Retribution_ The Battle For Japan, 1944-45 Part 16

Many women found a fulfilment in the ranks of Mao's Communists which had been wholly unattainable in pre-war China. Bai Jingfan was the daughter of a prosperous merchant from Henan Province who dealt in grain and oil. When the j.a.panese stormed their village in 1934, the family fled. Bai herself, sixteen at the time, set off alone in determined search of the Communists, whom she perceived as the only convincing opponents of occupation. Initially, she took an eight-day bus journey to Xian. From there, she travelled to Yan'an, where she enrolled in the Party's Women's University. On graduation she became a propaganda officer. The hardships of her new life counted for nothing beside the exhilaration of working for the cause. She married a rising star of the Communist military hierarchy, and followed him to fight with a guerrilla regiment in Hebei Province.

By May 1944 she had grown accustomed to a wholly nomadic existence, playing cat-and-mouse with j.a.panese forces. One night, camped in a village, they were awakened at midnight by scouts. An enemy search-and-destroy column was approaching. "It was pitch dark and blowing a gale. Our commander said: 'We've got to get out-fast.'" Hastily seizing weapons and equipment, they set off towards another village, nine miles distant. They had marched barely a mile when the night erupted into gunfire. Somebody said: "The lead platoon has run into the j.a.panese." Bai's companions said: "We'll have to make a run for it." She had a special problem of her own, however. She was heavily pregnant. After struggling across country for two miles, she felt she could not run another step. In the midst of the fields, she told the others: "Leave me here-I'll find a place to hide." They argued fiercely for a few moments, then took her at her word. After a cold and frighteningly lonely night, early next morning she was able to struggle on to the village rendezvous where she joined her company. The j.a.panese were still close behind, however. The guerrillas had to keep going. In a few hasty exchanges with the villagers, they found a refuge for Bai, in the hut of a widow with no reason to love the enemy, for they had killed her husband.

For two weeks, they lived peacefully enough. Then, one morning, a boy dashed in shouting: "j.a.panese come! j.a.panese come!" At first they were disbelieving. Then they saw enemy soldiers approaching. Once again, Bai had to stumble into flight with her unborn burden. She lasted six miles, as far as another village, before again collapsing exhausted. She threw herself on the mercy of the peasants. They showed her into a deep, narrow hole. In stifling heat and total darkness, she lay secreted when the enemy column arrived. The j.a.panese announced that they knew people from 8th Route Army were in the village, and proposed to find them. After a search, which came close to Bai's hole but did not discover it, they interrogated a ten-year-old boy and an old man. Both denied all knowledge of any fugitives. After raping the old man's niece in front of the entire village, the j.a.panese marched on. Bai said: "I felt so guilty, completely powerless to interfere with anything the j.a.panese did." She was safe, and rejoined her regiment. Soon afterwards, she gave birth to a son. She cherished the profound grat.i.tude, common to all fugitives, of owing her life to strangers who suffered much and risked more.

2. With the Soviets

ONE OF MANY errors made by Western observers in China was to a.s.sume that Communists in Moscow must be sympathetic to Communists in Yan'an, and vice versa. In the winter of 194445, when Chinese Nationalist troops were everywhere retreating before the j.a.panese, the British Joint Intelligence Committee speculated: "If Chinese unable put up even show errors made by Western observers in China was to a.s.sume that Communists in Moscow must be sympathetic to Communists in Yan'an, and vice versa. In the winter of 194445, when Chinese Nationalist troops were everywhere retreating before the j.a.panese, the British Joint Intelligence Committee speculated: "If Chinese unable put up even show789 of determined resistance in defence of such important towns, considerable danger gov might not survive. With breakdown of centralised govt and dispersal Chinese troops, other than those trained and led by Americans, organised Chinese opposition would come only from Communists...who might get more support than in past from Russians who might see some advantage in maintaining some Chinese Government in opposition to j.a.panese." of determined resistance in defence of such important towns, considerable danger gov might not survive. With breakdown of centralised govt and dispersal Chinese troops, other than those trained and led by Americans, organised Chinese opposition would come only from Communists...who might get more support than in past from Russians who might see some advantage in maintaining some Chinese Government in opposition to j.a.panese."

In reality, however, Stalin had long before reached brutally pragmatic conclusions about China. He believed that Chiang was the only man capable of ruling the country; that Mao was too weak to overthrow him; and that Soviet interests therefore demanded a working relationship with the Nationalists. For years before the war, Chiang received cash and military aid from Moscow. Mao's people in Yan'an were far more isolated politically than Western visitors knew. Though Stalin had funded China's Communists back in the 1920s, not until the war ended did the Soviet leader lift a finger to a.s.sist their cause against Chiang. Conversely, in the dark days of 194142, when Stalin's emissaries in Yan'an urged Mao to exert all possible military pressure on the j.a.panese, to diminish the risk that they would join Hitler's onslaught on Russia, the Chinese leader ignored their imprecations.

Yet the Soviets needed information from China, and above all from Manchuria, where Russian and j.a.panese forces confronted each other across their shared border, and had fought a brief war in 1939. Despite their supposed neutrality towards j.a.pan, the Russians welcomed into the far east of the Soviet Union several thousand Chinese Communist guerrillas who sought refuge from hunger and j.a.panese hara.s.sment. In remote forest areas, under the auspices of Moscow's Far East Intelligence Group, training camps and bases were established. Chinese guerrillas were sent back into their own country to spy and make trouble, in the same fashion as the British SOE and American OSS promoted resistance elsewhere in the world.

The activities of these groups form a remarkable story, largely unknown in the West. Chiang Kai-shek lost much face among Manchurians when he declined to commit Nationalist forces to resist the 1931 j.a.panese takeover. The local guerrilla bands which formed thereafter were Communist in name, however little ideology they possessed. Stalin's Chinese recruits were drawn from unimaginably wretched backgrounds. Li Dongguan was the child of a peasant in Heilongjiang Province, who started poor and grew relentlessly poorer. The child tended cattle for the local landlord, and quickly became radicalised by the j.a.panese occupation. One day when a group of boys were making a fishtrap by the river, two j.a.panese soldiers came by with a dog. One of the children was foolish enough to throw a stone at it. The j.a.panese unslung their rifles and shot dead not only the stone thrower, but three other children. "I was so shocked. After that, I cared only about fighting the j.a.panese."

Not long after, a Communist guerrilla group stayed in his village for a few days. He befriended its bugler, a boy about his own age. They played together, as children do, and Li-nicknamed "Tiezi" by his family-helped tend the guerrillas' horses. He told the bugler that he wanted to join the band. "You'll have to talk to Liu, the commissar," said the young warrior. Liu was dismissive: "Look at you-thirteen years old. Life as a guerrilla is no picnic. One day you're crossing mountains in the snow, the next there's nothing to eat. You'd never keep up. Anyway, your family need you at home." "My mother's dead and I needn't tell anybody else," said the boy. Liu shrugged, patted him on the head and said: "We can talk about this again in a couple of years."

