Neptune's Inferno_ The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal Part 16

They departed Espiritu Santo's Segond Channel anchorage at 11:30 p.m. on November 29, following a van composed of the destroyers Fletcher, Drayton, Maury, Fletcher, Drayton, Maury, and and Perkins. Perkins. When they reached the eastern entrance to Lengo Channel at nine forty the next night, Wright's task force encountered some friendly transports. Augmenting his tag team, Halsey ordered two of their escorts, the When they reached the eastern entrance to Lengo Channel at nine forty the next night, Wright's task force encountered some friendly transports. Augmenting his tag team, Halsey ordered two of their escorts, the Lamson Lamson and and Lardner, Lardner, to fall in astern the to fall in astern the Northampton. Northampton. And so another pickup squad with fresh leadership and big ideas headed north toward its destiny. And so another pickup squad with fresh leadership and big ideas headed north toward its destiny.

The Fletcher, Fletcher, with its modern SG radar, rode at the head of the line. If this was an improvement over Callaghan's approach two weeks before, the urge to hesitate would once again rise as a plague. According to the with its modern SG radar, rode at the head of the line. If this was an improvement over Callaghan's approach two weeks before, the urge to hesitate would once again rise as a plague. According to the Fletcher Fletcher's executive officer, Lieutenant Joseph C. Wylie, "About the last visual dispatch we got before dusk settled in were instructions stating not to commence firing without permission."

Wylie was on the radar when strange contacts began to register. The first one appeared to the radar officer in the Minneapolis Minneapolis like "a small wart on Cape Esperance which grew larger and finally detached itself from the outline of the land ma.s.s." As Tanaka's force steamed within range of the American microwaves, Wylie reported their bearing, course, and speed to the other destroyers. With torpedoes ready, he radioed Wright, " like "a small wart on Cape Esperance which grew larger and finally detached itself from the outline of the land ma.s.s." As Tanaka's force steamed within range of the American microwaves, Wylie reported their bearing, course, and speed to the other destroyers. With torpedoes ready, he radioed Wright, "REQUEST PERMISSION TO FIRE TORPEDOES." Wylie would call the task force commander's response "the most stupid thing that I have ever heard of." It was a single word: "NO." Wright deemed the range too long.

For four critical minutes Wright mulled the black night from the bridge of the Minneapolis. Minneapolis. When he finally granted permission to the destroyers to fire their torpedoes, the radar showed that their targets had already pa.s.sed them abeam, leaving the American missiles to pursue them from astern, a fruitless waste of fighting power. When Wright ordered the cruisers to open fire less than a minute after the destroyers had let fly, surprise became a casualty of impulsiveness, and what ensued was another confused free-for-all. As cruiser gunfire obliterated the senses, Wright lost sight of his targets behind the walls of water raised in front of them by American guns. When he finally granted permission to the destroyers to fire their torpedoes, the radar showed that their targets had already pa.s.sed them abeam, leaving the American missiles to pursue them from astern, a fruitless waste of fighting power. When Wright ordered the cruisers to open fire less than a minute after the destroyers had let fly, surprise became a casualty of impulsiveness, and what ensued was another confused free-for-all. As cruiser gunfire obliterated the senses, Wright lost sight of his targets behind the walls of water raised in front of them by American guns.

The spectacle was familiar to men observing from the beach. Lloyd Mustin and the others at Captain Greenman's headquarters saw great flashes of light that were too large to be mere gun discharges. They didn't know whose ships were out there bursting into flames, and there would be no knowing till morning. Suddenly and anticlimactically, Mustin's radio went silent. The sober messages that trickled in to Radio Guadalca.n.a.l over the next couple of hours told the story. From the Minneapolis Minneapolis came a dispatch before dawn that she had been torpedoed and was under way for Lunga at half a knot. The came a dispatch before dawn that she had been torpedoed and was under way for Lunga at half a knot. The Pensacola Pensacola weighed in with a similar report. Then Admiral Wright raised Greenman, asking: "C weighed in with a similar report. Then Admiral Wright raised Greenman, asking: "CAN YOU SEND BOATS TOWARD S SAVO?" The implications of the request were clear enough. Mustin instructed the Bobolink Bobolink and four PT boats to sweep the sound, while Wright's second in command, Rear Admiral Mahlon S. Tisdale, ordered the destroyers to a.s.sist damaged cruisers northwest of Lunga Point. Wright then pa.s.sed along a fuller report of the shattering damage inflicted on his task force and asked him to send it to Halsey. and four PT boats to sweep the sound, while Wright's second in command, Rear Admiral Mahlon S. Tisdale, ordered the destroyers to a.s.sist damaged cruisers northwest of Lunga Point. Wright then pa.s.sed along a fuller report of the shattering damage inflicted on his task force and asked him to send it to Halsey.

The news of the rout was shocking to anyone who believed the fleet was at last on the path to victory. Wanting a clearer picture, Captain Greenman ordered Mustin to go up as an airborne observer to survey the sound. Racing to Henderson Field at dawn, the Atlanta Atlanta survivor climbed into the rear seat of a Dauntless. The Marine pilot checked him out on the dive-bomber's twin-mounted Brownings, and they took to the skies. survivor climbed into the rear seat of a Dauntless. The Marine pilot checked him out on the dive-bomber's twin-mounted Brownings, and they took to the skies.

Gaining alt.i.tude over Ironbottom Sound, Mustin could see no ships anywhere. He raised the PT boat headquarters at Tulagi, but the mosquito fleet didn't know much, either. Several long turns over the waters south of Savo yielded no clues until the morning sun reached the proper angle to the water, and then he saw it: a wide sprawling oil slick trailing away to the west with the friction of an eight-knot wind. It marked the resting place of yet another American ship in what some would call the Savo Navy Yard, or Ironbottom Sound. Her ident.i.ty would be established soon enough. It was the Northampton, Northampton, gutted by torpedoes fired by Tanaka's surprised but quick-triggered destroyer commanders. gutted by torpedoes fired by Tanaka's surprised but quick-triggered destroyer commanders.

When Wright's cruisers opened fire, they erred in concentrating on a single ship, the destroyer Takanami, Takanami, riding ahead of Tanaka's group as a picket. As American projectiles straddled her and she returned fire, the cruisers' salvos, drawn to the light, converged in earnest. With memories still haunting the j.a.panese of what the riding ahead of Tanaka's group as a picket. As American projectiles straddled her and she returned fire, the cruisers' salvos, drawn to the light, converged in earnest. With memories still haunting the j.a.panese of what the Washington Washington and and South Dakota South Dakota had wrought fifteen days before, it was easy for Tanaka to believe the American force included battleships. had wrought fifteen days before, it was easy for Tanaka to believe the American force included battleships.

