Ontology or the Theory of Being Part 9

Finally, the logical truth which has its seat in created intelligences is _mutable_: it may be increased or diminished, acquired or lost.

42. ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH A TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF REALITY.-From what has been said it will be apparent that ontological truth is a transcendental attribute of reality. That is to say, whatever is real, whether actual or possible, is ontologically true; or, in scholastic terminology, "_Omne ens est verum; Ens et verum convertuntur_: All being is true; The real and the true are convertible terms". For in the first place there is no mode or category of real being, of which the human mind actually thinks, to which it does not attribute ontological truth in the sense of conformity with the right human conception of it. Moreover, the proper object of the human intellect is reality; all true knowledge is knowledge of reality. Reality of itself is manifestly knowable, intelligible, and thus potentially or fundamentally true; and, on the other hand, intellect is, according to the measure of its capacity, a faculty of insight into all reality, into whatever is real: _intellectus potens fieri omnia; anima ... quodammodo fit omnia_.(171) Deny either of these postulates regarding the terms of the ontological relation, reality and mind, and all rational thought is instantly paralysed. Hence, in so far as a reality becomes an actual object of human knowledge it has formal ontological truth in relation both to the human mind and to the Divine Mind; while antecedently to human thought it is fundamentally true, or intelligible, to the human mind, and of course formally true in relation to the Divine Mind.

Thus we see that whatever is real is ontologically true; that ontological truth is really identical with real being; that, applied to the latter, it is not a mere extrinsic denomination, but signifies an intrinsic, positive aspect of reality, _viz._ the real, essential, or transcendental relation of all real being to Mind or Intellect: a relation which is logically or conceptually distinct from the notion of reality considered in itself.

43. ATTRIBUTION OF FALSITY TO REAL BEING.-If ontological truth is really identical with real being, if it is an essential aspect of the latter, a transcendental relation of reality to mind, it follows immediately that there can be no such thing as transcendental falsity: if whatever is real is ontologically true, then the ontologically false must be the unreal, must be nothingness. And this is really so: ontologically falsity _is_ nothingness. We have, therefore, to discover the real meaning of attributing falsity to things, as when we speak of a false friend, false gold, false teeth, a false musical note, a false measure in poetry, etc.

First of all, then, it will be noted that each such object has its own real nature and character, its proper mental correlate, and, therefore, its ontological truth. The false friend is a true or real deceiver, or traitor, or coward, or whatever his real character may be; the false gold is true or real bronze, or alloy, or whatever it may be in reality; the false teeth are true or real ivory, or whatever substance they are made of; a false musical note is a true or real note but not the proper one in its actual setting; and so of a false measure in poetry. Next, when we thus ascribe falsity to a friend, or gold, or such like, we see that the epithet "false" is in reality merely transferred from the false judgment which a person is liable to make about the object. We mean that to judge that person a friend, or that substance gold, or those articles real teeth, would be to form a false judgment. We see that it is only in the judgment there can be falsity; but we transfer the epithet to the object because the object is likely to occasion the erroneous judgment in the fallible human mind, by reason of the resemblance of the object to something else which it really is not. We see, therefore, that falsity is not in the objects, but is transferred to them by a purely extrinsic denomination on account of appearances calculated to mislead. We commonly say, in such cases that "things mislead us," that "appearances deceive us". Things, however, do not deceive or mislead us _necessarily_, but only _accidentally_: they are the _occasions_ of our allowing ourselves to be deceived: the fallibility and limitations of our own minds in interpreting reality are the real cause of our erroneous judgments.(172)

Secondly, there is another improper sense in which we attribute falsity to works of art which fail to realize the artist's ideal. In this sense we speak of a "false" note in music, a "false" measure in poetry, a "false"

tint in painting, a "false" curve in sculpture or architecture. "False"

here means defective, bad, wanting in perfection. The object being out of harmony with the ideal or design in the practical intellect of the artist, we describe it as "false" after the a.n.a.logy of what takes place when we describe as "false gold" a substance which is out of harmony with the idea of gold in the speculative intellect. It is in relation to the speculative, not the practical, intellect, that things have ontological truth. All created things are, of course, as such, in conformity not only with the Divine Intellect considered as speculative, but also with the Divine Intellect considered as practical. For G.o.d, being omnipotent, does all things according to the designs of His Wisdom. For Him nothing is accidental, nothing happens by chance. But the world He has freely willed to create is not the best possible world. Both in the physical and in the moral order there are things and events which are defective, which fall short of their natural perfection. This defectiveness, which is properly physical or moral evil, is sometimes described as falsity, lying, vanity, etc., on account of the discrepancy between those things and the ideal of what they should be. But all such defective realities are known to be what they are by the Divine Mind, and may be known as they really are by the human mind. They have, therefore, their ontological truth. The question of their perfection or imperfection gives rise to the consideration of quite a different aspect of reality, namely its _goodness_. This, then, we must deal with in the next place.