Next day, however, when the guerrilla column marched out, behind them in the snow trudged Li. He said nothing to his family, carried only a little rice and a few trifles in a bag. That night, when the guerrillas camped, Li slipped in among them, and slept beside his friend the bugler. It was two days before Liu, the commissar, noticed him. Then he burst out furiously: "What the h.e.l.l are you doing here? We're going into action tomorrow. Look at your hands-you've got frostbite already. The cold will kill you in a week. Go home where you belong!" But Li did not go home. Through the days that followed, he shadowed his young friend the bugler, helping with camp ch.o.r.es, fetching water, peeling vegetables, feeding the horses. After a month of this, Liu shrugged and said: "OK, you're earning your keep. You can stay with us." Li's family a.s.sumed that he was dead. It was fifteen years before his few surviving relations saw him again.

In the times that followed, besides the usual privations of guerrilla life, Li took part in several skirmishes with the occupiers. Once, when his band saw two j.a.panese vehicles pa.s.s by on a road, they knew that they were likely to come back the same way, and laid an ambush. Sure enough, late in the afternoon the trucks reappeared. The guerrillas poured fire into them. When the action was over, they found that they had killed twenty j.a.panese. Only one made good his escape. There was a bonus: one truck had been carrying a garrison payroll. The guerrillas found themselves laden with cash as well as the weapons of the dead. In China, it was hard to distinguish between banditry and politically motivated resistance, and few tried to do so. Such little battles were rare. The guerrillas' lives were characterised by monotony, privation, and long marches to escape j.a.panese punitive columns. A combination of all three eventually drove Li's group across the northern border, into Russia.

Li Min's father was head of the anti-j.a.panese group in his village in Heilongjiang Province. During her brief period of schooling, her teacher proselytised enthusiastically about the virtues of the October Revolution in Russia. He taught them Lenin's song: "With Lenin's birth, a star rose in the sky, beloved of all workers, feared by every capitalist." Min's education ceased, along with the life of her village, after a punitive raid by j.a.panese troops in 1936. She found herself a young nomad in the forests with a guerrilla band. Her father and brother joined other groups-with which both were killed before she could see them again. In the early years of the j.a.panese occupation, such groups survived without too much difficulty, receiving help from sympathetic peasants. At its peak, Min's band was seven hundred strong. However, as the j.a.panese tightened their grip, the plight of their opponents grew harsher. Peasants were rounded up into "protected villages," which they needed pa.s.ses to leave. Others were deported for slave labour. Large numbers of j.a.panese immigrants arrived, taking over confiscated Chinese land. j.a.panese military sweeps of guerrilla areas became progressively more vigorous and ruthless.

It was a fantastically primitive existence, which only the youngest and hardiest could endure. Most of Min's group were aged between seventeen and twenty-"a man of thirty, like our commander, seemed to us incredibly old." They planted their own maize and rice in remote stretches of wilderness, hunted deer, wild boar and bears not only for food but for skins in which to clothe themselves. Like most of the wartime French maquis maquis, their chief concern was not with fighting the enemy-for which they possessed scant means-but with survival. They snared rabbits for food and skins with which to sew caps and cloaks. They lived in huts dug deep into the earth, so that only the roofs showed above ground level. They huddled around their fires to fight the winter cold. But fires meant smoke, and smoke brought strafing j.a.panese aircraft, which killed scores of their people. Of those who survived, many more perished of hunger. Finally, in 1941, they embarked on a twenty-day march which led them across the border into Russia.

Jiang De grew up with Communist guerrillas in Manchuria. Every autumn they came to his village seeking grain and recruits. His uncle, whom Jiang much admired, joined them. Jiang became a small-time spy, collecting fragments of information about j.a.panese movements, a.s.sisted by the fact that he had another uncle working in a local police station. "n.o.body took any notice of what a kid like me was doing." One day in July 1943, six guerrillas were in Jiang's house when two j.a.panese police appeared without warning at the front door. The guerrillas bolted through the back. There was a brief scuffle, in which one policeman was killed while the other fled. A few hours later, three trucks laden with j.a.panese soldiers and Chinese militia drove up to the village and rapidly deployed around it. They rounded up all fifteen members of the family except Jiang, who escaped into fields with the guerrillas. In captivity, the family paid dearly for their rashness in lingering at home after the policeman's killing. All were tortured in varying degrees, with forced infusions of chilli water, electric shocks and beatings. Jiang's father died under the experience.

After the j.a.panese had departed with their prisoners, the young man and the guerrillas raided the farm of a local landlord. They seized ten horses and all the grain the beasts could carry, then set off towards the forests. After marching all night, at dawn they realised that they were being pursued. For four hours they lay in hiding with their animals, listening to j.a.panese voices as troops searched the area. One of the horses began to whinny. They cut its throat. At last it seemed safe to move on. Early next morning, they reached the camp of the seventy-strong guerrilla band, with whom Jiang now threw in his lot. Winter came on. "It was a very difficult time," he said. They were soon desperate for food. They ate some of the horses, and the remainder soon perished of hunger. Eventually, a decision was taken: some men would hold out in the forest until spring. The rest, however, would make for the Russian border. After three weeks' hard marching, and a crossing of the frozen Amur River, they reached Soviet border posts. Jiang delivered a letter which the guerrilla commander had given him, asking that he should be trained and sent back into China.

Zhou Shuling was an illiterate fourteen-year-old when one day in 1934 her Manchurian hamlet was visited by j.a.panese troops who murdered her grandfather by stuffing chilli plants down his throat until he choked. Her brother, aunt and two uncles were killed by simpler methods. She ran away to join a local Communist guerrilla group of the North-East Anti-j.a.panese Union: "I refused to become a j.a.panese slave." There were eleven guerrilla groups in northern Manchuria at this time, some of them no more than bandits. She served with the 3rd Regiment, initially employed as a spy to scout j.a.panese positions and report where it might be possible to steal weapons or food. On one of these expeditions she met a j.a.panese patrol. A soldier casually lashed out with his bayonet, gashing her face. Another j.a.panese intervened, saying: "Oh, leave her alone. She's harmless." He said to Shuling: "Run for it, while you've got the chance." After that encounter, fearful of rejoining her group when the j.a.panese were on the move and she had no papers, she took refuge for a week with a woman whom she persuaded to give her shelter in return for helping to look after her four children. Then Shuling threw herself on the mercy of a women's religious group. After a week with them, she was able to escape back to her band.

