Personal Reminiscences of Early Days in California with Other Sketches Part 24

"We are extremely gratified to find that, through the action of the chief magistrate, and the attorney-general, a higher officer of the law, we shall be spared the necessity of further inquiring as to the extent of the remedy afforded the distinguished pet.i.tioner, by the Const.i.tution and laws of the United States, or of enforcing such remedies as exist, and that the stigma cast upon the State of California by this hasty and, to call it by no harsher term, ill-advised arrest will not be intensified by further prosecution."

Thus ended this most remarkable attempt upon the liberty of a United States Supreme Court Justice, under color of State authority, the execution of which would again have placed his life in great peril.

The grotesque feature of the performance was aptly presented by the following imaginary dialogue which appeared in an Eastern paper:

Newsboy: "Man tried to kill a judge in California!"

Customer: "What was done about it?"

Newsboy: "Oh! They arrested the judge."

The illegality of Justice Field's arrest will be perfectly evident to whoever will read sections 811, 812, and 813 of the Penal Code of California. These sections provide that no warrant can be issued by a magistrate until he has examined, on oath, the informant, taken depositions setting forth the facts tending to establish the commission of the offense and the guilt of the accused, and himself been satisfied by these depositions that there is reasonable ground that the person accused has committed the offense. None of these requirements had been met in Justice Field's case.

It needs no lawyer to understand that a magistrate violates the plain letter as well as the spirit of these provisions of law when he issues a warrant without first having before him some evidence of the probable, or at least the possible, guilt of the accused. If this were otherwise, private malice could temporarily sit in judgment upon the object of its hatred, however blameless, and be rewarded for perjury by being allowed the use of our jails as places in which to satisfy its vengeance. Such a view of the law made Sarah Althea the magistrate at Stockton on the 14th of August, and Justice Swain her obsequious amanuensis. Such a view of the law would enable any convict who had just served a term in the penitentiary to treat himself to the luxury of dragging to jail the judge who sentenced him, and keeping him there without bail as long as the magistrate acting for him could be induced to delay the examination.

The arrest of Justice Field was an attempt to kidnap him for a foul purpose, and if the United States circuit judge had not released him he would have been the victim of as arbitrary and tyrannical treatment as is ever meted out in Russia to the most dangerous of nihilists, to punish him for having narrowly escaped a.s.sa.s.sination by no act or effort of his own.

CHAPTER XVIII.

HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS IN NEAGLE'S CASE.

This narrative would not be complete without a statement of the proceedings in the United States Circuit Court, and in the United States Supreme Court on appeal, in the _habeas corpus_ proceedings in the case of Neagle, the deputy marshal, whose courageous devotion to his official duties had saved the life of Justice Field at the expense of that of his would-be a.s.sa.s.sin. We have already seen that Neagle, being in the custody of the sheriff of San Joaquin county, upon a charge of murder in the shooting of Judge Terry, had presented a pet.i.tion to the United States Circuit Court for a writ of _habeas corpus_ to the end that he might thereby be restored to his liberty.

A writ was issued, and upon its return, August 17th, the sheriff of San Joaquin county produced Neagle and a copy of the warrant under which he held him in custody, issued by the justice of the peace of that county, and also of the affidavit of Sarah Althea Terry, upon which the warrant was granted. Neagle being desirous of traversing the return of the sheriff, further proceedings were adjourned until the 22d of the month, and in the meantime he was placed in the custody of the United States marshal for the district. On the 22d a traverse of the return was filed by him stating the particulars of the homicide with which he was charged as narrated above, and averring that he was at the time of its commission a deputy marshal of the United States for the district, acting under the orders of his superior, and under the directions of the Attorney-General of the United States in protecting the a.s.sociate Justice, whilst in the discharge of his duties, from the threatened a.s.sault and violence of Terry, who had declared that on meeting the Justice he would insult, a.s.sault, and kill him, and that the homicide with which the pet.i.tioner is charged was committed in resisting the attempted execution of these threats in the belief that Terry intended at the time to kill the Justice, and that but for such homicide he would have succeeded in his attempt. These particulars are stated with great fullness of detail. To this traverse, which was afterwards amended, but not in any material respect, a demurrer was interposed for the sheriff by the district attorney of San Joaquin county. Its material point was that it did not appear from the traverse that Neagle was in the custody of the sheriff for an act done or omitted in pursuance of any law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree of any court or judge thereof, or in violation of the Const.i.tution or a treaty of the United States. The court then considered whether it should hear testimony as to the facts of the case, or proceed with the argument of the demurrer to the traverse. It decided to take the testimony, and to hear counsel when the whole case was before it, on the merits as well as on the question of jurisdiction.