CHAPTER VI. REALITY AND THE GOOD.

44. THE GOOD AS "DESIRABLE" AND AS "SUITABLE".-The notion of the _good_ (L. _bonum_; Gr. ??a???) is one of the most familiar of all notions. But like all other transcendental or widely generic concepts, the a.n.a.lysis of it opens up some fundamental questions. The princes of ancient Greek philosophy, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, gave much anxious thought to its elucidation. The tentative gropings of Socrates involved an ambiguity which issued in the conflicting philosophies of Stoicism and Epicureanism.

Nor did Plato succeed in bringing down from the clouds the "Idea of the Good" which he so devotedly worshipped as the Sun of the Intellectual World. It needed the more sober and searching a.n.a.lysis of the Stagyrite to bring to light the formula so universally accepted in after ages: The Good of beings is that which all desire: _Bonum est quod omnia appetunt_.(173) Let us try to reach the fundamental idea underlying the terms "good,"

"goodness," by some simple examples.

The child, deriving sensible pleasure from a sweetmeat, cries out: That is _good_! Whatever gratifies its senses, gives it sensible delight, it _likes_ or _loves_. Such things it _desires_, _seeks_, _yearns for_, in their absence; and in their presence _enjoys_. At this stage the good means simply the _pleasure-giving_. But as reason develops the human being apprehends and describes as good not merely what is pleasure-giving, but whatever satisfies any natural need or craving, whether purely organic, or purely intellectual, or more widely human: food is good because it satisfies a physical, organic craving; knowledge is good because it satisfies a natural intellectual thirst; friendship is good because it satisfies a wider need of the heart. Here we notice a transition from "agreeable" in the sense of "pleasure-giving" to "agreeable" in the more proper sense of "suitable" or useful. The good is now conceived not in the narrow sense of what yields sensible pleasure but in the wider sense of that which is useful or suitable for the satisfaction of a natural tendency or need, that which is _the object of a natural tendency_.

Next, let us reflect, with Aristotle, that each of the individual persons and things that make up the world of our direct experience has an end towards which it naturally tends. There is a purpose in the existence of each. Each has a nature, _i.e._ an essence which is for it a principle of development, a source of all the functions and activities whereby it continually adapts itself to its environment and thereby continually fulfils the aim of its existence. By its very nature it tends towards its end along the proper line of its development.(174) In the world of conscious beings this natural tendency is properly called appet.i.te: _sense appet.i.te_ of what is apprehended as good by sense cognition, and rational appet.i.te or _will_ in regard to what is apprehended as good by intellect or reason. In the world of unconscious things this natural tendency is a real tendency and is a.n.a.logous to conscious appet.i.te. Hence it is that Aristotle, taking in all grades of real being, describes the good as that which is the object of any natural tendency or "appet.i.te" whatsoever: the good is the "_appetibile_" or "desirable," that which all things seek: _bonum est quod omnia appetunt_.

45. THE GOOD AS AN "END," "PERFECTING" THE "NATURE".-So far, we have a.n.a.lysed the notion of what is "good" _for some being_; and we have gathered that it implies what _suits_ this being, what contributes to the latter's realization of its end. But we apply the term "good" to objects, and speak of their goodness, apart from their direct and immediate relation of helpfulness or suitability _for us_. When, for instance, we say of a watch that it is a _good_ one, or of a soldier that he is a _good_ soldier, what precisely do we mean by such attribution of goodness to things or persons? A little reflection will show that it is intelligible _only in reference to an end or purpose_. And we mean by it that the being we describe as good has the powers, qualities, equipments, which _fit it for its end or purpose_. A being is good whose nature is equipped and adapted for the realization of its natural end or purpose.