It was a hard life, moving constantly to escape roving j.a.panese columns, living in caves and woods, once surviving a week without food. In 1938, when she was sixteen, she was told that she was to marry the commander of another group, an old man of twenty-nine named Li Mingshu. "What did I think of him?" She shrugged. "It didn't matter whether I liked or disliked him. That was the way things were done." She lived for several months in the wilderness with Li's 32nd Battalion, until j.a.panese pressure became irresistible. After the Communist groups in their area had been desperately mauled, and with the loss of hundreds of men, the survivors slipped over the border into Russia, where most of them remained until 1945.

The Russians treated their Chinese guests as well as their own threadbare means allowed: "They respected us, because we had been fighting for the same thing as them," said Li Min. They were issued Russian uniforms, armed and intensively trained for intelligence missions and guerrilla war. Min underwent courses in radio work and parachuting. Clothes to wear, roofs over their heads and a bare minimum of food to eat might seem little enough, but were more than they had known in the forests of north-east China. Min supervised the guerrillas' little library, and acted as a.s.sistant to their group's resident intellectual, Chen Lei. He produced a string of pamphlets and reports, and conducted briefings for the group on the state of the war, based on newspaper reading and radio listening. In 1943, Min married Chen Lei. She was twenty-one, he was twenty-five. "It was not an arranged marriage-we simply loved each other. There was somebody else who liked me a lot, but Lei was the one I really cared about."

Marriage in such circ.u.mstances was a strange business. There was only the simplest of ceremonies before a few friends, with no spare food or alcohol with which to celebrate. In winter months, the couple were allowed to cohabit in a hut they found for themselves in a derelict Soviet army camp. In summer, however, party rules decreed that men and women should occupy separate quarters, whether married or not. The Chinese were strictly quarantined from all Soviet citizens except their own instructors. They were forbidden to visit the nearest town, Yasta, some forty miles from the guerrilla camps. Yet the union of Lei and Min, unlike so many wartime marriages, lasted through sixty-three years that followed. "I never regret my experience in Russia. I was very lucky. In some ways, it was a good time."

After months of training by Soviet instructors, Li Dongguan joined one of the reconnaissance groups which operated inside China from Russian bases. Over the next seven years he carried out seventy cross-border missions, scouting on foot up to thirty miles inside j.a.panese-controlled territory, liaising with local guerrillas and reporting on j.a.panese deployments. In winter the guerrillas usually stayed in their Soviet camps. Though there were occasional ski patrols, deep snow made movement difficult. In summer they worked in four-man teams. Dongguan's favoured companion was a young Korean named Li Yunlong, "a peasant like me, who had shared the same sort of life." They were dropped by jeep on the Russian side of the border, then travelled for three to five days in j.a.panese territory, clad usually in peasant clothing, occasionally in j.a.panese uniform, reporting back by radio. They slept mostly in the huts of sympathetic peasants. Unlike most Russian soldiers, they never carried vodka in their rations: "We saved our drinking for when we got back." Only once did they clash head-on with a j.a.panese patrol, which cost Dongguan a bullet in the shoulder. Fortunately, they had only just crossed the river border. Within hours his companions were able to get him back into Russia.

The young Chinese liked the Russians: "We were all fellow Communists." Once he had mastered the language, he became friendly with Russian officers who used to say: "You like it here. Why not take out citizenship and marry a nice Russian girl?" Dongguan was irked by this: "I am not a Russian-I'm Chinese." "Don't be so small-minded and nationalistic," they taunted him. "I'm not nationalistic!" the young Chinese said angrily. "I'm internationalistic." "Come on," insisted the Russians. "You'd have a much better life here than in China-even when we've dealt with the j.a.panese there'll be a civil war to come." Dongguan brushed them aside. He met a young Chinese Communist doctor named Zhang Yujie and married her three months later. He enjoyed his life in the Russian camps. Their remoteness held no terrors for a Chinese peasant, and he loved the opportunities to hunt and fish: "There was plenty of game in the forests. We lived pretty well." By 1945 he was twenty-eight years old, one of the most experienced of the guerrillas.

Jiang De joined a course of thirty students, most of them under twenty, who were taught the arts of reconnaissance and wireless operation-which, in the case of Jiang and several others, included some basic literacy skills. "I enjoyed it-I learned so many things I didn't know." Their material needs were served by Russian batmen and cooks, a privilege the teenager had never known. They liked their Russian "headmaster." Jiang said: "I changed a lot-for a start, I learned to read and write. I became a different person."

"The Russians were kind to us," said Zhou Shuling. "I saw how very hard life was in Russia-worse than in China-but they shared what they had. Sometimes, a Russian might only have one potato to eat. But he would share that potato." She herself was trained as a nurse, and during those years of exile bore her husband four children in their tiny room in the bleakness of the Russian north-east. Her husband's career became much more exotic. He was trained as a parachutist, and carried out several intelligence missions in Manchuria. He told her nothing of his abrupt comings and goings. Once, she was amazed to see a j.a.panese soldier walking up the path to her home. Then she recognised her husband in the hated uniform.

More than a few of the Chinese agents whom the Soviets sent back into Manchuria were captured by the j.a.panese, who were as confused as the Allies by the tangle of Communist loyalties between Mao and Stalin. In December 1944, j.a.panese intelligence in Manchuria reported to Tokyo that they had caught two Chinese Communist agents in Dalian, who had been in contact with the local Soviet consul. These men confessed under interrogation to membership of a thirty-strong network of agents in Manchuria, in wireless contact with the Communists in Yan'an. Their group, the prisoners a.s.serted, "at present were mostly inactive790 awaiting a revolt in Manchuria or a Soviet-j.a.panese war." It is today impossible to guess whether the captured agents were in reality reporting to Yan'an or to the Soviets. awaiting a revolt in Manchuria or a Soviet-j.a.panese war." It is today impossible to guess whether the captured agents were in reality reporting to Yan'an or to the Soviets.

In addition to the reconnaissance groups791, the Russians formed guerrilla refugees into a regular unit, the 88th Independent Brigade. Four of its battalions were Chinese. The fifth was Korean, commanded by Kim Il Sung, who later became ruler of North Korea. Their ranks were stiffened by some Soviet officers of Chinese and Korean origins. In the canteen at their base forty miles from Khabarovsk, they celebrated the German surrender with Russians who offered toasts to victory and to Stalin. The Chinese immediately called for another toast: victory over j.a.pan. The Red Army men enthusiastically joined in. From that day on, the former guerrillas antic.i.p.ated Soviet entry into the eastern war. When at last it came, the Chinese were bitterly disappointed when the Russians deployed only a handful of the Chinese trainees, committing the others to internal security duties in Manchuria and Korea. Stalin's Chinese clients were deemed a political a.s.set more than a military one.

JOHN P PATON D DAVIES and his kind forever afterwards believed that, in the winter of 194445, the United States lost a historic opportunity to achieve an understanding with China's future, in the person of Mao, which it sacrificed by clinging to the past, in the person of Chiang. This was naive. There is no more reason to suppose that Mao would have honoured promises to American capitalists, made under the duress of war, than did Chiang. Both were playing a game with the Americans, Chiang with greater apparent success, Mao with much shrewder understanding of his own people. Edgar Snow, the U.S. journalist who knew Mao for many years and who became one of his most effective Western propagandists, recorded a conversation with him in the 1930s: "Both of us felt and his kind forever afterwards believed that, in the winter of 194445, the United States lost a historic opportunity to achieve an understanding with China's future, in the person of Mao, which it sacrificed by clinging to the past, in the person of Chiang. This was naive. There is no more reason to suppose that Mao would have honoured promises to American capitalists, made under the duress of war, than did Chiang. Both were playing a game with the Americans, Chiang with greater apparent success, Mao with much shrewder understanding of his own people. Edgar Snow, the U.S. journalist who knew Mao for many years and who became one of his most effective Western propagandists, recorded a conversation with him in the 1930s: "Both of us felt792 a growing conviction that the Communist-Nationalist war in China would in the long term prove more important than the j.a.panese war...Mao correctly predicted the j.a.panese attack on Western colonies in Asia, Russian intervention in a general war to defeat the j.a.panese-and end colonialism in Asia. He told me to expect the j.a.panese to win all the great battles, seize the main cities and communications, and in the process destroy the KMT's best forces...at the end of a war which he thought might last ten years, the 'forces of the Chinese revolution' would...emerge as the leading power in East Asia." a growing conviction that the Communist-Nationalist war in China would in the long term prove more important than the j.a.panese war...Mao correctly predicted the j.a.panese attack on Western colonies in Asia, Russian intervention in a general war to defeat the j.a.panese-and end colonialism in Asia. He told me to expect the j.a.panese to win all the great battles, seize the main cities and communications, and in the process destroy the KMT's best forces...at the end of a war which he thought might last ten years, the 'forces of the Chinese revolution' would...emerge as the leading power in East Asia."

This seems both a plausible ill.u.s.tration of Mao Zedong's shrewdness and a convincing view of his agenda. In 1945, the U.S. remained implacably unwilling to send military aid to Yan'an. For this, much abuse has been heaped upon Hurley and his kind by liberal contemporaries and historians. Yet the Americans were surely right. It would have availed the Allied war effort nothing to ship arms to the Communists. These would have been used against the j.a.panese only in showcase operations to impress foreign spectators. By now, the minds of U.S. policy-makers as well as Chinese princ.i.p.als had become fixed upon shaping post-war realities, rather than promoting j.a.pan's defeat on the Asian mainland.

In January 1945, Wedemeyer chaired a meeting with the British at which he a.s.serted emphatically: "Under no circ.u.mstances is any material help793 to be given or negotiations entered into with any provincial authorities or military leaders who are not, repet.i.tion not, directly controlled by and owe allegiance to central authorities." A British hand pencilled on the War Office copy of this minute: "Yennan?" Wedemeyer urged everyone present to "come clean" about any "undeclared operations." The British in Chongqing agreed with their American colleagues about very little, but they endorsed Hurley and Wedemeyer's view that it was pointless to arm Mao's people. The British military attache signalled to London on 27 December 1944: "Seeing that the Communists have not been equipped to be given or negotiations entered into with any provincial authorities or military leaders who are not, repet.i.tion not, directly controlled by and owe allegiance to central authorities." A British hand pencilled on the War Office copy of this minute: "Yennan?" Wedemeyer urged everyone present to "come clean" about any "undeclared operations." The British in Chongqing agreed with their American colleagues about very little, but they endorsed Hurley and Wedemeyer's view that it was pointless to arm Mao's people. The British military attache signalled to London on 27 December 1944: "Seeing that the Communists have not been equipped794 with modern weapons nor organised and trained to operate with them, I consider that they would be of negligible value for at least a year, even if given all the facilities enjoyed by the central gov forces since 1928. They have never carried out regular ops against the j.a.ps, but have contented themselves with occupying territory from which the Kuomintang tps have withdrawn." with modern weapons nor organised and trained to operate with them, I consider that they would be of negligible value for at least a year, even if given all the facilities enjoyed by the central gov forces since 1928. They have never carried out regular ops against the j.a.ps, but have contented themselves with occupying territory from which the Kuomintang tps have withdrawn."

In March 1945 Hurley abandoned his attempt to forge a coalition between Mao and Chiang, and became implacably hostile to Yan'an. The amba.s.sador conducted a dramatic purge of all those whom he deemed Communist sympathisers, including Service and Ludden. He had become convinced that the United States must support Chiang, and Chiang alone. A British visitor met Hurley in 1945. He afterwards a.s.serted that the U.S. amba.s.sador "despised the Chinese [and] asked795 whether I did not agree that they were hopeless people who must have a strong man on top to keep them in order." As so often when others waver, one man pa.s.sionately committed to a course of action-Hurley-got his way. America withheld support from Mao, whose guerrillas remained largely pa.s.sive until August 1945. whether I did not agree that they were hopeless people who must have a strong man on top to keep them in order." As so often when others waver, one man pa.s.sionately committed to a course of action-Hurley-got his way. America withheld support from Mao, whose guerrillas remained largely pa.s.sive until August 1945.

John Paton Davies admitted later that he had been mistaken to suppose that Mao Zedong was amenable to democracy. However, the American diplomat was impenitent in his judgement about the virtues of what he and his colleagues saw, liked and admired about Mao's camp in 194445: "Yan'an provided the great ma.s.s796 of the population, which had been without hope, with an affirmative, personal way out of the swamps of despair. The way out was through rustic nationalism, based on organized rustic resistance to the j.a.panese invaders, and a novel feeling of having some say in the shaping of one's individual destiny." of the population, which had been without hope, with an affirmative, personal way out of the swamps of despair. The way out was through rustic nationalism, based on organized rustic resistance to the j.a.panese invaders, and a novel feeling of having some say in the shaping of one's individual destiny."

It was unquestionably true that Mao's people in Yan'an were building a base of popular support-however deluded were the Chinese people about Mao's ability to improve their lives-quite lacking for Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Christopher Thorne has written perceptively about the enthusiasm of generations of American foreign policy-makers for identifying a nation's "great man," and fixing upon him-sometimes to the point of obsession-as friend or foe. Americans, Thorne argues, are far less comfortable a.s.sessing movements and ideologies than categorising individuals. American policy in China represented a spectacular example of this proclivity. Chiang had become unequivocally the chosen "great man" of the United States. Though Washington grew deeply disillusioned about the Nationalists' will or ability to a.s.sist the Allied cause against the j.a.panese, and acknowledged the chronic corruption and incompetence of Chiang's government, they stuck with him.

Even if the U.S. had decided to ship military aid to the Communists in 1945, the logistical difficulties were so great that the j.a.panese would not have been much inconvenienced. No more than the Nationalists were the Communists capable of inflicting defeat upon a regular j.a.panese army. American support for the Communists might have spared the Chinese people from their later civil war, by hastening the fall of Chiang: it was plain to all but the most blind and bigoted foreigners in China in 1945 that if its people were granted political choice, Chiang must fall. But aid to Mao could not have altered the course of the Second World War in Asia.