The testimony was then taken. It occupied several days, and brought out strongly the facts which have been already narrated, and need not here be repeated. When completed, the question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States to interfere in the matter was elaborately argued by the attorney-general of the State, and special counsel who appeared with the district attorney of San Joaquin county on behalf of the State, they contending that the offense, with which the pet.i.tioner was charged, could only be inquired into before a tribunal of the State. Mr. Carey, United States district attorney, and Messrs. Herrin, Mesick, and Wilson, special counsel, appeared on behalf of the pet.i.tioner, and contended for the jurisdiction, and for the discharge of the pet.i.tioner upon the facts of the case. They did not pretend that any person in the State, be he high or low, might not be tried by the local authorities for a crime committed against the State, but they did contend that when the alleged crime consisted in an act which was claimed to have been done in the performance of a duty devolving upon him by a law of the United States, it was within the competency of their courts to inquire, in the first instance, whether that act thus done was in the performance of a duty devolving upon him; and if it was, that the alleged offender had not committed a crime against the State, and was ent.i.tled to be discharged. Their arguments were marked by great ability and learning, and their perusal would be interesting and instructive, but s.p.a.ce will not allow me to give even a synopsis of them.

The court, in deciding the case, went into a full and elaborate consideration, not only of its jurisdiction, but of every objection on the merits presented by counsel on behalf of the State. Only a brief outline can be given.

The court held that it was within the competency of the President, and of the Attorney-General as the head of the Department of Justice, representing him, to direct that measures be taken for the protection of officers of the Government whilst in the discharge of their duties, and that it was specially appropriate that such protection should be given to the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, whilst thus engaged in their respective circuits, and in pa.s.sing to and from them; that the Attorney-General, representing the President, was fully justified in giving orders to the marshal of the California district to appoint a deputy to look specially to the protection of Justices Field and Sawyer from a.s.sault and violence threatened by Terry and his wife; and that the deputy marshal, acting under instructions for their protection, was justified in any measures that were necessary for that purpose, even to taking the life of the a.s.sailant.

The court recognized that the Government of the United States exercised full jurisdiction, within the sphere of its powers, over the whole territory of the country, and that when any conflict arose between the State and the General Government in the administration of their respective powers, the authority of the United States must prevail, for the Const.i.tution declares that it and the laws of the United States in pursuance thereof "shall be the supreme law of the land, and that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Const.i.tution and laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." The court quoted the language of the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Davis (100 U.S. 257, 263), that "It [the General Government] can act only through its officers and agents, and they must act within the States. If, when thus acting and within the scope of their authority, those officers can be arrested and brought to trial in a State court, for an alleged offense against the law of the State, yet warranted by the Federal authority they possess, and if the General Government is powerless to interfere at once for their protection--if their protection must be left to the action of the State court--the operations of the General Government may, at any time, be arrested at the will of one of its members. The legislation of a State may be unfriendly. It may affix penalties to acts done under the immediate direction of the National Government and in obedience to its laws. It may deny the authority conferred by those laws. The State court may administer not only the laws of the State, but equally Federal law, in such a manner as to paralyze the operations of the Government. And even if, after trial and final judgment in the State court, a case can be brought into the United States court for review, the officer is withdrawn from the discharge of his duty during the pendency of the prosecution, and the exercise of acknowledged Federal power arrested. We do not think such an element of weakness is to be found in the Const.i.tution. The United States is a government with authority extending over the whole territory of the Union, acting upon the States and upon the people of the States. While it is limited in the number of its powers, so far as its sovereignty extends, it is supreme. No State government can exclude it from the exercise of any authority conferred upon it by the Const.i.tution, obstruct its authorized officers against its will, or withhold from it, for a moment, the cognizance of any subject which that instrument has committed to it." To this strong language the Circuit Court added:

"The very idea of a government composed of executive, legislative, and judicial departments necessarily comprehends the power to do all things, through its appropriate officers and agents, within the scope of its general governmental purposes and powers, requisite to preserve its existence, protect it and its ministers, and give it complete efficiency in all its parts. It necessarily and inherently includes power in its executive department to enforce the laws, keep the national peace with regard to its officers while in the line of their duty, and protect by its all-powerful arm all the other departments and the officers and instrumentalities necessary to their efficiency while engaged in the discharge of their duties."