Surprised but resilient, Tanaka ordered all commanders, "Belay supply schedule! All ships, prepare to fight!" "Belay supply schedule! All ships, prepare to fight!" The crews cast loose as many supply drums as they could when they brought their batteries to bear. Shielded by the flames of the The crews cast loose as many supply drums as they could when they brought their batteries to bear. Shielded by the flames of the Takanami, Takanami, much as the much as the Washington Washington had been masked by the burning destroyers a few weeks before, Tanaka accelerated to full speed and ordered a course reversal that brought his column running parallel to his targets. His destroyers proceeded to let loose with one of the most lethal torpedo salvos of the war. had been masked by the burning destroyers a few weeks before, Tanaka accelerated to full speed and ordered a course reversal that brought his column running parallel to his targets. His destroyers proceeded to let loose with one of the most lethal torpedo salvos of the war.

From on high in the rear seat of a Dauntless, Mustin could see the evidence of the swarm of fish that had beset Task Force 67. Washed up on Guadalca.n.a.l's northern beaches and Savo Island, their long forms lay at angles on the sand. Many were shiny and new, recently run aground. A great many more, of both American and j.a.panese origin, had decayed to rust, long of residence ash.o.r.e. Their numbers spoke to the great volume of underwater ordnance loosed in both directions in these waters over the past few months.

Amid the flotsam on the sea below, Mustin could make out the workaday paraphernalia of U.S. Navy shipboard life: powder cases, wooden shoring, life rafts, donut rings, and wreckage of varied kinds. There were a great many sailors in the water, too, and many more waved from the sh.o.r.es of Savo. The PT boats were soon among them. Tulagi's "splinter fleet" puttered about, joining the Fletcher Fletcher and and Drayton Drayton in rescue duty. in rescue duty.

Turning to pa.s.s over Tulagi, Mustin finally saw some large American ships. The Minneapolis Minneapolis and and New Orleans New Orleans were tied up close to sh.o.r.e, in the triage unit for wounded U.S. cruisers, mangled and nearly unrecognizable. The were tied up close to sh.o.r.e, in the triage unit for wounded U.S. cruisers, mangled and nearly unrecognizable. The New Orleans New Orleans had had her forecastle, about 150 feet of hull, removed clear back to her second turret by a single Long Lance. Its blast had triggered an adjoining magazine full of aircraft bombs and a large demolition charge, throwing a tower of flames and sparks twice as high as the foremast and turning the surrounding sea into a ma.s.s of flame. One hundred and eighty-two men, including the entire crew of turret two, died by shock. As the ship turned right, a fifty-yard length of the ship's own bow and forecastle tore away to port. One end of this heavy wreckage subducted under the keel, and the other bounced along the port side of the hull, tearing holes and wrecking the port inboard propeller. Sailors stationed aft believed they were running over the sinking carca.s.s of the had had her forecastle, about 150 feet of hull, removed clear back to her second turret by a single Long Lance. Its blast had triggered an adjoining magazine full of aircraft bombs and a large demolition charge, throwing a tower of flames and sparks twice as high as the foremast and turning the surrounding sea into a ma.s.s of flame. One hundred and eighty-two men, including the entire crew of turret two, died by shock. As the ship turned right, a fifty-yard length of the ship's own bow and forecastle tore away to port. One end of this heavy wreckage subducted under the keel, and the other bounced along the port side of the hull, tearing holes and wrecking the port inboard propeller. Sailors stationed aft believed they were running over the sinking carca.s.s of the Minneapolis Minneapolis ahead. ahead.

Confronted with this cataclysm, Captain Clifford H. Roper pa.s.sed the order to abandon ship. However, the exec, Commander Whitaker F. Riggs, canceled the order from his station in the rear of the ship, and ordered the crew to "lighten ship" with an eye toward saving her. And that's just what they did.

As the New Orleans New Orleans nodded under by the bow, her broken nose plowing up a pile of foam, open to the sea, the damage-control officer, Lieutenant Commander Hubert M. Hayter, and two subordinates, Lieutenant Richard A. Haines and Ensign Andrew L. Forman, remained at their post deep below in Central Station as it filled with toxic gas. When the air became unbreathable, Hayter gave his gas mask to an enlisted man who was suffering, then ordered all hands to evacuate. Two avenues of escape were available. One, a trunk that led from Central Station to the main deck, was blocked by flooding above, and Commander Hayter knew this. The other was a narrow, three-foot-diameter steel tube that led upward to the wardroom. The plotting room crew scurried up through it, but when Hayter's turn came, he found that his shoulders were too broad to fit through the opening to the tube, which was reinforced with a thick steel collar. Ordering "Small men first," he returned to his desk and resumed his damage-control duties. Haines and Forman remained with him in their increasingly untenable station until all three were asphyxiated. "I wondered what he thought about in those final minutes," the ship's chaplain, Howell M. Forgy, would write, "but I knew one thing: he was not afraid." nodded under by the bow, her broken nose plowing up a pile of foam, open to the sea, the damage-control officer, Lieutenant Commander Hubert M. Hayter, and two subordinates, Lieutenant Richard A. Haines and Ensign Andrew L. Forman, remained at their post deep below in Central Station as it filled with toxic gas. When the air became unbreathable, Hayter gave his gas mask to an enlisted man who was suffering, then ordered all hands to evacuate. Two avenues of escape were available. One, a trunk that led from Central Station to the main deck, was blocked by flooding above, and Commander Hayter knew this. The other was a narrow, three-foot-diameter steel tube that led upward to the wardroom. The plotting room crew scurried up through it, but when Hayter's turn came, he found that his shoulders were too broad to fit through the opening to the tube, which was reinforced with a thick steel collar. Ordering "Small men first," he returned to his desk and resumed his damage-control duties. Haines and Forman remained with him in their increasingly untenable station until all three were asphyxiated. "I wondered what he thought about in those final minutes," the ship's chaplain, Howell M. Forgy, would write, "but I knew one thing: he was not afraid."

Forward, at the site of the magazine explosion, a sailor named Gust Swenning, shipfitter second cla.s.s, dove beneath the rising waters to locate and wrestle closed an open watertight hatch that was causing the ship's sickbay compartment to flood. Badly injured in the initial explosion, and struggling against heavy fumes, Swenning plunged into the dark, dangerous void at least five times, groping around until he finally closed the hatch. He remained on duty through most of the next day until, lungs poisoned by noxious elements, he died of pulmonary edema.

