Pantheism, Its Story and Significance Part 3

[Footnote 14: See Col. i. 15-17 and refs. John i. 1-3; iii. 13; viii.

58.]

CHAPTER III

MODERN PANTHEISM.

[Sidenote: Spinoza.]

[Sidenote: A Pantheistic Prophet.]

[Sidenote: The Main Subject here Is his Religion and not his Philosophy.]

Modern Pantheism as a religion begins with Spinoza. Whether it ended with him is a question which the future will have to decide. But the signs of the times are, at least in my view, very clearly against such a conclusion. And amongst the omens which portend immortality, not necessarily for the philosophical scheme, but for the "G.o.d-intoxicated"

devoutness of his Pantheism, is the desire, or rather the imperious need increasingly realized, for a religion emanc.i.p.ated from theories of creation or teleology, intolerant of any miracle, save indeed the wonders of the spiritual life, and satisfying the heart with an ever present G.o.d. For it is to be remembered that Spinoza was the first Pantheist who was also a prophet, in the sense of speaking out the divine voice of the infinite Universe to its human const.i.tuent parts.

Not that I would minimize the religious fervour of the Neo-Platonists: it is their Pantheism that seems to have been imperfect. But in Spinoza we have a man who, inheriting by birth the tradition--I might even say the apostolic succession--of the Jewish prophets, and gifted with an insight into the consummation of that tradition in Jesus Christ, was driven by a commanding intellect to divorce the spiritual life he prized from creeds that had become to him Impossible, and to enshrine it in the worthier temple of an eternal Universe identical with G.o.d. It is not, then, with his philosophy that I am so much concerned as with his religion.[15]

[Sidenote: His Originality.]

[Sidenote: Relation to Descartes.]

It is given to no man to be absolutely original in the sense of creating ideas of which no germs existed before his day. But short of such an impossible independence of the past, Benedict de Spinoza had perhaps as much originality as any man who ever lived. Yet with a modesty ever characteristic of moral greatness, he himself was disposed, at any rate during his earlier philosophical development, to exaggerate his indebtedness to the philosopher Descartes, whose system he laboriously abridged in the inappropriate form of a series of propositions supposed to be demonstrated after the fashion of Euclid.

[Sidenote: Fundamental Differences.]

[Sidenote: Spinoza Discards Creator and Creation,]

[Sidenote: Beginning and End.]

[Sidenote: Takes the Universe as it Is.]

[Sidenote: And Worships the Static Whole as G.o.d.]

But whatever may have been the esoteric belief of Descartes about creation out of nothing and the theological dogmas connected therewith, he attached too much importance to the social and political functions of established ecclesiastical inst.i.tutions to declare himself independent of them. And though his submission, signalised on his death-bed, did not interfere with the freest working of his brilliant intellect within limits permitted to the former ecclesiastical "schoolmen," it did prevent his frank realization of the eternal oneness of all being. For it compelled him to retain belief in a Creator distinct in essence from Creation. Such a belief Spinoza entirely rejected. For though his "Natura Naturans," or Nature Active, may in a manner be called the Creator of his "Natura Naturata," or Nature Pa.s.sive, these are consubstantial and co-eternal, neither being before or after the other.

Thus for him there was no beginning of the Universe and there could be no end. There was no creation out of nothing, nor any omen of weariness, decay, or death in the eternal order. He teaches us in effect to take the Universe as it is, and to pry into no supposed secrets of origin or end, an entirely gratuitous labour, imposed by illusions arising out of the continuous redistribution of parts of the Whole. Instead of thus spending our mental energy for nought, he would have us regard the whole of Being as one Substance characterized by innumerable attributes, of which Extension and Thought alone come within our human cognizance; while each Attribute is subject to infinite Modes or modifications, which, in their effect on the two attributes known to us--extension and thought--const.i.tute the universe of our experience. That infinite and eternal Substance revealed by Attributes and their Modes is G.o.d, absolute in His perfections if He could be fully conceived and known in all His activities. And even to our ignorance He is entrancing in His gradual self-revelation, as with our inadequate ideas we pursue the unattainable from glory to glory.

[Sidenote: This View of the Universe applied to Psalm civ.]

This, then, is the first note we make of the gospel of Spinoza. But if any one thinks that the sacred word "gospel" is here misused, and that such teaching is fatal to piety, let him turn to the 104th Psalm and read, from Spinoza's point of view, the cosmic vision of the Hebrew seer. True, we can think no longer of the supernatural carpenter who works on "the beams of his chambers" above, or of the mythical engineer who digs deep in the darkness to "lay the foundations of the earth." For that is poetry, appealing by concrete images to the emotions. But it does not bind the intellect to a literal interpretation; and we are no longer tormented by vain efforts to reconcile with infinite impossibilities the half-human personality presented in poetic guise. So that the vision of the seer is now the suggestion to us of an infinite and eternal Being, whose attributes by modification take the innumerable shapes of sun, moon, and stars, and mountains and river, and tree and flower, and bird and beast, and man. And the winds that sweep and the floods that roll, and the rocky barriers that stand fast, and the rivers that wind among the hills, and the trees that flourish and the living societies that gather in fruitful places, the labourer in his vineyard, the sailor in his ship, all are in and of the one Eternal Being. Yet we echo not with less, but perhaps with more reverence, than the believers in a divine artisan, the words of the Psalmist: "O Lord, how manifold are Thy works! in wisdom hast Thou made them all: the earth is full of Thy riches." But if the thunder and the flaming fire and the sweeping flood seem discordant, they existed for the Psalmist as well as for us, and they do not seem to have troubled him. At this point, therefore, we need only say that Spinoza's religion of one divine Substance, whose unity in variety is holy, ought to stir within us with not less fervour, at least the spirit of the Psalmist's concluding prayer: "Let the sinners be consumed out of the earth and let the wicked be no more."

[Sidenote: Spinoza no Materialist,]

[Sidenote: Notwithstanding his Attribution of "Extension" to G.o.d.]

[Sidenote: Criticism by Sir F. Pollock.]

[Sidenote: Changes In Theories of Matter since Spinoza's time.]

Spinoza's maintenance of extension as one of the two infinite divine attributes cognizable by us has, with a certain amount of plausibility, been urged as a note of materialism. And this reproach has been supported by reference to his insistence that in man the body and the soul are only two different aspects of the same thing; for to him the body is a finite Mode of G.o.d's infinite attribute of extension and the soul a finite Mode of G.o.d's infinite attribute of thought, while both are manifestations of the one eternal divine Substance. Still, if in any way we are to regard G.o.d as extended, it seems impossible to avoid the inference that we regard Him as identified with matter, or at least the possibility of matter. Sir Frederick Pollock has admitted that this is a weak point in Spinoza's philosophy,[16] and mars its symmetry. But, being more concerned with, his religion, I am content to point out that such an objection was much more effective in Spinoza's time than it is to-day. For the whole trend of philosophy during the nineteenth century was towards a view of Extension itself as a mode of Thought, and therefore toward the absorption of one of Spinoza's theoretical divine attributes in the other.

[Sidenote: Their Effect on his System.]

Now if this should prove to be the permanent tendency of the most influential thinkers--as indeed seems most likely--it will probably be held that Spinoza was wrong in attributing extension to the Eternal as one of the qualities of His substance, except in so far as extension is, if not a necessary, at any rate an actual, and so far as we know, a universal mode of thought. But though, as Sir Frederick Pollock has pointed out, Spinoza has in a manner "counted thought twice over" while treating of the only two infinite attributes cognizable to us, we need not, on that account, surrender his luminous idea of G.o.d as a Being absolutely infinite, that is, "Substance consisting of infinite Attributes, whereof each one expresses eternal and infinite being." Nor need we abandon his supplementary but essential idea of "Modes" or "modifications" which mould the attributes into the varieties of finite worlds, known and unknown. Thus it may be that, in Spinoza's sense of the word "Attribute," we shall have to confess that only one comes within our human ken, that of Thought in a sense which includes feeling.

But if the late Herbert Spencer, apart from his synthetic philosophy of phenomena, has left any permanent mark on the religions consciousness, it has been by a consecration of the mystery of the ultimate Unknowable.[17] And in the spirit of reverence thus taught by him we may still hold with Spinoza that the Eternal has an infinity of other attributes with their infinite modifications not within our cognizance.

This would only be an enlarged application of Hamlet's words:

"There are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

Or, to put it in another way, the Universe perceptible to us is only one of an infinity of Universes. By which is not meant an infinite extension of galaxies in s.p.a.ce, but the co-existence and, so to speak, interpenetration of an infinity of modes of existence imperceptible to us.

[Sidenote: G.o.d Is Identical with the Whole of Being.]

To Spinoza, then, G.o.d is the totality of Being. But it is not to be inferred that he identified G.o.d with the visible, or with any conceivable Universe. For either of these must fall far short of infinity, and the Being of G.o.d is infinite. All I mean, when I say that Spinoza identifies G.o.d with the totality of existence, is that he regards the deity as that Perfect Being without beginning or end, whose essence it is to be, and of whom all that exists, whether known to us or not, is separately a partial, and comprehensively a perfect expression.

[Sidenote: His Doctrine of Man.]

Of more practical interest to us perhaps is Spinoza's doctrine of man, though it would have been impossible to explain that without first indicating his idea of G.o.d. In his view, then, man is a finite mode of the two divine attributes, extension and thought. Thus both the extended body and the conscious mind have their substance and reality in G.o.d.[18]

But the essence of man does not necessarily involve his separate existence as the essence of G.o.d implies Being. Of course the substance of man is imperishable because it is of G.o.d's substance. Nay, there is a sense in which each man, being an eternal thought of G.o.d, has an aspect towards eternity or exists "sub specie eternitatis." But that is a truth transcending the finite practical world with which we have to do.

[Sidenote: Ill.u.s.tration by the Vortex Theory.]