Exposure of the delusion that the U.S. could determine the future of China cost Americans only money, but was paid for in blood by the Chinese people. By the spring of 1945, Wedemeyer in Chongqing was making hasty plans for American troop landings at Chinese ports and in Beijing, to pre-empt their seizure by the Communists when hostilities ended. The U.S. general was grudgingly obliged to recognise how formidable Communist forces and organisation had become. By summer, Mao's people in Yan'an displayed a notable smugness. The mere fact of their survival against all expectations until the j.a.panese stood on the brink of defeat enabled them to stand poised to launch the only struggle which mattered to them: for the body and soul of China.

EIGHTEEN.

Eclipse of Empires

ALTHOUGH J j.a.pAN and n.a.z.i Germany never significantly collaborated, the collapse of Hitler's regime plainly hastened the defeat of j.a.pan, because it enabled the Allies to transfer significant, though not unlimited, resources to completing the destruction of Hirohito's shrinking empire. In the last weeks of the European war, j.a.panese emissaries in Berlin pestered leading n.a.z.is in the hope of salvaging something for themselves from the wreckage of Hitler's a.r.s.enal. After considerable difficulties, naval representative Vice-Admiral Katsuo Abe secured an interview with Admiral Karl Donitz on 15 April 1945, and another with Keitel and Ribbentrop on the seventeenth. He begged that the surviving German fleet, and especially its U-boats, should be sent to j.a.pan. The Germans curtly informed Abe that only three of their submarines had sufficient range to make the voyage. Hitler refused to grant the admiral an audience. Ribbentrop explained to the j.a.panese that the Fuhrer was "extremely busy and n.a.z.i Germany never significantly collaborated, the collapse of Hitler's regime plainly hastened the defeat of j.a.pan, because it enabled the Allies to transfer significant, though not unlimited, resources to completing the destruction of Hirohito's shrinking empire. In the last weeks of the European war, j.a.panese emissaries in Berlin pestered leading n.a.z.is in the hope of salvaging something for themselves from the wreckage of Hitler's a.r.s.enal. After considerable difficulties, naval representative Vice-Admiral Katsuo Abe secured an interview with Admiral Karl Donitz on 15 April 1945, and another with Keitel and Ribbentrop on the seventeenth. He begged that the surviving German fleet, and especially its U-boats, should be sent to j.a.pan. The Germans curtly informed Abe that only three of their submarines had sufficient range to make the voyage. Hitler refused to grant the admiral an audience. Ribbentrop explained to the j.a.panese that the Fuhrer was "extremely busy797." Though a handful of U-boats sought refuge in j.a.pan's East Indies ports, embroiled in their own catastrophe the Germans cared unsurprisingly little about providing a.s.sistance to an ally close behind them on the brink of the abyss.

A British WRNS signaller, Peggy Wightman, wrote home from Mountbatten's headquarters in Ceylon on 19 April, amid reports that the German war was hastening towards its conclusion: "The news is terrific isn't it?798 I wonder what you are all feeling like. It is all so remote out here that I think we will all be feeling very funny when the day comes for your rejoicings." Captain Ronnie McAllister, with his Gurkha battalion in Burma, said: "The end of the war in Europe I wonder what you are all feeling like. It is all so remote out here that I think we will all be feeling very funny when the day comes for your rejoicings." Captain Ronnie McAllister, with his Gurkha battalion in Burma, said: "The end of the war in Europe799 was all very nice, but it didn't mean a lot to us. Our horizon stretched way ahead. We thought we'd have to go into Siam." was all very nice, but it didn't mean a lot to us. Our horizon stretched way ahead. We thought we'd have to go into Siam."

On 8 May, a foolish young officer of the Border Regiment ran out in front of his company waving his hat and crying exultantly: "Men! The war in Europe is over!800" He was crestfallen by the response: "There was a long silence, while we digested this, and looked through the heat haze to the village where j.a.p might be waiting...then someone laughed, and it ran down the extended line in a great torrent of mirth, punctuated by cries of 'Git the boogers oot here!" and 'Ev ye told Tojo, like?'" Yet Nimitz's Pacific Fleet Strategic Intelligence Section noted with jocular satisfaction on 21 May: "If, as reports have it801, the German announcement of the death of n.a.z.ism's chief protagonist was accompanied by the ma.s.sive strains of Wagner's requiem, 'Twilight of the G.o.ds,' it is to the less decorous if more modern jangle of 'Don't Fence Me In' that Nippon, now a Lone Ranger astride a white horse, jogs dolefully towards the last round-up."

At midsummer 1945, major Allied ground operations against the j.a.panese were in recess. The armies of Slim in Burma, Krueger and Eichelberger in the Philippines, Stilwell-who, to widespread astonishment, was appointed Buckner's successor-on Okinawa, Blamey's Australians in Borneo and the south-west Pacific were engaged in mopping up. It was symbolic of the j.a.panese condition that some of their starving soldiers resorted to cannibalism. There were cases802 in New Guinea and Burma of downed Allied aircrew being eaten. Portions of beheaded U.S. carrier flier Marve Mershon were served to senior j.a.panese officers on Chichi Jima in February 1945, not because they needed the food, but to promote their own virility. Such gestures were not uncommon. in New Guinea and Burma of downed Allied aircrew being eaten. Portions of beheaded U.S. carrier flier Marve Mershon were served to senior j.a.panese officers on Chichi Jima in February 1945, not because they needed the food, but to promote their own virility. Such gestures were not uncommon.

When driven by hunger to eat their own dead, j.a.panese soldiers favoured flesh cut from the thighs. An account from Biak Island described "many corpses lying round...with portions removed with a knife." A j.a.panese prisoner from the 108th Airfield Construction Unit described seeing three fresh civilian corpses lying in a pool of blood approximately fifteen feet from a jungle path, each with bayonet wounds in the chest, "and flesh was removed from thighs803...There were many occasions when PW encountered j.a.p troops offering meat in exchange for potatoes." Even if some such reports were exaggerated, cannibalism was not infrequent among desperate soldiers in far-flung places.

Scattered enemy forces continued doggedly to reject surrender, and Allied soldiers were obliged to risk their lives to deal with them. On the night of 9 June, for instance, four Royal Navy motor launches took part in a characteristic little adventure up a river in southern Burma. Information was received from local people that j.a.panese were hiding nearby. Accompanied by a police inspector, Lt. Simon Mitch.e.l.l led his boats up the Pebin until they reached a village named Payabyo. Police inquiries revealed that the j.a.panese had gone, but the British found a man whose sampan they had used for their escape. He took them to the place where he had deposited the fugitives. The British used loudhailers to summon the j.a.panese to give themselves up. Rewarded only by silence, the launches804 formed a line ahead and cruised upstream, pouring 15,000 rounds of automatic fire into the area behind the riverbank. Mitch.e.l.l and his police companion then landed to make a cautious reconnaissance. To their surprise, and no doubt initial alarm, a j.a.panese officer and forty men emerged-and surrendered. A year earlier, such docility would have been unthinkable. formed a line ahead and cruised upstream, pouring 15,000 rounds of automatic fire into the area behind the riverbank. Mitch.e.l.l and his police companion then landed to make a cautious reconnaissance. To their surprise, and no doubt initial alarm, a j.a.panese officer and forty men emerged-and surrendered. A year earlier, such docility would have been unthinkable.

"From May onwards, prisoners805 in a terrible state came in daily," recorded a British gunner unit in Burma, "many of them armed with nothing more dangerous than bamboo spears, and trembling with a mixture of malaria and humiliation." Almost every j.a.panese soldier, sailor or airman who lived through the war, especially those posted to designated suicide units, afterwards felt obliged to offer elaborate excuses for his own survival. Most such explanations must be deemed fanciful. The truth, surely, was that a substantial number of young men found that the attraction of preserving their own lives overcame the pressures imposed upon them by the demented culture of in a terrible state came in daily," recorded a British gunner unit in Burma, "many of them armed with nothing more dangerous than bamboo spears, and trembling with a mixture of malaria and humiliation." Almost every j.a.panese soldier, sailor or airman who lived through the war, especially those posted to designated suicide units, afterwards felt obliged to offer elaborate excuses for his own survival. Most such explanations must be deemed fanciful. The truth, surely, was that a substantial number of young men found that the attraction of preserving their own lives overcame the pressures imposed upon them by the demented culture of bushido bushido.

But if some proved ready to quit, others did not. To the end, most j.a.panese who lost their ships at sea deliberately evaded Allied rescuers. On the deck of HMS Saumarez Saumarez, destroyer captain Martin Power was directing rescue operations after sinking a j.a.panese convoy off the Nicobars, when he suddenly heard a "clang" against the ship. Peering over the side, he saw a bald, heavily built j.a.panese clinging to a scrambling net with one hand, while hammering the nose of a sh.e.l.l against the hull with the other. Power drew his pistol, leaned over and whacked the man's head. "I could not think of anything else to do806-I spoke no j.a.panese. Blood streaming down his face, he looked up at me, the pistol six inches from his eyes, the sh.e.l.l in his hand...I do not know how long I hung in this ridiculous position, eyeball to eyeball with a fanatical enemy, but it seemed too long at the time. At last he dropped the sh.e.l.l into the sea, brought up his feet, pushed off from the ship's side like an Olympic swimmer, turned on his face and swam away."

The main business of the Allies, following the conquest of Okinawa, was the maintenance of the blockade of j.a.pan and the air bombardment by LeMay's B-29s, now joined by carrier aircraft of Third Fleet, together with preparations for Mountbatten's Operation Zipper, an amphibious landing by British and Indian forces on the coast of Malaya, to be staged in defiance of American disdain; finally, of course, there was Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, j.a.pan's southern island. This was scheduled for November. Despite rumours that Nimitz or even Marshall himself might direct the operation, MacArthur was appointed. His subordinate commanders immersed themselves in the huge task of planning the a.s.sault, together with a.s.sessing likely j.a.panese responses. This would be the largest opposed landing in history, with fourteen divisions afloat and twenty-eight carriers deployed in support. Weighty volumes of doc.u.mentation were prepared in antic.i.p.ation. "Ma.s.s air attacks807 mixed with frequent small sorties will probably begin as soon as landing is imminent," stated a characteristic forecast from MacArthur's staff dated 25 April, ent.i.tled "Estimate of the enemy situation with respect to an operation against southern Kyushu in November 1945," "and continue with great violence until the enemy is convinced his efforts to prevent our landing and consolidation are unlikely to succeed...The enemy fleet...will probably launch a final desperate suicide attack during the approach or soon after landing. Intense submarine attack by both large and midget subs and 1 man suicide torpedoes may be expected." mixed with frequent small sorties will probably begin as soon as landing is imminent," stated a characteristic forecast from MacArthur's staff dated 25 April, ent.i.tled "Estimate of the enemy situation with respect to an operation against southern Kyushu in November 1945," "and continue with great violence until the enemy is convinced his efforts to prevent our landing and consolidation are unlikely to succeed...The enemy fleet...will probably launch a final desperate suicide attack during the approach or soon after landing. Intense submarine attack by both large and midget subs and 1 man suicide torpedoes may be expected."

MacArthur's behaviour was markedly unimproved by his new responsibilities. Throughout the Okinawa campaign he delivered a stream of criticisms of its conduct, oblivious of the fact that he himself had done no better in the Philippines. His relations with Nimitz worsened: there were persistent "turf wars" and arguments about resources. As late as 8 August, Navy Secretary James Forrestal urged that MacArthur should be replaced as Olympic commander, in the interests of inter-service relations and operational effectiveness. But the general's untiring publicity machine served him better than did his battlefield judgement. His prestige, the American public's belief that he was the embodiment of national retribution against j.a.pan, rendered him unsackable. Forrestal, King and Nimitz were obliged to put up and shut up. If Olympic took place, however, it would be directed by an officer whose military competence and even mental stability seemed increasingly questionable.

One of the most difficult issues for the Allied high command was that of transferring formations from Europe to the Far East. Many British soldiers and civilians who had begun to keep diaries of the Second World War in September 1939 made their last entries in May 1945, perceiving the conflict as ended once the Germans were beaten. Almost every European veteran felt that he had done his part, and expected to go home. Some 5.2 million Americans were serving overseas, only 1.2 million of them in the Pacific. There was dismay in British and U.S. formations under Eisenhower's command when some were told that they would be required to invade Malaya or j.a.pan.

Many men had ama.s.sed sufficient points to qualify for demobilisation, drastically weakening units' combat power. Intensive training of replacements was needed before any of Eisenhower's formations would be fit for their destined role in Operation Coronet, the post-Olympic a.s.sault on Honshu. For British soldiers in Burma, "repat"-repatriation-had become an obsession. Slim noted that a man in a foxhole, asked what he was, replied not "A Lancashire Fusilier," but "I'm four and two," or "three and ten," indicating his length of overseas service. The British Army reduced compulsory foreign service from four years to three years and eight months in January 1945, then again in June to three and four. The consequence was that thereafter many units found themselves abruptly stripped of experienced men, who were sent home. Slim saw no purpose in trying to hold back the time-expired: "It would have been not only unfair808 to land such men on Malayan beaches, but unwise." to land such men on Malayan beaches, but unwise."