Tied up to Tulagi's sh.o.r.e, the shattered hull of the New Orleans, New Orleans, truncated like a barge, lay draped in vegetation and cargo nets to hide it from enemy planes. It was an inglorious state for the ship whose chaplain, Commander Forgy, had coined the immortal phrase "Praise the Lord and pa.s.s the ammunition" while exhorting his ship's antiaircraft gunners under attack at Pearl Harbor. The truncated like a barge, lay draped in vegetation and cargo nets to hide it from enemy planes. It was an inglorious state for the ship whose chaplain, Commander Forgy, had coined the immortal phrase "Praise the Lord and pa.s.s the ammunition" while exhorting his ship's antiaircraft gunners under attack at Pearl Harbor. The Minneapolis Minneapolis was alongside her, too, similarly coiffed, the tug was alongside her, too, similarly coiffed, the tug Bobolink Bobolink serving as a pump house to keep her leaks from pulling her under. The crews of the broken ships hauled logs out of Tulagi's jungle to use as shoring for the forward compartments, and arranged with the Marine chaplain ash.o.r.e to bury the dead. serving as a pump house to keep her leaks from pulling her under. The crews of the broken ships hauled logs out of Tulagi's jungle to use as shoring for the forward compartments, and arranged with the Marine chaplain ash.o.r.e to bury the dead.

The Pensacola Pensacola was lucky to survive a battering by Long Lances. One of them shattered a full oil tank forward of turret three, tore the deck open above it, and splashed a fiery wave of oil all over the after part of the ship, topside and belowdecks. With the after fire main destroyed, her crew fought severe oil fires through the night, spreading carbon dioxide and foam compounds by hand as the ship was concussed by the deep cadence of eight-inch rounds detonating, one by one, all 150 of them, in the after magazine. was lucky to survive a battering by Long Lances. One of them shattered a full oil tank forward of turret three, tore the deck open above it, and splashed a fiery wave of oil all over the after part of the ship, topside and belowdecks. With the after fire main destroyed, her crew fought severe oil fires through the night, spreading carbon dioxide and foam compounds by hand as the ship was concussed by the deep cadence of eight-inch rounds detonating, one by one, all 150 of them, in the after magazine.

Wright might have expected better of his task force, given that he had surprised Tanaka by radar at long range. Three of his cruisers (all but the Pensacola Pensacola and and Northampton Northampton) enjoyed the superb sight picture provided by the advanced SG radar. But Wright understood little of the combat capability of his enemy. In his December 9 after-action report, he concluded that the torpedoings of the Pensacola Pensacola and and Northampton Northampton had been lucky shots from submarines. "The observed positions of the enemy surface vessels before and during the gun action makes it seem improbable that torpedoes with speeddistance characteristics similar to our own could have reached the cruisers." Of course, Wright's torpedoes were nothing like those of the j.a.panese. had been lucky shots from submarines. "The observed positions of the enemy surface vessels before and during the gun action makes it seem improbable that torpedoes with speeddistance characteristics similar to our own could have reached the cruisers." Of course, Wright's torpedoes were nothing like those of the j.a.panese.

Nearly a year into the war, and four months into a bitter campaign against j.a.panese surface forces, it seems incomprehensible that an American cruiser commander could be unaware of the enemy advantage in torpedo warfare. Norman Scott had called it specifically to Admiral Halsey's attention in October. The reports were there to be read. Before he rode to his death in the naval campaign for Java, the captain of the heavy cruiser Houston, Houston, Captain Albert H. Rooks, turned over to a colleague in Darwin an a.n.a.lysis he had written three weeks before the Pearl Harbor attack. It discussed at length j.a.pan's prowess in torpedo combat and described their aggressively realistic night battle training. Their mastery of this specialty had been recommended to them by their experience in the Russo-j.a.panese War. When their diplomats agreed to constrain the size of their big-gun fleet at the Washington Conference, the j.a.panese, like other navies, emphasized construction of their light forces. Rooks's prewar report, which was based substantially on existing work of the Office of Naval Intelligence, never found its way into the battle plans. Not even Halsey grasped the superiority of j.a.panese surface-ship torpedoes. After Ta.s.safaronga he endorsed Wright's view that the outcome had to have been the result of submarines. Norman Scott's October victory over a surprised j.a.panese force that failed to get its torpedoes into the water might have led the Americans to underestimate the weapon and place undue importance on gunnery. Captain Albert H. Rooks, turned over to a colleague in Darwin an a.n.a.lysis he had written three weeks before the Pearl Harbor attack. It discussed at length j.a.pan's prowess in torpedo combat and described their aggressively realistic night battle training. Their mastery of this specialty had been recommended to them by their experience in the Russo-j.a.panese War. When their diplomats agreed to constrain the size of their big-gun fleet at the Washington Conference, the j.a.panese, like other navies, emphasized construction of their light forces. Rooks's prewar report, which was based substantially on existing work of the Office of Naval Intelligence, never found its way into the battle plans. Not even Halsey grasped the superiority of j.a.panese surface-ship torpedoes. After Ta.s.safaronga he endorsed Wright's view that the outcome had to have been the result of submarines. Norman Scott's October victory over a surprised j.a.panese force that failed to get its torpedoes into the water might have led the Americans to underestimate the weapon and place undue importance on gunnery.

The reward for this ignorance was to see four proud ships, two of them fitted with the new radar that had proven decisive in more capable hands, "picked off like mechanical ducks in a carnival shooting gallery," as Samuel Eliot Morison would put it. Only the Honolulu, Honolulu, a sister ship to the a sister ship to the Helena, Helena, had been able to avoid the burning wrecks ahead and zigzag clear of the torpedo water. The had been able to avoid the burning wrecks ahead and zigzag clear of the torpedo water. The Minneapolis, New Orleans, Minneapolis, New Orleans, and and Pensacola Pensacola were put out of action for almost a year. were put out of action for almost a year.

Generous in defeat, Wright recommended all five of his cruiser captains for the Navy Cross, writing speciously that each had "contributed greatly to the destruction of all enemy vessels within range." He made the wildly inaccurate claim that Task Force 67 had sunk two light cruisers and seven destroyers and praised the Northampton Northampton's captain for the speed with which his crew abandoned ship. The award to Captain Roper of the New Orleans New Orleans would puzzle survivors of that ship-"He did nothing heroic in any sense," one would write. Having crushed Wright's force, Tanaka faced a predicament comparable to the one his countryman Mikawa had faced in August. As he regrouped fifty miles from Guadalca.n.a.l's beach, he found that his ships were low on torpedoes. With only two destroyers fully loaded, he decided he was no longer in shape to risk another fight. He gave the order to return to Rabaul. Though his reputation was high among Americans, Tanaka would take lumps at home for declining to exploit his victory by delivering his supplies to the island. Here as in August, the Americans, for all their failings, could interpret a ghastly result as a win. would puzzle survivors of that ship-"He did nothing heroic in any sense," one would write. Having crushed Wright's force, Tanaka faced a predicament comparable to the one his countryman Mikawa had faced in August. As he regrouped fifty miles from Guadalca.n.a.l's beach, he found that his ships were low on torpedoes. With only two destroyers fully loaded, he decided he was no longer in shape to risk another fight. He gave the order to return to Rabaul. Though his reputation was high among Americans, Tanaka would take lumps at home for declining to exploit his victory by delivering his supplies to the island. Here as in August, the Americans, for all their failings, could interpret a ghastly result as a win.

