Neptune's Inferno_ The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal Part 6

Destroyer captains were known for their esprit. Off Balikpapan, Borneo, in January 1942, the old four-stack tin cans of the now-disbanded Asiatic Fleet had made the first offensive surface-ship foray of the war. In a quick nighttime raid against j.a.panese shipping at rest in an anchorage, a quartet of destroyers pressed in, turned out, and left several cargomen ablaze. For the first time, the night had been seized from the victory-sotted empire.

Chester Nimitz was well acquainted with this spirit. In 1907, as an ensign in command of the destroyer Decatur, Decatur, he ran his ship into a sandbar off Bataan. After turning himself in like the George Washington of legend, he faced a court-martial for incaution and negligence. His defense turned on his observation, calmly articulated during the proceedings, that the commander of a destroyer was supposed to have a devil-may-care att.i.tude and that was precisely what he had given his Navy. In view of his spotless (if thin) record, and the handicap of having outdated charts, he was forgiven the offense and his path to the stars remained open. he ran his ship into a sandbar off Bataan. After turning himself in like the George Washington of legend, he faced a court-martial for incaution and negligence. His defense turned on his observation, calmly articulated during the proceedings, that the commander of a destroyer was supposed to have a devil-may-care att.i.tude and that was precisely what he had given his Navy. In view of his spotless (if thin) record, and the handicap of having outdated charts, he was forgiven the offense and his path to the stars remained open.

It was in this tradition that the Monssen Monssen went hunting on the morning of September 27. Smoot's ship had been shepherd to a large cargo ship, the went hunting on the morning of September 27. Smoot's ship had been shepherd to a large cargo ship, the Alhena, Alhena, on a run from Noumea to Guadalca.n.a.l. As the on a run from Noumea to Guadalca.n.a.l. As the Alhena Alhena was being unloaded, the Marine command decided to take advantage of having a modern destroyer in the area. A 1,630-tonner of the was being unloaded, the Marine command decided to take advantage of having a modern destroyer in the area. A 1,630-tonner of the Benson Benson cla.s.s, the cla.s.s, the Monssen Monssen was ordered to cruise along the western sh.o.r.eline and bombard targets of opportunity. She was a veteran of the North Atlantic convoy runs, of Jimmy Doolittle's Tokyo raid, and of Coral Sea and Midway, but Smoot had never been involved in something like this, where the enemy was standing so near, taunting him with his proximity. was ordered to cruise along the western sh.o.r.eline and bombard targets of opportunity. She was a veteran of the North Atlantic convoy runs, of Jimmy Doolittle's Tokyo raid, and of Coral Sea and Midway, but Smoot had never been involved in something like this, where the enemy was standing so near, taunting him with his proximity.

The j.a.panese garrison had been making good use of the reinforcements the Tokyo Express was bringing them. They no longer underestimated the Marines. As they learned to fight smarter, U.S. patrols into the jungles and hills near Henderson Field found their days becoming increasingly dangerous. When the Marines asked the Monssen Monssen for a hand, Captain Smoot gladly answered the call. for a hand, Captain Smoot gladly answered the call.

The Monssen Monssen's patrol line took her close to the mouth of the Matanikau River, the western boundary of the beachhead, about three miles west of Lunga Point. For several hours, the Monssen Monssen's gunners fired on small j.a.panese landing craft on the beach, suspicious structures that might shelter the enemy, and anything resembling a fuel or ammo dump.

Then, cruising off Lunga Point, Smoot spied through his binoculars an American tank climbing a hill and a small group of j.a.panese soldiers emerging from a cave nearby. For a warship on a fire-support mission, the margin of victory in an encounter like that was defined by the flight time of a salvo to the beach. As far as the men in that tank were concerned, the gulf separating them was unbridgeable. The soldiers began running toward the tank. They climbed atop it and doused it with gasoline. Then a torch was produced and that was that. But the exchange was a total loss for the j.a.panese, too. "My gunnery officer saw those j.a.ps running back," Smoot said, "and he turned the whole broadside of the ship on that cave and blew it to smithereens." Everybody burned.

Overhead, a high-flying V of Betty bombers arrived and began a run on the airfield. The Monssen Monssen pointed her batteries high and engaged them until several Marine Wildcats arrived. Smoot and his men watched as the last Betty in the formation was a.s.saulted by the fighters, began falling, and exploded. One of its wings struck the water just a hundred feet from the ship. Ash.o.r.e, the bodies of the j.a.panese dead could be seen wasting in the sand at the mouth of the Matanikau River. This was not distant. It was personal. pointed her batteries high and engaged them until several Marine Wildcats arrived. Smoot and his men watched as the last Betty in the formation was a.s.saulted by the fighters, began falling, and exploded. One of its wings struck the water just a hundred feet from the ship. Ash.o.r.e, the bodies of the j.a.panese dead could be seen wasting in the sand at the mouth of the Matanikau River. This was not distant. It was personal.

Late in the morning, as sounds of battle echoed through the coconut groves, the Monssen Monssen was ordered to escort several landing craft bearing two hundred Marine riflemen who were to be landed behind enemy lines. Four Higgins boats carrying them followed the destroyer to a projection of sh.o.r.e about a mile west of the river. The was ordered to escort several landing craft bearing two hundred Marine riflemen who were to be landed behind enemy lines. Four Higgins boats carrying them followed the destroyer to a projection of sh.o.r.e about a mile west of the river. The Monssen Monssen sh.e.l.led the jungle behind the beach as the marines went ash.o.r.e and vanished into the jungle. sh.e.l.led the jungle behind the beach as the marines went ash.o.r.e and vanished into the jungle.

At that point, another wave of Bettys arrived. They were promptly met by the Cactus Air Force's fliers. "The sky was soon crisscrossed with dozens of white streaks, which seemed to persist for many minutes from high alt.i.tude to sea level," a Monssen Monssen sailor, Chester C. Thomason, said. "Perhaps a dozen planes-friend and foe-were seen to plunge into the sea. The sailor, Chester C. Thomason, said. "Perhaps a dozen planes-friend and foe-were seen to plunge into the sea. The Monssen Monssen did not attempt to fire, as individual dogfights were too confusing." Afterward, once the surviving aircraft had dropped their bombs and departed, a group of men, apparently Americans, appeared on an open gra.s.sy hillside about half a mile inland. They seemed to be surrounded. Mortar rounds were bursting among them. Evidently the landings that the did not attempt to fire, as individual dogfights were too confusing." Afterward, once the surviving aircraft had dropped their bombs and departed, a group of men, apparently Americans, appeared on an open gra.s.sy hillside about half a mile inland. They seemed to be surrounded. Mortar rounds were bursting among them. Evidently the landings that the Monssen Monssen had accompanied hadn't managed to encircle and destroy the j.a.panese. had accompanied hadn't managed to encircle and destroy the j.a.panese.