Thus we see that the notion of goodness is correlative with the notion of an end, towards which, or for which, a being has a natural tendency or desire. Without the concept of a nature as tending to realize an end or purpose, the notion of "the good" would be inexplicable.(175) And the two formulae, "The good is that which beings desire, or towards which they naturally tend," and "The good is that which is adapted to the ends which beings have in their existence," really come to the same thing; the former statement resolving itself into the latter as the more fundamental. For the reason why anything is desirable, why it is the object of a natural tendency, is because it is good, and not _vice versa_. The description of the good as that which is desirable, "_Bonum est id quod est appetibile_,"

is an _a posteriori_ description, a description of cause by reference to effect.(176) A thing is desirable because it is good. Why then is it good, and therefore desirable? Because it _suits_ the natural needs, and _is adapted_ to the nature, of the being that desires it or tends towards it; because it _helps_ this being, _agrees with_ it, by contributing towards the realization of its end: _Bonum est id quod convenit naturae appetentis_: The good is that which suits the nature of the being that desires it. The greatest good for a being is the realization of its end; and the means towards this are also good because they contribute to this realization.

No doubt, in beings endowed with consciousness the gradual realization of this natural tendency, by the normal functioning and development of their activities, is accompanied by pleasurable feeling. The latter is, in fact, not an end of action itself, but rather the natural concomitant, the effect and index, of the healthy and normal activity of the conscious being: _delectatio sequitur operationem debitam_. It is the pleasure felt in tending towards the good that reveals the good to the conscious agent: that is, taking pleasure in its wide sense as the feeling of well-being, of satisfaction with one's whole condition, activities and environment.

Hence it is the antic.i.p.ated pleasure, connected by past a.s.sociation with a certain line of action, that stimulates the conscious being to act in that way again. It is in the first instance because a certain operation or tendency is felt to be _pleasing_ that it is desired, and apprehended as _desirable_. Nor does the brute beast recognize or respond to any stimulus of action other than pleasure. But man-endowed with reason, and reflecting on the relation between his own nature and the activities whereby he duly orients his life in his environment-must see that what is pleasure-giving or "agreeable" in the ordinary sense of this term is generally so because it is "agreeable" in the deeper sense of being "suitable to his nature,"

"adapted to his end," and therefore "good".

The good, then, is whatever suits the nature of a being tending towards its end: _bonum est conveniens naturae appetentis_. In what precisely does this suitability consist? What suits any nature _perfects_ that nature, and suits it precisely in so far as it perfects it. But whatever perfects a nature does so only because and in so far as it is _a realization of the end_ towards which this nature tends. Here we reach a new notion, that of "perfecting" or "perfection," and one which is as essentially connected with the notion of "end" or "purpose," as the concept of the "good" itself is. Let us compare these notions of "goodness," "end," and "perfection".

We have said that a watch or a soldier are good when they are adapted to their respective ends. But they are so only because the end itself is already good. And we may ask why any such end is itself good and therefore desirable. For example, why is the accurate indication of time good, or the defence of one's country? And obviously in such a series of questions we must come to something which is good and desirable in and for itself, for its own sake and not as leading and helping towards some remoter good.

And this something which is good in and for itself is a last or ultimate end-an absolute, not a relative, good. There must be such an absolute good, such an ultimate end, if goodness in things is to be made intelligible at all. And it is only in so far as things tend towards this absolute good, and are adapted to it, that they can be termed good. The realization of this tendency of things towards the absolute good, or ultimate end, is what const.i.tutes the goodness of those things, and it does so because it _perfects their natures_.

The end towards which any nature tends is the cause of this tendency, its _final_ cause; and the influence of a final cause consists precisely in its goodness, _i.e._ in its power of actualizing and perfecting a nature. This influence of the good is sometimes described as the "diffusive" character of goodness: _Bonum est diffusivum sui_: Goodness tends to diffuse or communicate itself, to multiply or reproduce itself. This character, which we may recognize in the goodness of finite, created things, is explained in the philosophy of theism as being derived, with this goodness itself, from the uncreated goodness of G.o.d who is the Ultimate End and Supreme Good of all reality. Every creature has its own proper ultimate end and highest perfection in its being a manifestation, an expression, a shewing forth, of the Divine Goodness. It has its own actuality and goodness, distinct from, but dependent on, the Divine Goodness; but inasmuch as its goodness is an expression or imitation of the Divine Goodness, we may, by an _extrinsic_ denomination, say that the creature is good _by the Divine Goodness_. In a similar way, and without any suspicion of pantheism, we may speak of the goodness of creatures as being a _partic.i.p.ation_ of the Divine Goodness (5).