[image]

Order of Battle-Battle of Ta.s.safaronga (November 30, 1942) [image]

U.S.

TASK FORCE 67.

Rear Adm. Carleton H. Wright Minneapolis (CA) (flagship) (CA) (flagship) New Orleans (CA) (CA) Pensacola (CA) (CA) Northampton (CA) (CA) Honolulu (CL) (CL) Fletcher (DD) (DD) Drayton (DD) (DD) Maury (DD) (DD) Perkins (DD) (DD) Lamson (DD) (DD) Lardner (DD) (DD) j.a.pan REINFORCEMENT UNIT.

Rear Adm. Raizo Tanaka Naganami (flagship) (flagship) Takanami (DD) (DD) Oyashio (DD) (DD) Kuroshio (DD) (DD) Kagero (DD) (DD) Makinami (DD) (DD) Kawakaze (DD) (DD) Suzukaze (DD) (DD) [image]

[image]

(Photo Credit: 40.1) ***

WITH THE IMPERIAL j.a.pANESE Army's transport force decimated, and attrition to his destroyers reaching critical levels, Yamamoto was hard-pressed to provision the Imperial Army on Guadalca.n.a.l. The j.a.panese soldiers ash.o.r.e were nourished by a withering vine. Of the thirty thousand men serving there at the end of November, it was estimated that just forty-two hundred were fit to fight. One three-thousand-man regiment reportedly had just sixty to seventy men capable of service. Admiral Ugaki called the cargo load of supplies landed in the last week of November "just chicken feed for thirty thousand men." On December 3, fifteen hundred drums were delivered without heavy opposition from the American fleet, but only about a third of the drums were recovered by the troops. On December 7, the Tokyo Express ran again, eleven destroyers under Captain Torajiro Sato. Planes from Henderson hara.s.sed them, and eight PT boats roared in after them, too. It was an inconsequential skirmish, but the unexpected presence of enemy combat forces compelled the j.a.panese to withdraw. Army's transport force decimated, and attrition to his destroyers reaching critical levels, Yamamoto was hard-pressed to provision the Imperial Army on Guadalca.n.a.l. The j.a.panese soldiers ash.o.r.e were nourished by a withering vine. Of the thirty thousand men serving there at the end of November, it was estimated that just forty-two hundred were fit to fight. One three-thousand-man regiment reportedly had just sixty to seventy men capable of service. Admiral Ugaki called the cargo load of supplies landed in the last week of November "just chicken feed for thirty thousand men." On December 3, fifteen hundred drums were delivered without heavy opposition from the American fleet, but only about a third of the drums were recovered by the troops. On December 7, the Tokyo Express ran again, eleven destroyers under Captain Torajiro Sato. Planes from Henderson hara.s.sed them, and eight PT boats roared in after them, too. It was an inconsequential skirmish, but the unexpected presence of enemy combat forces compelled the j.a.panese to withdraw.

As new American naval forces steamed toward the South Pacific, a decisive victory was no longer within Yamamoto's grasp. Only after it had slipped from his fingers would he recognize the opportunity he had had within his reach in September and October. The time for the battle had pa.s.sed. It had been preempted, if not won, by Scott, Callaghan, Lee, and, in his way, Wright. The U.S. Navy's narrow victories of November allowed it to absorb a catastrophe like Ta.s.safaronga. This defeat resembled the first one, the Battle of Savo Island, in that it sh.o.r.ed up, at fearful cost, the position of the men on the island and allowed them to build up strength to fight in their own defense.

Tanaka's final "drum runs" in December provoked no further large naval battles. No significant American formations were mustered to meet him, but he met fierce resistance from Henderson Field's aviators and the PT boats from Tulagi, which inflicted incremental losses on the Tokyo Express and forced Yamamoto to begin diverting submarines from hunting ships to running the blockade. On the night of the ninth, a pair of PT boats caught a j.a.panese sub on the surface three miles off Kamimbo Bay, towing a barge full of ammunition, food, and medicine. They opened their throttles, rushed in, and sank the I-3 I-3 with torpedoes. Credit for the kill went to the with torpedoes. Credit for the kill went to the PT-59, PT-59, captained by John M. Searles. "This was quite a feather in the cap of those PT boat boys," said Lloyd Mustin. captained by John M. Searles. "This was quite a feather in the cap of those PT boat boys," said Lloyd Mustin.

On December 11, Tanaka led what would be the final run of the Tokyo Express. The mosquito fleet intercepted his force of nine destroyers between Cape Esperance and Savo Island. Tanaka's flagship, the Teruzuki, Teruzuki, took a torpedo that detonated her depth charge stowage, sinking her. Fewer than one in five of the twelve hundred drums thrown overboard reached the beach. took a torpedo that detonated her depth charge stowage, sinking her. Fewer than one in five of the twelve hundred drums thrown overboard reached the beach.

Victory did not come by way of a shattering decisive battle. It came through attrition, exacted relentlessly, night after night. Victory, when it came, did not march on parade. It announced itself more subtly, through a return to normalcy and a reemergence of human behaviors that tended to disappear in periods of emergency, when the urgent struggle for survival concentrated minds. At the ice plant within the Marine perimeter, some enterprising leathernecks made a robust black market selling a slushy grog made from papayas, limes, fruit juice, and a surplus of torpedo fuel. When the fresh and generously supplied men of the Americal Division arrived, veteran riflemen suckered them mercilessly, selling to credulous souvenir seekers counterfeit j.a.panese battle flags manufactured at the parachute loft. On Red Beach that December, discipline among the beachmaster's boat crews teetered on the brink of breakdown. Cargo ships carrying shipments of beer quickly found themselves swarmed by lighters jockeying to unload them. Nets swung from the booms of ammunition ships full of bombs and howitzer projectiles and machine-gun ammunition and canned pineapple, but few boats volunteered to take them. Beer received higher priority. Delighted to find a Liberty ship carrying thirty thousand cases, thieves loaded up their boats and spirited the suds up the beach to a secret depot that was quite secure from discovery owing to its location several miles behind j.a.panese lines-"a fiasco which would be rather deplorable if it weren't so humorous," Lloyd Mustin said. "The boat crews knew it too, but by George, they were going to land some beer in a private cache known only to them."

