight came, they found that their battalion commander was dead, while the adjutant, company commander and Ogita himself were among the wounded. They had salvaged a few weapons, but no food. For a time they squatted on a nearby hilltop, then realised that it was essential to get moving. A lieutenant and ten men went in search of j.a.panese forces. When they did not return, next day the remainder of the party set off towards their original destination, the port of Ormoc.

It proved a terrible journey. They wandered uncertainly, lacking maps and compa.s.ses. Most of their wounded died. When at last the survivors reached the town, they found it under air attack. "Enemy planes appear, but ours do not," Ogita wrote gloomily in his diary. "I wonder why." On 13 November, they had yet to fire a shot: "We have not received orders to start the attack because many of our troops have not yet landed." He whistled to keep his spirits up: "There are only thirty-four men in our company338, but we have confidence enough to take on an enemy battalion."

This was typical of the manner in which j.a.panese reinforcements reached the Leyte battlefield, losing many men and much equipment before even encountering American troops. It is astonishing, in such circ.u.mstances, that they achieved as much as they did. MacArthur's Sixth Army faced an intensity of resistance beyond anything SWPA's supreme commander had antic.i.p.ated. By 7 November339 the j.a.panese 16th Division, original garrison of Leyte, had lost all its battalion commanders and engineer officers, together with most of its company commanders and half its artillery. But much of 1st Division had arrived from Luzon, and more was coming. Suzuki was hopeful of driving the Americans back across the central plain. the j.a.panese 16th Division, original garrison of Leyte, had lost all its battalion commanders and engineer officers, together with most of its company commanders and half its artillery. But much of 1st Division had arrived from Luzon, and more was coming. Suzuki was hopeful of driving the Americans back across the central plain.

Again and again, Krueger's units found themselves caught off-balance by j.a.panese entrenched on higher ground. The 1/382nd Infantry were in the midst of a rice paddy when they came under intense fire which killed or wounded every officer of two companies: "Men threw away their packs340, machine guns, radios and even rifles. Their sole aim was to get through the muck and get onto solid ground once more. Some of the wounded gave up the struggle and drowned in the grasping swamp." Captain George Morrissey, a doctor with the 1/34th Infantry, wrote: "We had just begun to dig in341 when an artillery sh.e.l.l lit in the forward part of the perimeter. I ran up there to find three killed, eight seriously wounded. Just then the rain began to pour furiously and it got dark. The first man I saw was bleeding from a jagged hole in the neck. It was a h.e.l.l of a thing there in the rain not being able to do anything but having to try anyway. This man died on the way in and another next day. No supper. Foxhole full of water. Our artillery thunders and cracks all night...I have never been so filthy before." when an artillery sh.e.l.l lit in the forward part of the perimeter. I ran up there to find three killed, eight seriously wounded. Just then the rain began to pour furiously and it got dark. The first man I saw was bleeding from a jagged hole in the neck. It was a h.e.l.l of a thing there in the rain not being able to do anything but having to try anyway. This man died on the way in and another next day. No supper. Foxhole full of water. Our artillery thunders and cracks all night...I have never been so filthy before."

The campaign yielded its share of heroes. It is often the case that men distinguish themselves in combat who are an embarra.s.sment everywhere else. Before the Leyte landing, infantrymen confined to the stockade for punishment had been returned to their units. The commander of G Company, 2/34th Infantry, strongly objected to accepting back Private Harold Moon, a persistent troublemaker. He got Moon anyway. On the night of 21 October, the regiment faced a series of violent, almost overwhelming enemy attacks. Dawn revealed foxholes surrounded by enemy dead. Several lay near the body of Private Moon, killed after fighting to the last with rifle and grenades. He received a posthumous Medal of Honor, which roused both admiration and bewilderment among his comrades. "I only knew him as a G Company screw-up342," wrote Private Eric Diller wonderingly.

Diller was himself an interesting study-the son of German Catholic immigrants who fled to the United States in 1936 because of his mother's Jewish blood. In a machine-gun squad on Leyte, the twenty-year-old carried papers which still cla.s.sified him as an alien-indeed, notionally an enemy one. Diller was squeamish about many manifestations of war in the Pacific. When comrades set about extracting gold teeth from dead j.a.panese, he declined to keep his own share. He felt unhappy about the treatment of the few enemy who became live captives: "I saw an undernourished343, sick-looking, pathetic specimen brought into our perimeter, where a newcomer to the platoon proceeded to punch the helpless prisoner in the face. No one said anything but most felt, as I did, that kind of behaviour was nothing to be proud of."

Beyond grief inflicted344 by the enemy, there was that created by the weather. Within days of the landings, it began to rain. Deluges of tropical intensity persisted through the weeks that followed. Men grew accustomed to marching, fighting, eating, sleeping soaked to the skin. Roads and tracks collapsed beneath the pounding of heavy vehicles. Phone lines shorted. Tanks and trucks bogged down or were wrecked. Streams swelled and burst. Liver fluke rendered bathing in rivers hazardous. Batteries swiftly deteriorated. It was difficult for gunners to keep cordite dry. Howitzers had to be cleaned three times a day. Blankets became covered with mildew. Folded canvas rotted. Bolts on vehicles and machinery rusted irretrievably into place. Fungus grew in weapon optics. White phosphorus in sh.e.l.ls melted in the heat, which also blew out the safety disks of flame-thrower tanks. It proved necessary to keep vehicle fuel tanks fully filled, or moisture seeped in. by the enemy, there was that created by the weather. Within days of the landings, it began to rain. Deluges of tropical intensity persisted through the weeks that followed. Men grew accustomed to marching, fighting, eating, sleeping soaked to the skin. Roads and tracks collapsed beneath the pounding of heavy vehicles. Phone lines shorted. Tanks and trucks bogged down or were wrecked. Streams swelled and burst. Liver fluke rendered bathing in rivers hazardous. Batteries swiftly deteriorated. It was difficult for gunners to keep cordite dry. Howitzers had to be cleaned three times a day. Blankets became covered with mildew. Folded canvas rotted. Bolts on vehicles and machinery rusted irretrievably into place. Fungus grew in weapon optics. White phosphorus in sh.e.l.ls melted in the heat, which also blew out the safety disks of flame-thrower tanks. It proved necessary to keep vehicle fuel tanks fully filled, or moisture seeped in.

Airfield construction became a hopeless task. A minor typhoon on 29 October blew away tentage and created havoc at stores dumps. Many men found themselves on short rations, because the overstrained logistics system was obliged to prioritise ammunition. "The task of supply and evacuation345 of wounded soon a.s.sumed staggering proportions," the American official historian acknowledged later. Richard Krebs of the 24th Division described a blow which struck the island on 8 November: "Floods raced of wounded soon a.s.sumed staggering proportions," the American official historian acknowledged later. Richard Krebs of the 24th Division described a blow which struck the island on 8 November: "Floods raced346 in almost horizontal sheets. Palms bent low under the storm, their fronds flattened like streamers of wet silk. Trees crashed to earth...The howling of the wind was like a thousandfold plaint of the unburied dead." in almost horizontal sheets. Palms bent low under the storm, their fronds flattened like streamers of wet silk. Trees crashed to earth...The howling of the wind was like a thousandfold plaint of the unburied dead."

Though overall American casualties were not excessive, some units suffered severely in local actions. For instance, in three days at the end of October, the 2/382nd Infantry lost thirty-four men killed and eighty wounded, fighting for the town of Tabontabon. George Morrissey wrote on 5 November: "I saw the creek bed347 where the fighting had been yesterday, and we brought the bodies out. Thank G.o.d I'm not a rifleman. Near the scene were two sad heaps of humanity. In the first were five Filipino men, bound and bayoneted. In the second three women and three children, bound, bayoneted and partially burned." where the fighting had been yesterday, and we brought the bodies out. Thank G.o.d I'm not a rifleman. Near the scene were two sad heaps of humanity. In the first were five Filipino men, bound and bayoneted. In the second three women and three children, bound, bayoneted and partially burned."

Leyte Valley was secured by 2 November. After ten days ash.o.r.e, SWPA headquarters announced that the j.a.panese had suffered 24,000 casualties for American losses of 3,221, including 976 killed and missing. MacArthur's staff persistently and grotesquely misjudged the campaign's progress. As early as 3 November, SWPA reports referred repeatedly to enemy "remnants" or "final remnants" in full retreat. "The end of the Leyte-Samar348 campaign is in sight," a.s.serted a press communique. Yet five days later, a bulletin grudgingly acknowledged "sharp fighting...The enemy has rushed reinforcements into this sector." Two days later still, SWPA announced that Sixth Army had destroyed the entire original Leyte garrison-but added lamely that this had been replaced by reinforcements from Luzon. American intelligence throughout the battle was poor, partly because the j.a.panese seldom directed local operations by radio, partly because MacArthur and his subordinates were unwilling to heed what they learned. "Ultra," claimed Sixth Army's G3 Clyde Eddleman, discussing the role of enemy signal decrypts, "was of little value to Sixth Army directly. It gave some indication of j.a.panese morale but little else." There were notable disadvantages to fighting an enemy short of sophisticated communications. campaign is in sight," a.s.serted a press communique. Yet five days later, a bulletin grudgingly acknowledged "sharp fighting...The enemy has rushed reinforcements into this sector." Two days later still, SWPA announced that Sixth Army had destroyed the entire original Leyte garrison-but added lamely that this had been replaced by reinforcements from Luzon. American intelligence throughout the battle was poor, partly because the j.a.panese seldom directed local operations by radio, partly because MacArthur and his subordinates were unwilling to heed what they learned. "Ultra," claimed Sixth Army's G3 Clyde Eddleman, discussing the role of enemy signal decrypts, "was of little value to Sixth Army directly. It gave some indication of j.a.panese morale but little else." There were notable disadvantages to fighting an enemy short of sophisticated communications.

SIXTH A ARMY now began the second phase of the Leyte battle: the struggle to clear the mountains which dominated northern and western areas of the island. By 8 November, the Americans had 120,000 men ash.o.r.e, contesting possession with perhaps one-third that number of j.a.panese. On the densely covered hills, the enemy could exploit to the utmost his tenacity, fieldcraft and small-unit tactical skills. Krueger's operations were bedevilled by ignorance of the ground, which was poorly mapped. The Americans suffered two months of pain and frustration, which imposed a serious delay upon MacArthur's planned landing on Luzon. Names such as b.l.o.o.d.y Ridge and Breakneck Ridge became etched into the consciousness of thousands of his soldiers as they strove to dislodge the j.a.panese from their positions, then to hold these against counterattacks. Private Luther Kinsey of the 382nd Infantry expressed a bewilderment common among Krueger's men: "I'm surprised it isn't going faster now began the second phase of the Leyte battle: the struggle to clear the mountains which dominated northern and western areas of the island. By 8 November, the Americans had 120,000 men ash.o.r.e, contesting possession with perhaps one-third that number of j.a.panese. On the densely covered hills, the enemy could exploit to the utmost his tenacity, fieldcraft and small-unit tactical skills. Krueger's operations were bedevilled by ignorance of the ground, which was poorly mapped. The Americans suffered two months of pain and frustration, which imposed a serious delay upon MacArthur's planned landing on Luzon. Names such as b.l.o.o.d.y Ridge and Breakneck Ridge became etched into the consciousness of thousands of his soldiers as they strove to dislodge the j.a.panese from their positions, then to hold these against counterattacks. Private Luther Kinsey of the 382nd Infantry expressed a bewilderment common among Krueger's men: "I'm surprised it isn't going faster349. I knew they were camouflaged and dug in, but I didn't know so few of them would hold up so many of us."

The phrase which dogged the experience of every American commander on Leyte was "pinned down." "The 1st battalion made little progress," says a typical account, describing the 128th Infantry's attack on a position named Corkscrew Ridge. "Company A was immediately pinned down by machine-gun, mortar and rifle fire." A unit could legitimately declare itself to be in this condition if it suffered substantial casualties, then incurred more by every attempt at movement. Yet all too often, the words merely indicated that a force had come under fire, taken to cover and stayed there even before suffering significant loss. Footsoldiers hoped that support arms-artillery, aircraft or tanks-would discover a means of silencing resistance without need for those "pinned down" to expose themselves to a further advance under fire.