Yet there were always some eager warriors, especially in special forces and airborne units. Maj.-Gen. James Gavin and other fiery spirits in the U.S. 82nd Airborne expressed disappointment that, after reaching the Elbe, they were offered no chance to fight the j.a.panese. Elements of British "private armies"-the Long Range Desert Group, Special Boat Service and suchlike-volunteered for the Asian theatre. A brigadier who signed himself "Crasher" Nicholls, commanding the "Special Allied Airborne Recce Force," which was being disbanded in Germany, wrote to SEAC on 1 June 1945, appealing for employment: "I am trying very hard809 to get myself included in something going to the Far East as I regard War [ to get myself included in something going to the Far East as I regard War [sic] as my job, and as long as there is a War on I want to be in it." By the summer of 1945, however, there were relatively few "Crasher" Nichollses. The higher commanders of the U.S. and British armies were alike dismayed by the prospect of needing to motivate soldiers for further battles when some comrades were already going home, and most were out of harm's way.

THE D DUTCH, French and British owners of the old Eastern empires were increasingly preoccupied with regaining their lost territories-and conscious that they could expect scant help from the Americans to achieve this. "We must naturally be prepared French and British owners of the old Eastern empires were increasingly preoccupied with regaining their lost territories-and conscious that they could expect scant help from the Americans to achieve this. "We must naturally be prepared810 for criticism from some quarters whatever we do," the British emba.s.sy in Washington observed to the Foreign Office on 13 May. "If we prosecute Eastern War with might and main, we shall be told by some people that we are really fighting for our colonial possessions the better to exploit them and that American blood is being shed to no better purpose than to help ourselves and Dutch and French to perpetuate our degenerate colonial Empires; while if we are judged not to have gone all out, that is because we are letting America fight her own war with little aid, after having let her pull our chestnuts out of the European fire." The U.S. Navy, said the emba.s.sy with a sigh, was p.r.o.ne to think both these things simultaneously. for criticism from some quarters whatever we do," the British emba.s.sy in Washington observed to the Foreign Office on 13 May. "If we prosecute Eastern War with might and main, we shall be told by some people that we are really fighting for our colonial possessions the better to exploit them and that American blood is being shed to no better purpose than to help ourselves and Dutch and French to perpetuate our degenerate colonial Empires; while if we are judged not to have gone all out, that is because we are letting America fight her own war with little aid, after having let her pull our chestnuts out of the European fire." The U.S. Navy, said the emba.s.sy with a sigh, was p.r.o.ne to think both these things simultaneously.

Not only j.a.pan's Asian possessions, but those of the European powers, were perceived to be "in play." Tensions between Britain and the U.S. grew, rather than diminished, as the war entered its final stage. MacArthur made plain that he had no desire for British partic.i.p.ation in Olympic. A Foreign Office official minuted bitterly: "The Americans are virtually conducting811 political warfare against us in the Far East and are seeking not only to belittle the efforts which we have hitherto made in that theatre of war, but also to keep us in a humiliating and subsidiary role in the future." Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's most intimate counsellor in Washington, did not dissent from such a view: "To hear some people talk political warfare against us in the Far East and are seeking not only to belittle the efforts which we have hitherto made in that theatre of war, but also to keep us in a humiliating and subsidiary role in the future." Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's most intimate counsellor in Washington, did not dissent from such a view: "To hear some people talk812...you would think the British were our potential enemies."

If the Americans were unenthusiastic about the resumption of British hegemony over Burma and Malaya, they were implacably hostile to French retention of Indochina. In 1945 the j.a.panese achieved a victory there which did nothing to improve their own strategic fortunes, but significantly influenced the future of South-East Asia. They had entered northern Indochina in 1940, to halt the flow of supplies to Nationalist China from the Vietnamese port of Haiphong. In 1941 they introduced 35,000 troops to secure for themselves the colony's rich resources of rice, rubber and tin. The Vichy French administration was permitted to continue in office; the French garrison kept its arms under Tokyo's orders; the hapless Vietnamese people were allowed to starve so that j.a.panese people might eat.

Early in 1945, however, de Gaulle's government in Paris demanded that the governor, Vice-Admiral Jean Catoux, should adopt a far more aggressive policy. As the local nationalist Vietminh under Ho Chi Minh spread their influence ever more widely, de Gaulle decided that France would only regain possession of Indochina by being seen to contribute to its liberation. The outcome was a disaster. On 9 March the j.a.panese staged a pre-emptive coup against the Saigon administration, seizing or ma.s.sacring ill-equipped French troops who sought to resist. By 13 March, the j.a.panese claimed to have captured 8,500 POWs and killed a further thousand Frenchmen. Saigon Opera House became the j.a.panese interrogation and torture centre. With wildly confused loyalties, some French colonials found themselves held captive in prisons manned by French guards. Straggling columns of French fugitive soldiers sought to cut a path across country from Tonkin to the Chinese border, beset by both j.a.panese and Vietminh.

The British were eager to a.s.sist these survivors, on both humanitarian and political grounds. If Indochina fell into local nationalist hands, this would represent a disastrous precedent for Burma and Malaya. Yet the Americans, with bases and aircraft in neighbouring China, declined to lift a finger. This provoked one of the most bitter Anglo-American rows of the j.a.pan war. Esler Dening, chief political adviser to Mountbatten, once observed acidly: "I often think that we might813 on important occasions remind ourselves that we are not yet the 49th of the United States." In Paris, the enraged de Gaulle complained to U.S. amba.s.sador Jefferson Caffery about the refusal of the U.S. air force in China to fly support missions to his people in Vietnam. He said that he found American policy incomprehensible: "What are you driving at? Do you want us to become, for example, one of the federated states under the Russian aegis?" In Washington, a State Department official minuted contemptuously: "I personally think that the French are making a great fuss over the IndoChina resistance for political reasons only in an effort to smoke out our policy." on important occasions remind ourselves that we are not yet the 49th of the United States." In Paris, the enraged de Gaulle complained to U.S. amba.s.sador Jefferson Caffery about the refusal of the U.S. air force in China to fly support missions to his people in Vietnam. He said that he found American policy incomprehensible: "What are you driving at? Do you want us to become, for example, one of the federated states under the Russian aegis?" In Washington, a State Department official minuted contemptuously: "I personally think that the French are making a great fuss over the IndoChina resistance for political reasons only in an effort to smoke out our policy."