46. THE PERFECT. a.n.a.lYSIS OF THE NOTION OF PERFECTION.-It is the realization of the end or object or purpose of a nature that perfects the latter, and so far formally const.i.tutes the goodness of this nature. Now the notion of perfection is not exactly the same as the notion of goodness: although what is perfect is always good, what is good is not always perfect. The term "perfect" comes from the Latin _perficere_, _perfectum_, meaning fully made, thoroughly achieved, completed, finished.

Strictly speaking, it is only finite being, potential being, capable of completion, that can be spoken of as _perfectible_, or, when fully actualized, _perfect_. But by universal usage the term has been extended to the reality of the Infinite Being: we speak of the latter as the Infinitely _Perfect_ Being, not meaning that this Being has been "perfected," but that He is the purely Actual and Infinite Reality.

Applied to any finite being, the term "perfect" means that this being has attained to the full actuality which we regard as its end, as the ideal of its natural capacity and tendency. The finite being is subject to change; it is not actualized all at once, but gradually; by the play of those active and pa.s.sive powers which are rooted in its nature it is gradually actualized, and thus perfected, gaining more and more reality or being by the process. But what directs this process and determines the line of its tendency? The _good_ which is the _end_ of the being, the good towards which the being by its nature tends. This good, which is the term of the being's natural tendency-which is, in other words, its end-is the fundamental principle(177) which perfects the nature of the being, is the source and explanation of the process whereby this nature is perfected: _bonum est perfectivum_: _the good is the perfecting principle of reality_. The end itself is "the good which perfects," _bonum quod_; the "perfecting" itself is the formal cause of the goodness of the being that is perfected, _bonum quo_; the being itself which is perfected, and therefore ameliorated or increased in goodness, is the _bonum cui_. In proportion, therefore, to the degree in which a being actually possesses the perfection due to its nature it is "good"; in so far as it lacks this perfection, it is wanting in goodness, or is, as we shall see, ontologically "bad" or "evil".

While, then, the notion of the "good" implies a relation of the appet.i.te or natural tendency of a being towards its end, the notion of "perfection," or "perfecting," conveys to our minds actual reality simply, or the actualizing of reality. The term "perfection" is commonly used as synonymous with actual reality. In so far forth as a reality is actual we say it "has perfection". But we do not call it "perfect" _simply_, unless it has all the actuality we conceive to be due to its nature: so long as it lacks any of this it is only perfect _secundum quid_, _i.e._ in proportion to the actuality it does possess. Hence we define "the perfect"

as _that which is actually lacking in nothing that is due to its nature_.

The perfect is therefore not simply the good, but the complete or finished good; and it is even logically distinct from the latter, inasmuch as the actuality connoted by the former has added to it the relation to appet.i.te connoted by the latter. Similarly "goodness" is logically distinct from "perfection" by adding the like relation to the latter. Although a thing has goodness in so far as it has perfection, and _vice versa_, still its perfection is its actuality simply, while its goodness is this actuality considered as the term of its natural appet.i.te or tendency.

47. GRADES OF PERFECTION. REALITY AS STANDARD OF VALUE.-We may distinguish between stages of perfection in the changing reality of the same being, or grades of perfection in comparing with one another different cla.s.ses or orders of being.

In one and the same being we may distinguish between what is called its _first_ or _essential_ perfection, which means its essence or nature considered as capable of realizing its purpose in existence by tending effectively towards its end; what is called its _intermediate_ or _accidental_ perfection, which consists in all the powers, faculties and functions whereby this tendency is gradually actualized; and what is called its _final_ or _integral_ perfection, which consists in its full actualization by complete attainment of its end.