The new commanding officer of American ground forces on Guadalca.n.a.l, General Patch, let the whole thing slide. He reportedly allowed fantastic quant.i.ties of surplus to pile up for off-the-books requisition. Just one in six cases of beer ferried ash.o.r.e reached the quartermaster dump. Much as the Army supply clerks might have protested, no complaints ever came from Patch, who seemed to regard the theft as a generous toast to his brothers in arms who had served so well since August.

Under Patch, Guadalca.n.a.l would begin its transformation to a rear-area base, a place dense with storage depots, hospitals, baseball games, fire trucks, and ration dumps with beer stacked higher than two men could stand. There would be automotive maintenance shops, chapels, water carnivals and regattas with clowns on surfboards, forestry companies, performances by Bob Hope and Jerry Colonna, gardens tended by j.a.panese POWs, kennel shows, and visits by Eleanor Roosevelt. An armed forces radio affiliate known as The Mosquito Network would flourish there. Its program supervisor, hired out of Hollywood, would create a musical segment called the "Atabrine c.o.c.ktail Hour," promoting faithful use of the anti-malaria medication. Troops coming ash.o.r.e would do so now as rehearsals for landings farther north and westward.

The Imperial j.a.panese Navy had lost the ability to impose its will on the waters of Savo Sound. Ash.o.r.e, the position of the 17th Army, desperately drawn in to hold small parts of the island's tangled and mountainous twenty-five hundred square miles, was about as precarious as the initial U.S. position. "The whole color of the war ash.o.r.e on Guadalca.n.a.l was changing, and we could see it," said Lloyd Mustin.

41.

Future Rising IN THIS SEA OF DESTINY, A SPANISH PRIEST HAD ONCE SEEN BOTH THE scale and the pattern of the coming days. Men now living, the survivors of the inferno of 1942, could begin to see the shape of the future, too. It was a wide, islanded oceanic vista cut through now with markers for a trail that would become a path that would become a road. Extended and improved by other ships and other crews, it would lead all the way to Tokyo. scale and the pattern of the coming days. Men now living, the survivors of the inferno of 1942, could begin to see the shape of the future, too. It was a wide, islanded oceanic vista cut through now with markers for a trail that would become a path that would become a road. Extended and improved by other ships and other crews, it would lead all the way to Tokyo.

Some would say the victory at Guadalca.n.a.l led nowhere. After all, instead of setting sights on conquering Rabaul, the Navy and the Marines would bypa.s.s it, jumping north to Tarawa and pouring through the Central Pacific. MacArthur would carry the fight on a line to the west, following a parallel route along New Guinea's northern coast toward the Philippines. But the rights of way for all these roads were laid by the ships and men of the South Pacific Forces. If they had faltered, Australia and New Zealand would have stood alone and America's confidence to undertake a serious offensive anywhere at all might have been broken entirely. For the American veterans of the struggle in the South Pacific, another road lay before them, a road home for a brief respite, and then a return to the war that gave no permanent reprieves except to the dead.

For several days after the Atlanta Atlanta went down, Robert Graff drifted in and out of consciousness in a Lunga Point foxhole. Effectively checked out of the campaign, he was unaware of the final dramas that raged in Savo Sound. The pillars of the earth shook beneath him, but he remained in his own world, bruised body and mind rallying to their own defense. went down, Robert Graff drifted in and out of consciousness in a Lunga Point foxhole. Effectively checked out of the campaign, he was unaware of the final dramas that raged in Savo Sound. The pillars of the earth shook beneath him, but he remained in his own world, bruised body and mind rallying to their own defense.

One night Graff was placed in a small boat and sent to a waiting cargo ship, and along with many other stretcher cases was taken to Espiritu Santo. There, in a series of operations in a medical hut, doctors removed chunks of shrapnel that had riddled him that night. That's where he first heard the whole story of the loss of his ship, and of the deaths of Admiral Scott and the others on the Atlanta Atlanta's bridge under heavy fire from friend and foe. It felt like a story told by a stranger from another world. He walled himself off from the experience, even as he couldn't quite shake his wonderment that he had survived it. He would reflect on the arbitrary randomness of his luck for the rest of his life. "People were killed all around me. It put me in a very, very deep emotional funk for years."

Graff was taken to Efate to recover. Most of the other medical evacuees were taken to Noumea, where they were transferred to the "receiving ship," which was not a vessel but a transfer facility consisting of a large tent city on a scenic hillside, well populated with survivors of the Hornet, Hornet, the the Atlanta, Atlanta, the the Northampton, Northampton, and various sunken destroyers. In time they were gathered and transferred to the holds of a transport, the and various sunken destroyers. In time they were gathered and transferred to the holds of a transport, the President Monroe, President Monroe, which ferried them to Auckland. Graff ended up in Auckland, too. which ferried them to Auckland. Graff ended up in Auckland, too.

On arrival in the harbor, Graff heard strains of a military band playing its bouncing repertoire. Recent history started to catch up with him then. "I just cried my heart out," he said. "I could not get ahold of myself, whatever there was to hold onto." A nurse came into his hospital room once or twice and lulled, "Shhh, there's nothing to cry about, old man." But she couldn't know and he didn't tell her. "I just continued to cry." In time, and with struggle, he was able to rise and lift himself out of bed. there's nothing to cry about, old man." But she couldn't know and he didn't tell her. "I just continued to cry." In time, and with struggle, he was able to rise and lift himself out of bed.

The Atlanta Atlanta survivors got four days of "free gangway" in New Zealand's largest city. "This was a privilege seldom afford in the USN. It means 'beat it and don't come back until we sail,'" Bill McKinney wrote. Strolling the city streets by evening, the sailors were, he recalled, "literally engulfed by girls. It would have taken a leper to have wound up with less than a girl on each arm. They were quite frank and got to the point quickly. Many of them seemed to live alone and we were invited to move in during our stay in Auckland. They were so blunt that many a usually self-a.s.sured sailor was left open-mouthed." survivors got four days of "free gangway" in New Zealand's largest city. "This was a privilege seldom afford in the USN. It means 'beat it and don't come back until we sail,'" Bill McKinney wrote. Strolling the city streets by evening, the sailors were, he recalled, "literally engulfed by girls. It would have taken a leper to have wound up with less than a girl on each arm. They were quite frank and got to the point quickly. Many of them seemed to live alone and we were invited to move in during our stay in Auckland. They were so blunt that many a usually self-a.s.sured sailor was left open-mouthed."

