Neptune's Inferno_ The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal Part 17

As Graff went to sea in the Monterey, Monterey, the the Aaron Ward Aaron Ward's radar officer, Bob Hagen, reported to Seattle-Tacoma to become the gunnery officer of a new destroyer, the Johnston, Johnston, whose captain, Commander Ernest E. Evans, was a combat veteran who had been similarly recycled from a previous a.s.signment. Jesse Coward and Roland Smoot, commanders of the whose captain, Commander Ernest E. Evans, was a combat veteran who had been similarly recycled from a previous a.s.signment. Jesse Coward and Roland Smoot, commanders of the Sterett Sterett and and Monssen, Monssen, respectively, would take command of destroyer squadrons and play important tactical roles in later campaigns, too. Tested and seasoned by adversity, all would acquire varying degrees of naval legend in the Leyte Gulf campaign in the Philippines in 1944. respectively, would take command of destroyer squadrons and play important tactical roles in later campaigns, too. Tested and seasoned by adversity, all would acquire varying degrees of naval legend in the Leyte Gulf campaign in the Philippines in 1944.

The epic of the Pacific war found new chapters for everyone. The endless game of personnel-rotation musical chairs saw the continuous replacement of the experienced by the inexperienced, until, by the end, only the experienced remained.

JOE JAMES CUSTER, the war correspondent, had served in the South Pacific campaign's earliest days and witnessed the destruction firsthand. On board the Astoria, Astoria, and later, recovering from eye surgery at Queen's Hospital in Honolulu, he had become close with men who had served in the inferno. He had looked into their eyes and seen right through into their minds and souls, and found reflections of pain in a blackness that he called "something new the psychiatrists were working on." Experience was important. It delivered benefits, and took a price, too. "They were ill, physically, mentally, spiritually; they had undergone agonies of body and mind that were impossible to contemplate except by those who had actually been there." The scale of violence was impossible to reckon with. and later, recovering from eye surgery at Queen's Hospital in Honolulu, he had become close with men who had served in the inferno. He had looked into their eyes and seen right through into their minds and souls, and found reflections of pain in a blackness that he called "something new the psychiatrists were working on." Experience was important. It delivered benefits, and took a price, too. "They were ill, physically, mentally, spiritually; they had undergone agonies of body and mind that were impossible to contemplate except by those who had actually been there." The scale of violence was impossible to reckon with.

Custer's articles detailing the loss of the Astoria, Astoria, published near the end of October in published near the end of October in The Seattle Times The Seattle Times and elsewhere, awakened in the families of many servicemen an urgency to understand what their loved ones had been through. Letters soon began arriving in Room 232 at Queen's Hospital. Until his eyes healed and he could read them himself, the nurses on duty had to do the honors for him. and elsewhere, awakened in the families of many servicemen an urgency to understand what their loved ones had been through. Letters soon began arriving in Room 232 at Queen's Hospital. Until his eyes healed and he could read them himself, the nurses on duty had to do the honors for him.

One correspondent's brother, a lieutenant, had gone missing. "We have received news from Wash. of his reported death. I guess it's natural that I should wish to repudiate this, but I just don't feel Tom is gone. You say a cruiser was lost-was anybody on board saved? If I could come to you personally to talk it over with you I'm sure I could readily make you see how much the truth means to me, to all of us. My mother hasn't even been told as yet what we've heard. We're afraid what the shock might do to her.... In the name of Christian charity, and as a fellow countryman, can you see fit to write and answer me?"

"You may not care to bother with this letter but please do as it will probly relieve the heartaches of seven people who morn the loss of a dear Boy just 20 years old, who was on the ship Astoria Astoria in battle. this is his grandfather writeing you for more information. He was dearly loved by me and his grandmother who pa.s.sed away on the night of August 9th 42." (All typos in quotations are in battle. this is his grandfather writeing you for more information. He was dearly loved by me and his grandmother who pa.s.sed away on the night of August 9th 42." (All typos in quotations are sic. sic.) Another correspondent had a son on the Quincy, Quincy, now missing in action. Could he have swum to land or been taken prisoner? "If he is in a hospital would they let him write home and tell me where he is? My son's wife is to have a baby some time this month.... We grasp at any opportunity to contact someone who may have known our boy.... We shall never tire of listening to anything connected with the last days of the life of the now missing in action. Could he have swum to land or been taken prisoner? "If he is in a hospital would they let him write home and tell me where he is? My son's wife is to have a baby some time this month.... We grasp at any opportunity to contact someone who may have known our boy.... We shall never tire of listening to anything connected with the last days of the life of the Astoria. Astoria."

Someone in the War Department got the idea to send veterans of America's first victorious campaign around the country to factories, bolstering morale. By 1943, absenteeism was becoming a serious problem in the war industries. With women pressed into full-time service in the workforce, adding to their responsibilities as homemakers, many found the dual commitments difficult to sustain. Edgar Harrison of the San Francisco San Francisco was called to duty in this effort. A speech was written for him, and he went out to testify to his experiences. was called to duty in this effort. A speech was written for him, and he went out to testify to his experiences.