It was then that Smoot noticed a lone figure on another hill waving signal flags. His signal read: SEND BOAT ASh.o.r.e. SEND BOAT ASh.o.r.e. The captain was wary of j.a.panese trickery. The figure was dressed in what he called "army drill," but from this distance the man could belong to either side. "We didn't know who it was and I wasn't going to take any chances." Smoot asked a signalman if there were a way to verify his ident.i.ty. The signalman had an idea, and flagged a question to their mysterious correspondent: The captain was wary of j.a.panese trickery. The figure was dressed in what he called "army drill," but from this distance the man could belong to either side. "We didn't know who it was and I wasn't going to take any chances." Smoot asked a signalman if there were a way to verify his ident.i.ty. The signalman had an idea, and flagged a question to their mysterious correspondent: WHO WON THE WORLD SERIES IN 1941? WHO WON THE WORLD SERIES IN 1941? The answer- The answer-YANKEES IN FIVE-decided the issue.

The deck force lowered a whaleboat over the side, and it motored in to the beach. When it returned, it was carrying the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines, his aide, and two other marines. Coming aboard, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, age forty-four, saluted Smoot. "I doggone near lost my life getting down to the beach. I've got a whole group of my men up there in the hills. I've got to get them out of trouble."

Puller told a grim story. His marines, landing at Point Cruz and attempting to join up with Colonel Merritt A. Edson's 1st Raider Battalion, were in the midst of a faltering effort to dislodge j.a.panese forces from the Matanikau village area. When Puller's battalion got ambushed and pinned down by the well-entrenched units of General Kawaguchi's 17th Army, they were effectively cut off. By day's end, two dozen men would be dead and that same number wounded. They needed evacuation. Puller arranged for a couple dozen Higgins boats to do the job. The Monssen Monssen would lend fire support. "They are trapped up there," he told Smoot. "Let me tell you where to shoot." would lend fire support. "They are trapped up there," he told Smoot. "Let me tell you where to shoot."

Puller conferred with the destroyer's gunnery officer, and in short order the ship's four five-inch guns were trained inland again and set to barking. "We just ploughed it with bullets, straight up and down the middle," Smoot said. "Then we spread the firepower up two sides." Several Higgins boats, crewed by volunteers, motored in under fire to evacuate the trapped marines.

Wielding her main battery like a long-armed plow, Smoot's gunners blew open a path through the jungle. "As the first marines appeared on the beach," Chet Thomason wrote, "heavy enemy rifle and machine gun fire commenced from both sides. After a few minutes, the landing boats retreated back alongside the Monssen. Monssen." Getting the men to the beach was much easier than retrieving them from it. When Puller thought that the boat crews hadn't committed themselves fully to the evacuation, he was furious. He stepped on Smoot's toes by yelling at the c.o.xswains, telling them to drive back to the beach and not come back until all the survivors had been retrieved.

"Four marines had managed to scramble into one of the boats earlier," Thomason said. "They were lying down exhausted in the bottom of the boat. When they realized that the boat was being sent back into the beach, they scrambled up and jumped for the Monssen. Monssen. Three managed to grab the lifelines and were pulled aboard. The fourth marine missed, and he disappeared beneath the water under the weight of his equipment. Two of the Three managed to grab the lifelines and were pulled aboard. The fourth marine missed, and he disappeared beneath the water under the weight of his equipment. Two of the Monssen Monssen's sailors quickly stripped off their clothes and dived into the ocean in an attempt to locate him, but they failed, and he was not seen again."

A Navy Dauntless pilot who had been strafing j.a.panese positions, Lieutenant Maxwell Leslie, guided the boats to the landing area. As the Monssen Monssen's brain trust peered out through the clearing smoke through their gla.s.ses, the boats closed the beach. The coming of darkness would soon give them cover. With the setting of the sun, bright red slashes of tracer bullets could be seen reaching out from the jungle, splashing all around the departing vessels. One of the c.o.xswains of the landing party, a Coast Guard signalman named Douglas A. Munro, lingered during the evacuation to support his mates with his craft's light machine gun. A j.a.panese machine gunner drew a bead on Munro's boat and opened fire, killing him.

After Puller and the marines rescued from the island were dropped off in a waiting boat at Lunga Point, Smoot took the Monssen Monssen away from Guadalca.n.a.l. The destroyer joined the away from Guadalca.n.a.l. The destroyer joined the Alhena Alhena for the nighttime run out to sea, away from the threat of nighttime surface attack. The next day the two ships returned for a final day of unloading, and the for the nighttime run out to sea, away from the threat of nighttime surface attack. The next day the two ships returned for a final day of unloading, and the Alhena Alhena evacuated many of the wounded rescued the previous day. With a lull in the fighting ash.o.r.e and the skies free of air raids, the day was quiet and the ships retired again late that afternoon for Espiritu Santo. evacuated many of the wounded rescued the previous day. With a lull in the fighting ash.o.r.e and the skies free of air raids, the day was quiet and the ships retired again late that afternoon for Espiritu Santo.

Their traditional griping could not mask the fact that the marines needed their fleet for much more than just transportation. The Monssen Monssen's display of fighting spirit restored some of their faith. And many had had enough of a taste of life at sea to know they wanted no part of it. After Smoot had given Puller his parting gift the day before-a steak dinner in the wardroom, a hot shower, a seabag full of clean clothes, and a stash of cookies and cigarettes-the infantryman took his leave from the ship. Smoot was glad to be of some help to the Marine Corps. "Everything we could do to help in their rugged life ash.o.r.e, we did." Puller thanked him, then said, "G.o.d, I wouldn't have your job for anything in the world."

At this, Smoot raised an eyebrow. "You mean to tell me you'd go back and go into that messy stuff over there and get yourself filthy and live on c-rations? You've come to see the kind of life I lead out here and you prefer yours?"

"I sure do. When you get hit, where are you? When I I get hit, I get hit, I know know where I am." where I am."

Like most of the other commanders in Operation Watchtower, Roland Smoot could not know where getting hit would leave him. For the time being, the storm of war had settled its eye on the fetid island. It had not yet come directly for him. When it did, as would almost always be the case, the little tin cans would take its brunt.

15.

The Visit SEPTEMBER WAS A MONTH OF PREPARATION, OF CONSOLIDATION, OF preliminary reckoning. "Today," Admiral Matome Ugaki wrote in his diary on the thirtieth, "September is going to pa.s.s. Looking back, I find nothing has been accomplished this month." That judgment may have been just deserts for being slow to grasp the significance of the American move into the Solomons. The j.a.panese were finding themselves outgunned at the point of contact and hamstrung by the geometry of the inter-island campaign. A shortage of fuel at Rabaul forced them to be sparing and selective in the use of their major warships. preliminary reckoning. "Today," Admiral Matome Ugaki wrote in his diary on the thirtieth, "September is going to pa.s.s. Looking back, I find nothing has been accomplished this month." That judgment may have been just deserts for being slow to grasp the significance of the American move into the Solomons. The j.a.panese were finding themselves outgunned at the point of contact and hamstrung by the geometry of the inter-island campaign. A shortage of fuel at Rabaul forced them to be sparing and selective in the use of their major warships.