The Helena, Helena, now under a new captain, Charles P. Cecil, was ordered from Noumea to Sydney for some R&R. Entering the harbor, the light cruiser was saluted by the deep groans of tugboat whistles and cheering well-wishers waving from sailboats and pleasure craft. The city's iconic Harbour Bridge, silhouetted in a rosy red at twilight, was the backdrop for a celebration that spilled ash.o.r.e into the oyster bars and Red Crosssponsored dances and c.o.c.ktail parties. now under a new captain, Charles P. Cecil, was ordered from Noumea to Sydney for some R&R. Entering the harbor, the light cruiser was saluted by the deep groans of tugboat whistles and cheering well-wishers waving from sailboats and pleasure craft. The city's iconic Harbour Bridge, silhouetted in a rosy red at twilight, was the backdrop for a celebration that spilled ash.o.r.e into the oyster bars and Red Crosssponsored dances and c.o.c.ktail parties.

Such pleasures were a superficial salve. Graff's shipmate Jim Shaw wrote to his wife, Jane, of the new perspective on life the experience of battle had given them. "We hate the petty bickering of politics.... We hate the disunity between labor and capital. We look with a sort of contemptuous tolerance on such organizations as the USO. We eye askance and critically the opinions aired by the press. As for the 'military commentators' who learn their strategy out of books, we writhe in disgust at their positive statements as to how the actual combat should be carried on.... After the war is over the fighting man is going to demand a kind of peace and a kind of government that will be some slight remuneration for the blood and toil and anguish of the war."

For Leonard A. Joslin, a survivor of the Quincy, Quincy, nighttime was forevermore a haunted place. "Years later I'd have nightmares, and dreams at night, and I would see the ship coming into port. I'd see men waving. I could see the signal bridge. I knew that I was supposed to be up there. But the ship would fade away. And I'd try to catch it at another port, and the same thing. I could see the men waving, the signal bridge; I knew I was supposed to be up there. But the ship would leave me, and the dream would fade. Many times, years later even, I would dream of this ship, and the men. And they're waving at me." nighttime was forevermore a haunted place. "Years later I'd have nightmares, and dreams at night, and I would see the ship coming into port. I'd see men waving. I could see the signal bridge. I knew that I was supposed to be up there. But the ship would fade away. And I'd try to catch it at another port, and the same thing. I could see the men waving, the signal bridge; I knew I was supposed to be up there. But the ship would leave me, and the dream would fade. Many times, years later even, I would dream of this ship, and the men. And they're waving at me."

On the eleventh of December, Joslin's vision unfolded in real time for the survivors of Dan Callaghan's old flagship arriving in her namesake city. As the crew manned the rail, thousands of Bay Area residents greeted them, jamming the hillsides and promenades to have a look at the battered San Francisco San Francisco entering the harbor. Eugene Tarrant remembers the cool weather that welcomed their homecoming, and the fog that held the Golden Gate Bridge like a midnight pall off Savo. It was a publicist's dream: the veterans of a hero ship, returning to the city where she had been built (Vallejo), right next door to the hometown (Oakland) of the admiral who had died in battle on her bridge. entering the harbor. Eugene Tarrant remembers the cool weather that welcomed their homecoming, and the fog that held the Golden Gate Bridge like a midnight pall off Savo. It was a publicist's dream: the veterans of a hero ship, returning to the city where she had been built (Vallejo), right next door to the hometown (Oakland) of the admiral who had died in battle on her bridge.

When the ambulatory survivors were flushed out of the Oak Knoll Naval Hospital and bused downtown for a ticker-tape parade six days later, "They gave this city a strange feeling of humility and sadness, and at the same time its greatest thrill in many a year," a San Francisco Chronicle San Francisco Chronicle reporter wrote. The procession of survivors stretched out for more than a mile, attended by a crowd of seventy-five thousand lining the street. However, the mood of the celebration was peculiar. "It was the quietest parade this city has ever seen. There was some cheering and applauding, but it didn't stick. For the most part, the thousands on the streets stared as they would at a sacred procession." Some of the marchers proceeded with canes and crutches, wearing hospital robes. None of them stayed thirsty for long on Market Street that week. reporter wrote. The procession of survivors stretched out for more than a mile, attended by a crowd of seventy-five thousand lining the street. However, the mood of the celebration was peculiar. "It was the quietest parade this city has ever seen. There was some cheering and applauding, but it didn't stick. For the most part, the thousands on the streets stared as they would at a sacred procession." Some of the marchers proceeded with canes and crutches, wearing hospital robes. None of them stayed thirsty for long on Market Street that week.

Admirals Nimitz and King were on hand to give medals. They decorated Bruce McCandless with the Medal of Honor in front of an audience that included his parents and his wife. The father of Dan Callaghan drove over from Oakland, but the late admiral's mother and widow stayed home. "They didn't think they could face it. They didn't think they could stand it," Dan Callaghan, Sr., told a reporter. In Washington, President Roosevelt himself had just given the same award to family representatives of Callaghan and Norman Scott. Herbert Schonland and the San Francisco San Francisco's heroic firefighter, Reinhardt J. Keppler, received the Medal of Honor as well.

For the rest of the San Francisco San Francisco's crew, there was acclaim to go around, though many of them understood it was excessive. "In the press we were lauded beyond all reason," Clifford Spencer wrote. Almost everyone knew that other ships, including the Sterett, Monssen, Barton, Juneau, Sterett, Monssen, Barton, Juneau, and and Atlanta, Atlanta, had suffered far heavier proportions of casualties but weren't able to return for ticker tape and free beer. Whenever he heard the had suffered far heavier proportions of casualties but weren't able to return for ticker tape and free beer. Whenever he heard the San Francisco San Francisco referred to as the Navy's "fightin'est ship," McCandless would insist that "polishing off a battleship is a community job." referred to as the Navy's "fightin'est ship," McCandless would insist that "polishing off a battleship is a community job."