[Sidenote: Distinction between Man and Beast.]

According to Spinoza, what const.i.tutes the real essence of the human mind is the (divine) idea of a certain individual creature actually existing.[19] Here, perhaps, modern speculations about the const.i.tution of matter may help us--if we use them with due reserve--to grasp Spinoza's notion of a "res singularis in actu"--or as it might be rendered freely, "a creature of individual functions," for what is called the "vortex theory," though as old as Cartesian philosophy, has recently flashed into sudden prominence. And whether or no the speculation be only a pa.s.sing phase of human thought about the Unknowable, it equally answers the purpose of ill.u.s.tration. Thus the so-called "ether" is supposed to fill all s.p.a.ce; and within it there are imagined or inferred innumerable "tourbillons" or "vortices," which, though parts of the indefinitely extended ether, form by their self-contained motion little worlds in themselves. These little worlds are by some regarded as the atoms which, by composition, and differentiation, build up our palpable universe. With the possibilities of such a theory I have nothing to do. But the notion of the vortex in the ether may perhaps help us to a glimpse of Spinoza's notion when he speaks of a "res singularis in actu" a creature of individual functions.

For to him man was, as it were, an infinitesimal vortex in a phase or attribute of the divine Substance. The a.n.a.logy, like all other a.n.a.logies, would not bear being pressed. But it does suggest to us a picture of finite individuality in action or function, subordinated to unity with infinite Substance. If it be said that such an explanation would necessarily include the conscious life of beasts and birds, the answer would seem to be, that admitting this to be the case, yet in man the divine idea of individuality is more fully expressed and has more of reality than in any lower creature.

[Sidenote: Moral Difficulties.]

Man, then, according to Spinoza, is in G.o.d and of G.o.d. But what are we to say of bad men, the vile, the base, the liar, the murderer? Are they also in G.o.d and of G.o.d? Spinoza does not blench. Yes, they are. But here comes in his doctrine of "adequate" and "inadequate ideas." Thus, if you see the colour red it completely expresses itself. It cannot be defined and needs no explanation.[20] As it is in the Infinite Thought so it is in ours. We have an "adequate idea" of it. But now if you see on an artist's canvas a splotch of red and blue and yellow, part of a work only begun, it gives you no adequate idea. True, you have an adequate idea of each several colour, but not of their relations to the work conceived. To get that you would have to enter into the mind of the artist and see as he sees. Then the splotch of colour would take its place as part of a harmonious whole; and would give you an adequate idea just as it does to the artist.

[Sidenote: But the Universe Is Not an Unfinished Picture.]

[Sidenote: It is an Eternal Whole, of which a Partial consideration is Misleading.]

Now, according to Spinoza, when we see things as they appear in Infinite Thought we have an adequate idea. But if we see only a component element in an idea--let us say--of the divine Artist, then our idea is inadequate.[21] Hence we misjudge things. And of the part played by bad men in the divine Whole we certainly have no adequate idea. But here again we must be on our guard against the abuse of ill.u.s.trations. For it is not to be inferred that Spinoza regards the Universe as an unfinished picture, of which, the completion will justify the beginning. On the contrary, the Universe is to him eternal, the necessary expression of the infinite attributes of eternal Being. Still the a.n.a.logy may help us.

For the concentration of attention on a single part of an ordered whole may, quite as certainly as a glance at an unfinished work, be the occasion of an inadequate idea. In effect, the suggestion is that if we, like G.o.d, could contemplate the infinite Universe all at once, and have an adequate idea thereof, in other words if we could ascend to the self contemplation of the Eternal, we should have the bliss a.s.sociated by long habit with the words of the Psalmist: "I shall be satisfied when I awake, with thy likeness." Such bliss, however, is only approximately attainable in moments of mystic transport. And when, as in so many experiences, we see only in part, and have inadequate ideas, faith in the Eternal Whole is needed to keep us from blasphemy.

[Sidenote: Doctrine of Man Resumed.]

[Sidenote: Final Cause Replaced by Idea.]

[Sidenote: Freedom, Purity, Love.]

With such necessarily brief hints as to Spinoza's att.i.tude towards evil, I resume his doctrine of man--the individual creature as a centre of action. Of final causes Spinoza will not hear. But if instead of asking "what is the chief end of man," we ask what is the idea of man, Spinoza answers that it is the realization of a mode of the divine attributes, extension and thought. And if this should seem unsatisfying, let it be remembered that to this devout Pantheist the divine attributes and their modes were the expression of the very substance and life of G.o.d.

Now with "extension," for reasons already given, we need not trouble ourselves except to say that at least Spinoza's teaching would suggest the idea of _mens sana in corpore sano_. Because to him the mind was the "idea" of the body, and the body the "object"--not quite in the modern sense--of the mind. But as regards the human mode of the divine attribute of thought, Spinoza makes its ideal to be a life absorbed in such contemplation of "the Blessed G.o.d," the infinite Whole, as shall react on the creature in inspirations of freedom, purity and love.