"This young man could be any of your sons or husbands," the executive who introduced him at one event said. "He's going to tell you about a battle you just heard about on radio." The speeches were made as b.l.o.o.d.y as the mores of public presentation would allow. For three months Harrison traveled to the manufacturing plants of the Midwest and Northeast, doing four or five speeches a day, always. .h.i.tting the shift changes when the audience was double. "Guys would walk up to me afterwards with tears in their eyes, shake my hand, and not say a word. Everybody knew somebody in the Army or Navy," he said.

One morning in early 1943, before a speech at the Cadillac plant in Cadillac, Michigan, he was escorted to a railroad siding behind a large building and asked to paint his name on a large piece of steel on a flatcar. Then he was invited to follow it through every manufacturing phase on the a.s.sembly line, until, three hours later, it was driven off the end of the line, part of a finished Sherman tank.

Tom and Alleta Sullivan, gold-star parents of the five boys from the Juneau, Juneau, began a speaking tour in February that took them to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Newport, Hartford, and through the heartland, slated to end with the launching in San Francisco of a new destroyer named after their sons. At a whistlestop in Chicago several weeks along, a survivor from the ship, Allen Heyn, confided to them what had really happened to George, their oldest, during his ordeal at sea. began a speaking tour in February that took them to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Newport, Hartford, and through the heartland, slated to end with the launching in San Francisco of a new destroyer named after their sons. At a whistlestop in Chicago several weeks along, a survivor from the ship, Allen Heyn, confided to them what had really happened to George, their oldest, during his ordeal at sea.

They would inspire untold thousands of people in more than two hundred appearances nationwide before they returned to Waterloo and the public eye wandered elsewhere. Back home, they would be left to contend with the smaller minds of their community who suspected the couple of cashing in on their sons' loss. They would never feel at home in Waterloo again. And it finally became too much. In San Francisco the first week of April, at the launching of the USS The Sullivans, The Sullivans, Alleta broke a champagne bottle against the hull and smiled graciously for the cameras. Before the ceremony could end, however, her strength gave out. She buckled and fell to the ground sobbing. Alleta broke a champagne bottle against the hull and smiled graciously for the cameras. Before the ceremony could end, however, her strength gave out. She buckled and fell to the ground sobbing.

EARLY 1943 WAS A TIME of many reckonings. Foremost among them, in the echoing halls of the Navy's culture of reputation at least, was Admiral Hepburn's inquisition into the failures that decided the Battle of Savo Island. of many reckonings. Foremost among them, in the echoing halls of the Navy's culture of reputation at least, was Admiral Hepburn's inquisition into the failures that decided the Battle of Savo Island.

After recovering from his illness in Hawaii, he went quickly to work, inspecting Admiral Nimitz's files and then interrogating Commander H. B. Heneberger, the senior surviving officer of the Quincy, Quincy, and Commander Elijah W. Irish, the navigator of the and Commander Elijah W. Irish, the navigator of the Chicago. Chicago. He boarded the next available ship for Noumea, where he met with Admiral Halsey. Then, on February 16, he took his inquiry to Australia. He boarded the next available ship for Noumea, where he met with Admiral Halsey. Then, on February 16, he took his inquiry to Australia.

Interservice niceties were needed to gain an audience with Admiral Crutchley, still serving under U.S. command but now with Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Forces. Hepburn found the British officer's account of the battle, filed in Brisbane, "the most complete and lucid report of the entire operation," though of course Crutchley was miles away when it took place. Perhaps out of the respect thus gained, Hepburn would write that he "conferred with" (rather than "interrogated") Crutchley in Melbourne, on board the vessel that had been excused from disaster on August 9, the cruiser Australia. Australia. At Canberra, Hepburn was received by Australia's governor-general and attended a meeting of the War Council. He returned to Noumea to interrogate Admiral Turner, then flew home to Pearl Harbor to examine Captain Greenman and begin work on his report to Admiral King. At Canberra, Hepburn was received by Australia's governor-general and attended a meeting of the War Council. He returned to Noumea to interrogate Admiral Turner, then flew home to Pearl Harbor to examine Captain Greenman and begin work on his report to Admiral King.

Only then, on April 2, did Hepburn fly back to the mainland to interrogate the two officers whose culpable inefficiency he was beginning to see most clearly: Captain Riefkohl of the Vincennes Vincennes and Captain Bode of the and Captain Bode of the Chicago. Chicago. Shrewd interrogators will often save the most difficult sessions for last. Armed with deep knowledge of the facts, and with his report largely already drafted, Arthur J. Hepburn arrived in Corpus Christi and prepared for the final stage of his inquest. Shrewd interrogators will often save the most difficult sessions for last. Armed with deep knowledge of the facts, and with his report largely already drafted, Arthur J. Hepburn arrived in Corpus Christi and prepared for the final stage of his inquest.

43.

The Opinion of Convening Authority SOME OFFICERS SAW SUCCESS AND FAILURE AS PRODUCTS OF TEAMWORK. "No one man was responsible for our success in the Pacific," wrote Charles W. Weaver, Ghormley's a.s.sistant operations officer. "It was a team effort by many good men. Others, of lesser stature, are scrambling now in their memoirs to remind posterity that they they won the war." The Navy was now well along chasing something else: accountability from those who had marred its successful campaign with an avoidable defeat in the Battle of Savo Island. won the war." The Navy was now well along chasing something else: accountability from those who had marred its successful campaign with an avoidable defeat in the Battle of Savo Island.