A battalion commander in the Philippines described a typical combat conversation with a fresh second lieutenant: "The new john radioed back350 to battalion requesting reinforcement-he was pinned down. I took the radio mike...and asked the lieutenant if he had anyone hit. He answered that he had not, and then I asked: 'How then do you know you are pinned down?' He replied that they were being shot at and couldn't move. I told him that I was not convinced, and he would have to get out on his own. When the patrol returned, without a single casualty, I found him an unhappy and resentful 2nd john. I admonished him to face up to the facts of life, for combat was a serious business. He had to do his job, which meant not calling for help unless he truly needed it." Much of the story of the Leyte campaign, and indeed of infantry action in World War II, was of commanders struggling to make men move forward, when those at the sharp end feared that to comply would prove fatal to their welfare. to battalion requesting reinforcement-he was pinned down. I took the radio mike...and asked the lieutenant if he had anyone hit. He answered that he had not, and then I asked: 'How then do you know you are pinned down?' He replied that they were being shot at and couldn't move. I told him that I was not convinced, and he would have to get out on his own. When the patrol returned, without a single casualty, I found him an unhappy and resentful 2nd john. I admonished him to face up to the facts of life, for combat was a serious business. He had to do his job, which meant not calling for help unless he truly needed it." Much of the story of the Leyte campaign, and indeed of infantry action in World War II, was of commanders struggling to make men move forward, when those at the sharp end feared that to comply would prove fatal to their welfare.

The CO of the 307th Infantry sent a brusque, ungrammatical circular to his regiment: "I don't want this business351 of when someone calls 'litter-bearers,' for everyone to stop fighting. You must not attack without your bayonets fixed. The Corsairs will not support us unless we stop firing on them...Right now we are not aggressive enough, although we are getting lots of experience." Everything hinged on what a few bold men would do. On 15 December 1944, Sgt. Leroy Johnson of the 2/126th Infantry led a nine-man patrol to reconnoitre a ridge near Limon. Spotting an enemy machine gun, Johnson crawled to within six yards of it, then returned to report. He was told to destroy the gun, and advanced with three other men. They found themselves in a grenade duel with the j.a.panese, which continued until Johnson saw two grenades land close to his comrades, and threw himself on them before they exploded. Johnson was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor for his sacrifice, but it would have been unrealistic to expect many men of Sixth Army to emulate it. Aggressive junior leadership is what makes things happen on battlefields, and there were never enough Sergeant Johnsons. of when someone calls 'litter-bearers,' for everyone to stop fighting. You must not attack without your bayonets fixed. The Corsairs will not support us unless we stop firing on them...Right now we are not aggressive enough, although we are getting lots of experience." Everything hinged on what a few bold men would do. On 15 December 1944, Sgt. Leroy Johnson of the 2/126th Infantry led a nine-man patrol to reconnoitre a ridge near Limon. Spotting an enemy machine gun, Johnson crawled to within six yards of it, then returned to report. He was told to destroy the gun, and advanced with three other men. They found themselves in a grenade duel with the j.a.panese, which continued until Johnson saw two grenades land close to his comrades, and threw himself on them before they exploded. Johnson was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor for his sacrifice, but it would have been unrealistic to expect many men of Sixth Army to emulate it. Aggressive junior leadership is what makes things happen on battlefields, and there were never enough Sergeant Johnsons.