In language attributed to Mr. ex-Secretary Bayard, used with reference to this very case, which we quote, not as a controlling judicial authority, but for its intrinsic, sound, common sense, "The robust and essential principle must be recognized and proclaimed, that the inherent powers of every government which is sufficient to authorize and enforce the judgment of its courts are, equally, and at all times, and in all places, sufficient to protect the individual judge who, fearlessly and conscientiously in the discharge of his duty, p.r.o.nounces those judgments."

In reference to the duties of the President and the powers of the Attorney-General under him, and of the latter's control of the marshals of the United States, the court observed that the duties of the President are prescribed in terse and comprehensive language in section 3 of article II of the Const.i.tution, which declares that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed;" that this gives him all the authority necessary to accomplish the purposes intended--all the authority necessarily inherent in the office, not otherwise limited, and that Congress, added the court, in pursuance of powers vested in it, has provided for seven departments, as subordinate to the President, to aid him in performing his executive functions. Section 346, R.S., provides that "there shall be at the seat of government an executive department to be known as the Department of Justice, and an Attorney-General, who shall be the head thereof." He thus has the general supervision of the executive branch of the national judiciary, and section 362 provides, as a portion of his powers and duties, that he "shall exercise general superintendence and direction over the attorneys and marshals of all the districts in the United States and the Territories as to the manner of discharging their respective duties; and the several district attorneys and marshals are required to report to the Attorney-General an account of their official proceedings, and of the state and condition of their respective offices, in such time and manner as the Attorney-General may direct." Section 788, R.S., provides that "the marshals and their deputies shall have, in each State, the same powers in executing the laws of the United States as the sheriffs and their deputies in such State may have, by law, in executing the laws thereof." By section 817 of the penal code of California the sheriff is a "peace officer," and by section 4176 of the political code he is "to preserve the peace"

and "prevent and suppress breaches of the peace." The marshal is, therefore, under the provisions of the statute cited, "a peace officer," so far as keeping the peace in any matter wherein the powers of the United States are concerned, and as to such matters he has all the powers of the sheriff, as peace officer under the laws of the State. He is, in such matters, "to preserve the peace" and "prevent and suppress breaches of the peace." An a.s.sault upon or an a.s.sa.s.sination of a judge of a United States court while engaged in any matter pertaining to his official duties, on account or by reason of his judicial decisions, or action in performing his official duties, is a breach of the peace, affecting the authority and interests of the United States, and within the jurisdiction and power of the marshal or his deputies to prevent as a peace officer of the National Government.

Such an a.s.sault is not merely an a.s.sault upon the person of the judge as a man; it is an a.s.sault upon the national judiciary, which he represents, and through it an a.s.sault upon the authority of the nation itself. It is, necessarily, a breach of the national peace. As a national peace officer, under the conditions indicated, it is the duty of the marshal and his deputies to prevent a breach of the national peace by an a.s.sault upon the authority of the United States, in the person of a judge of its highest court, while in the discharge of his duty. If this be not so, in the language of the Supreme Court, "Why do we have marshals at all?" What useful functions can they perform in the economy of the National Government?

Section 787 of the Revised Statutes also declares that "It shall be the duty of the marshal of each district to attend the District and Circuit Courts when sitting therein, and to execute throughout the district all lawful precepts directed to him and issued under the authority of the United States, and he shall have power to command all necessary a.s.sistance in the execution of his duty." There is no more authority specifically conferred upon the marshal by this section to protect the judge from a.s.sa.s.sination in open court, without a specific order or command, than there is to protect him out of court, when on the way from one court to another in the discharge of his official duties. The marshals are in daily attendance upon the judges, and performing official duties in their chambers. Yet no statute specifically points out those duties or requires their performance.

Indeed, no such places as chambers for the circuit judges or circuit justices are mentioned at all in the statutes. Yet the marshal is as clearly authorized to protect the judges there as in the court-room.

All business done out of court by the judge is called chamber business. But it is not necessary to be done in what is usually called chambers. Chamber business may be done, and often is done, on the street, in the judge's own house, at the hotel where he stops, when absent from home, or it may be done in transitu, on the cars in going from one place to another within the proper jurisdiction to hold court. Mr. Justice Field could, as well, and as authoritatively, issue a temporary injunction, grant a writ of _habeas corpus_, an order to show cause, or do any other chamber business for the district in the dining-room at Lathrop, as at his chambers in San Francisco, or in the court-room. The chambers of the judge, where chambers are provided, are not an element of jurisdiction, but are a convenience to the judge, and to suitors--places where the judge at proper times can be readily found, and the business conveniently transacted.

But inasmuch as the Revised Statutes of the United States (sec.