The homecoming of damaged warships was a rare thing for the public. The lack of a fair perspective on their accomplishments was inevitable. The way Mike Moran's Boise Boise was feted in Philadelphia would forever irk many was feted in Philadelphia would forever irk many Helena Helena sailors, who had thrown at least as much ordnance the enemy's way and were now rewarded with obscurity for having taken less in return. sailors, who had thrown at least as much ordnance the enemy's way and were now rewarded with obscurity for having taken less in return.1 The New York Times The New York Times reported as fact that the reported as fact that the Boise Boise "sank six j.a.panese warships in twenty-seven minutes." To the lasting chagrin of the "sank six j.a.panese warships in twenty-seven minutes." To the lasting chagrin of the Washington Washington's men, the South Dakota South Dakota was immortalized in the press as "Battleship X," used out of concern for security. When the mask was finally lifted, the ship's name was cast in lights that her dubious battle performance did not seem to merit. Nevertheless, Captain Gatch announced that his ship "sank three j.a.p cruisers and demonstrated there's no match for a battleship, except equally good battleships." When the was immortalized in the press as "Battleship X," used out of concern for security. When the mask was finally lifted, the ship's name was cast in lights that her dubious battle performance did not seem to merit. Nevertheless, Captain Gatch announced that his ship "sank three j.a.p cruisers and demonstrated there's no match for a battleship, except equally good battleships." When the San Francisco San Francisco entered harbor, she was in the company of a fellow veteran of Ironbottom Sound, the entered harbor, she was in the company of a fellow veteran of Ironbottom Sound, the Sterett. Sterett. As the cruiser prepared for a public reception at Pier 16, the humble tin can went, unheralded as those expendable ships often are, to the yard at Mare Island. As the cruiser prepared for a public reception at Pier 16, the humble tin can went, unheralded as those expendable ships often are, to the yard at Mare Island.

None of these small injustices matched what Eugene Tarrant and his fellow steward's mates and cooks suffered when they went ash.o.r.e. Cameramen from the Fox Movietone News Agency dwelled on the San Francisco San Francisco's crew until Tarrant's turn came. When he and his S Division shipmates began filing past, the motion-picture crews turned their cameras on other subjects.

AS THE SAN FRANCISCO SAN FRANCISCO was approaching the West Coast for her grand reception, an Imperial Army colonel returned to Tokyo from Rabaul after a fact-finding mission to the Southern Area front. Across all services at j.a.pan's forward-most base, he told high command, there was a wholesale lack of confidence. With the destruction of their reinforcement convoys in November and their faltering hold on New Guinea, both naval and Army high command saw that the end of the struggle was near. The colonel's report urged the unthinkable: abandonment of Guadalca.n.a.l, and the evacuation of its garrison. In the discussion that followed, the concern arose that if word of an evacuation reached the island, the soldiers might take their own lives. was approaching the West Coast for her grand reception, an Imperial Army colonel returned to Tokyo from Rabaul after a fact-finding mission to the Southern Area front. Across all services at j.a.pan's forward-most base, he told high command, there was a wholesale lack of confidence. With the destruction of their reinforcement convoys in November and their faltering hold on New Guinea, both naval and Army high command saw that the end of the struggle was near. The colonel's report urged the unthinkable: abandonment of Guadalca.n.a.l, and the evacuation of its garrison. In the discussion that followed, the concern arose that if word of an evacuation reached the island, the soldiers might take their own lives.

The Americans had their own setbacks to explore, and their own fact-finding missions to launch. Though victory was within its grasp, the Navy was looking back on the disaster that had nearly derailed it in the beginning with the losses of the Vincennes, Quincy, Vincennes, Quincy, and and Astoria. Astoria. An old saying later popularized by a veteran of the Solomons naval campaign, John F. Kennedy, went, "Victory has a hundred fathers. Defeat is an orphan." What then of the parentage a defeat suffered within the context of a larger victory? The Navy seemed bent on isolating it like a cancer. An old saying later popularized by a veteran of the Solomons naval campaign, John F. Kennedy, went, "Victory has a hundred fathers. Defeat is an orphan." What then of the parentage a defeat suffered within the context of a larger victory? The Navy seemed bent on isolating it like a cancer.

On December 20, Ernest King ordered an "informal inquiry into the circ.u.mstances attending the loss of these vessels." Its purpose, he would write, was "to find out exactly what caused the defeat, and second, to determine whether or not any responsible officers involved in the planning and execution of the operations were culpably inefficient." Three days later, the man who would conduct the investigation reported to King's headquarters in Washington. His name was Arthur J. Hepburn. The chairman of the Navy's General Board, a panel of senior admirals that advised the secretary of the Navy, Hepburn was the U.S. admiralty's most senior man. He had served as commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and had a deep expertise in the mysteries of the world's largest ocean. As an ensign, after the Spanish-American War, he had partic.i.p.ated in the U.S. Exploring Expedition, an oceanographic survey of the entire vast Pacific. He was serious, dignified, and reserved. As Hanson Baldwin wrote in a 1936 New York Times New York Times profile, "He is not a colorful personality; there are no legends about him on his flagships, no ma.s.s of Hepburn anecdota in the fleet. His record speaks for him; he is respected and trusted." Hepburn served in another role, too, one that is seldom mentioned in the shadow of his other accomplishments: He was the Navy's director of public relations, the sea service's princ.i.p.al public affairs man. After reporting to King, Hepburn sat down with Vice Admiral Ghormley in Washington and interrogated him. Ghormley had been puzzled and perturbed since his relief that any specific fault might attach to him for the August 9 disaster off Savo Island. His interrogation by his former superior-Ghormley had been Hepburn's staff operations officer after his tour in command of the profile, "He is not a colorful personality; there are no legends about him on his flagships, no ma.s.s of Hepburn anecdota in the fleet. His record speaks for him; he is respected and trusted." Hepburn served in another role, too, one that is seldom mentioned in the shadow of his other accomplishments: He was the Navy's director of public relations, the sea service's princ.i.p.al public affairs man. After reporting to King, Hepburn sat down with Vice Admiral Ghormley in Washington and interrogated him. Ghormley had been puzzled and perturbed since his relief that any specific fault might attach to him for the August 9 disaster off Savo Island. His interrogation by his former superior-Ghormley had been Hepburn's staff operations officer after his tour in command of the Nevada Nevada-opened that wound again. On January 2, 1943, Hepburn reported to CINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii. When illness forced Hepburn to the hospital for three weeks, his aide, Commander Donald J. Ramsey, began reviewing doc.u.ments at the headquarters of CINCPAC.

WHILE HEPBURN WAS CONVALESCING in Hawaii, American intelligence a.n.a.lysts were starting to divine from movements of troops, aircraft, and ships that the j.a.panese might be shifting to the strategic defensive. But something in the radio traffic suggested otherwise. Stymied by a change in j.a.panese ciphers, they took what they could from the radio traffic. Again and again they heard references to something known as "Operation KE," evidently planned to take place somewhere in New Guinea or the Solomons. in Hawaii, American intelligence a.n.a.lysts were starting to divine from movements of troops, aircraft, and ships that the j.a.panese might be shifting to the strategic defensive. But something in the radio traffic suggested otherwise. Stymied by a change in j.a.panese ciphers, they took what they could from the radio traffic. Again and again they heard references to something known as "Operation KE," evidently planned to take place somewhere in New Guinea or the Solomons.