The Americans had their own problems, some of them similar, but they were confronting them with active, troubleshooting minds. The fleet's Service Squadron, the command that operated the tankers and transports and tenders and supply ships, had moved its headquarters north, from Auckland to Noumea. The Navy was solving the algorithms that would determine how many tons of supplies, ammunition, fresh water, and food were needed per capita to keep an operation going. When the destroyer Laffey Laffey left the shipyard for war, she carried 103 pounds of beef liver, 280 pounds of cabbage, 400 pounds of carrots, 418 pounds of bacon and 499 pounds of pork loin, 36 pounds of chili powder, and nine gallons of ice cream-and that was just for her own men. Her inventory was typical, and delivering the calculated sum was a challenge to planners. left the shipyard for war, she carried 103 pounds of beef liver, 280 pounds of cabbage, 400 pounds of carrots, 418 pounds of bacon and 499 pounds of pork loin, 36 pounds of chili powder, and nine gallons of ice cream-and that was just for her own men. Her inventory was typical, and delivering the calculated sum was a challenge to planners.

One of Nimitz's staffers, visiting to investigate and report on the state of the supply chain, found Noumea's harbor a choked bottleneck of fully loaded cargomen waiting for dock s.p.a.ce. The trouble ran all the way from San Francisco, where few seemed to know about the problems confronting SOPAC's stevedores, to Wellington, New Zealand, where an untimely longsh.o.r.eman's strike was looming. Though Noumea's facilities could handle only twenty-four ships per month, often as many as eighty or more awaited unloading. The cranes in the harbor weren't stout enough to haul away heavy loads such as PT boats. Serious thought was given to a crude remedy: sinking the merchantmen so that the Elco motor torpedo boats, seventy feet long and fifty tons each, could simply float free.

Admiral Nimitz had long been worrying about the chemistry of the SOPAC command. He decided to visit the theater personally to size up not only its materials but also its state of mind. On September 28, his seaplane set down in Noumea harbor and he was promptly taken to the Argonne Argonne for an afternoon meeting of area commanders. for an afternoon meeting of area commanders.

On his first arrival, Nimitz was disappointed to learn that the battleship Washington Washington was still at the Navy's fueling base at Tongatabu, eighteen hundred miles from Guadalca.n.a.l, "so far removed from the critical area," he would scold Ghormley, "that she might as well have been in Pearl or San Francisco, insofar as taking advantage of favorable opportunities is concerned." Nimitz also thought Ghormley was keeping Admiral Scott's striking force on too short a leash, holding them too far south "to do much about visiting enemy ships." was still at the Navy's fueling base at Tongatabu, eighteen hundred miles from Guadalca.n.a.l, "so far removed from the critical area," he would scold Ghormley, "that she might as well have been in Pearl or San Francisco, insofar as taking advantage of favorable opportunities is concerned." Nimitz also thought Ghormley was keeping Admiral Scott's striking force on too short a leash, holding them too far south "to do much about visiting enemy ships."

At 4:30 p.m. Nimitz sat down in the flagship's ward room with a gathering of bra.s.s that included Ghormley, the SOPAC chief of staff, Dan Callaghan, Kelly Turner, Major General Richard K. Sutherland from MacArthur's headquarters, and General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, the commanding general of the Army Air Forces.

Arnold, a four-star, was Nimitz's only equal in the room. Arnold was no friend of the Navy's ambitions in the Pacific. Before leaving, he sought General Marshall's advice on dealing with the rival service branch. Marshall's advice was basic Dale Carnegie: Listen to the other fellow's story. Don't get mad. And let the other fellow tell his story first.

"We recognized the fact that the Navy was hard-pressed at Guadalca.n.a.l," Arnold wrote. "They did need a 'shot in the arm'-and needed it badly; but I was not sure that the way to give it to them was by sending airplanes that might better be used against the Germans from England." He viewed the Navy's demands for aircraft as a "separate intramural war" that was driven by "uninformed pressures" arising from public interest in the Pacific war. Arnold had been shocked by President Roosevelt's posturing on the question of which theater should have priority. In private, FDR affirmed a Europe-first strategy. In public, he made statements that Guadalca.n.a.l had to be "held at all costs." While Arnold didn't argue with the idea that Guadalca.n.a.l should be held, he noted, "A natural word of encouragement from the President was at once seized upon as proof that he had changed his mind" about theater priorities. As Arnold would write, "It was obvious that the naval officers in this area were under a terrific strain. It was also obvious that they had chips on their shoulders." Ghormley said that the pace of work had been such that he hadn't left the Argonne Argonne's flag quarters in about a month. When Arnold told him "that probably was the cause of some of his troubles, because no man-I don't care who he is-can sit continuously in a small office, fighting a war, with all the complicated problems that come up, without suffering mentally, physically and nervously," he received a quick comeuppance. "Admiral Ghormley lost no time in telling me that this was his his theater and that no one could tell him how to command it. I a.s.sured him all I wanted was information; I was not trying to tell him in any way how to run his command. Things smoothed down after that, but it was clear that Ghormley and the other naval officers in that area-Admiral John S. McCain and Admiral Daniel Callaghan-were very worried about the situation there.... It looked to me as if everybody on that South Pacific front had a bad case of jitters." theater and that no one could tell him how to command it. I a.s.sured him all I wanted was information; I was not trying to tell him in any way how to run his command. Things smoothed down after that, but it was clear that Ghormley and the other naval officers in that area-Admiral John S. McCain and Admiral Daniel Callaghan-were very worried about the situation there.... It looked to me as if everybody on that South Pacific front had a bad case of jitters."

The logistical bottlenecks Arnold found at Noumea appalled him. He found the practice of rerouting ships to New Zealand for unloading and reloading inexcusable given the shortages everywhere else. "At that moment the planners of Torch were going nearly crazy in their search for ships," he wrote. In view of the acc.u.mulations of crated aircraft that he found at Noumea, Arnold said that no more planes ought to go to SOPAC until the inventory had been unpacked and sent forward. The Navy's princ.i.p.al problem, he told Admiral King, was a shortage not of planes, but of airfields.

Ghormley disagreed. "I presented the need for aircraft of all types, especially Army fighters.... I felt that our emergency needs should be met even if our commitments to allied nations, on lend-lease and our commitments to the African Campaign, which had not yet commenced, had to be slowed down somewhat." Alas, the Army planners who allocated the service's planes worldwide made decisions based on projected U.S. and j.a.panese air strength six months out, in April 1943. Since the planners estimated that the U.S. would have five thousand planes in the Pacific then, and the j.a.panese only four thousand, the more immediate needs of SOPAC were immaterial. The Cactus Air Force would have to make do in '42.