753) declare that the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not extend to "a prisoner in jail unless where he is in custody--for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a _law_ of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof, or in custody in violation of the Const.i.tution or of a law or treaty of the United States," it was urged in the argument by counsel for the State that there is no statute which specifically makes it the duty of a marshal or deputy marshal to protect the judges of the United States whilst out of the court-room, travelling from one point to another in their circuits, on official business, from the violence of litigants who have become offended at the adverse decisions made by them in the performance of their judicial duties, and that such officers are not within the provisions of that section. To this the court replied that the language of the section is, "an act done in pursuance of a _law_ of the United States"--not in pursuance of a statute of the United States; and that the statutes do not present in express terms all the law of the United States; that their incidents and implications are as much a part of the law as their express provisions; and that when they prescribe duties providing for the accomplishment of certain designated objects, or confer authority in general terms, they carry with them all the powers essential to effect the ends designed. As said by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States (9 Wheaton, 865-866), "It is not unusual for a legislative act to involve consequences which are not expressed. An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an individual. It is not necessary, nor is it usual, to say that he shall not be punished for obeying this order.

His security is implied in the order itself. It is no unusual thing for an act of Congress to imply, without expressing, this very exemption from State control, which is said to be so objectionable in this instance. The collectors of the revenue, the carriers of the mail, the mint establishment, and all those inst.i.tutions which are public in their nature, are examples in point. It has never been doubted that all who are employed in them are protected while in the line of duty; and yet this protection is not expressed in any act of Congress. It is incidental to, and is implied in, the several acts by which these inst.i.tutions are created; and is secured to the individuals employed in them by the judicial power alone--that is, the judicial power is the instrument employed by the Government in administering this security."

Upon this the Circuit Court observed:

"If the officers referred to in the preceding pa.s.sage are to be protected while in the line of their duty, without any special law or statute requiring such protection, the judges of the courts, the princ.i.p.al officers in a department of the Government second to no other, are also to be protected, and their executive subordinates--the marshals and their deputies--shielded from harm by the national laws while honestly engaged in protecting the heads of the courts from a.s.sa.s.sination."[1]

To the position that the preservation of the peace of the State is devolved solely upon the officers of the State, and not in any respect upon the marshals of the United States, the court replied: This position is already answered by what has been said. But it is undoubtedly true that it was the imperative duty of the State to preserve the public peace and amply protect the life of Justice Field, _but it did not do it_, and had the United States relied upon the State to keep the peace as to him--one of the justices of the highest court--in relation to matters concerning the performance of his official duties, they would have leaned upon a broken reed. The result of the efforts to obtain an officer from the State to a.s.sist in preserving the peace and protecting him at Lathrop was anything but successful. The officer of the State at Lathrop, instead of arresting the conspirator of the contemplated murderer, the wife of the deceased, arrested the officer of the United States, a.s.signed by the Government to the special duty of protecting the justice against the very parties, while in the actual prosecution of duties a.s.signed to him, without warrant, thereby leaving his charge without the protection provided by the Government he was serving, at a time when such protection seemed most needed. And, besides, the use of the State police force beyond the limits of a county for the protection of Justice Field would have been impracticable, as the powers of the sheriff would have ended at its borders, and of other township and city peace officers at the boundaries of their respective townships and cities. Only a United States marshal or his deputy could have exercised these official functions throughout the judicial district, which embraces many counties. The only remedy suggested on the part of the State was to arrest the deceased and hold him to bail to keep the peace under section 706 of the Penal Code, the highest limit of the amount of bail being $5,000. But although the threats are conceded to have been publicly known in the State, no State officer took any means to provide this flimsy safeguard. And the execution of a bond in this amount to keep the peace would have had no effect in deterring the intended a.s.sailants from the, commission of the offense contemplated, when the penalties of the law would not deter them.

As to the deliberation and wisdom of Neagle's conduct under the circ.u.mstances, the court, after stating the established facts, concludes as follows:

"When the deceased left his seat, some thirty feet distant, walked stealthily down the pa.s.sage in the rear of Justice Field and dealt the unsuspecting jurist two preliminary blows, doubtless by way of reminding him that the time for vengeance had at last come, Justice Field was already at the traditional 'wall' of the law. He was sitting quietly at a table, back to the a.s.sailant, eating his breakfast, the side opposite being occupied by other pa.s.sengers, some of whom were women, similarly engaged. When, in a dazed condition, he awoke to the reality of the situation and saw the stalwart form of the deceased with arm drawn back for a final mortal blow, there was no time to get under or over the table, had the law, under any circ.u.mstances, required such an act for his justification.