Again, comparing with one another the individual beings that make up our experience, we cla.s.sify them, we arrange them in a hierarchical order of relative "perfection," of inferiority or superiority, according to the different grades of reality or perfection which we think we apprehend in them. Thus, we look on living things as a higher, n.o.bler, more perfect order of beings than non-living things, on animal life as a higher form of being than plant life, on intelligence as higher than instinct, on will as superior to sense appet.i.te, on mind or spirit as n.o.bler than matter, and so on. Now all such comparisons involve the apprehension of some standard of value. An estimation of relative values, or relative grades of perfection in things, is unintelligible except in reference to some such standard; it involves of necessity the intuition of such a standard. We feel sure that some at least of our appreciations are unquestionably correct: that man, for instance, is superior to the brute beast, and the latter superior to the plant; that the lowest manifestation of life-in the amba, or whatever monocellular, microscopic germ may be the lowest-is higher on the scale of being than the highest expression of the mechanical, chemical and physical forces of the inorganic universe. And if we ask ourselves what is our standard of comparison, what is our test or measure, and why are we sure of our application of it in such cases, our only answer is that our standard of comparison is reality itself, actual being, perfection; that we rely implicitly on our intuition of such actual reality as manifested to us in varying grades or degrees within our experience; that without claiming to be infallible in our judgments of comparison, in our cla.s.sifications of things, in our appreciations of their relative perfection, we may justly a.s.sume reality itself to be as such intelligible, and the human mind to be capable of obtaining some true and certain insight into the nature of reality.

48. THE GOOD, THE REAL, AND THE ACTUAL.-Having compared "perfection" with "goodness" and with "being," let us next compare the two latter notions with each other. We shall see presently that every actual being has its ontological goodness, that these are in reality identical. But there is a logical distinction between them. In the first place the term "being" is applied _par excellence_ to substances rather than to accidents. But we do not commonly speak of an individual substance, a person or thing, as good in reference to essential or substantial perfection.(178) When we describe a man, or a machine, as "good," we mean that the man possesses those _accidental_ perfections, those qualities and endowments, which are suitable to his nature as a man; that the machine possesses those properties which adapt it to its end. In the second place the notion of being is absolute; that of the good is relative, for it implies the notion not of reality simply but of reality as desirable, agreeable, suitable, as perfecting the nature of a subject, as being the end, or conducive to the end, towards which this nature tends. And since what thus _perfects_ must be something not potential but actual, it follows that, unlike real truth, real goodness is identical not with potential, but only with actual reality. It is not an attribute of the abstract, possible essence, but only of the concrete, actually existing essence.(179)

From the fact that the notion of the good is relative it follows that the same thing can be simultaneously good and bad in different relations: "What is one man's meat is another man's poison".

49. KINDS OF GOODNESS; DIVISIONS OF THE GOOD.-(_a_) The goodness of a being may be considered in relation to this being itself, or to other beings. What is good for a being itself, what makes it intrinsically and formally good, _bonum sibi_, is whatever perfects it, and in the fullest sense the realization of its end. Hence we speak of a virtuous, upright man, whose conduct is in keeping with his nature and conducive to the realization of his end, as a good man. But a being may also be good to others, _bonum alteri_, by an extrinsic, active, effective goodness, inasmuch as by its action it may help other beings in the realization of their ends. In this sense, a beneficent man, who wishes the well-being of his fellow-men and helps them to realize this well-being, is called a good man. This kind of goodness is what is often nowadays styled _philanthropy_; in Christian ethics it is known as _charity_.

(_b_) We have described the good as the term or object of natural tendency or appet.i.te. In the domain of beings not endowed with the power of conscious apprehension, determinism rules this natural tendency; this latter is always oriented towards the _real_ good: it never acts amiss: it is always directed by the Divine Wisdom which has given to things their natures. But in the domain of conscious living agents this natural tendency is consequent on apprehension: it takes the form of instinctive animal appet.i.te or of rational volition. And since this apprehension of the good may be erroneous, since what is not really good but evil may be apprehended as good, the appet.i.te or will, which follows this apprehension-_nil volitum nisi praecognitum_-may be borne towards evil _sub ratione boni_. Hence the obvious distinction between _real good_ and _apparent good_-_bonum verum_ and _bonum apparens_.

(_c_) In reference to any individual subject-a man, for instance-it is manifest that _other_ beings can be good for him in so far as any of them can be his end or a means to the attainment of his end. They are called in reference to him _objective goods_, and their goodness _objective goodness_. But it is equally clear that they are good for him only because he can perfect his own nature by somehow identifying or uniting himself with them, possessing, using, or enjoying them. This possession of the objective good const.i.tutes what has been already referred to as _formal_ or _subjective goodness_.(180)

(_d_) We have likewise already referred to the fact that in beings endowed with consciousness and appet.i.te proper, whether sentient or rational, the function of possessing or attaining to what is objectively good, to what suits and perfects the nature of the subject, has for its natural concomitant a feeling of pleasure, satisfaction, well-being, delight, enjoyment. And we have observed that this pleasurable feeling may then become a stimulus to fresh desire, may indeed be desired for its own sake.