Even though the U.S.British Combined Chiefs of Staff had specifically agreed to divert fifteen Army air groups from Britain to the South Pacific, General Arnold successfully contrived to cancel it by arguing that any such reallocation, no matter how specific, was void because it jeopardized the "agreed strategic concept" of going on the offensive in North Africa.

As of September 1942, there was only one Allied offensive that stood in actual jeopardy, and it was far from the beaches of Casablanca. American forces on Cactus, Ghormley said, were "under constant pressure. Logistics supply is most difficult. We can send only one ship at a time and from the eastward there is only one channel.... The j.a.ps are still getting in despite our air activity. n.o.body knows exactly how many are on Cactus right now." Ghormley made a worrying impression on his superiors. Nimitz took note of the discrepancy and the awkward second looks it caused around the room. Watching closely as Ghormley spoke, Nimitz found him worn, weary, and anxious. He couldn't estimate enemy troop strength in part because he hadn't visited the island himself to talk with the marines. Vandegrift's intelligence section based their numbers on actual contact and behind-the-lines reconnaissance. When Ghormley mentioned that the island's supply of aviation gas was down to just ten thousand gallons, Turner pointed out that the supply had actually been as low as half that volume.

After Arnold remarked on the pressing need for aircraft worldwide and observed that the South Pacific already had all the planes its airfields could effectively handle, Nimitz asked Ghormley a pointed question: Why hadn't SOPAC's naval forces been sent out at night to sink the Tokyo Express? The answer came when staffers interrupted the meeting twice to deliver priority radio dispatches to Ghormley. When he read them, his reaction both times was to say, "My G.o.d, what are we going to do about this?" In his voice were the echoes of the defeat at Savo, a generalized dread that manifested itself in defeatism. Ghormley saw the whole operation as standing on a precipice. As he later recalled, "If the j.a.panese desired to take a chance, with the major portion of their fleet supporting a large landing force, they could retake Guadalca.n.a.l and break through our lines of communication."

As it happened, what Ghormley feared was exactly the plan then being devised by Yamamoto and his staff at Truk. On the Imperial Navy's drawing boards was an ambitious schedule of sustained reinforcements, to be coordinated in October with another major naval push.

THE DAY AFTER the conference of high commanders on the the conference of high commanders on the Argonne, Argonne, Chester Nimitz stepped into a B-17 Flying Fortress and flew to Henderson Field to tour the island battlefront. General Vandegrift was there to greet him. Nimitz promptly reaffirmed to him that his primary mission was to hold Henderson Field, as opposed to dislodging the j.a.panese garrison from the surrounding jungles and hills. Vandegrift had understood this well from the beginning, when he drew up his landing plan. Chester Nimitz stepped into a B-17 Flying Fortress and flew to Henderson Field to tour the island battlefront. General Vandegrift was there to greet him. Nimitz promptly reaffirmed to him that his primary mission was to hold Henderson Field, as opposed to dislodging the j.a.panese garrison from the surrounding jungles and hills. Vandegrift had understood this well from the beginning, when he drew up his landing plan.

In the bamboo grove outside Vandegrift's headquarters, Nimitz decorated several men. Colonel Merritt Edson, commander of the 1st Marine Raider Battalion and victor in the early clash south of Henderson Field, received the Navy Cross, as did the Marine Corps fighter ace Captain Marion Carl and Vandegrift himself. As Hal Lamar, Nimitz's chief of staff, read the citations, Nimitz pinned them on each recipient. Among them was a tall sergeant who had captured a j.a.panese tank and blown up a couple of machine-gun nests. As Nimitz reached up to pin him with the Navy Cross, the sergeant fainted. "I never saw an admiral before," he offered later.

When Nimitz returned to Noumea, he met again with Ghormley and told him exactly what he wanted. He wanted all-weather airfields, more storage facilities for aviation gas, and Quonset huts, not tents, to shelter his pilots. He wanted better cargo-handling facilities, better roads, and more attentive aircraft repair services. "Planes are too expensive and too hard to get to let only minor damage render them permanently unserviceable," he said. Nimitz wanted a salvage tug in the area, and improved radio procedures and better equipment. He wanted new doctrine for communications and more efficient distribution of mail.

In cataloging these things, Nimitz was showing Ghormley how he wanted leadership exercised. It would not prove helpful to Ghormley's career that Nimitz visited Guadalca.n.a.l before Ghormley himself did. Gracious and subtle as ever, CINCPAC calmly told Ghormley something that might have been tinged with h.e.l.lfire coming from a different commander: "I want you to go up and see conditions for yourself."

At their second meeting, Nimitz learned that Ghormley had not responded to a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a schedule of planned offensive operations up the Solomons toward Rabaul. Ghormley said he had not responded because "I feel that our present operations have not yet reached a point where such a plan and schedule would be worthwhile."

Ghormley's failure to propose the requested schedule of future operations was a command failure of a high order. Nimitz was suspicious of commanders who found reasons to stay out of harm's way. Typically he kept his judgments of people to himself, but after two months of fighting and no victories to show, he was in a mood for accountability. He instructed Ghormley to include in his final report on the Battle of Savo Island his view as to the responsibility for the results that night. "Such a blow cannot be pa.s.sed over, and we owe it to the country to do our best to fix the responsibility for that disaster, and to take the action necessary to prevent a recurrence," Nimitz said.

Back at Pearl Harbor, Nimitz would give a New York Times New York Times reporter a sunny a.s.sessment of his trip. He professed himself "satisfied in every way with what I saw." His other remarks, artfully innocuous, sent a warning shot over his South Pacific commander's bow. Nimitz told Trumbull, "It was just the kind of trip you would expect a senior officer to take from time to time to see what's going on." reporter a sunny a.s.sessment of his trip. He professed himself "satisfied in every way with what I saw." His other remarks, artfully innocuous, sent a warning shot over his South Pacific commander's bow. Nimitz told Trumbull, "It was just the kind of trip you would expect a senior officer to take from time to time to see what's going on."

Late one evening on Guadalca.n.a.l, Nimitz had said to General Vandegrift over a drink, "When this war is over we are going to write a new set of Navy regulations. So just keep it in the back of your mind because I will want to know some of the things you think ought to be changed."

"I know one right now," the marine said. "Leave out all reference that he who runs his ship aground will face a fate worse than death. Out here too many commanders have been far too leery about risking their ships."

Nimitz said nothing but smiled, perhaps recalling his tenure in command of the Decatur Decatur and of the court-martial charges that he had so audaciously defeated. Somehow that spirit had to be made to prevail here and now. There was little doubt that he meant to send his friend Bob Ghormley a message: Know your theater, know your command, then find those aggressive captains, the fighters, who would win the day. and of the court-martial charges that he had so audaciously defeated. Somehow that spirit had to be made to prevail here and now. There was little doubt that he meant to send his friend Bob Ghormley a message: Know your theater, know your command, then find those aggressive captains, the fighters, who would win the day.