The fleet seemed to find it irresistible to refight the battle. Retrospectively, wisdom abounded as to what commanders should have done, what risks they should have embraced or avoided. It had always been so. As a Roman general, Lucius Aemilius Paulus, observed in 168 BC BC, "In every circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people who lead armies into Macedonia."

Admiral King's flag secretary, Captain George L. Russell, noted that the exercise was significantly academic in nature. "The deficiencies which manifested themselves in this action, with particular reference to communications and the condition of readiness, together with erroneous conceptions of how to conduct this type of operation, have long since been corrected," he wrote. Long after it had ceased to matter, the Navy would deliver a verdict on its failings. As salve for its own inst.i.tutional pride perhaps, or for bereaved relatives still mourning their losses, Admiral Hepburn would find his "culpable inefficiency."

A critic could find a long list of candidates to blame for the many errors of the Guadalca.n.a.l campaign: Riefkohl for failure to keep watch and his mystifyingly persistent belief that Mikawa's cruisers were friendly. Turner for not understanding the limits of the radar he relied on. Crutchley for removing the Australia Australia from her patrol station without communicating his intentions up or down the chain of command. McCain for failing to report the cancellation of a critical air search. Fletcher and his superiors for the inability to mediate, arbitrate, or otherwise control a serious disagreement about the use of the carriers on the eve of a critical operation. Ghormley for his absorption in detail and absence in body and spirit from the combat zone. Halsey for his spendthrift way with his carriers in October, and for his miscommunications with Kinkaid that prevented Willis Lee from moving north with the from her patrol station without communicating his intentions up or down the chain of command. McCain for failing to report the cancellation of a critical air search. Fletcher and his superiors for the inability to mediate, arbitrate, or otherwise control a serious disagreement about the use of the carriers on the eve of a critical operation. Ghormley for his absorption in detail and absence in body and spirit from the combat zone. Halsey for his spendthrift way with his carriers in October, and for his miscommunications with Kinkaid that prevented Willis Lee from moving north with the Washington Washington in time to help Callaghan's cruisers on the night of November 13. Callaghan and Wright for not exploiting a radar advantage against a surprised foe. The journalist and critic I. F. Stone would call the state of mind that permitted the Pearl Harbor attack "sheer stodgy unimaginative bureaucratic complacency." That syndrome was at work on August 9, and the result was another virtuoso performance by the blitz-minded Imperial j.a.panese Navy. in time to help Callaghan's cruisers on the night of November 13. Callaghan and Wright for not exploiting a radar advantage against a surprised foe. The journalist and critic I. F. Stone would call the state of mind that permitted the Pearl Harbor attack "sheer stodgy unimaginative bureaucratic complacency." That syndrome was at work on August 9, and the result was another virtuoso performance by the blitz-minded Imperial j.a.panese Navy.

The day before his relief by Halsey, Ghormley prepared a commentary that cast the defeat at Savo Island as a result of flawed battle doctrine. His preliminary conclusion was that Kelly Turner's instructions to Crutchley's screening force were "too indefinite in regard to what the units of that group were to do and how they were to accomplish their tasks." Though Turner had written to Hepburn, "I was satisfied with arrangements, and hoped that the enemy would attack," Ghormley observed that those arrangements were woefully inadequate. "No special battle plan was prescribed to cover the possibility of a surface ship night attack," he wrote, also observing that Turner's instructions to the two radar pickets, the destroyers Blue Blue and and Ralph Talbot, Ralph Talbot, "were faulty in requiring them to 'shadow' an enemy force and report them frequently. Time and s.p.a.ce did not permit the employment of tactics of this nature." Neither Turner nor Crutchley, Ghormley observed, had decided how the two cruiser groups on patrol that night might coordinate in the event of enemy contact. "were faulty in requiring them to 'shadow' an enemy force and report them frequently. Time and s.p.a.ce did not permit the employment of tactics of this nature." Neither Turner nor Crutchley, Ghormley observed, had decided how the two cruiser groups on patrol that night might coordinate in the event of enemy contact.

Stickling and insistent in some matters, Hepburn was laissez-faire in others. He didn't worry about the lack of a battle plan: "Only one plan of battle was practicable, viz., bring batteries to bear as quickly as possible," he wrote in his fifty-four-page "informal inquiry." He continued, "In my opinion, the important causes of the defeat suffered in this action are to be found in reasons other than those discussed above, and which fall within the general category of 'Readiness for Action.'"

Turner would angrily rebut the accusation that he had been pa.s.sive in the face of Mikawa's threat. "I have been accused of being and doing many things but n.o.body before has ever accused me of sitting on my a.r.s.e and doing nothing," he would tell his biographer. "If I had known of any 'approaching' j.a.p force I would have done something-maybe the wrong thing, but I would have done something.... What I failed to do was to a.s.sume that the g.d. pilots couldn't count and couldn't identify and wouldn't do their job and stick around and trail the j.a.ps and send through a later report. And I failed to a.s.sume that McCain wouldn't keep me informed of what his pilots were or were not doing. And I failed to guess that despite the reported composition of the force, and the reported course, and the reported speed, the j.a.ps were headed for me via a detour, just like we arrived at Guadalca.n.a.l via a detour. I wouldn't mind if they said that I was too d.a.m.ned dumb to have crystal-balled these things, but to write that I was told of an 'approaching force' and then didn't do anything, that's an unprintable, unprintable, unprintable lie.

