New York Times Current History The European War, Vol 1, Issue 4, January Part 12

Official casualty lists of recent date which have been captured show that the losses of the Germans continue to be heavy. One single list shows that a company of German infantry had 139 men killed and wounded, or more than half of its war establishment. Other companies suffered almost as heavily. It further appears that the number of men reported missing--that is, those who have fallen into the hands of the enemy or who have become marauders--is much greater in the reserve battalions than in the first line units. This is evidence of the inferior quality of some of the reserves now being brought up to reinforce the enemy field army, and it is all the more encouraging, since every day adds to our first line strength.

The arrival of the Indian contingents caused every one to realize that while the enemy was filling his depleted ranks with immature levies, we have large reserves of perfectly fresh and thoroughly trained troops to draw upon.

X.

*Nature of Fighting Changes.*

[Dated Oct. 26.]

Before the narrative [Transcriber: original 'narative'] of the progress of the fighting near the Franco-Belgian frontier subsequent to Oct. 20 is continued a brief description will be given of the movement of a certain fraction of our troops from its former line facing north, on the east of Paris, to its present position facing east, in the northwest corner of France, by which a portion of the British Army has been enabled to join hands with the incoming and growing stream of reinforcements.

This is now an accomplished fact, as is generally known, and can therefore be explained in some detail without detriment. Mention will also be made of the gradual development up to Oct. 20 in the nature of the operations in this quarter of the theatre of war, which has recently come into such prominence.

In its broad lines the transfer of strength by one combatant during the course of a great battle which has just been accomplished is somewhat remarkable. It can best be compared with the action of the j.a.panese during the battle of Mukden, when Gen. Oku withdrew a portion of his force from his front, moved it northward behind the line, and threw it into the fight again near the extreme left of the j.a.panese armies.

In general direction, though not in scope or possible results, owing to the coast line being reached by the Allies, the parallel [Transcriber: original 'parellel'] is complete. The j.a.panese force concerned, however, was much smaller than ours and the distance covered by it was less than that from the Aisne to the Franco-Belgian frontier. Gen. Oku's troops, moreover, marched, whereas ours were moved by march, rail, and motor.

What was implied in the actual withdrawal from contact with the enemy along the Aisne will be appreciated when the conditions under which we were then situated are recalled.

In places the two lines were not one hundred yards apart, and for us no movement was possible during daylight. In some of the trenches which were under enfilade fire our men had to sit all day long close under the traverses--as are called those mounds of earth which stretch like part.i.tions at intervals across a trench so as to give protection from lateral fire. Even where there was cover, such as that afforded by depressions or sunken roads, on the hillside below and behind our firing line, any attempt to cross the intervening s.p.a.ce was met by fierce bursts of machine gun and sh.e.l.l fire.

The men in the firing line were on duty for twenty-four hours at a time, and brought rations and water with them when they came on duty, for none could be sent up to them during the day. Even the wounded could not be removed until dark.

The preliminary retirement of the units was therefore carried out gradually, under cover of darkness. That the Germans only once opened fire on them while so engaged was due to the care with which the operation was conducted, and also, probably, to the fact that the enemy were so accustomed to the recurrence of the sounds made by the reliefs of the men in the firing line and by the movement of the supply trains below that they were misled as to what was actually taking place.

What the operation amounted to on our part was the evacuation of the trenches, under carefully made arrangements with the French who had to take our place in the trenches; the retirement to the river below--in many cases down a steep slope; the crossing of the river over the noisy plank roadways of floating or repaired bridges, which were mostly commanded by the enemy's guns--and the climb up to the top of the plateau on the south side.

The rest of the move was a complicated feat of transportation which cut across some of the lines of communication of our allies; but it requires no description here. In spite of the various difficulties, the whole strategic operation of transferring the large number of troops from the Aisne was carried out without loss and practically without a hitch.

As regards the change in the nature of the fighting in which we have recently been engaged, it has already been pointed out that the operations had up till then been of a preparatory nature and that the Germans were obviously seeking to delay us by advanced troops while heavier forces were being got ready and brought up to the scene of action. It was known that they were raising a new army, consisting of corps formed of Ersatz, (supernumerary reserves), volunteers, and other material which had not yet been drawn upon, and that part of it would in all probability be sent to the western theatre, either to cover the troops laying siege to Antwerp, in case that place should hold out, or, in the event of the capture of the fortress, to act in conjunction with the besieging force in a violent offensive movement toward the coast.

After the fall of Antwerp and the release of the besieging troops there was a gradual increase in the strength of the opposition met with by us.

The resistance of the detachments--which beyond the right extreme of the German fortified line near Bethune a fortnight ago consisted almost entirely of cavalry--grew more and more determined as more infantry and guns came into the front line, until Tuesday, Oct. 20, when the arrival opposite us of a large portion of the new formations and a considerable number of heavy guns enabled the enemy to a.s.sume the offensive practically against the whole of our line at the same time that they attacked the Belgians between us and the coast.