Off Ta.s.safaronga and Cape Esperance, night after night, Imperial Navy cruisers and destroyers landed troops and supplies with scant interference. Between the end of September and the first week of October, Admiral Mikawa made eight runs after dark with fast destroyer-transports, delivering virtually without incident ten thousand troops of the Imperial Army 2nd Division, a veteran unit that had won infamy for its work during the murderous occupation of Nanking.

To Norman Scott and his cruiser captains-Gilbert Hoover in the Helena, Helena, Mike Moran in the Mike Moran in the Boise, Boise, Charles H. McMorris in the Charles H. McMorris in the San Francisco, San Francisco, Ernest G. Small in the Ernest G. Small in the Salt Lake City, Salt Lake City, and soon enough many others-a terrible burden was about to be pa.s.sed. They would confront the j.a.panese at night and try to reverse their momentum after dark. and soon enough many others-a terrible burden was about to be pa.s.sed. They would confront the j.a.panese at night and try to reverse their momentum after dark.

Probably encouraged by Nimitz, Ghormley ordered Scott on October 5 to "HAVE STRIKING FORCE OPERATE IN POSITION OF READINESS TO ATTACK ENEMY VESSELS LANDING REINFORCEMENTS AT CACTUS." Scott was the author of a new night battle plan that attempted to apply the lessons of the previous months. Flying his flag in the San Francisco, San Francisco, he accompanied the escort carrier he accompanied the escort carrier Copahee Copahee within range of Guadalca.n.a.l and stood by on the sixth as air reinforcements flew off to Henderson Field. Then he joined the within range of Guadalca.n.a.l and stood by on the sixth as air reinforcements flew off to Henderson Field. Then he joined the Salt Lake City, Salt Lake City, the the Helena, Helena, the the Boise, Boise, and five destroyers east of Rennell Island and prepared to seize his opportunity. and five destroyers east of Rennell Island and prepared to seize his opportunity.

16.

Night of a New Moon WITH GHORMLEY'S BATTLE ORDER IN HAND, NORMAN SCOTT WASTED no time departing Espiritu Santo. Task Force 64 arrived south of Rennell Island on October 9. There he ran them through a series of intramural scrimmages, pitting his cruisers against one another in offset gunnery exercises. That same day, two transports, the no time departing Espiritu Santo. Task Force 64 arrived south of Rennell Island on October 9. There he ran them through a series of intramural scrimmages, pitting his cruisers against one another in offset gunnery exercises. That same day, two transports, the Zeilin Zeilin and and McCawley, McCawley, departed Noumea carrying a regiment from the U.S. Army's New Caledoniabased "Americal" Division-the 164th Infantry with 2,837 men under Colonel Bryant E. Moore-as well as 210 ground crewmen from the 1st Marine Air Wing, eighty-one jeeps and trucks, heavy guns, and forty-two hundred tons of supplies and cargo. Scott's cruiser force joined them at sea for the journey to Guadalca.n.a.l. departed Noumea carrying a regiment from the U.S. Army's New Caledoniabased "Americal" Division-the 164th Infantry with 2,837 men under Colonel Bryant E. Moore-as well as 210 ground crewmen from the 1st Marine Air Wing, eighty-one jeeps and trucks, heavy guns, and forty-two hundred tons of supplies and cargo. Scott's cruiser force joined them at sea for the journey to Guadalca.n.a.l.

Scott had chosen as his flagship the heavy cruiser San Francisco, San Francisco, commanded by Captain Charles H. McMorris. As one of two such ships in Task Force 64, she was a traditional if not an ideal choice from which to command this particular battle force. Even among the heavy cruisers, she was a black sheep. After she performed poorly in gunnery exercises off Hawaii early in the year, the commanded by Captain Charles H. McMorris. As one of two such ships in Task Force 64, she was a traditional if not an ideal choice from which to command this particular battle force. Even among the heavy cruisers, she was a black sheep. After she performed poorly in gunnery exercises off Hawaii early in the year, the San Francisco San Francisco found herself a.s.signed to escort convoys rather than sailing with a combat task force. To equip her for an escort role, the shipfitters at Pearl had fastened to her fantail a depth charge rack. This hardware, customarily found on a destroyer, was of dubious value in a heavy cruiser, insofar as those ships had no sonar equipment with which to locate submarines. Cruisers were meant to fight surface actions, in which depth charges were decidedly unhelpful things to have aboard. The unusual fitting was a shameful "scarlet letter" that brought derision from other cruiser sailors. found herself a.s.signed to escort convoys rather than sailing with a combat task force. To equip her for an escort role, the shipfitters at Pearl had fastened to her fantail a depth charge rack. This hardware, customarily found on a destroyer, was of dubious value in a heavy cruiser, insofar as those ships had no sonar equipment with which to locate submarines. Cruisers were meant to fight surface actions, in which depth charges were decidedly unhelpful things to have aboard. The unusual fitting was a shameful "scarlet letter" that brought derision from other cruiser sailors.

Though the twelve-thousand-ton heavy cruisers San Francisco San Francisco and and Salt Lake City Salt Lake City were the largest and most heavily armed ships in Scott's force, as well as the two highest-rated cruisers in the fleet in terms of the efficiency of their overall engineering performance, they were not necessarily the most technologically capable or most powerful in combat. That honor belonged to his light cruisers, the were the largest and most heavily armed ships in Scott's force, as well as the two highest-rated cruisers in the fleet in terms of the efficiency of their overall engineering performance, they were not necessarily the most technologically capable or most powerful in combat. That honor belonged to his light cruisers, the Helena Helena and the and the Boise, Boise, which were equipped with fast-firing six-inch main batteries and the new microwave-frequency SG surface-search radar, far superior to the SC sets carried by most heavy cruisers. But radar was a newfangled complexity. Almost all admirals of the World War II era were more comfortable with mechanical-optical fire control, based on direct observation and visual adjustment. This and other factors, including considerations of onboard living s.p.a.ce for an admiral's staff, recommended the heavy cruisers as flagships. which were equipped with fast-firing six-inch main batteries and the new microwave-frequency SG surface-search radar, far superior to the SC sets carried by most heavy cruisers. But radar was a newfangled complexity. Almost all admirals of the World War II era were more comfortable with mechanical-optical fire control, based on direct observation and visual adjustment. This and other factors, including considerations of onboard living s.p.a.ce for an admiral's staff, recommended the heavy cruisers as flagships.

As October settled in, quickening radio traffic continued to suggest a surge in enemy naval activity in the northern Solomons. Admiral Ghormley queried MacArthur and Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, who on September 21 had replaced Rear Admiral John S. McCain as commander of SOPAC's land-based air forces,1 whether their search pilots had seen any of the "new-type heavy units" that he believed the j.a.panese were operating in the area. He mentioned sightings of an "extra large cruiser, whether their search pilots had seen any of the "new-type heavy units" that he believed the j.a.panese were operating in the area. He mentioned sightings of an "extra large cruiser, Mutsu Mutsu type," as well as some kind of a "mystery ship." Perhaps scorning his South Pacific commander's foggy notions of the j.a.panese Navy's generally familiar ship cla.s.ses, Nimitz replied dismissively: "No mystery ship known here." But as ever in war, the faster information flowed, the more the questions proliferated. type," as well as some kind of a "mystery ship." Perhaps scorning his South Pacific commander's foggy notions of the j.a.panese Navy's generally familiar ship cla.s.ses, Nimitz replied dismissively: "No mystery ship known here." But as ever in war, the faster information flowed, the more the questions proliferated.

On the morning of October 11, the sense of pending action was well apparent to anyone with access to a radio. In the Helena, Helena, encoded blocks of text dashed through the foremast antenna into Chick Morris's radio room, "a steady, chattering stream that kept the typewriters hopping," he wrote. There were reports of sightings, requests for information and clarification, questions from pilots on patrol. The latest was that a pair of j.a.panese cruisers and six destroyers were southbound from Rabaul. This report was rather innocuous on its face, and not entirely accurate. The j.a.panese force that was sighted, commanded by Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto, consisted of two separate groups. The cruiser force, which Goto personally commanded from his flagship, the encoded blocks of text dashed through the foremast antenna into Chick Morris's radio room, "a steady, chattering stream that kept the typewriters hopping," he wrote. There were reports of sightings, requests for information and clarification, questions from pilots on patrol. The latest was that a pair of j.a.panese cruisers and six destroyers were southbound from Rabaul. This report was rather innocuous on its face, and not entirely accurate. The j.a.panese force that was sighted, commanded by Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto, consisted of two separate groups. The cruiser force, which Goto personally commanded from his flagship, the Aoba, Aoba, actually included three heavy cruisers, the actually included three heavy cruisers, the Aoba, Furutaka, Aoba, Furutaka, and and Kinugasa, Kinugasa, and two destroyers and two destroyers. The Reinforcement Group, steaming separately, contained the fast seaplane tenders The Reinforcement Group, steaming separately, contained the fast seaplane tenders Nisshin Nisshin and and Chitose Chitose and five troop-carrying destroyers. and five troop-carrying destroyers.

Goto's cruisers were dispatched to bombard Henderson Field on the night of October 1112. The two tenders, meanwhile, were scheduled to anchor off Ta.s.safaronga and send ash.o.r.e heavy artillery, ammunition, and equipment as well as a battalion of troops. Powerful as Goto's combined group was, it was but the vanguard of a much larger force that Admiral Yamamoto was gathering at Truk, soon to flatten Henderson Field and destroy the U.S. Navy forces protecting them once and for all. Under the overall command of Vice Admiral n.o.butake Kondo, this force included all five of Yamamoto's carriers. A force that included the carriers Junyo Junyo and and Hiyo, Hiyo, with the battleships with the battleships Kongo Kongo and and Haruna Haruna and four heavy cruisers and the ten ships of Raizo Tanaka's Destroyer Squadron 2, sailed under Kondo's direct command. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's fast carrier striking force, with the and four heavy cruisers and the ten ships of Raizo Tanaka's Destroyer Squadron 2, sailed under Kondo's direct command. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's fast carrier striking force, with the Shokaku, Zuikaku, Shokaku, Zuikaku, and and Zuiho, Zuiho, steamed separately. Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe would command the rest of the combined task force's heavy surface forces: the battleships steamed separately. Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe would command the rest of the combined task force's heavy surface forces: the battleships Hiei Hiei and and Kirishima Kirishima and three heavy cruisers, escorted by fifteen destroyers. Sixteen submarines advanced in a skirmish line ahead of the surface task forces. and three heavy cruisers, escorted by fifteen destroyers. Sixteen submarines advanced in a skirmish line ahead of the surface task forces.

This tremendous gathering of naval power would unleash itself on Guadalca.n.a.l and its neighboring seas in coordination with an a.s.sault on Henderson Field by the 17th Army, tentatively set to step off on October 22. Yamamoto would await the Army's signal. Meanwhile, Goto's force would serve as the spearhead of the counteroffensive.

SCOTT PREPARED TO enter battle on the basis of partially correct and incomplete information. American search planes found the Reinforcement Group but mistook the tenders for cruisers-a near-perfect reversal of the error made by the New Zealand scout pilot back in August, who reported tenders or gunboats, thereby masking the ident.i.ty of cruisers. Now Goto's cruisers approached undetected, and behind the Reinforcement Group. The manner of approach suggested the j.a.panese had no fear of an American surface fleet. On October 11 and 12, attacks by the planes of the 11th Air Fleet would suppress Henderson Field and enable the tenders to reach Ta.s.safaronga, while the cruisers struck the airfield. enter battle on the basis of partially correct and incomplete information. American search planes found the Reinforcement Group but mistook the tenders for cruisers-a near-perfect reversal of the error made by the New Zealand scout pilot back in August, who reported tenders or gunboats, thereby masking the ident.i.ty of cruisers. Now Goto's cruisers approached undetected, and behind the Reinforcement Group. The manner of approach suggested the j.a.panese had no fear of an American surface fleet. On October 11 and 12, attacks by the planes of the 11th Air Fleet would suppress Henderson Field and enable the tenders to reach Ta.s.safaronga, while the cruisers struck the airfield.

In the San Francisco San Francisco's flag quarters, Scott studied the charts with his staff and did the math, figuring the approaches his enemy was most likely to use and planning his own countermoves backward from the point of optimum contact. His designation as "Commander, Night Screening and Attack Force," suggested the approach he would use in defending Savo Sound. There was nothing attack-oriented about Admiral Crutchley's approach back in August. Scott intended to choose the circ.u.mstances of first contact. He seemed to appreciate something a surviving officer of the Quincy Quincy wrote regarding the disaster of August 9-that "Battles can only be won by ships engaged in wrote regarding the disaster of August 9-that "Battles can only be won by ships engaged in offensive actions. offensive actions....In spite of the fact that we had numerically superior forces in the area, a bold attack by the enemy was partially successful. Doubtless a similar attack by our own forces on a j.a.panese stronghold would have been equally successful." In an evaluation released by Admiral King's headquarters, it was urged, "Surface ships should be employed as striking forces. So far the war in the Pacific has been featured by long-range carrier air duels. We have, however, suffered equal if not greater losses from submarine and surface ship attacks. We must use our surface ships more boldly as opportunity warrants." Scott saw the night patrol as a hunt. He would remain hidden, and set out to intercept when the moment was right, seeking the enemy. At a conference at Espiritu Santo, he discussed the new mission with his commanders and formulated the doctrine that would give them a chance to beat the j.a.panese at their own game.

Doctrine, simply put, is an agreed plan of action that clarifies who will do what, how, and when. Existing tactical instructions for combat commanders emphasized major actions between capital ships fought at long range. According to General Tactical Instructions, General Tactical Instructions, formulated in 1940, any firing that took place below seventeen thousand yards was considered "close range." The light forces that engaged at those close ranges had no standardized doctrine at the fleet level; squadron and division commanders had the responsibility to devise their own doctrine and battle plans. Norman Scott's plan for Task Force 64 on the eve of battle would go like this: On the night he planned a sortie, Scott would keep his nine ships south of Guadalca.n.a.l near Rennell Island, outside the range of enemy bombers, until about noon. He would begin his run after the open window to air attack had closed. Moving north during the midafternoon, with his cruisers' aviation divisions stripped to a single floatplane, he would accelerate to battle speed-twenty-five knots-when he was about 130 miles south of Savo Sound. As his task force made its five-hour sprint toward the battle zone north of Guadalca.n.a.l, friendly search planes would confirm the enemy's position by last light. Once the battle area was reached, he would form into a single column with the destroyers formulated in 1940, any firing that took place below seventeen thousand yards was considered "close range." The light forces that engaged at those close ranges had no standardized doctrine at the fleet level; squadron and division commanders had the responsibility to devise their own doctrine and battle plans. Norman Scott's plan for Task Force 64 on the eve of battle would go like this: On the night he planned a sortie, Scott would keep his nine ships south of Guadalca.n.a.l near Rennell Island, outside the range of enemy bombers, until about noon. He would begin his run after the open window to air attack had closed. Moving north during the midafternoon, with his cruisers' aviation divisions stripped to a single floatplane, he would accelerate to battle speed-twenty-five knots-when he was about 130 miles south of Savo Sound. As his task force made its five-hour sprint toward the battle zone north of Guadalca.n.a.l, friendly search planes would confirm the enemy's position by last light. Once the battle area was reached, he would form into a single column with the destroyers Farenholt, Duncan, Farenholt, Duncan, and and Laffey Laffey in the van, followed by the flagship in the van, followed by the flagship San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City, and and Helena, Helena, with the destroyers with the destroyers Buchanan Buchanan and and McCalla McCalla bringing up the rear. He would then launch his floatplane for tactical spotting leading up to the engagement. Radio silence on the talk-between-ships frequency would be broken only to report actual contacts. bringing up the rear. He would then launch his floatplane for tactical spotting leading up to the engagement. Radio silence on the talk-between-ships frequency would be broken only to report actual contacts.

If the timing worked out, Scott would intercept the Tokyo Express west of Savo in accordance with its faithfully kept delivery schedule. His destroyers would illuminate the enemy ships immediately upon radar contact and attempt a torpedo attack. His commanders would be free to open fire on first contact, without requesting his permission. Fire first and ask questions later Fire first and ask questions later would be the order of the day. His leading cruisers would close rapidly and fire at short range in continuous-fire rather than salvo mode. The two rear cruisers, the would be the order of the day. His leading cruisers would close rapidly and fire at short range in continuous-fire rather than salvo mode. The two rear cruisers, the Salt Lake City Salt Lake City and the and the Helena, Helena, and the rear destroyers would keep watch on the formation's disengaged side. A particular challenge for the leading destroyers would be to stay alert for course changes blinkered from the and the rear destroyers would keep watch on the formation's disengaged side. A particular challenge for the leading destroyers would be to stay alert for course changes blinkered from the San Francisco San Francis...o...b..hind them. Improvised maneuvers were likely to be frequent once the action started. behind them. Improvised maneuvers were likely to be frequent once the action started.

Unlike the Navy brain trust in the campaign's inaugural days, Scott based his doctrine not on sunny a.s.sumptions, but on grave possibilities. Whereas Kelly Turner and his commanders had once a.s.sumed the j.a.panese could not reach Savo Sound before morning on August 9, Scott set himself to face the worst. His plan was no stroke of brilliance, nor was it even American in origin-he was more than willing to learn from the success of his enemies. His approach resembled nothing quite so much as a defensively oriented version of the one that Admiral Mikawa had prevailed with two months earlier.

One thing Scott's tactical instructions didn't adequately clarify was how his destroyer captains would bring their torpedoes to bear. Torpedoes were the killing weapons of naval war, and much easier to aim than guns were. The art of gunnery, of firing projectiles at a moving target, entailed difficult calculations, including the problem of physically stabilizing guns on a rolling sea and the vagaries of three dimensions. Torpedo solutions were expressed in just two dimensions. If you knew your own torpedo's speed, it was a simple matter to trace the enemy's crossing angle and estimate the intersection point. "Any qualified watch officer accustomed to maneuvering a destroyer in formation can estimate the lead angle accurately enough to produce a collision course [for a torpedo]," an experienced destroyerman wrote. "At the short ranges of engagement being reported, a destroyer's hull length would cover almost any error in estimate." Aside from that oversight-Scott intended to rely on his guns-he had ably applied common sense, and the standard tactics for surface battle that every professional graduate of the Naval War College should have known well.

IN THE HELENA HELENA, as in all the ships of the SOPAC force, runners hustled decoded message traffic to Captain Hoover and his department heads. Three or four times an hour, Ensign Morris ran to Hoover's cabin behind the bridge with messages and battle plan dispatches from Scott. There was no doubting the pace of activity within the skipper's mind. His bulkheads were papered with charts of the southern Solomons area, marked in red where enemy submarines and ships had been reported. Whenever Hoover received a new dispatch, he studied it quietly then turned to his chart, tracing his finger over the track marking the progress of the j.a.panese ships. "The two lines on the chart were twin fuses, smoldering toward each other," Morris wrote. "When they met there would be an explosion." as in all the ships of the SOPAC force, runners hustled decoded message traffic to Captain Hoover and his department heads. Three or four times an hour, Ensign Morris ran to Hoover's cabin behind the bridge with messages and battle plan dispatches from Scott. There was no doubting the pace of activity within the skipper's mind. His bulkheads were papered with charts of the southern Solomons area, marked in red where enemy submarines and ships had been reported. Whenever Hoover received a new dispatch, he studied it quietly then turned to his chart, tracing his finger over the track marking the progress of the j.a.panese ships. "The two lines on the chart were twin fuses, smoldering toward each other," Morris wrote. "When they met there would be an explosion."

Despite that, Hoover "was without question the calmest man on the Helena, Helena," Morris continued. "It was, in fact, something more than simple calmness. On entering that cabin from the feverish bustle of the ship, you sensed a kind of loneliness. You felt the pressure of the responsibility upon the man who sat there hour after hour, thoughtfully planning the attack of his ship-our ship.... Her officers and men were already waging that battle within themselves, measuring their mettle, wondering how they would shape up in action." Hoover told Morris that he expected action that night and asked him to show the reports to all the Helena Helena's department heads.

Commander Rodman Smith, Hoover's gunnery officer, was tall and husky and not given to pleasantries: "as grim as his guns." When Morris found him he was poring over gunnery charts, ordnance data, and hundreds of other technical matters that determine a ship's ability to land salvos on target. When the ensign handed him the dispatch board, Smith initialed it without comment and gave it to his a.s.sistant, Warren Boles.

"Captain seem to be worried?" Lieutenant Boles asked.

"Not a bit," Morris said.

"Are we going in?"

"He says it looks like it."

"I hope so. The men need something to shoot at."

The prospect of a small steel-enclosed world crashing in around a man has a useful way of concentrating the mind. Men whose stations were in belowdecks compartments, situated below the waterline and sealed in at battle stations by watertight doors, were keenly aware that they already lay in their tombs should a torpedo hit. On untested ships especially, people tended to fidget. The Helena Helena had a fire controlman named Samuel Maslo who reliably predicted the worst. Whenever talk of intercepting the Tokyo Express came up, which was always, he would say things like, "We'll catch it sure. They got twenty ships to our one. They'll murder us." They called him "Sobbin' Sam the Fire Control Man." Fretting like that was easy to laugh off, but the echoes tended to linger. Still, one learned through the strenuous pace of shipboard life not to dwell on remote possibilities. Nimitz had found that confidence grew and pessimism waned the closer one got to the combat front. had a fire controlman named Samuel Maslo who reliably predicted the worst. Whenever talk of intercepting the Tokyo Express came up, which was always, he would say things like, "We'll catch it sure. They got twenty ships to our one. They'll murder us." They called him "Sobbin' Sam the Fire Control Man." Fretting like that was easy to laugh off, but the echoes tended to linger. Still, one learned through the strenuous pace of shipboard life not to dwell on remote possibilities. Nimitz had found that confidence grew and pessimism waned the closer one got to the combat front.

To sailors and officers whose knowledge of war had come in school, as opposed to the crucible of the actual thing, there was comfort in numbers-and in the open air. On the Helena, Helena, Chick Morris and his fellow ensigns and j.g.'s (junior grades) made a habit of gathering on the forecastle. They called themselves the Junior Board of Strategy. Until sunset left them sitting in darkness, they studied the flag hoists by which Admiral Scott sent messages to the squadron, then discussed and a.n.a.lyzed the implications. On the moonlit nights, beautiful to a layman's eye but fraught with danger for sailors in a war zone, the creamy light was bright enough to play cards by. But it was another kind of contest that held their imaginations captive. Chick Morris and his fellow ensigns and j.g.'s (junior grades) made a habit of gathering on the forecastle. They called themselves the Junior Board of Strategy. Until sunset left them sitting in darkness, they studied the flag hoists by which Admiral Scott sent messages to the squadron, then discussed and a.n.a.lyzed the implications. On the moonlit nights, beautiful to a layman's eye but fraught with danger for sailors in a war zone, the creamy light was bright enough to play cards by. But it was another kind of contest that held their imaginations captive.

What would it feel like when it finally came? "The j.a.ps would strike-they had to strike-but when?" Chick Morris wondered. "The ship's officers talked of nothing else." The young could be forgiven their nerves. Experienced officers would be given less lat.i.tude to indulge themselves.

Morris never forgot the otherworldly serenity of the tropical evening of October 11 as the Junior Board of Strategy stood in session, watching the San Francisco San Francisco's flag hoists raise the orders for the night. "We were moving west, straight into the sun," he wrote, "the air so clear and still that the whole visible world seemed splashed with sunset colors. It was good to stand there and watch the ships of our formation steaming through that placid sea. And I was not alone. Other men were thinking the same thoughts. Some were sitting around anchor windla.s.ses. Others were parked on the bitts, quietly 'batting the breeze.' One man was asleep on the steel deck, and another, nearby, was deep in a magazine of Western stories."

With the four cruisers in column and five destroyers arrayed in an anti-submarine screen ahead, the formation covered nearly three miles of ocean. The men in the task force stood in the place that separates the boundless tedium of being under way from the freeze-frame intensity of action. The physical magnitude of what was coming was beyond the ken of everyone except the crew who operated the SG search radar's graphical scope. The Boise Boise's rangekeeper operator swept his parabolic transmitter through a continuous 360-degree arc, generating a map-like visual display on the PPI repeaters and distinguishing ship from sh.o.r.e so sharply as to reveal inaccuracies in the ancient charts. The search radar scanned for targets. When they were found, the narrower beams of the ship's fire-control radars would zero in. The fire-control radars could also be used for search. Moran's FD operators probed for targets through a quarter-circle arc pointed east. Not fully trusting radar, Scott had ordered his commanders to refrain from using their older SC sets during the run-in, lest their transmissions be detected by the enemy much as the beam of a lighthouse could be seen from beyond its effective range. A man's eyes could reach only from the churning wake of the ship ahead to the flaring bow wave of the one behind. Everyone in the force, from the admiral down to the loaders on the powder hoists, had his senses heightened by his ignorance.

In the Boise, Boise, some turret crewmen breathed a soft chant over the battle telephones: some turret crewmen breathed a soft chant over the battle telephones: Pa.s.s the word from gun to gun: This won't be a dummy run. Pa.s.s the word from gun to gun: This won't be a dummy run. Captain Moran's ship had compiled a far-flung war record. Fresh from an audacious solo raid on j.a.panese shipping in their home waters, conceived as a diversion to a.s.sist the Guadalca.n.a.l landings, "Iron Mike's" men redeemed what had been a frustrating deployment with the Asiatic Fleet in January. Off Timor, they had met the same fate the Captain Moran's ship had compiled a far-flung war record. Fresh from an audacious solo raid on j.a.panese shipping in their home waters, conceived as a diversion to a.s.sist the Guadalca.n.a.l landings, "Iron Mike's" men redeemed what had been a frustrating deployment with the Asiatic Fleet in January. Off Timor, they had met the same fate the South Dakota South Dakota did off Tongatabu-grounding on an unfortunately situated coral head. The did off Tongatabu-grounding on an unfortunately situated coral head. The Boise Boise's withdrawal from the Asiatic theater for stateside repair had earned her the nickname "the Reluctant Dragon." Having missed battle, Moran's gang were just like the others in Task Force 64: eager for a sc.r.a.p but awaiting the measure of their worth that only the actual thing can provide. No officer could have burned with antic.i.p.ation more than Norman Scott himself.

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Shortly after 6 p.m., the j.a.panese ships spotted by the patrol planes that morning were reported again, 110 miles north of Guadalca.n.a.l, heading down the Slot at twenty knots. Exactly what their mission was-bombardment or reinforcement-continued to be anybody's guess. The evening call to general quarters was pre-climactic. Hours would pa.s.s with Scott's crews in that ready state, and the heavily fraught tedium mounted. "There was little to do," Chick Morris said. "Our search planes had returned to their bases and had nothing more for us." Despite Scott's order to muzzle the search radars, the Salt Lake City Salt Lake City began radiating with its SC unit as the projectilemen loaded star sh.e.l.ls into the fuze pots. began radiating with its SC unit as the projectilemen loaded star sh.e.l.ls into the fuze pots.

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Order of Battle-Battle of Cape Esperanc