"n.o.body reported an 'approaching force' to me. They reported a force which could and did approach, but they reported another kind of force headed another kind of way. It was a masterful failure of air reconnaissance and my fellow aviators."

When misfortune came, no one's career was safe from a sudden change in the weather. Gilbert Hoover lost his seagoing career in Halsey's storm. Even Admiral Raymond Spruance, Nimitz's chief of staff and widely considered one of the Navy's most capacious minds, had taken lumps for what some critics deemed his excessive caution in the Battle of Midway. The experience soured him on second-guessing: "I have always hesitated to sit in judgment of the responsible man on the spot, unless it was obvious to me at the time he was making a grave error in judgment. Even in that case I wanted to hear his side of the matter before I made any final judgment."

Hepburn acknowledged some of this. "There is generally a twilight zone lying between culpable inefficiency on the one hand and a more or less excusable error of judgment on the other." But when he released his report on May 13, five weeks after finishing his interrogations and resuming his duties as chairman of the General Board, Hepburn's conclusions shone like a harsh ray through that twilight.

"In my opinion the primary cause of defeat must be ascribed generally to the complete surprise achieved by the enemy," he began. It was in the specific reasons for this surprise that culpable inefficiency lay. In order of importance, those reasons were: an inadequate condition of readiness on all ships to meet a sudden night attack, a failure to understand the telltale presence of enemy planes beforehand, a misplaced confidence in the radar pickets, delayed reports of enemy contact, and a communications breakdown regarding the canceled air-search mission. As a "contributory cause," Hepburn cited Fletcher's withdrawal of the carriers on August 9, which made necessary Crutchley's departure to the conference, which enabled the confused command arrangement for the southern cruiser group.

Though Captain Riefkohl's leadership of the northern cruiser group was "far from impressive," plying a box-shaped patrol course that Hepburn deemed poorly conceived, "there is only one instance in the circ.u.mstances immediately attendant upon the Savo Island Battle in which censure is definitely indicated and in which the foregoing considerations"-about the "twilight zone"-"did not apply. That was in the action, or inaction, of the Commanding Officer of the Chicago. Chicago."

Hepburn thought Howard Bode culpable on two counts: the decision to remain at the rear of the formation-"a severe indictment of his professional judgment"; and to steam away from the battle zone for thirty-five minutes-"unexplainable." Hepburn's criticism was oddly self-canceling. He allowed that "it would be difficult to sustain a charge that his decision, or lack of decision, resulted in greater damage than actually occurred." He also saw that the most likely result, had Bode made the choices that presumably Hepburn would have made, would have been largely the same-"the Chicago Chicago would have been sunk instead of the would have been sunk instead of the Canberra. Canberra." Nonetheless, Bode in the end was the only officer deemed culpably inefficient by the Navy's lone inquisitor and judge.

Afterward, in his endors.e.m.e.nt to Hepburn's report, King wrote to James Forrestal: "Granting that the immediate cause of our losses was the surprise attack, the question is whether or not any officer should be held accountable for failing to antic.i.p.ate it. Considering that this was the first battle experience for most of the ships partic.i.p.ating in the operation and for most of the flag officers involved, and that consequently it was the first time that most of them had been in the position of 'kill or be killed,' the answer to that specific question, in my judgment, must be in the negative. They simply had not learned how and when to stay on the alert." King specifically exonerated Turner and Crutchley for the way they had deployed the cruisers. Regarding Bode in particular, King was silent.

Captain Russell wasn't having any of it. Admiral King's flag secretary wrote, "It does not necessarily follow that because we took a beating, somebody must be the goat. The operation was undoubtedly hastily planned, and poorly executed, and there was no small amount of stupidity, but to me it is more of an object lesson in how not to fight than it is a failure for which some one should hang."

Bode didn't hang. He was a.s.signed to command the 15th Naval District, headquartered at the Balboa Naval Station in the Panama Ca.n.a.l Zone. His transfer to such a backwater would brand him forever as having fallen short of the mark.

He had aspired to flag rank and had always seemed to carry himself as if he would get there. His strict and severe manner might have been an attempt at redemption for a lapse that marred his early career. As a midshipman at the Naval Academy, he had gotten into trouble with three other uppercla.s.smen for hazing. It was a mild offense and typical of the time, but because Bode was caught at it shortly after the superintendent had issued a warning, Bode got a hundred demerits, was confined to academy premises, and lost the privilege of attending the ArmyNavy football game. The episode and its aftermath were page-one news in the Sunday New York Times New York Times in the autumn of 1910. in the autumn of 1910.

From his first day in Panama, Bode "seemed to be under some sort of a strain, and it was very noticeable to me and to the officers," a reserve lieutenant commander said. "He talked a great deal about wondering why he had been sent here, and before he got out of the plane asked a number of questions as to what kind of a place he was coming to, and couldn't understand why he had been ordered here because he was a combat man.

"He told me a number of times that he did not contemplate being here very long, and shortly after he arrived, within a day or so, he told me he would be out in about two weeks." That was when Admiral Hepburn came calling, summoning him to Corpus Christi.

The interrogations, which took place on April 23, did not go well for Bode. No one saw him for about a week. When he came back, he had a much more sanguine outlook. He was conversational and seemed acclimated to his new a.s.signment. He invited younger officers to visit him and enjoy some scotch. "It was one of the most pleasant talks I had had with him since he had been attached to the Station," the officer said. The only thing he saw fit to complain about was the speed with which his letters home were reaching his wife.