Now this subjective, pleasure-giving possession of an objective good has been itself called by scholastics _bonum delectabile_-delectable or delight-giving good. The objective good itself considered as an end, and the perfecting of the subject by its attainment, have been called _bonum honestum_-good which is really and _absolutely_ such _in itself_. While if the good in question is really such only when considered as a means to the attainment of an end, of something that is good in itself, the former is called _bonum utile_-useful good.(181)

In this important triple division _bonum honestum_ is used in the wide sense in which it embraces any _real_ good, whether physical or moral. As applied to man it would therefore embrace whatever perfects his physical life as well as whatever perfects his nature considered as a rational, and therefore moral, being. But in common usage it has been restricted to the latter, and is in this sense synonymous with _moral good_, _virtue_.(182)

Furthermore, a good which is an end, and therefore desirable for its own sake, whether it be physical or moral, can be at the same time a means to some higher good and desired for the sake of this latter. Hence St.

Thomas, following Aristotle, reduces all the moral goods which are desirable in themselves to two kinds: that which is desirable only for itself, which is the last end, final felicity; and those which, while good in themselves, are also conducive to the former, and these are the virtues.(183)

When these various kinds of goodness are examined in reference to the nature, conduct and destiny of man, they raise a mult.i.tude of problems which belong properly to Ethics and Natural Theology. The fact that man has a composite nature which is the seat of various and conflicting tendencies, of the flesh and of the spirit; that he perceives in himself a "double law," a higher and a lower appet.i.te; that he is subject to error in his apprehension of the good; that he apprehends a distinction between pleasure and duty; that he feels the latter to be the path to ultimate happiness,-all this accentuates the distinction between real and apparent good, between _bonum honestum_, _bonum utile_, and _bonum delectabile_.

The existence of G.o.d is established in Natural Theology; and in Ethics, aided by Psychology, it is proved that no finite good can be the last end of man, that G.o.d, the Supreme, Infinite Good, is his last end, and that only in the possession of G.o.d by knowledge and love can man find his complete and final felicity.

50. GOODNESS A TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF BEING.-We have shown that there is a logical distinction between the concept of "goodness" and that of "being". We have now to show that the distinction is not real, in other words, that goodness is a transcendental attribute of all actual reality, that all being, in so far forth as it is actual, has goodness-transcendental or ontological goodness in the sense of _appetibility_, _desirability_, _suitability_, as already explained.

When the thesis is formulated in the traditional scholastic statement, "_Omne ens est bonum_: _All being is good_" it sounds a startling paradox.

Surely it cannot be contended that everything is good? A cancer in the stomach is not good; lies are not good; yet these are actual realities; cancers exist and lies are told; therefore not every reality is good. This is unquestionably true. But it does not contradict the thesis rightly understood. The true meaning of the thesis is, not that every being is good in all respects, or possesses such goodness as would justify us in describing it as "good" in the ordinary sense, but that every being possesses some goodness: every being in so far as it has actuality has formal, intrinsic goodness, or is, in other words, the term or object of natural tendency or desire. This goodness, which we predicate of any and every actual being, may be (1) the term of the natural tendency or appet.i.te of that being itself, _bonum sibi_, or (2) it may be conceivably the term of the appet.i.te of some other being, _bonum alteri_. Let us see whether it can be shown that every actual being has goodness in one or both of these senses.

(1) _Bonum sibi_.-Is there any intelligible sense in which it can be said that the actuality of any and every existing being is _good for that being_-_bonum sibi_? There is. For if we recognize in every such being, as we must, a _nature_, a potentiality of further actualization, a tendency towards a state of fuller actuality which is its _end_; and if, furthermore, we recognize that every such being at any instant not merely _is_ or exists, but is _becoming_ or _changing_, and thereby tending effectively towards its end; we must admit not merely that the full attainment of its end (its integral or final perfection) is "desired" by, and "perfects," and is "good" for, that being's nature; but also that the partial realization of its end, or, in other words, the actuality it has at any instant in its changing condition of existence (its accidental or intermediate perfection) is similarly "good" for it; and even that its actual existence as compared with its mere possibility (its first or essential perfection) is "desirable" and "good" for its nature. Actually existing beings are intelligible only because they exist for some end or purpose, which, by their very existence, activities, operations, conduct, they tend to realize. If this be admitted we cannot deny that the full attainment of this end or purpose is "good" for them-suitable, desirable, agreeable, perfecting them. In so far as they fail in this purpose they are wanting in goodness, they are bad, evil. For the realization of their end their natures are endowed with appropriate powers, faculties, forces, by the normal functioning of which they gradually develop and grow in actuality. No real being is by nature inert or aimless; no real being is without its connatural faculties, forces and functions. But the natural result of all operation, of all action and interaction among things, is _actualization_ of the potential, amelioration, development, growth in perfection and goodness by gradual realization of ends. If by accident any of these powers is wanting, or acts amiss by failing to contribute its due perfection to the nature, there is in the being a proportionate want of goodness-it is so far bad, evil. But, even so, the nature of the thing preserves its fundamental orientation towards its end, towards the perfection natural to it, and struggles as it were against the evil-tries to make good the deficiency. A cancer in the stomach is never good _for the stomach_, or _for the living subject_ of which the stomach is an organ. For the living being the cancer is an evil, a _failure_ of one of the organs to discharge its functions normally, _an absence of a good_, _viz._ the healthy functioning of an organ. But the cancerous growth, considered in itself and for itself, biologically and chemically, has its own nature, purpose, tendencies, laws; nor can we deny that its development according to these laws is "good" for its specific nature,(184) _bonum sibi_.

It may be asked how can the _first_ or _essential_ perfection of an existing substance, which is nothing else than the actual existence of the nature itself, be conceived as "good" for this nature? It is so inasmuch as the actual existence of the substance is the first stage in the process by which the nature tends towards its end; an existing nature desires and tends towards the conservation of its own being;(185) hence the saying, "Self-preservation is the first law of nature"; and hence, too, the scholastic aphorism, "_Melius est esse quam non esse_".

The argument just outlined tends to show that every nature of which we can have direct experience, or in other words every finite, contingent nature, is _bonum sibi_, formally and intrinsically good for itself.

It is, of course, equally applicable to the Uncreated, Necessary Being Himself. The Infinite Actuality of the Divine Nature is essentially the term and end of the Divine Love. Therefore every actual being has intrinsic, formal goodness, whereby it is _bonum sibi_, _i.e._ its actuality is, in regard to its nature, really an object of tendency, desire, appet.i.te, a something that really suits and perfects this nature.

Thus understood, the thesis formulates no mere tautology. It makes a real a.s.sertion about real being; nor can the truth of this a.s.sertion be proved otherwise than by an argument based, as ours is, on the recognition of purpose, of final causality, of adaptation of means to ends, in the actual universe of our experience.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, it may still be asked why should those individual beings, whose existence we have claimed to be good for them, exist at all. It will be objected that there exist mult.i.tudes of beings whose existence is manifestly _not_ good for them. Take, for instance, the case of the reprobate. If they wish their total annihilation, if they desire the total cessation of their being, rather than an existence of eternal punishment, they undoubtedly wish it _as a good_. Is annihilation or absolute non-existence _really_ a good _for them_? _De facto_ it is _for them_, considered _in their actual condition_ which is _accidental to their nature_. Christ said of the scandal-giver what is surely true of the reprobate: "It were better for that man had he never been born". We may admit, therefore, that for the reprobate themselves simple non-existence is more desirable, and better, than their actual concrete state of existence as reprobate: because simple non-existence is for them the simple _negation_ of their reality, whereas the absolute and irreparable loss of their last end, the total frustration of the purpose for which they came into being, is for them the greatest conceivable _privation_. But this condition of the reprobate is accidental to their nature, alien to the purpose of their being, a self-incurred failure, a deliberate thwarting of their natural tendency. It remains true, therefore, that their nature is good though incapable of progress, its purpose is good though frustrated. In so far as they have actual reality they have "essential" goodness. Their _natures_ still tend towards self-conservation and the realization of their end. They form no _real_ exception to the general truth that "it is better to be than not to be: _melius est esse quam non esse_". It is not annihilation as such that is desired by them, but only as a less evil alternative than the eternal privation of their last end.(186) If the evils accidentally and actually attaching to a certain state of existence make the continuance of _this state_ undesirable for a being, it by no means follows that the continuance of this being in existence, simply and in itself, is less desirable than non-existence.