Neagle could not seek a 'wall' to justify his acts without abandoning his charge to certain death. When, therefore, he sprang to his feet and cried, 'Stop! I am an officer,' and saw the powerful arm of the deceased drawn back for the final deadly stroke instantly change its direction to his left breast, apparently seeking his favorite weapon, the knife, and at the same time heard the half-suppressed, disappointed growl of recognition of the man who, with the aid of half a dozen others, had finally succeeded in disarming him of his knife at the court-room a year before, the supreme moment had come, or, at least, with abundant reason he thought so, and fired the fatal shot. The testimony all concurs in showing this to be the state of facts, and the almost universal consensus of public opinion of the United States seems to justify the act.

On that occasion a second, or two seconds, signified, at least, two valuable lives, and a reasonable degree of prudence would justify a shot one or two seconds too soon rather than a fraction of a second too late. Upon our minds the evidence leaves no doubt whatever that the homicide was fully justified by the circ.u.mstances. Neagle on the scene of action, facing the party making a murderous a.s.sault, knowing by personal experience his physical powers and his desperate character, and by general reputation his life-long habit of carrying arms, his readiness to use them, and his angry, murderous threats, and seeing his demoniac looks, his stealthy a.s.sault upon Justice Field from behind, and, remembering the sacred trust committed to his charge--Neagle, in these trying circ.u.mstances, was the party to determine when the supreme moment for action had come, and if he, honestly, acted with reasonable judgment and discretion, the law justifies him, even if he erred. But who will have the courage to stand up in the presence of the facts developed by the testimony in this case, and say that he fired the smallest fraction of a second too soon?

"In our judgment he acted, under the trying circ.u.mstances surrounding him, in good faith and with consummate courage, judgment, and discretion. The homicide was, in our opinion, clearly justifiable in law, and in the forum of sound, practical common sense commendable. This being so, and the act having been 'done * * * in pursuance of a law of the United States,' as we have already seen, it cannot be an offense against, and he is not amenable to, the laws of the State."

The pet.i.tioner was accordingly discharged from arrest.

[1] NOTE.--I find the following apt ill.u.s.trations of this doctrine in a journal of the day:

If a military or naval officer of the United States, in the necessary suppression of a mutiny or enforcement of obedience, should wound or take the life of a subordinate, would it be contended that, if arrested for that act by the State authority, he could not be released on _habeas corpus_, because no statute expressly authorized the performance of the act? If the commander of a revenue cutter should be directed to pursue and retake a vessel which, after seizure, had escaped from the custody of the law, and the officer in the performance of that duty, and when necessary to overcome resistance, should injure or kill a member of the crew of the vessel he was ordered to recapture, and if for that act he should be arrested and accused of crime under the State authority, will any sensible person maintain that the provisions of the _habeas corpus_ act could not be invoked for his release, notwithstanding that no statute could be shown which directly authorized the act for which he was arrested?

If by command of the President a company of troops were marched into this city to protect the subtreasury from threatened pillage, and in so doing life were taken, would not the act of the officer who commanded the troops be an act done in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and in the lawful exercise of its authority? Could he be imprisoned and tried before a State jury on the charge of murder, and the courts of the United States be powerless to inquire into the facts on _habeas corpus_, and to discharge him if found to have acted in the performance of his duty? Can the authority of the United States for the protection of their officers be less than their authority to protect their property?

There appears to be but one rational answer to these questions.

In all these cases the authority vested in the officer to suppress a mutiny, or to overtake and capture an escaped vessel, or to protect the subtreasury from threatened pillage, carries with it power to do all things necessary to accomplish the object desired, even the killing of the offending party.

The law conferring the authority thus extended to the officer in these cases, is in the sense of the _habeas corpus_ act, a law of the United States to do all things necessary for the execution of that authority.

CHAPTER XIX.

EXPRESSIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION.

This case and all the attendant circ.u.mstances--the attempted a.s.sa.s.sination of Justice Field by his former a.s.sociate, Terry; the defeat of this murderous attempt by Deputy Marshal Neagle; the arrest of Justice Field and the deputy marshal upon the charge of murder, and their discharge--created very great interest throughout the United States. They were the subject of articles in all the leading journals of the country; and numerous telegrams and letters of congratulation were sent to the Justice on his escape from the murderous attempt.

Satisfaction was very generally expressed at the fate which Terry met, and much praise was given to the courageous conduct of Neagle and at the bearing of Justice Field under the trying circ.u.mstances.

A few of the letters received by him are here given, and citations are made from some of the periodicals, which indicated the general sentiment of the country.

Letter from Hon. T.F. Bayard, ex-Secretary of State:

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE, _August 18, 1889_.

MY DEAR BROTHER FIELD: