Neptune's Inferno_ The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal Part 5

Nimitz and his staff read these words in bewilderment. Just four days earlier, Ghormley deemed his situation "critical." Now he was requesting "freedom of action" and professing not to see the direction of the j.a.panese thrust. Retiring his carriers-and with the Enterprise Enterprise ordered back to Pearl Harbor for repairs-he was promising to stand ready to defend a twenty-five-hundred-mile front, and a.s.suring high command that the threadbare Cactus Air Force-which by Ghormley's own count at month's end had just eight fighters capable of intercepting j.a.panese bombers and which was struggling to fend off destroyers, much less the entire Combined Fleet-could hold off Nagumo's still-potent carrier force. In London he had learned, following British operations off Norway and in the Mediterranean, that "surface craft, unless heavily protected by fighters, cannot stand up against sh.o.r.e based aircraft." But now he was expecting far more than the gallant fliers and ground crews of Henderson Field could deliver. ordered back to Pearl Harbor for repairs-he was promising to stand ready to defend a twenty-five-hundred-mile front, and a.s.suring high command that the threadbare Cactus Air Force-which by Ghormley's own count at month's end had just eight fighters capable of intercepting j.a.panese bombers and which was struggling to fend off destroyers, much less the entire Combined Fleet-could hold off Nagumo's still-potent carrier force. In London he had learned, following British operations off Norway and in the Mediterranean, that "surface craft, unless heavily protected by fighters, cannot stand up against sh.o.r.e based aircraft." But now he was expecting far more than the gallant fliers and ground crews of Henderson Field could deliver.

As it happened, the j.a.panese had newly settled on the thrust of their "main effort." With their traditional invasion convoys unable to land by day in the face of American air attacks, and too slow to sneak in and out by night, Yamamoto abandoned sending reinforcements via troopships altogether. As his chief of staff, Admiral Ugaki, wrote, "It is apparent that landing on Guadalca.n.a.l by transports is hopeless unless the enemy planes are wiped out." A new way to bring troops to the embattled island would have to be found. Raizo Tanaka would be asked to repeat his exploit delivering the Ichiki detachment again and again, using not slow transports but swift destroyers and other fast combatants to carry the j.a.panese Army south.

Several days before the j.a.panese reinforcements began running, Ghormley wrote MacArthur to state his preferences as to the types of ships he wanted the Southwest Pacific Command's pilots to strike. Ghormley reckoned that the "greatest immediate threat to success" came from the j.a.panese surface fleet, and that the highest-priority targets should be aircraft carriers and troop transports. Destroyers were last on his list. Ghormley was not alone in underrating the value of enemy destroyers. That he expressed the thought so clearly on the very day the j.a.panese settled on them as their princ.i.p.al means of carrying arms and men to Guadalca.n.a.l was no small irony.

On the evening of August 28, seven j.a.panese destroyers approached the island. Sallying within range of Henderson, their vanguard was greeted brutally by the Cactus Air Force's dive-bombers, who exacted a steep price: the Asagiri Asagiri sunk, the sunk, the Shiratsuyu Shiratsuyu rendered unnavigable, and the rendered unnavigable, and the Yugiri Yugiri badly damaged with her commander mortally wounded. It was a remarkable performance against the small, difficult-to-hit ships. The rest of the j.a.panese flotilla turned back after the grim news was reported. A "perfect failure," Ugaki called it. But in the week that followed, bad weather prevented the boys from Cactus from blocking the Tokyo Express. Stubbornly maintaining his pace of nightly runs from Rabaul, Tanaka finally landed the last of Ichiki's and Kawaguchi's forces-more than five thousand men. Through piecemeal a.s.sembly, the j.a.panese had at last marshaled enough men to undertake their first general counteroffensive on Guadalca.n.a.l. badly damaged with her commander mortally wounded. It was a remarkable performance against the small, difficult-to-hit ships. The rest of the j.a.panese flotilla turned back after the grim news was reported. A "perfect failure," Ugaki called it. But in the week that followed, bad weather prevented the boys from Cactus from blocking the Tokyo Express. Stubbornly maintaining his pace of nightly runs from Rabaul, Tanaka finally landed the last of Ichiki's and Kawaguchi's forces-more than five thousand men. Through piecemeal a.s.sembly, the j.a.panese had at last marshaled enough men to undertake their first general counteroffensive on Guadalca.n.a.l.

Yamamoto now resolved officially to make Guadalca.n.a.l, not New Guinea, the "princ.i.p.al operational zone of the Southeast Area" and postponed the drive to capture Port Moresby. On Guadalca.n.a.l, General Kawaguchi's troops had gathered and, fading into the jungle near Lunga, began planning a renewed a.s.sault on Vandegrift's perimeter.

On August 29, as the bomb-damaged Enterprise Enterprise steamed toward Pearl Harbor, Admiral Ghormley ordered his remaining carriers, the steamed toward Pearl Harbor, Admiral Ghormley ordered his remaining carriers, the Wasp Wasp and the and the Saratoga, Saratoga, to take turns reprovisioning at Tongatabu. Until the j.a.panese fleet made another appearance, the carriers would remain on station in their usual position, 220 miles southeast of Guadalca.n.a.l, flying their planes in protection of convoys traveling from Espiritu Santo to Guadalca.n.a.l. A third carrier, the to take turns reprovisioning at Tongatabu. Until the j.a.panese fleet made another appearance, the carriers would remain on station in their usual position, 220 miles southeast of Guadalca.n.a.l, flying their planes in protection of convoys traveling from Espiritu Santo to Guadalca.n.a.l. A third carrier, the Hornet, Hornet, was under way south from Pearl Harbor. was under way south from Pearl Harbor.

Because of the submarine threat, the carrier task force made a practice of steaming at just thirteen knots in order to optimize the efficiency of the sonar gear on their escorting destroyers. But that slow speed increased the ability of submarines to intercept and target them in the first place. On the morning of August 31, Commander Minoru Yokota, captain of the submarine I-26, I-26, stalked the stalked the Saratoga Saratoga east of San Cristobal. When he chose his moment to attack, he closed so aggressively that his periscope scratched the hull of a destroyer in the U.S. screen. The Americans spotted his incoming torpedo wakes, but too late to evade. Shortly before 7 a.m., the carrier shook "like a house in a severe earthquake" as a torpedo struck her. The shock wave whiplashed the hull from below the sea to the flag bridge, tossing Admiral Fletcher up into the overhead and inflicting a forehead wound that would make him-much to his embarra.s.sment-the highest-ranking U.S. naval officer to date to receive the Purple Heart. The blast tripped circuit breakers in the east of San Cristobal. When he chose his moment to attack, he closed so aggressively that his periscope scratched the hull of a destroyer in the U.S. screen. The Americans spotted his incoming torpedo wakes, but too late to evade. Shortly before 7 a.m., the carrier shook "like a house in a severe earthquake" as a torpedo struck her. The shock wave whiplashed the hull from below the sea to the flag bridge, tossing Admiral Fletcher up into the overhead and inflicting a forehead wound that would make him-much to his embarra.s.sment-the highest-ranking U.S. naval officer to date to receive the Purple Heart. The blast tripped circuit breakers in the Saratoga Saratoga's turboelectric drive system, leaving her dead in the water.

The Saratoga Saratoga was an exceptionally stout ship, built originally as a battle cruiser and converted after the conclusion of naval treaties. Her engineers righted the starboard list by transferring fuel between tanks. Then the cruiser was an exceptionally stout ship, built originally as a battle cruiser and converted after the conclusion of naval treaties. Her engineers righted the starboard list by transferring fuel between tanks. Then the cruiser Minneapolis Minneapolis took her in tow, gingerly bringing her along at seven knots. With a stiff headwind, Captain Dewitt C. Ramsey's flight crews were able to perform the remarkable feat of conducting flight operations while under tow. Twenty-nine of took her in tow, gingerly bringing her along at seven knots. With a stiff headwind, Captain Dewitt C. Ramsey's flight crews were able to perform the remarkable feat of conducting flight operations while under tow. Twenty-nine of Sara Sara's strike aircraft got off the deck and flew to Espiritu Santo while their ship was in this infirm condition.

The waters southeast of Guadalca.n.a.l would earn the bitter nickname "Torpedo Junction." Whenever the sound of gunfire or the ba.s.so thudding of depth charges were heard, someone would inevitably remark, "Sounds like there's a function at the junction." With the Saratoga Saratoga out of action for three months, Fletcher could no longer survive Ernest King's acid mistrust. Fletcher's caution paid no dividends now that his carriers' favorite haunts, outside range of enemy air attack, were infested with submarines. His reward was a recall to Pearl Harbor in his damaged flagship and, before the year was out, to have his career as a carrier task force commander terminated by the COMINCH. When Leigh Noyes a.s.sumed command of Task Force 61, the U.S. Marine Corps no longer had Frank Jack Fletcher, the victor at Midway, to kick around anymore. out of action for three months, Fletcher could no longer survive Ernest King's acid mistrust. Fletcher's caution paid no dividends now that his carriers' favorite haunts, outside range of enemy air attack, were infested with submarines. His reward was a recall to Pearl Harbor in his damaged flagship and, before the year was out, to have his career as a carrier task force commander terminated by the COMINCH. When Leigh Noyes a.s.sumed command of Task Force 61, the U.S. Marine Corps no longer had Frank Jack Fletcher, the victor at Midway, to kick around anymore.

But they got plenty more planes. After the Saratoga Saratoga's disabling, her valuable air group, like that of the Enterprise, Enterprise, found temporary homes-on the found temporary homes-on the Wasp, Wasp, on Espiritu Santo, and on Guadalca.n.a.l as well. A Marine general with a keen sense of the absurd was said to remark, "What saved Guadalca.n.a.l was the loss of so many carriers." on Espiritu Santo, and on Guadalca.n.a.l as well. A Marine general with a keen sense of the absurd was said to remark, "What saved Guadalca.n.a.l was the loss of so many carriers."

12.

What They Were Built For IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, THE MOMENTUM OF ATTACK AND DEFENSE would swing daily, diurnally, as the Americans commanded the skies and seas by day, and the j.a.panese regained them by night. Neither side could effectively fight on the other's terms. Whipped by Mikawa at Savo Island, the warriors of the U.S. Navy's surface force would continue to spend much of the month screening carrier task forces or escorting convoys, not roaming the seas as the predators they were meant to be. "It seemed we were on the fringe of battle for months," Richard Hale of the destroyer would swing daily, diurnally, as the Americans commanded the skies and seas by day, and the j.a.panese regained them by night. Neither side could effectively fight on the other's terms. Whipped by Mikawa at Savo Island, the warriors of the U.S. Navy's surface force would continue to spend much of the month screening carrier task forces or escorting convoys, not roaming the seas as the predators they were meant to be. "It seemed we were on the fringe of battle for months," Richard Hale of the destroyer Laffey Laffey said. "I felt uneasy knowing the real war was only five hundred miles north of us in the Solomons, and we could have run up there in a day's steaming." said. "I felt uneasy knowing the real war was only five hundred miles north of us in the Solomons, and we could have run up there in a day's steaming."

Ten days before the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, a plan circulated briefly, never to be executed, providing for the creation of a "surface attack group" under Fletcher's cruiser boss, Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright, drawing the battleship North Carolina, North Carolina, the heavy cruisers the heavy cruisers Minneapolis, San Francisco, New Orleans, Portland, Minneapolis, San Francisco, New Orleans, Portland, and and Salt Lake City, Salt Lake City, the the Atlanta, Atlanta, and four destroyers into a single fighting force should the j.a.panese fleet come within gun range. Those ships were finally reckoned too valuable to spare in missions other than antiaircraft defense. and four destroyers into a single fighting force should the j.a.panese fleet come within gun range. Those ships were finally reckoned too valuable to spare in missions other than antiaircraft defense.

The cruiser and destroyermen circling with the task force relished the idea that the surface Navy might one day rea.s.sert itself in its traditional role. j.a.panese destroyers ferrying supplies and men to Guadalca.n.a.l disgorged their cargoes mostly unopposed, took potshots at Henderson Field with their main batteries, and headed home. Much as the j.a.panese 17th Army's senior leadership hated traveling light, without the heavy weapons and equipment that a transport could have accommodated, but not a destroyer, the activity of the fleet emboldened j.a.panese artillery crews and mortarmen hidden in the surrounding hills. Their sporadic barrages, along with nightly visits by aircraft that dropped small bombs haphazardly around the island's northern plain, were a malicious nuisance that kept the marines sleepless.

The princ.i.p.al reason Admiral Yamamoto was hesitating to mount a general attack on the island was his respect for U.S. airpower. Henderson Field was an unsinkable aircraft carrier, host to an interservice brotherhood of aviators whose bonds were strengthening under the test of fire and loss. With the arrival of more Navy pilots and planes, including twenty-four well-seasoned Wildcat jockeys from the Saratoga, Saratoga, the shoestring holding together the American position on Guadalca.n.a.l was cinched a little tighter in early September. the shoestring holding together the American position on Guadalca.n.a.l was cinched a little tighter in early September.

j.a.panese pilots had their own shoestrings to worry about. When the 8th Fleet chief of staff, Toshikazu Ohmae, arrived at Rabaul from Truk in late August, he was appalled by what he saw as a lackadaisical approach to harbor defense, and the evident vulnerability of the whole place. The stronghold at New Britain had just nineteen fighters, twenty-nine medium bombers, and four flying boats at the time. With the Cactus Air Force getting stronger on its feet every day, Imperial pilots suffered worse for the geographic disadvantage. Taking off at first light so that they could strike and return before sunset, at the edge of their fuel envelope, they were bound to a schedule that put them over their target during the same midday window and from the same northwesterly bearing. With forewarning by coast.w.a.tchers, Cactus Air Force Wildcat pilots usually had the forty minutes they needed to scramble and reach interception alt.i.tude before the enemy planes arrived. Battling close to their base, with fuel tanks full, they had the flexibility to engage, maneuver, and fight that the j.a.panese lacked. Though many Zero pilots were no novices in long-range missions-the December 8 raid against MacArthur's airfields on Luzon, launched from Formosa, was a fine example-sustaining daily operations indefinitely over great distances was a steep challenge.

Because the j.a.panese kept their ships clear of the outer reach of U.S. search planes until late afternoon, Mangrum's dive-bomber pilots seldom could hit them before dark, even when the weather cooperated. The Marine aviators did their best after nightfall, depending on the elevation of the moon, the position of the clouds, and the light cast by stars. But there were only four or five days a month when the lunar phase permitted nighttime attacks. Bad weather reduced that number. Even by day, dive-bombers could not reliably hit the agile thirty-four-knot j.a.panese destroyers steered by Tanaka's veteran shiphandlers. Their skill was impressive. They seemed to know well Guadalca.n.a.l's northern coast, where they usually landed their men and supplies. Despite the hazards of night navigation, the Cactus Air Force's dawn patrols never found them grounded or struggling in the shallows. "They come right up to the beach...and get them right out. They don't lose any time," said Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Fike, the exec of Marine Air Group 23. "Certainly the means we had at our disposal were not enough. Control of channels of supply there were always in dispute, and the j.a.panese were more often in control of them than our own Navy. Under those circ.u.mstances, we were reluctant to build up the force on Guadalca.n.a.l because of the possibility that we wouldn't be able to meet the supply requirements."

The rising strength of the Guadalca.n.a.l-based aviators taxed the morale of the IJN, too. On the night of August 29, one of Tanaka's captains refused a direct order to take his four destroyers and attack an inbound American convoy. On a clear night with a full moon, Captain Yonosuke Murakami explained, U.S. planes would have a clear shot at his ships. Tanaka found the explanation "so dumbfounding...that I could not even think of words to reprove him. Blame attached to me, of course, for having such a man in my command." The next day, physically exhausted and in a fury about the continuing resistance of 17th Army officers to using destroyers for transport, Tanaka found himself done in by his rival service branch. He was relieved of command of the Reinforcement Unit and returned to Truk to rejoin the 2nd Fleet as a destroyer squadron commander.

But Major Mangrum grasped airpower's limits. "It was difficult for us to understand, while sitting in a foxhole, without adequate surface [ship] support, that we could be expected to maintain the peace and quiet of Guadalca.n.a.l," he said. Nimitz was pressing King for more aircraft of any and all types. Late on the night of September 1, from his headquarters at Pearl, he implored his superior, "Let's give Cactus the wherewithal to live up to its name. Something for the j.a.ps to remember forever." But two legs of the airlandsea tripod weren't going to get the job done, no matter how stout they were. As Nimitz was beseeching King for more hardware, Vandegrift weighed in with Admiral Turner, copying Ghormley, on what it would take to hold the island.

"Appears enemy is building up striking force by continuous small landings during darkness," Vandegrift wrote. "Due to difficult terrain areas are beyond range of land operations except at expense of weakened defenses of airfield. We do not have a balanced force and it is imperative that following measures be taken: A. A. Base planes here capable of searching beyond steaming range during darkness. Base planes here capable of searching beyond steaming range during darkness. B. B. Provide surface craft DD's or motor torpedo boats for night patrolling. Provide surface craft DD's or motor torpedo boats for night patrolling. C. C. Provide striking force for active defense by transferring 7th Marines to Cactus. If not prevented by surface craft enemy can continue night landings beyond our range of action and build up large force." In other words, the Marines needed the Navy. Provide striking force for active defense by transferring 7th Marines to Cactus. If not prevented by surface craft enemy can continue night landings beyond our range of action and build up large force." In other words, the Marines needed the Navy.

On September 3, Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, Fletcher's replacement as carrier commander, proposed that the cruisers and destroyers of the disbanded Saratoga Saratoga group be used much as Vandegrift had suggested-to add muscle to the surface Navy in direct support of the Marines. A few days later, Ghormley revamped the task force a.s.signments to provide for a separate "surface screening and attack force" of cruisers and destroyers, known as Task Force 64. It was a humble flotilla, far less powerful than the group be used much as Vandegrift had suggested-to add muscle to the surface Navy in direct support of the Marines. A few days later, Ghormley revamped the task force a.s.signments to provide for a separate "surface screening and attack force" of cruisers and destroyers, known as Task Force 64. It was a humble flotilla, far less powerful than the North Carolina North Carolinaled force envisioned earlier. To be based at Espiritu Santo and placed under temporary command of Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright, the new surface attack force was made up of the heavy cruiser Minneapolis, Minneapolis, the light cruisers the light cruisers Boise Boise and and Leander, Leander, and four destroyers. Still, the unit's designation as Task Force 64 was an organizational signal that these ships had a vital mission and deserved stature on par with the carrier task forces (Task Force 61), Turner's amphibs (Task Force 62), and McCain's land-based air command (Task Force 63). and four destroyers. Still, the unit's designation as Task Force 64 was an organizational signal that these ships had a vital mission and deserved stature on par with the carrier task forces (Task Force 61), Turner's amphibs (Task Force 62), and McCain's land-based air command (Task Force 63).

No longer under a foreigner's flag, as Crutchley's cruiser screen had been, or linked by a decimal to the amphibious fleet, as Riefkohl's martyred Task Group 62.6 had been, Task Force 64 were their own warriors. Given nominally to the operational control of Kelly Turner, they had an essential mission that "leaves much to the initiative of Task Force Commanders," Ghormley wrote. "Keep in mind that there is no quicker means to ultimate victory than the sinking of enemy ships."

Only the ships of the surface fleet could hold safe the nighttime supply lanes and finally ensure American control of the island. Only surface ships, the mobile heavy armor of the seaways, could stop the Tokyo Express after dark and hold control of the seas. All that remained was for the Navy to find the will and the opportunity to send them into action again against the reigning masters of the old way of naval war.

Thus far in 1942, six of the seven Allied heavy cruisers that had ventured forth and fought j.a.panese surface ships muzzle-to-muzzle lay at rest beneath a blood-warm sea. The Vincennes, Vincennes, the the Quincy, Quincy, the the Astoria, Astoria, the HMAS the HMAS Canberra, Canberra, and, four months earlier and far from the Solomons, the and, four months earlier and far from the Solomons, the Houston Houston and the HMS and the HMS Exeter, Exeter, had all been overmatched and destroyed by their counterparts. All seven might have been lost had Howard Bode's had all been overmatched and destroyed by their counterparts. All seven might have been lost had Howard Bode's Chicago Chicago entered battle on the night of August 9. This record was doubtlessly on the minds of all the skippers of the fast, multi-role ships that the Navy had long a.s.sumed would prevail in any direct action with j.a.panese surface ships. In the cold trade of naval warfare, such preconceptions held no value. There was but a single axiom that counted (now confirmed and amended by Gunichi Mikawa): Victory flew with the first effective salvo, and a second and a third didn't hurt the cause either. entered battle on the night of August 9. This record was doubtlessly on the minds of all the skippers of the fast, multi-role ships that the Navy had long a.s.sumed would prevail in any direct action with j.a.panese surface ships. In the cold trade of naval warfare, such preconceptions held no value. There was but a single axiom that counted (now confirmed and amended by Gunichi Mikawa): Victory flew with the first effective salvo, and a second and a third didn't hurt the cause either.

Training courses in evolving disciplines such as fire control were under furious revision. Certain courses, for radarmen for instance, were being designed from scratch. All these changes, the growth of manpower and the evolution of doctrine, were aimed at one thing: knocking j.a.pan to the mat in what was shaping up to be an epic oceanic brawl. In the sweltering South Pacific, the hardware needed to do that was plowing relentlessly south, fresh from the proving grounds.

On the morning of September 6, the men of the light cruiser Atlanta, Atlanta, en route to Hawaii with the damaged en route to Hawaii with the damaged Saratoga, Saratoga, arrived at Tongatabu and beheld a heartening sight. Two powerful new ships were in the harbor, the battleship arrived at Tongatabu and beheld a heartening sight. Two powerful new ships were in the harbor, the battleship South Dakota South Dakota and the antiaircraft cruiser and the antiaircraft cruiser Juneau. Juneau. News came that the mighty News came that the mighty North Carolina North Carolina's sister ship, the Washington, Washington, was seven days out of the Panama Ca.n.a.l, due in the theater the following week. was seven days out of the Panama Ca.n.a.l, due in the theater the following week.

The coming of the powerful (and more fuel-efficient) fast battleships raised hopes at a time when naval planners were intensely aware that j.a.pan's great 69,000-ton Yamato Yamato and several of the heralded 36,600-ton and several of the heralded 36,600-ton Kongo Kongo-cla.s.s battleships were at Truk. No U.S. ship in the area could match them. "I cling to the fond hope that some one of our admirals, some day, will force the fight-will go after these b.a.s.t.a.r.ds at a time of our choosing, and with forces arrayed to our satisfaction, and will blow the b.l.o.o.d.y b.a.s.t.a.r.ds clean to h.e.l.l. And the North Carolina North Carolina and and Washington Washington are some of what it takes to do that job," Lloyd Mustin wrote. are some of what it takes to do that job," Lloyd Mustin wrote.

Lieutenant Commander Edwin B. Hooper, the alumnus of MIT's fire-control course and an a.s.sistant gunnery officer in the Washington, Washington, proclaimed the fast battleships "a tremendous step forward in technology, orders of magnitude over the old battleships, even with their modernization." The most dramatic improvement they offered over the older battleships was their high-frequency SG radar, the existence of which was still secret. The proclaimed the fast battleships "a tremendous step forward in technology, orders of magnitude over the old battleships, even with their modernization." The most dramatic improvement they offered over the older battleships was their high-frequency SG radar, the existence of which was still secret. The North Carolina North Carolina had had her new apparatus installed at sea instead of within view of prying eyes in the shipyard. The ship's Marine detachment stood armed guard over the newly equipped fire-control and plotting rooms. The had had her new apparatus installed at sea instead of within view of prying eyes in the shipyard. The ship's Marine detachment stood armed guard over the newly equipped fire-control and plotting rooms. The Atlanta Atlanta's sailors had hardly gotten the dope on the South Dakota South Dakota or greeted their counterparts on their sister ship, the or greeted their counterparts on their sister ship, the Juneau, Juneau, when the two newcomers were under way again. Then, oddly, just a few hours later they were returning to port. Misfortunate had struck the when the two newcomers were under way again. Then, oddly, just a few hours later they were returning to port. Misfortunate had struck the South Dakota. South Dakota. She had run aground on an uncharted coral head. She had run aground on an uncharted coral head.

Reputations form fast in the cloistered pa.s.sageways of the fleet. The South Dakota South Dakota was already known as a hard-luck ship. Some ascribed it to the state of South Dakota's failure to follow the tradition whereby states presented their namesake dreadnoughts with a handmade silver service. The governor didn't deliver, and the consequences were inevitable. During a shakedown run in the Chesapeake Bay, she went aground and lost electrical power. In speed trials off Cas...o...b..y, Maine, the was already known as a hard-luck ship. Some ascribed it to the state of South Dakota's failure to follow the tradition whereby states presented their namesake dreadnoughts with a handmade silver service. The governor didn't deliver, and the consequences were inevitable. During a shakedown run in the Chesapeake Bay, she went aground and lost electrical power. In speed trials off Cas...o...b..y, Maine, the South Dakota South Dakota collided dead center with a whale. Unable to slow down during the stringently prescribed test of the power plant, the ship ground the hapless mammal in half. Some of the chief petty officers said this heralded, somehow, good fortune. If good fortune was to be had, it belonged to Captain Thomas Gatch, for he might have been relieved of command on the spot had any of this made the papers. Now he had done it again, and his reward for putting an eighteen-inch-wide gash the full length of her underside was to be ordered back to Pearl for two weeks of repairs. It was a serious setback for the reconst.i.tution of SOPAC's surface striking force. collided dead center with a whale. Unable to slow down during the stringently prescribed test of the power plant, the ship ground the hapless mammal in half. Some of the chief petty officers said this heralded, somehow, good fortune. If good fortune was to be had, it belonged to Captain Thomas Gatch, for he might have been relieved of command on the spot had any of this made the papers. Now he had done it again, and his reward for putting an eighteen-inch-wide gash the full length of her underside was to be ordered back to Pearl for two weeks of repairs. It was a serious setback for the reconst.i.tution of SOPAC's surface striking force.

ON SEPTEMBER 7, Admiral Nimitz flew to San Francisco to meet with Admiral King and Secretary Forrestal at the St. Francis Hotel. On the agenda was a review of the state of the South Pacific command, partly occasioned by the defeat in the Battle of Savo Island. It would be more than a month yet before such matters became fodder for headline writers.

On that same day, on board his flagship Argonne Argonne at Noumea, Admiral Ghormley composed a letter to Nimitz that he knew he had no business writing. He was in the grip of an exhaustion that seemed to color everything. It might have been cabin fever; he hadn't left his flagship since his arrival on the first of August. He couldn't stop himself from unburdening himself. "I have to spill this to somebody," he wrote, "so I am afraid you will have to be the goat, but I hope you will burn this after it is read." at Noumea, Admiral Ghormley composed a letter to Nimitz that he knew he had no business writing. He was in the grip of an exhaustion that seemed to color everything. It might have been cabin fever; he hadn't left his flagship since his arrival on the first of August. He couldn't stop himself from unburdening himself. "I have to spill this to somebody," he wrote, "so I am afraid you will have to be the goat, but I hope you will burn this after it is read."

By the time this reaches you, Mr. Forrestal will have seen you. I think for the time he was here, he got an eyeful and an earful. Whether he can do anything about it, I don't know. Somebody said the last day or two, on the British first visit to Washington they burned it, on the second visit they occupied it. It looks so to me that we are doing their job all over the world and the Government is not backing us up down here with what we need, why, I don't know. I feel sure that you have the picture completely, but I am very surprised from one or two of King's dispatches, that I do not believe he appreciates it.

As between King and Ghormley, the doubts were mutual. King was growing skeptical about his SOPAC commander's fitness for command. King asked Nimitz whether Ghormley could stand up physically to the strain of South Pacific duty. Nimitz had no way to know. He knew his friend was a seadog, a strategist, a diplomat, and a gentleman. But he would soon wonder if he had the one thing that was needed most in the South Pacific in 1942: a fighter's heart.

"Our carrier situation at present is precarious," continued Ghormley's letter to Nimitz of September 7. "Some people are probably saying why don't I send surface forces in strength to Guadalca.n.a.l at night. The simple reason is, it is too dangerous to suffer possible loss under the present conditions where they have submarines, motor torpedo boats, surface forces and sh.o.r.e based aircraft to aid them in restricted waters."

The last sentence revealed that Ghormley didn't really understand what confronted his men in the combat theater. If j.a.pan's change in radio codes left Navy intelligence snoopers poorly apprised of movements, it should have been clear by the second week of September that j.a.panese motor torpedo boats were not a major threat in the Slot, nor did they fly land-based attack aircraft at night. As for the restricted waters, they were, of course, no less restricted for the j.a.panese than they were for the Americans, who enjoyed the significant advantage of defending those waters instead of attacking them. While the Navy's conservatism with its carriers was well justified, the same could not be said of the light forces. If the gunslingers of the fleet were too valuable to risk now, when would they be risked?

Ghormley was of mixed mind regarding the appropriate range of his command authority. He wrote Nimitz in that same letter, "A recent dispatch from Washington told me of several ships that had P-38's on board, but they have never given me authority to divert a ship. I do not want that authority, for in diverting a ship in order to get an airplane, I might divert the very ship that had the critical ammunition in the hold to tide over a tough situation in Australia." The pressures of command were clearly weighing on him. He had insufficient authority, but he was no longer sure he wanted more of it.

At the St. Francis, Nimitz acknowledged to King and Forrestal that the problems in the South Pacific were grave. While he was glad to have three battleships in his theater-the Washington, North Carolina, Washington, North Carolina, and and South Dakota South Dakota-they were poor replacements for the heavy cruisers lost at Savo because their ravenous appet.i.te for fuel limited their deployability. Nimitz didn't yet have enough tankers to keep them operating. Forrestal promised he would do what he could.

But the question of Ghormley's fitness for command was a far more perplexing problem. Nimitz knew then, faced with Ernest King's inquiry, that he had no other choice: He would hop on a Coronado patrol plane and fly to Noumea to see his old friend personally. He would order Ghormley to undergo a physical examination. Then he would let King know what he found.

Ghormley had long complained that Washington had little interest in or sympathy for his problems. What he didn't know was that Forrestal, based in part on impressions formed during his own recent trip to Noumea, was going powerfully to bat for him. Forrestal had visited hospitals where badly burned sailors from the Battle of Savo Island were still fighting for their lives. "What could I say in the face of such heroism and such suffering except to bow my head," Forrestal said. The Navy secretary would find tankers for Nimitz and urge Roosevelt to speed up reinforcements. He was so vocal in his entreaties on Ghormley's behalf that Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, by now occupied with planning the invasion of North Africa, thought Forrestal had been unduly influenced by his personal impressions. "Jim," Stimson said, "you've got a bad case of localitis." Forrestal replied without a lost beat: "Mr. Secretary, if the Marines on Guadalca.n.a.l were wiped out, the reaction of the country will give you a bad case of localitis in the seat of your pants."

Before adjourning at the St. Francis Hotel, the three leaders settled on a personnel move that would send electricity through the carrier fleet and beyond. It was agreed that Vice Admiral Halsey would return to Pearl Harbor with Nimitz and eventually take over his old billet as commander of the Enterprise Enterprise task force as soon as repairs to the battle-damaged carrier were complete in mid-October. task force as soon as repairs to the battle-damaged carrier were complete in mid-October.

Shortly after they returned to Pearl, Nimitz took Halsey to visit the Enterprise. Enterprise. On board the weathered and battle-worn ship, competing with the pneumatic and hydraulic clangor, Nimitz awarded decorations to the crew. Then he announced, "Boys, I've got a surprise for you. Bill Halsey's back!" There were cheers. Then he told them, "I know that you have been promised a rest and G.o.d knows that you deserve it, but you also know that we have lately suffered severe losses in ships and men. I have no recourse but to send you back into battle." That statement received a courteous silence, and they would have five more weeks to think about it. On board the weathered and battle-worn ship, competing with the pneumatic and hydraulic clangor, Nimitz awarded decorations to the crew. Then he announced, "Boys, I've got a surprise for you. Bill Halsey's back!" There were cheers. Then he told them, "I know that you have been promised a rest and G.o.d knows that you deserve it, but you also know that we have lately suffered severe losses in ships and men. I have no recourse but to send you back into battle." That statement received a courteous silence, and they would have five more weeks to think about it.

IN HINDSIGHT IT was unclear which of the opposing fleets was less prepared for the fight that lay ahead. As the American brain trust was conferring in San Francisco, Yamamoto held a series of conferences in the flag quarters of the was unclear which of the opposing fleets was less prepared for the fight that lay ahead. As the American brain trust was conferring in San Francisco, Yamamoto held a series of conferences in the flag quarters of the Yamato Yamato at Truk. According to Tameichi Hara, a destroyer captain who partic.i.p.ated in the meetings, his commander in chief's agenda was trivial next to other pressing issues. When would the world-beating Combined Fleet summon the will to gather, coordinate, and smash the upstart Americans? Where was the fuel going to come from that would enable the great Imperial battleship force to churn south? A culture of deference kept tough questions from being addressed. "Criticism of basic concepts in the Imperial Navy would have impugned the top-level admirals, and brought instant dismissal of the critic," Hara wrote. at Truk. According to Tameichi Hara, a destroyer captain who partic.i.p.ated in the meetings, his commander in chief's agenda was trivial next to other pressing issues. When would the world-beating Combined Fleet summon the will to gather, coordinate, and smash the upstart Americans? Where was the fuel going to come from that would enable the great Imperial battleship force to churn south? A culture of deference kept tough questions from being addressed. "Criticism of basic concepts in the Imperial Navy would have impugned the top-level admirals, and brought instant dismissal of the critic," Hara wrote.

The problems Yamamoto faced were those that plagued every commander in the machine age, when ships were more powerful than they had ever been before, but were effectively tethered to bases by their insatiable need for fuel. Situated much like the Americans were, waging war six thousand miles from home, the j.a.panese struggled all the more because of the large investment of pride they had made in the ships that were least amenable to operating at high tempo. That pride manifested itself in doctrine that vested supremacy in battleships: The j.a.panese fleet had been created under the idea that it would win a decisive battle over the Americans, at a time and place of its choosing. The pieces were in place. The battleships Yamato, Mutsu, Hiei, Yamato, Mutsu, Hiei, and and Kirishima Kirishima were all in the theater at Truk, backstopping Nagumo's roaming carriers. If the idea of sidelining their heaviest naval armor was dismaying to the Americans, it was downright intolerable to the j.a.panese, who counted on them to win the "decisive battle." were all in the theater at Truk, backstopping Nagumo's roaming carriers. If the idea of sidelining their heaviest naval armor was dismaying to the Americans, it was downright intolerable to the j.a.panese, who counted on them to win the "decisive battle."

The j.a.panese Army's hubris and ambition were part of the problem. Famed for its iron discipline, it failed to discipline its ends to its means. The 17th Army stubbornly refused to abandon its failing bid to cross New Guinea's central range and seize Port Moresby. This strained both resources and attention. The Imperial j.a.panese Navy saw the limitations more clearly. "Unless Guadalca.n.a.l is settled," Ugaki wrote, "we cannot hope for any further development in this area." A continuous realignment of means with shifting ends took place as both sides wrestled with complexities of the battlefield that were seldom apparent at the game table.

On September 11, Turner and McCain met with General Vandegrift to plan their resistance to an expected j.a.panese attack that the U.S. fleet would be in no position to stop. Early that morning, Ghormley wrote Nimitz again to recount the deficits and laxities of the various components of SOPAC, "SITUATION AS I VIEW IT TODAY IS EXTREMELY CRITICAL." Not wanting the carriers to seek battle unnecessarily, Ghormley ordered Noyes to keep them south of 12 degrees South lat.i.tude, about 150 miles south of Henderson Field. With land-based air strength on Guadalca.n.a.l down to eleven Wildcats and twenty-two Dauntlesses, once again the marines were left to their devices to endure air attacks, bombardment by naval gunfire, and seaborne landings of enemy reinforcements. On the night of September 13, the defenders of Henderson Field faced their most serious test yet.

That night-just as, on the other side of the world, the earth shook from the German a.s.sault on Stalingrad-Vandegrift's marines faced some seventeen hundred j.a.panese troops charging their positions about a mile south of the airfield. Skillfully dug in on a high ridge soon to be named in his honor, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Edson mounted a determined defense, coordinating artillery and mortars with the close-in work of his riflemen. The tenacity of the j.a.panese was unnerving, their nearness to victory harrowing. They briefly overran a second airstrip under construction east of Henderson Field, named Fighter One. A patrol of infiltrators was killed within fifty feet of General Vandegrift's tent. Though the casualties of this battle were poorly recorded-the j.a.panese lost around eight hundred men, as against a hundred or so for the Americans-the Battle of Edson's Ridge was another resounding victory for the marines. Nevertheless, the savagery and determination of the j.a.panese attack suggested grim things to come if the nighttime reinforcements were allowed to flow. American reinforcements were on the way. A regiment of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Marines, was at last under way from Noumea to join Vandegrift.

The Wasp Wasp and the newly arrived and the newly arrived Hornet Hornet were a.s.signed to provide air cover to the transport force. En route north to their operating area on the afternoon of September 15, the carrier task force got its hardest shock yet. Admiral Noyes was turning the were a.s.signed to provide air cover to the transport force. En route north to their operating area on the afternoon of September 15, the carrier task force got its hardest shock yet. Admiral Noyes was turning the Wasp Wasp out of the wind as flight operations ended for the day. She was making sixteen knots, about 150 miles southeast of San Cristobal, when a periscope broke the water and crosshairs settled on the carrier. The j.a.panese submarine out of the wind as flight operations ended for the day. She was making sixteen knots, about 150 miles southeast of San Cristobal, when a periscope broke the water and crosshairs settled on the carrier. The j.a.panese submarine I-19 I-19 maneuvered, lined up on the carrier, and loosed six torpedoes. maneuvered, lined up on the carrier, and loosed six torpedoes.

It would go down as the single most devastating torpedo spread of the war; the I-19 I-19's torpedoes struck three ships. The Wasp Wasp absorbed two of them, producing a series of blasts fed by aviation fuel and stored bombs. In minutes the carrier was a pyre, her pall visible for miles. The torpedoes that missed boiled onward, toward the absorbed two of them, producing a series of blasts fed by aviation fuel and stored bombs. In minutes the carrier was a pyre, her pall visible for miles. The torpedoes that missed boiled onward, toward the Hornet Hornet task force six miles away. The destroyer task force six miles away. The destroyer O'Brien O'Brien was struck, too, and lost part of her bow. The battleship was struck, too, and lost part of her bow. The battleship North Carolina North Carolina was the third victim, taking a torpedo forward on the port side that opened a thirty-two-foot-wide hole in her hull, buckled two decks, and disabled her number one turret, killing six. was the third victim, taking a torpedo forward on the port side that opened a thirty-two-foot-wide hole in her hull, buckled two decks, and disabled her number one turret, killing six.

The dying Wasp Wasp drew in her escorts in a feverish rescue effort. It was the way of the South Seas that episodes like this were well attended by sharks. As the escorting vessels moved in with cargo nets thrown over the gunwales, the sailors were horrified. "Sharks were everywhere," wrote Ford Richardson, a sailor from the destroyer drew in her escorts in a feverish rescue effort. It was the way of the South Seas that episodes like this were well attended by sharks. As the escorting vessels moved in with cargo nets thrown over the gunwales, the sailors were horrified. "Sharks were everywhere," wrote Ford Richardson, a sailor from the destroyer Farenholt. Farenholt. "Dozens. Hundreds. A shark would catch a man by an arm or a foot and pull him under, cutting off his screams. The poor devil would pop up again, and again, like a cork on a fishing line. Each time his scream would be weaker than before. Finally, he would come up no more. Sometimes the shark would grab a poor man in the middle and shake him like a dog shaking a rat. Then the shark would back off, dragging the dying man's entrails behind him. The water would turn milky with blood." The rescuers worked until nightfall shrouded the scene of the horror. The ordeal was never more luridly horrifying than for a pair of brothers whom the deck force of the "Dozens. Hundreds. A shark would catch a man by an arm or a foot and pull him under, cutting off his screams. The poor devil would pop up again, and again, like a cork on a fishing line. Each time his scream would be weaker than before. Finally, he would come up no more. Sometimes the shark would grab a poor man in the middle and shake him like a dog shaking a rat. Then the shark would back off, dragging the dying man's entrails behind him. The water would turn milky with blood." The rescuers worked until nightfall shrouded the scene of the horror. The ordeal was never more luridly horrifying than for a pair of brothers whom the deck force of the Farenholt Farenholt tried to rescue. "Just at dark, a sailor came drifting by just out of range of a heaving line. He was holding up another sailor, but that man's head was drooped over and his face was under water. He was dead. We shouted to the sailor, 'Turn him loose and swim to us. He's dead!' tried to rescue. "Just at dark, a sailor came drifting by just out of range of a heaving line. He was holding up another sailor, but that man's head was drooped over and his face was under water. He was dead. We shouted to the sailor, 'Turn him loose and swim to us. He's dead!'

"'He's my brother,' he replied.

"'He's dead, Let him go and swim closer!'

"'He's my brother! He's my brother! He's my brother...!'

"Helplessly we watched as the current swept him by us, and on into the darkening gloom. The last we saw of him, he was still holding onto his dead brother. The last we heard faintly 'He's my brother.'"

Although her escorts pulled aboard more than four hundred survivors, jamming them into all available s.p.a.ces and pa.s.sageways, the Wasp Wasp went down in the Coral Sea with 173 men. Though quick work by her damage-control crews kept her at full speed, the went down in the Coral Sea with 173 men. Though quick work by her damage-control crews kept her at full speed, the North Carolina North Carolina would need six weeks at Pearl Harbor for repairs. The would need six weeks at Pearl Harbor for repairs. The O'Brien O'Brien was patched up, too, but she sank when her hull buckled en route to the West Coast. was patched up, too, but she sank when her hull buckled en route to the West Coast.

Next to the loss of the Wasp, Wasp, the costliest casualty of the the costliest casualty of the I-19 I-19's attack was the Navy's confidence in its commanders. Nimitz took a dim view of how Leigh Noyes had handled the carriers, operating at speeds that CINCPAC believed too slow to stay clear of prowling submarines. (Destroyer commanders preferred to operate below thirteen knots to enable best use of sonar.) Noyes was quietly removed and returned to the States to take a sh.o.r.e command, and placed before a board of inquiry that explored the culpability for the loss of the carrier. He was exonerated by a 1943 inquiry into the loss of the Wasp, Wasp, but was never recognized for his combat service. but was never recognized for his combat service.

The loss of the ship was kept a closely guarded secret. "They didn't want anybody to know the Wasp Wasp was lost," Thomas Weschler said, "just as they didn't want anyone to know the was lost," Thomas Weschler said, "just as they didn't want anyone to know the Lexington Lexington had been lost at Coral Sea.... The j.a.panese would have had a heyday if they really knew how close to the end we were." The had been lost at Coral Sea.... The j.a.panese would have had a heyday if they really knew how close to the end we were." The Wasp Wasp's survivors, like the survivors of the Battle of Savo Island, were hidden away-quarantined-in Noumea. The news of the carrier's sinking would not be released until December, by which time the survivors, sworn to secrecy about the reason for their leave, were finally allowed to tell family and friends the rest of the story. Stories of unmitigated disaster were never helpful to morale. While the South Dakota South Dakota was under repair at Pearl Harbor, her skipper, Thomas Gatch, tried to use the story of the Battle of Savo Island as a teaching opportunity, inviting the captain of one of the sunken cruisers to visit his wardroom. Telling of the disastrous battle against Mikawa's cruisers, his guest spoke in tones that fell from solemn to dire. "I guess he and Captain Gatch were old friends, and I am pretty sure Captain Gatch didn't know in advance what this captain was going to say. His talk was very pessimistic," recalled Paul H. Backus, a junior-grade lieutenant on the battleship. "At the end, Captain Gatch had to get up and say, in front of this officer, that nothing like that was going to happen to the was under repair at Pearl Harbor, her skipper, Thomas Gatch, tried to use the story of the Battle of Savo Island as a teaching opportunity, inviting the captain of one of the sunken cruisers to visit his wardroom. Telling of the disastrous battle against Mikawa's cruisers, his guest spoke in tones that fell from solemn to dire. "I guess he and Captain Gatch were old friends, and I am pretty sure Captain Gatch didn't know in advance what this captain was going to say. His talk was very pessimistic," recalled Paul H. Backus, a junior-grade lieutenant on the battleship. "At the end, Captain Gatch had to get up and say, in front of this officer, that nothing like that was going to happen to the South Dakota, South Dakota, that our best defense against this kind of nonsense was our nine sixteen-inch guns-cut and dried-and then he escorted the officer out of the wardroom. It was kind of sad, because this guy had lost his ship, and the way he lost it had left a very discouraging impression on him." That mood would persist until the fleet got off its heels and did something to turn around morale. Admiral Wright, with Task Force 64, had under his command the tools to do the job. But the tools are not the craftsman, and they would be of little productive use until the right men showed up to do the job. that our best defense against this kind of nonsense was our nine sixteen-inch guns-cut and dried-and then he escorted the officer out of the wardroom. It was kind of sad, because this guy had lost his ship, and the way he lost it had left a very discouraging impression on him." That mood would persist until the fleet got off its heels and did something to turn around morale. Admiral Wright, with Task Force 64, had under his command the tools to do the job. But the tools are not the craftsman, and they would be of little productive use until the right men showed up to do the job.

13.

The Warriors IT TOOK CONSIDERABLE FORCE OF WILL TO OVERCOME THE PARALYSIS of the routine, the heavy inertia of predictability that almost every aspect of Navy life promoted, from the plan of the day to the formation plans drawn on the navigation board. It was easy not to notice how tiny elements of routine fused into a culture and made every day rea.s.suringly like the last. The rhythm was made possible through a professionalization of the business of naval service that would never have existed but for previous great victories. In war, those comfortable rhythms needed to be violently overthrown if further victories were to be possible. Fast-thinking, quick-acting men would be needed to overthrow them. of the routine, the heavy inertia of predictability that almost every aspect of Navy life promoted, from the plan of the day to the formation plans drawn on the navigation board. It was easy not to notice how tiny elements of routine fused into a culture and made every day rea.s.suringly like the last. The rhythm was made possible through a professionalization of the business of naval service that would never have existed but for previous great victories. In war, those comfortable rhythms needed to be violently overthrown if further victories were to be possible. Fast-thinking, quick-acting men would be needed to overthrow them.