ONE OF THE EPIC actions of the campaign was fought by the 1/34th Infantry, under Lt. Col. Tom Clifford. Early on the morning of 10 November, his battalion was shipped seven miles along the north coast in landing craft, to a beach in the midst of Carigara Bay. There, they offloaded without opposition, and began marching into the hills. Three days later they took up position on Kilay Ridge, a nine-hundred-foot elevation which commanded much of the surrounding countryside, and provided vital flanking support for American operations on Breakneck Ridge. The battalion remained on Kilay until 4 December, in almost continuous contact with the j.a.panese. Clifford's men were isolated, dependent for supply on Filipino porters and spasmodic airdrops. They suffered much, but held their ground. During one firefight, Clifford himself was visiting a company headquarters where he found a man wounded in the thigh, unable to walk. The colonel carried the casualty a mile on his own back over a mountain trail to his command post. On leave in the U.S. shortly before, Clifford was detained by military police without his dogtags, and accused of impersonating an officer. Now he received a Distinguished Service Cross for outstanding leadership. actions of the campaign was fought by the 1/34th Infantry, under Lt. Col. Tom Clifford. Early on the morning of 10 November, his battalion was shipped seven miles along the north coast in landing craft, to a beach in the midst of Carigara Bay. There, they offloaded without opposition, and began marching into the hills. Three days later they took up position on Kilay Ridge, a nine-hundred-foot elevation which commanded much of the surrounding countryside, and provided vital flanking support for American operations on Breakneck Ridge. The battalion remained on Kilay until 4 December, in almost continuous contact with the j.a.panese. Clifford's men were isolated, dependent for supply on Filipino porters and spasmodic airdrops. They suffered much, but held their ground. During one firefight, Clifford himself was visiting a company headquarters where he found a man wounded in the thigh, unable to walk. The colonel carried the casualty a mile on his own back over a mountain trail to his command post. On leave in the U.S. shortly before, Clifford was detained by military police without his dogtags, and accused of impersonating an officer. Now he received a Distinguished Service Cross for outstanding leadership.

Conditions on Kilay Ridge were never less than dreadful. "Rained all night and still raining hard," medical officer George Morrissey wrote on 20 November "...The ground is a deep gooey churned mixture of mud, urine, faecal matter, garbage. The floor of our aid station is three inches deep with caked mud." He described the terror of his helpless patients when shooting came close. It became especially hard to treat men when mud-stained fragments of clothing were blown into their wounds. So tenuous were the battalion's communications that it took three days to move each casualty to a first-surgery facility. Some did not make it, despite the devotion of their Filipino carriers. Morrissey noted bleakly that the yearning to go home, common to every man in the Pacific theatre, was replaced in those days by a much more modest ambition-to get off Kilay. On 26 November, he wrote: "No loud talking or laughing352 around here these days. People converse in low voices, as at the bedside of a sick patient...Platoons have twelve to fifteen men at most...The mortality among our good non-coms has been very high...These are jittery days." around here these days. People converse in low voices, as at the bedside of a sick patient...Platoons have twelve to fifteen men at most...The mortality among our good non-coms has been very high...These are jittery days."

They drank from potholes of milky water, and in the deep darkness of the nights cursed the bats which flew in thousands around their heads. There was no mail, and often they felt abandoned by their higher formation. Clifford explained by radio his difficulties with sick and hungry men, the j.a.panese crowding them. Corps headquarters shrugged: "You are in a tough spot." The colonel was finally reduced to threatening: "Either you give us artillery or I'm going to pull my men off the ridge and leave the j.a.ps looking down your throat." The battalion got its gunfire support. Each morning, Morrissey viewed with disgust the heap of soaked, slashed, stinking clothing and dirty bandages lying outside the aid station to be burned. A sick call produced a queue of a hundred men, most suffering inflamed feet or fever. The doctor grew wearily accustomed to the cry: "Will you look at my feet? Will you look at my feet?" The 1/34th was relieved on 4 December, and made its weary way down to the coast. Clifford had lost 28 killed and 101 wounded, but his battalion could boast one of the most impressive performances of the campaign.

Other units suffered almost as badly in the November actions. "These bearded, mud-caked soldiers came out of the mountains exhausted and hungry," said a 24th Division report on the experience of the 2/19th Infantry. "Their feet were heavy, cheeks hollow, bodies emaciated and eyes glazed." When they left the line 241 officers and men-about a third of the battalion-were immediately hospitalised with skin disorders, foot ulcers, battle fatigue and exhaustion. "The men looked ten or fifteen353 years older than their ages," wrote Kansan Captain Philip Hostetter, medical officer of the 1/19th Infantry. "They spoke little and moved slowly. There was no joking or horseplay." Hostetter consigned three exhausted company commanders to hospital. years older than their ages," wrote Kansan Captain Philip Hostetter, medical officer of the 1/19th Infantry. "They spoke little and moved slowly. There was no joking or horseplay." Hostetter consigned three exhausted company commanders to hospital.

It sometimes seemed, to commanders and footsoldiers alike, that the Leyte campaign was being conducted in slow motion. "The infantry policy was to avoid battle unless great force could be brought to bear on that particul