Churchill cabled Washington on 19 March: "It will look very bad in history814 if we were to let the French force in Indochina be cut to pieces by the j.a.panese through shortage of ammunition, if there is anything we can do to save them." Marshall, however, delegated operational decisions to Wedemeyer in Chongqing, who pleaded logistical difficulties to justify American pa.s.sivity. Such arguments seemed unconvincing. On 29 March, for instance, two C-47s of Tenth Air Force were dispatched from China to Tonkin to evacuate OSS personnel and six downed American airmen. Frenchmen at the strip where they landed were enraged when the planes arrived empty, without even cigarettes for the dest.i.tute colonists. An officer of the British Force 136 signalled: "American name is mud, repeat mud, with French and British alike in this whole episode." if we were to let the French force in Indochina be cut to pieces by the j.a.panese through shortage of ammunition, if there is anything we can do to save them." Marshall, however, delegated operational decisions to Wedemeyer in Chongqing, who pleaded logistical difficulties to justify American pa.s.sivity. Such arguments seemed unconvincing. On 29 March, for instance, two C-47s of Tenth Air Force were dispatched from China to Tonkin to evacuate OSS personnel and six downed American airmen. Frenchmen at the strip where they landed were enraged when the planes arrived empty, without even cigarettes for the dest.i.tute colonists. An officer of the British Force 136 signalled: "American name is mud, repeat mud, with French and British alike in this whole episode."

The anti-colonialist policy of the Roosevelt administration in Washington was executed with utmost fervour by OSS teams operating in support of the Vietminh nationalists. American special forces' definition of Vietnamese liberation addressed French rather than j.a.panese occupation. Sebastian Patti of OSS explicitly told the Vietminh that they enjoyed the wholehearted support of the United States. Another OSS man described Ho Chi Minh as "an awfully sweet guy815...If I had to pick out one quality about that little old man sitting on his hill in the jungle, it was his gentleness." Washington refused to allow troops of de Gaulle's Corps Leger to be deployed in Asia. French agents parachuted into Tonkin Province by British and Australian aircraft were killed by the Vietminh. After dreadful sufferings as they struggled through the jungles and mountains of northern Vietnam, some 5,000 French fugitives eventually reached China. They were greeted without enthusiasm by U.S. amba.s.sador Patrick Hurley. Urging that they should quickly be removed elsewhere, he described them as "undisciplined, unequipped and dest.i.tute816 refugees and almost useless." refugees and almost useless."

Relations worsened steadily between Wedemeyer in Chongqing and Mountbatten's headquarters at Kandy. On 30 May, the American general asked Washington to suspend lend-lease aid to British clandestine organisations in South-East Asia. He was chagrined to learn that this was impracticable, since in the China-Burma-India theatre U.S. forces were getting "considerable a.s.sistance from [the] British817 through reverse lend-lease." The "turf" dispute about Indochina was settled at Potsdam in July, when the combined chiefs of staff agreed to a.s.sign southern Indochina to SEAC, the north to China, at the j.a.panese surrender. Esler Dening wrote from Mountbatten's headquarters, however: "The division of French Indochina through reverse lend-lease." The "turf" dispute about Indochina was settled at Potsdam in July, when the combined chiefs of staff agreed to a.s.sign southern Indochina to SEAC, the north to China, at the j.a.panese surrender. Esler Dening wrote from Mountbatten's headquarters, however: "The division of French Indochina818 by the parallel of 16 degrees north...is going to cause a lot of trouble...The division is purely arbitrary and divides people of the same race, while raising new and unnecessary problems to divide French civil administration between here and [Chongqing]." by the parallel of 16 degrees north...is going to cause a lot of trouble...The division is purely arbitrary and divides people of the same race, while raising new and unnecessary problems to divide French civil administration between here and [Chongqing]."

The consequence, of course, was that when the French returned, the Vietminh had gained a momentum which was to prove irreversible. The West had the worst of all possible worlds. The British showed poor judgement in supposing that the French status quo ante status quo ante might be restored. The Americans allowed Ho Chi Minh to exploit U.S. support for his own political purposes, rather than in pursuit of the struggle against j.a.pan. The cynicism of Wedemeyer and the OSS in denying even humanitarian aid to French troops after 9 March-when they were, after all, fighting the j.a.panese-invited dismay. The U.S. subsequently forfeited Indochinese goodwill by withdrawing its support from the Vietminh. Here was an ugly subplot to the war which did credit to no one. might be restored. The Americans allowed Ho Chi Minh to exploit U.S. support for his own political purposes, rather than in pursuit of the struggle against j.a.pan. The cynicism of Wedemeyer and the OSS in denying even humanitarian aid to French troops after 9 March-when they were, after all, fighting the j.a.panese-invited dismay. The U.S. subsequently forfeited Indochinese goodwill by withdrawing its support from the Vietminh. Here was an ugly subplot to the war which did credit to no one.

A directive from the Political Warfare Executive in London to Mountbatten's command highlighted the political and cultural complexities besetting the theatre: "Keep off Russo-j.a.panese819, Russo-Chinese and Sino-j.a.panese relations except for official statements. Do not comment on [Chongqing-Yan'an] relations...Continue to show that if Germany had prolonged her resistance the devastation would have been yet more terrible. Show that a worse fate awaits j.a.pan if her militarists force her to fight on...Continue to avoid the alleged j.a.panese peace feelers." At Britain's Military Administration School in Wimbledon, and at the Malaya Planning Unit in London's Hyde Park Gate, intensive planning had been taking place for years, in antic.i.p.ation of the restoration of imperial rule in the east. Many of those involved, however, especially younger officers and civil servants, perceived that they were crafting a hollow crown.

BRITAIN'S Royal Navy was embarra.s.sed by its difficulties in sustaining a small fleet alongside the great American armada off Okinawa. In the spring of 1945, however, it conducted a series of little actions which helped to revive its battered self-esteem. First, on 1516 May, a destroyer flotilla fought what proved to be the last significant battle between surface ships in the Second World War. Signals intelligence revealed that the 13,380-ton heavy cruiser Royal Navy was embarra.s.sed by its difficulties in sustaining a small fleet alongside the great American armada off Okinawa. In the spring of 1945, however, it conducted a series of little actions which helped to revive its battered self-esteem. First, on 1516 May, a destroyer flotilla fought what proved to be the last significant battle between surface ships in the Second World War. Signals intelligence revealed that the 13,380-ton heavy cruiser Haguro Haguro, with the escorting destroyer Kamikaze Kamikaze, was sailing to the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean to deliver supplies and evacuate troops. After evading British submarines, Haguro Haguro was a hundred miles south-west of p.h.u.ket when spotted by a Fleet Air Arm Avenger shortly after noon on 15 May. was a hundred miles south-west of p.h.u.ket when spotted by a Fleet Air Arm Avenger shortly after noon on 15 May. Saumarez Saumarez's Captain Martin Power, leading five destroyers of "Force 61," headed to attack the j.a.panese at twenty-seven knots. Given the overwhelmingly superior firepower of Haguro Haguro's eight-inch guns, Power hoped to delay an engagement until nightfall, then close with torpedoes. Lest he be in any doubt as to his duty, he received a terse signal from his admiral: "You should sink enemy ships before returning."

The British were relieved when dusk fell without a sighting. Thereafter, despite heavy rain which limited visibility, they were confident of defeating the j.a.panese when they found them. The destroyers steamed in line abreast, four miles apart, pr