The awareness that one was in the presence of such an insurgent came at a pheromonal level. He didn't have to be brash or intimidating. If he had the right qualities, they carried through the air around him despite his quietude. Some men were fiery and motivational, leading with a barely restrained recklessness and a demeanor of perpetually fresh anger. Others were intellectual warriors, brains in circuit with the matrix in s.p.a.ce where vectors flew toward other vectors and the results of battle followed from the nature of their intersections. The fighter's way was elemental. It was not possible to cultivate it reliably in an academic meritocracy, or to gauge it by cla.s.s rank. The woodsmen with their squirrel guns who beat the British at New Orleans rallied to Andrew Jackson's readiness to fury, a scent that inspired fear, his instinct to abandon prudence and seize a sudden opening to kill. Such a man knew that a warship was not a lady but a platform of systems that fire projectiles that kill. Having tasted defeat, the Navy was starting to come back to appreciating the unpolished strengths of the Georgia farm boys who found themselves under gentle persecution on board Commander Wylie's Fletcher. Fletcher. A rebel yell and a blast of powder. That and a little planning and technical proficiency would carry the day. A rebel yell and a blast of powder. That and a little planning and technical proficiency would carry the day.

Rear Admiral Norman Scott was one of them. A 1911 graduate of the Naval Academy, he was known as "one of the best-liked men in the cla.s.s," in part no doubt because of his prowess in a hand-to-hand fight. An expert fencer, he had won "immortal fame," as the irrepressible yearbook scribes wrote, by beating West Point en route to becoming an intercollegiate champion. He was a warrior; he always wanted his sword in the fight. According to Admiral Raymond Spruance, Scott's tour of duty in the CNO's office was an unhappy one. Sent there after commanding the heavy cruiser Pensacola, Pensacola, Scott "made things so miserable around him in Washington that he finally got what he wanted-sea duty." Robert Graff of the Scott "made things so miserable around him in Washington that he finally got what he wanted-sea duty." Robert Graff of the Atlanta Atlanta thought Scott was "kind of like a junior Halsey." But fighters don't always find their fight. It had been Norman Scott's fate to sit idly by in the antiaircraft cruiser thought Scott was "kind of like a junior Halsey." But fighters don't always find their fight. It had been Norman Scott's fate to sit idly by in the antiaircraft cruiser San Juan San Juan off Tulagi as the j.a.panese sliced through Captain Riefkohl's cruiser screen on the night of August 9. Scott spent the next day, his fifty-third birthday, reflecting on what little he had seen of the Battle of Savo Island. He could claim some prescience for the screen's unpreparedness for combat. He had warned Crutchley about the "grave inadequacies" of Condition Two, the state of partial battle readiness whose circuitous personnel shifts underlay the slow-footed response to Mikawa's appearance. off Tulagi as the j.a.panese sliced through Captain Riefkohl's cruiser screen on the night of August 9. Scott spent the next day, his fifty-third birthday, reflecting on what little he had seen of the Battle of Savo Island. He could claim some prescience for the screen's unpreparedness for combat. He had warned Crutchley about the "grave inadequacies" of Condition Two, the state of partial battle readiness whose circuitous personnel shifts underlay the slow-footed response to Mikawa's appearance.

When he was named as Carleton Wright's successor as commander of Task Force 64 in mid-September, one of his first acts was to return to tradition. In the late thirties, the U.S. Navy borrowed a training regimen from the Royal Navy, the so-called offset gunnery exercise. In these drills, ships squared off as they would in battle, fixing their gun directors on one another but setting off the alignment of the turrets by several degrees. As the guns fired askance, a second director measured the precision of the offset. Any shot that landed a calculated distance behind the ship, projected in accordance with the range and the degree of the offset, was deemed a hit. Such drills were generally more orderly affairs if one ship did the firing and another served as target, rather than having both duel and maneuver simultaneously at full battle speeds. Precautions notwithstanding, the exercises were acts of faith: With fears of a catastrophic accident always present, they were conducted with a flinching caution that could keep officers up the rest of the night.

Greater cause for insomnia lay in not knowing the proficiency of one's crew. Admiral Ghormley had been hampered by this uncertainty. He didn't know what his ships and commanders were capable of. He hadn't spent time with them, or among them; hadn't been physically present to a.s.sess critical variables, from their intangible esprit to the physical soundness of their machinery. He was candid about this. "I did not know, from actual contact, the ability of the officers, nor the material condition of the ships nor their readiness for battle, nor did I know their degree of training for warfare such as was soon to develop in this area. Improvement was acquired while carrying out combat missions," he would write. This was a startling admission of a leadership failure. Norman Scott wasn't about to emulate it, and certainly wasn't satisfied to leave the education of his men to the enemy.

After the damaging of the South Dakota, North Carolina, Enterprise, South Dakota, North Carolina, Enterprise, and and Saratoga, Saratoga, the U.S. Navy had more capital ships on the sidelines than it had in the forward area. The loss of the the U.S. Navy had more capital ships on the sidelines than it had in the forward area. The loss of the Wasp Wasp left just one carrier, the left just one carrier, the Hornet, Hornet, in the entire South Pacific. Battleships would find their moment, when fortune and necessity conspired. Until then, the "light forces"-cruisers and destroyers-would hold the line. The Slot would be their battlefield. "It was the way the j.a.ps would come. We talked about it constantly," wrote the in the entire South Pacific. Battleships would find their moment, when fortune and necessity conspired. Until then, the "light forces"-cruisers and destroyers-would hold the line. The Slot would be their battlefield. "It was the way the j.a.ps would come. We talked about it constantly," wrote the Helena Helena's Chick Morris. "The talk was always of the impending clash with the enemy's warships. Were we good enough? None of us knew. We had never been through the real thing."

In the last two weeks of September, during moments stolen from the drudgery of escort duty, Scott arranged for his cruisers to practice their craft. Determined to make his own force a match for the j.a.panese, he had studied the recent night surface actions carefully and inst.i.tuted what a Marine gunner on the San Francisco, San Francisco, Clifford C. Spencer, called "Night Fighting Course 101." No peacetime moonlight excursion this. "For the next two weeks we held daily gunnery practice and high speed night tactical maneuvers, every night, all night," Spencer wrote. "We were at general quarters every night and had mock battles with opposing ships, all moving at flank speed. Some fun! The object of the practice was to have everyone sharpen their night vision and spot the enemy before he saw you. With training, helmsmen were able to maintain ship intervals with more expertise and direct more energy to finding the enemy ships, allowing you to get off those very important first salvos." Floatplanes towing target sleeves. Flash cards with ship silhouettes. Compet.i.tions were inst.i.tuted to determine the fastest gun crews. "In Texas the battle cry had been 'Remember the Alamo!' Here the rally cry was 'Remember Savo Island!'" Spencer wrote. "Fatigue melted away when you thought of the slaughter of friends in the now infamous August 9th 'Battle of the Sitting Ducks.'" Clifford C. Spencer, called "Night Fighting Course 101." No peacetime moonlight excursion this. "For the next two weeks we held daily gunnery practice and high speed night tactical maneuvers, every night, all night," Spencer wrote. "We were at general quarters every night and had mock battles with opposing ships, all moving at flank speed. Some fun! The object of the practice was to have everyone sharpen their night vision and spot the enemy before he saw you. With training, helmsmen were able to maintain ship intervals with more expertise and direct more energy to finding the enemy ships, allowing you to get off those very important first salvos." Floatplanes towing target sleev