Bode knew from the tone of Hepburn's questioning that his conduct was under scrutiny. But an inquiry, if undertaken in the right frame of mind, can be a motivator to change and redemption. Guadalca.n.a.l was supposed to have been his chance to redeem the loss of the Oklahoma Oklahoma at Pearl Harbor. (Bode was blameless for being ash.o.r.e that morning, but captains never fully escape their responsibility.) Now he needed redemption for Guadalca.n.a.l, too, a double dose. at Pearl Harbor. (Bode was blameless for being ash.o.r.e that morning, but captains never fully escape their responsibility.) Now he needed redemption for Guadalca.n.a.l, too, a double dose.

After returning to Panama from Texas, Bode wrote to Hepburn twice, explaining his decisions that night in greater clarity than he had mustered in his stunned state during the interrogation. He had lost track of the Chicago Chicago's course heading after maneuvering to avoid torpedoes, he said. He had thought he was standing out to the northwest and hoped to rendezvous with the Vincennes Vincennes group and reengage the enemy to seaward. When he noticed the quiet night around him and suggested reversing course, his navigator advised against it. "Although there are probably other minor details which might promote a fuller understanding, I think the above will clarify the situation attending the two points of criticism. I do hope that your cold is better," he closed, "and that you had a comfortable trip from New Orleans." group and reengage the enemy to seaward. When he noticed the quiet night around him and suggested reversing course, his navigator advised against it. "Although there are probably other minor details which might promote a fuller understanding, I think the above will clarify the situation attending the two points of criticism. I do hope that your cold is better," he closed, "and that you had a comfortable trip from New Orleans."

In the quiet of his new command, Bode had the chance to reflect more deeply on the Guadalca.n.a.l campaign. His further ruminations led him to write Hepburn a third time on April 18. "Within the past two weeks, I have had an opportunity to read the a.n.a.lysis of the Savo Island battle. From it I perceived that I had committed a grievous error of judgment in the very beginning, although the decision (to continue the formation) seemed sound and logical at the time and has since until the logic of cool a.n.a.lysis throws a different light upon it. That error has just been brought to realization. Although I can find a great deal to justify that decision even now, I do feel that I acted with too great a degree of a.s.surance of the correctness of my estimate of a general and specific situation."

Though he was never reputed to change his mind much, it was clear he had been changed by this ordeal. "Some time recently I had an opportunity to clarify by amplification of information, effectively and conclusively, I believe some other points, which for purposes of a.n.a.lysis clarified other phases of the situation. I have now carefully considered what my course of action should now be. I have decided that the only honorable course is to atone for my errors of judgment in the only way I can."

First thing the next morning, he checked his laundry, then asked after the morning paper. The steward on duty gave it to him. Bode took the paper to the restroom, and ten or fifteen minutes later the steward heard a whoom. whoom.

"I am writing a letter to be delivered to my wife," his April 18 letter to Admiral Hepburn continued, "which I hope you will forward as soon as practical. Although she is a very courageous and competent person she should have knowledge of the why and wherefore, or a reason for this totally unexpected tragedy descending upon her.

"I can find no expression to convey to you my regret that the District you command is to be hindered with the culmination of the unfortunate situation in which I find myself. But I am sure that you will be able to understand the reaction caused by a sudden reversal of the path of life and hope and achievement I had been following."

The cook asked two janitors if they had heard the noise. They said they had. He came back and checked the laundry and the bedroom door twice, then went downstairs again and asked the two boys again if they were sure they had heard a noise. "Don't be afraid, there are no bombs here," one of them said.

Knocking on doors, calling for the captain, the cook told one of the janitors to climb a ladder and look through the bathroom window. When he came down the janitor said there was a figure lying on the floor, a woman, he thought, because it was wearing a blue bathrobe. Next to the body was a .38 caliber round that had done its work and lay there, bent on the floor.

"I am sure that the affairs of the Station will progress smoothly and effectively as long as necessary for the arrival of a relief," Bode wrote to Hepburn. "With a.s.surance of my deep grat.i.tude for your uniformly courteous consideration and the pleasure of my brief service under you. I am sincerely, Howard Bode."

"It is the opinion of the convening authority," the commandant of the 15th Naval District would conclude, "that although all of Captain Howard D. Bode's conduct up to his last act indicated that he was entirely rational, his reaction to criticism of his professional judgment and conduct as commanding officer of the USS Chicago Chicago during the first night action off Savo Island, resulted in a depression and unbalanced mental condition which was the direct cause of his death." during the first night action off Savo Island, resulted in a depression and unbalanced mental condition which was the direct cause of his death."

The chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery supported that conclusion in its endors.e.m.e.nt to Admiral King. "This Bureau concurs with the opinion of the Convening Authority and the Judge Advocate General that the death of Captain Bode occurred as a direct consequence of a severe mental illness characterized by depression, and accordingly is of the opinion that it should be considered not the result of his own misconduct."

A notation at the end of his personnel file indicates, apropos of nothing in particular, "Not a war casualty."

44.