The operations then really a.s.sumed a fresh complexion.

Since that date, up to the 25th, apart from the operations on either side of us, there has been plenty of action to chronicle on our immediate front, where some of the heaviest fighting in which we have yet been engaged has taken place, resulting in immense loss to the Germans.

On Wednesday, the 21st, the new German formations again pressed forward in force vigorously all along our line. On our right, south of the Lys, an attack on Violaines was repulsed with loss to the a.s.sailants.

On the other hand, we were driven from some ground close by, to the north, but regained it by a counter attack.

Still further north the Germans gained and retained some points.

Their total casualties to the southeast of Armentieres are estimated at over 6,000.

On the north of the Lys, in our centre, a fiercely contested action took place near La Gheir, which village was captured in the morning by the enemy and then retaken by us. In this direction the German casualties were also extremely heavy. They came on with the greatest bravery, in swarms, only to be swept away by our fire. One battalion of their 104th Regiment was practically wiped out, some 400 dead being picked up by us in our lines alone.

Incidentally, by our counter attack, we took 130 prisoners and released some forty of our own men who had been surrounded and captured, including a subaltern of artillery who had been cut off while observing from a point of vantage.

It is agreeable to record that our men were very well treated by their captors, who were Saxons, being placed in cellars for protection from the bombardment of our own guns.

On our left our troops advanced against the German 26th Reserve Corps near Pa.s.schendaele, and were met by a determined counter offensive, which was driven back with great loss. At night the Germans renewed their efforts unsuccessfully in this quarter.

At one point they tried a ruse which is no longer new. As they came up in a solid line two deep they shouted out: "Don't fire; we are the Coldstream Guards."

But our men are getting used to tricks of this kind, and the only result of this "slimness" was that they allowed the enemy's infantry to approach, quite close before they swept them down with magazine fire.

Apart from the 400 dead found near our lines in our centre, our patrols afterwards discovered some 300 dead further out in front of our left, killed by our artillery.

Thursday, the 22d, saw a renewal of the pressure against us. We succeeded, however, in holding our ground in nearly every quarter.

South of the Lys the enemy attacked from La Ba.s.see, and gained Violaines and another point, but their effort against a third village was repulsed by artillery fire alone, the French and British guns working together very effectively. On the north of the river it was a day of minor attacks against us, which were all beaten back.

The Germans advanced in the evening against our centre and left, and were again hurled back, though they gained some of our trenches in the latter quarter. By this time the enemy had succeeded in bringing up several heavy howitzers, and our casualties were considerable.

On Friday, the 23d, all action south of the Lys on our right was confined to that of the artillery, several of the hostile batteries being silenced by our fire? In the centre their infantry again endeavored to force their way forward, and were only repulsed after determined fighting, leaving many dead on the ground and several prisoners in our hands. North of the Lys attacks at different points were repulsed.

On our left the 23d was a bad day for the Germans. Advancing in our turn, we drove them from some of the trenches out of which they had turned us on the previous evening, captured 150 prisoners, and released some of our men whom they had taken.

As the Germans retreated our guns did great execution among them.

They afterwards made five desperate a.s.saults on our trenches, advancing in ma.s.s and singing "Die Wacht am Rhein" as they came on. Each a.s.sault was easily beaten back, our troops waiting until the enemy came to very close range before they opened fire with rifles and Maxims, causing terrible havoc in the solid ma.s.ses.

During the fighting in this quarter on the night of the 22d and on the 23d the German losses were again extremely heavy. We made over 600 prisoners during that time and picked up 1,500 dead, killed on the latter day alone.

Much of the slaughter was due to the point blank magazine fire of our men against the German a.s.saults, while our field guns and howitzers, working in perfect combination, did their share when the enemy were repulsed. As they fell back they were subjected to a shower of shrapnel.

When they sought shelter in villages or buildings they were shattered and driven out by high-explosive sh.e.l.ls and then again caught by shrapnel as they came into the open.

The troops to suffer so severely were mostly of Twenty-third Corps, one of their new formations.

Certainly the way their advance was conducted showed a lack of training and faults in leading which the almost superhuman bravery of the soldiers could not counterbalance. It was a holocaust.

The spectacle of these devoted men chanting a national song as they marched on to certain death was inspiring. It was at the same time pitiable.

And if any proof were needed that untrained valor alone cannot gain the day in modern war, the advance of the Twenty-third German Corps on Oct.

23 most a.s.suredly furnished it.

Besides doing its share of execution on the hostile infantry, our artillery in this quarter brought down a German captive balloon.

As some gauge of the rate at which the guns were firing at what was for them an ideal target, it may be mentioned that one field battery expended 1,800 rounds of ammunition during the day.

On Sat.u.r.day, the 24th, action on our right was once more confined to that of artillery, except at night, when the Germans pressed on, only to be repulsed.