Ironbottom Sound "THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN HAS NEVER BEEN fully realized," Joe Custer wrote. "Some day its detailed, barbaric history will awe the civilized world. The clock had been turned back thousands of years, back to the primitive, on Guadalca.n.a.l." fully realized," Joe Custer wrote. "Some day its detailed, barbaric history will awe the civilized world. The clock had been turned back thousands of years, back to the primitive, on Guadalca.n.a.l."

That history was quickly in the writing. The surrender ceremony on board the USS Missouri Missouri was barely two weeks past when recriminations were flying in the papers. The Marine Corps, it seemed, was working to shape its preferred narrative of the campaign. By that account, the marines had been left high and dry by the Navy and had to make do on their own. was barely two weeks past when recriminations were flying in the papers. The Marine Corps, it seemed, was working to shape its preferred narrative of the campaign. By that account, the marines had been left high and dry by the Navy and had to make do on their own.

In the fall of 1945, with the war just two weeks over, The New York Times The New York Times ran an article in which "senior Marine Corps operations officers" claimed that Ghormley's secretiveness had been costly at Guadalca.n.a.l, early on. "The Australian government, which might have moved to aid Admiral Ghormley, was alienated by his refusal to disclose the nature of his operations, it is said.... If Admiral Ghormley had been less secretive his original force might have been at least doubled, it is said here, and the tremendous tax upon the Marines would have been materially diminished." Ghormley made an easy target. But with Nimitz strongly allergic to public displays of interservice discord, no one rose to dispute the criticism. ran an article in which "senior Marine Corps operations officers" claimed that Ghormley's secretiveness had been costly at Guadalca.n.a.l, early on. "The Australian government, which might have moved to aid Admiral Ghormley, was alienated by his refusal to disclose the nature of his operations, it is said.... If Admiral Ghormley had been less secretive his original force might have been at least doubled, it is said here, and the tremendous tax upon the Marines would have been materially diminished." Ghormley made an easy target. But with Nimitz strongly allergic to public displays of interservice discord, no one rose to dispute the criticism.

Out of concern for decorum, Nimitz would long conceal the real reasons for Ghormley's relief. When Ghormley's son wrote Nimitz after the war to inquire as to CINCPAC's rationale, the admiral wrote back: "Your father was relieved by Admiral Halsey because of my belief that he was on the verge of a nervous breakdown during the early days of our attempt to capture Guadalca.n.a.l from the j.a.panese. The dispatches he sent to me from his headquarters in Noumea so alarmed my operations staff officers by their panicky and desperate tone that I decided to replace him with Admiral Halsey-who had been sent to the area for a lookaround.... We parted the very best of friends-and when he was returned to me for employment after he had had some leave at home he served most satisfactorily as Commandant of the 14th Naval District and Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and we were always on most friendly terms and I admired him and considered him to be my friend."

The war's psychological casualties, from Robert Ghormley to Howard Bode to Alleta Sullivan and on through the years, would never be counted. They were lost in the larger story, for November 1942 had brought the Allies a worldwide turning of the tide. The victories at Guadalca.n.a.l and in North Africa, broadly seen, were part of the same worldwide effort. The two major Axis nations could pursue their separate military ambitions, but "their hopes for a combined victory over their enemies still looked to a meeting in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, which had been blocked for the j.a.panese at Midway and in the Solomons as it was blocked for the Germans in North Africa and the southern part of the Eastern Front," the historian Gerhard Weinberg observed. A Collier's Collier's editorialist saw this on the day after Christmas 1942: "We don't claim to be prophets, but we feel constrained to agree with the numerous prophets, a.n.a.lysts and commentators who are saying that the first two weeks of November, 1942, in all probability, were the turning point of the war." editorialist saw this on the day after Christmas 1942: "We don't claim to be prophets, but we feel constrained to agree with the numerous prophets, a.n.a.lysts and commentators who are saying that the first two weeks of November, 1942, in all probability, were the turning point of the war."

Five months later, a contributor to the magazine wondered what had been gained. "We have not begun to penetrate more than j.a.pan's outpost lines. In sixteen months of war we have taken one airfield and three jungle towns. j.a.pan has captured an empire.... The j.a.panese could lose all of the Solomons and all of New Guinea and New Britain without endangering any vital point in their empire."

But the significance of the Guadalca.n.a.l campaign was never about just war materiel or real estate. Though the idea had haunted Yamamoto from the beginning that American victory was inevitable, the outcome was not foreordained by advantages in industry and war production. As the French Army's performance against Germany in 1940 had suggested, arms and materiel were not sufficient for victory. It had to be seized by men with an active will to fight. On that score j.a.pan had misestimated the United States as, in Weinberg's words, "unwilling to pay the price in blood and treasure to retake islands of which they had never heard, only to be returned to allies for whose colonial empires they had only disdain."

An American defeat was strongly possible well into November. Had such a setback occurred, Ernest King, who two weeks after Pearl Harbor was appointed COMINCH in a major shakeup, would likely have fallen in another one. The campaign would have been written off as his signature folly, a haphazardly conceived fantasy. King's powerful rivals such as General Hap Arnold would have testified morosely, no doubt, to the folly of the Navy's ambitions in the war's secondary theater. That it ended differently is a testament to the fighting character of the fleet at the squadron level. The Navy wasn't ready for its light forces-its cruisers and destroyers-to be the primary weapons of a naval campaign. By the end of November 1942, it wouldn't need to use much else to finish the job in the southern Solomons.

At Guadalca.n.a.l from August through November, the j.a.panese saw for the first time the terrifying aspect of the American nation resolved to total war and bent to slaughter. The Imperial j.a.panese Navy, well blooded, seemed to lose some of its will to fight. In the decades before the outbreak of the war, j.a.pan came to the negotiating table in Washington and again in London out of a conviction of its materiel inferiority to the Western navies. Despite its fleet's achievement in the early stages of the war, a powerful current within the IJN cast it as an underdog against the United States. It compensated for the perceived inferiority through a dedication to training and esprit de corps. After Guadalca.n.a.l, pessimism was preeminent again. Not until October 1944-and not in any of the significant amphibious invasions that took place from Tarawa to Peleliu-did j.a.pan again commit heavy surface forces to battle. The reason appears to be the shattering effect of the Guadalca.n.a.l defeat on morale.

Though j.a.panese losses in planes, pilots, and aircrewmen were terrible at Guadalca.n.a.l, far worse than at Midway, the 8th Fleet chief of staff, Toshikazu Ohmae, would cite the U.S. Fleet's use of radar-controlled gunfire as "the outstanding feature in the Guadalca.n.a.l campaign." The IJN's first realization, after the Battle of Cape Esperance, that the United States held a meaningful technology advantage at night was "a bad influence upon the morale of the men," Ohmae wrote. "The once high morale of the j.a.panese destroyer crews partic.i.p.ating in the so-called 'Tokyo Express'...soon suffered a letdown. This lack of confidence in night engagements" disclosed "physical and mental defects in the j.a.panese naval forces which partic.i.p.ated in the Guadalca.n.a.l sea battle fought from 12th to 14th November." A Marine veteran of Guadalca.n.a.l who became a general and a historian as well, Samuel B. Griffith II, argued that the land fighting had a "decisive nature." The air and sea actions were "ancillary." This avoids the fact that if the seas were lost, no level of gallantry would have saved the marines ash.o.r.e from starvation and attrition. Admiral Halsey drew a convincing parallel. "If our surface forces in this epic battle had been routed our land forces on Guadalca.n.a.l would have been in the same position as our forces in the Philippines were at the beginning of the war. Archie Vandegrift would have undoubtedly taken to the hills. Those who had fallen into the hands of the j.a.panese would have received the same horrible mistreatment our prisoners did on all occasions. Archie Vandegrift would have been the 'Skinny' Wainwright of Guadalca.n.a.l, and the Bataan Death March would have been repeated."

Raymond Spruance credited Kelly Turner foremost among those making courageous decisions prior to November 13. "There were many courageous decisions, from lowest to highest commands, and heroic actions without number. First place among them, however, belongs to the decision of Commander Task Force 67, well knowing the odds and possible destruction of his forces, to send his cruisers and destroyers against the j.a.panese battleship bombarding force, and the resolute manner in which our ships were led into the resulting battle. The night action of 1213 November probably saved Henderson Field and made possible subsequent air operations from Guadalca.n.a.l."

Some would question the value of that sacrifice. The historian Richard B. Frank did not second-guess Callaghan's tactical decisions, but wrote that the so-called Battle of Friday the 13th (or the Cruiser Night Action) only "purchased one night's respite for Henderson Field" and "postponed, not stopped, the landing of major j.a.panese reinforcements." However, the aviation historian John B. Lundstrom called that melee between ships "the key to Allied success" given what Henderson Field's fliers were thereby allowed to wreak the following day. The pivotal air attacks on the transport force throughout the day on the fourteenth might not have occurred at all had Abe's battleships been permitted to work over the airfields. And the meager troop landings that did take place were a fraction of what they might have been had all eleven transports reached Guadalca.n.a.l.

In Admiral King's a.n.a.lysis, Callaghan's fight was a triumph, despite the aspersions many, including the president of the Naval War College, Admiral Pye, would cast. "We have come to expect, and to count on, complete courage in battle from officers and men of the United States Navy," King wrote. "But here, in this engagement, we had displayed for our lasting respect and admiration, a cool but eager gallantry that is above praise. Had this battle not been fought and won, our hold on Guadalca.n.a.l would have been gravely endangered."

Having confronted the Imperial j.a.panese Navy's skill, energy, persistence, and courage, Nimitz identified the key to victory: "training, TRAINING and M-O-R-E T-R-A-I-N-I-N-G," he wrote King in February. In June 1943, the Navy's light forces got a new playbook from which to train. Common tactical principles were spelled out in Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Pacific Fleet, known as PAC 10. Its standardization of basic maneuvers helped make possible the victories of 1943, from Kolombangara (July 13) to Empress Augusta Bay (November 12) and onward. They also got better weapons. Terrible mechanical problems afflicted U.S. torpedoes in the first year of the war. The scuttlings of the known as PAC 10. Its standardization of basic maneuvers helped make possible the victories of 1943, from Kolombangara (July 13) to Empress Augusta Bay (November 12) and onward. They also got better weapons. Terrible mechanical problems afflicted U.S. torpedoes in the first year of the war. The scuttlings of the Benham Benham and and Hornet Hornet were cases in point; in both instances, American destroyers firing on static targets at point-blank range had embarra.s.sing results. Only three of the first eight fired by the were cases in point; in both instances, American destroyers firing on static targets at point-blank range had embarra.s.sing results. Only three of the first eight fired by the Mustin Mustin against the against the Hornet Hornet hit and exploded. None of the four that the hit and exploded. None of the four that the Gwin Gwin fired at the fired at the Benham Benham scored. scored.

The emotional truth of battle was a deeper, more complex matter. Robert Graff had years to think about it, and years not to talk. After serving in three warships he returned to New York to pursue a career in broadcast journalism at NBC. He put the "inhuman existence" of his experiences on the Atlanta Atlanta out of his mind. out of his mind.

"War is unlike life," he said. "It's a denial of everything you learn life is. And that's why when you get finished with it, you see that it offers no lessons that can't be better learned in civilian life. You are exposed to horrors you would sooner forget. A disconnect needs to be made to get yourself cleansed." His children were after him for thirty-five years to talk about it. "I refused. I said 'Read it in the history books. I can't do it justice.' We were closed up tight as a clam." He attended the reunions of the Atlanta, Atlanta, the the Monterey, Monterey, and the and the Flint, Flint, a sister ship to the a sister ship to the Atlanta, Atlanta, only spa.r.s.ely. Then the memberships aged, and their a.s.sociations faded away. only spa.r.s.ely. Then the memberships aged, and their a.s.sociations faded away.

Before Christmas in 1997, his son, age fifty-five, made him an offer that Graff wished on one level that he could have refused: a trip to Guadalca.n.a.l. They would fly there via Fiji and stay in a j.a.panese-owned hotel in Honaira about ten miles up the coast from Henderson Field. All the arrangements had been made for a five-day trip. Against his better judgment, and years of reflexive avoidance, he agreed to go. They flew out in November 1998.

"I couldn't stop crying for most of the five days," Graff said. "After that trip, it was like finally I'm back in life. Like so many people, I never opened my mouth for fifty years about all of this. Suddenly everything was open. Most people get to that stage only with the help of doctors."

They spent the first few days visiting battle sites. There were rusted hulks of trucks and tanks and memorials to fallen Americans and j.a.panese. The drive out to Cape Esperance took them over twenty-five miles of rough island roads.

One morning they chartered a dive boat and took it out into Savo Sound armed with bouquets of flowers and leis and a big floating raft. The skipper gave a signal when they arrived over the wreck, 421 feet below. Using the sonor, backing down once or twice and pulling the helm as if he were parking a car, the captain positioned the boat over the wreck, then, on Graff's request, cut the engines and shut down the air-conditioning system. "We're right over the Atlanta, Atlanta," the captain said. Graff wanted silence.

The Atlanta Atlanta survivor went to the fantail with a Melanesian Episcopal padre who had helped them make the arrangements. The padre, Graff's son Christopher, and his grandson Kenneth, who was in his twenties, each said a few words. The grandson talked about how far away the war seemed now, and how it was hard to understand what it was all about because its veterans didn't like to talk. So far away, and so little to talk about, except the hulk of the ship right below them, lying on her side on a ridge in the mud, her remaining anchor still wedged in the bank to keep her from going aground. survivor went to the fantail with a Melanesian Episcopal padre who had helped them make the arrangements. The padre, Graff's son Christopher, and his grandson Kenneth, who was in his twenties, each said a few words. The grandson talked about how far away the war seemed now, and how it was hard to understand what it was all about because its veterans didn't like to talk. So far away, and so little to talk about, except the hulk of the ship right below them, lying on her side on a ridge in the mud, her remaining anchor still wedged in the bank to keep her from going aground.

Somebody read some Scripture, then, stepping onto a diving platform mounted just inches above the surface, Graff began his eulogy. He addressed it to his former shipmates, whom he could sense all around him. He said that he had come out with his family to honor them and that they were good people and would be always remembered. "From the waters surrounding us, millions of javelins, reflected rays of the sun, blind us with your memory and pierce our hearts." He wondered whether life had turned out as they all had hoped it would, and said he feared there might not be much to show for everybody's efforts. "We were the youthful hope of the nation and the promise of mankind. Taking the world as we found it, in our way and in our time, we tried to remake the world-more hope, more possibility, a much larger community for happiness. That is what, years ago, brought us to Guadalca.n.a.l."

The three men and the padre threw their leis onto the water, and then pushed the raft overboard with a copy of the text of the speech. "And we just stood there and everybody cried watching these float on the surface of the water away from the ship on the current. And then I remember when it was time to go, and the captain started the engine. I impulsively removed the Navy cap I brought with me and flung it into the water with the flowers. And I sat down in the corner of the upper deck and cried a little bit more.

"Finally we got back to sh.o.r.e, and that was that."

PHOTO INSERT.

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(Photo Credit: 1) Admiral Ernest J. King: "He would acknowledge no mind as superior to his own."

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(Photo Credit: 2) Admiral Chester W. Nimitz: the Pacific War's essential man.

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(Photo Credit: 3) Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley wasn't Nimitz's first choice to command South Pacific naval forces. His remote leadership style and tight nerves would lead to his relief by Halsey.

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(Photo Credit: 4) Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, victorious at Coral Sea and Midway, took heat for his cautious employment of his carriers off Guadalca.n.a.l.

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(Photo Credit: 5) Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of amphibious forces, had a virulent disagreement with Fletcher over how Operation Watchtower should be run.

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(Photo Credit: 6) Rear Admiral John S. McCain, commander of land-based naval air forces in the South Pacific.