Nimitz believed Yamamoto might still have plans to strike at and reinforce Guadalca.n.a.l. When Halsey's intelligence staff saw signs in the third week of January that at least three carriers, the Zuikaku, Zuiho, Zuikaku, Zuiho, and and Junyo, Junyo, were at Truk, along with the super battleships were at Truk, along with the super battleships Yamato Yamato and and Musashi, Musashi, there was good reason for vigilance. Confronted with the possibility of another major naval a.s.sault, Halsey resolved to finish the replacement of the war-weary Marine units on Guadalca.n.a.l while things were still relatively quiet. He ordered transports to bring in the last of the Army's 25th Division and take off the marines. A powerful element of the South Pacific Area naval force was ordered to support them and cover the withdrawal. there was good reason for vigilance. Confronted with the possibility of another major naval a.s.sault, Halsey resolved to finish the replacement of the war-weary Marine units on Guadalca.n.a.l while things were still relatively quiet. He ordered transports to bring in the last of the Army's 25th Division and take off the marines. A powerful element of the South Pacific Area naval force was ordered to support them and cover the withdrawal.

In desperation, the Imperial General Headquarters had drawn up an even more ambitious plan. As forces gathered at the great naval base in the Carolines, j.a.pan's service branches were regrouping to defend the central and northern Solomons-and preparing to throw their fullest effort into Operation KE. After five months of attrition, Halsey and his staff were blameless in thinking it was another reinforcement effort.

Emperor Hirohito was sensitive about the public's opinion of a campaign that had emerged as a showcase of the j.a.panese will to fight. In public he held to the view that an opportunity for victory lay for the taking in the Solomons. In an Imperial Rescript broadcast to the nation on December 26, the very same day that the Imperial General Headquarters decided to withdraw, the emperor declared that "dawn is about to break in the Eastern Sky" and announced that forces then gathering would head toward the Solomons for the decisive battle.

In a meeting with his high commanders a few days later, however, the Emperor decided to do what until then was unthinkable. The Imperial Army would not reinforce. It would withdraw. Compelling testimony of the morbid state of j.a.panese soldiers on the island came from diaries taken from the dead. In late December, when deaths by starvation were tolling at a rate of more than a hundred a day, a j.a.panese Army lieutenant estimated the life expectancy of his comrades as follows: "Those who can stand-30 days. Those who can sit up-3 weeks. Those who cannot sit up-1 week. Those who urinate lying down-3 days. Those who have stopped speaking-2 days. Those who have stopped blinking-tomorrow." The j.a.panese were finished throwing good men and machines into the grinder.

Yamamoto would borrow a page from a seldom-studied playbook: that of the Royal Navy at Dunkirk. Operation KE was an evacuation mission, and it would take place right under the noses of the pilots and ships and PT boats of the South Pacific Forces. Reluctantly approving the plans, Hirohito said, "It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalca.n.a.l. We must launch an offensive elsewhere." But what was acceptable-and possible-was no longer up to the divine prince. The U.S. Navy had a great deal more to say about it. In the Solomons and in New Guinea, as elsewhere, momentum was swinging its way.

Secrecy was Operation KE's byword. Its true purpose was concealed not only from the Americans, but also from the j.a.panese infantrymen who were its princ.i.p.al beneficiaries. It began the last week of January with the coordinated movement of troops to the coast near Cape Esperance. Avoiding pursuit and encirclement from General Patch's army, which now numbered more than fifty thousand men, they hauled the last of their starving selves toward the sh.o.r.e on Savo Sound, sparing the dignity of potential mutineers with the cover story that they were gathering for a final offensive.

American planes were ranging well up the Slot now, hammering targets from the air base at Munda to Rabaul itself. j.a.panese aircraft, meanwhile, were newly recommitted en ma.s.se to their months-old drill: to make the long flight down to Guadalca.n.a.l, suppress the Cactus Air Force, block the sea approaches to the island, and cover the evacuation. In this final spasm of violence in the southern Solomons, a group of U.S. warships was set upon by j.a.panese torpedo bombers.

They came in at twilight on the evening of January 30, a flight of thirty-one torpedo-armed Betty bombers, bearing down from the starboard hand of Task Force 18 as it slugged a northwesterly course at twenty-four knots. Under the command of a rookie to the Pacific theater, Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen, steamed the heavy cruisers Wichita, Chicago, Wichita, Chicago, and and Louisville, Louisville, the light cruisers the light cruisers Montpelier, Cleveland, Montpelier, Cleveland, and and Columbia, Columbia, and six destroyers. The escort carriers and six destroyers. The escort carriers Chenango Chenango and and Suwannee Suwannee slugged along to provide air cover. slugged along to provide air cover.

Giffen had orders to rendezvous with four destroyers southwest of Guadalca.n.a.l and then patrol Savo Sound. To keep the rendezvous, and to escape a significant threat from submarines, he chose in favor of better speed and ordered the slow carriers to lag behind. At twilight on January 30, this force was fifty miles north of Rennell Island when air-search radars lit up with bogeys. Submarines had indeed been hunting him, not with their torpedoes, but with their snooping periscopes and radios. Though he had been sighted, Giffen, like Gilbert Hoover, was loath to break radio silence. He thus declined to transmit interception coordinates to the combat air patrol provided by the Chenango Chenango and and Suwannee, Suwannee, standing off to the south. standing off to the south.

Except for the fact that they arrived after sunset, it was a reprise of the November 12 air attack on Turner and Callaghan, with a twist. From the sky at dim twilight fell a kaleidoscope of burning colors, flares, expertly dropped to show the direction of the American force and color-coded to indicate its composition. The j.a.panese air forces were as much students of night warfare as their Navy, and the Americans were no less bewildered by this innovation than by the others the j.a.panese had employed. Still, shipboard antiaircraft gunnery was, as ever, very effective, aided by a technological wrinkle kept strictly secret: the use of "proximity fuzes" that used a radar transmitter in the sh.e.l.l to tell it when to explode. One of the burning Bettys fell through the night sky and pa.s.sed ahead of the Chicago, Chicago, crashing into the sea off her port bow. crashing into the sea off her port bow.

The last group to bear the designation Task Force 18 had been the star-crossed unit containing the Wasp, Vincennes, Wasp, Vincennes, and and Quincy, Quincy, all of them now lost. The all of them now lost. The Chicago Chicago was a blooded veteran of these waters, too, having served, on the night it all began, as the interim flagship of Rear Admiral Crutchley's southwestern cruiser screen. Her captain at the time, Howard D. Bode, had a.s.sumed temporary command when his British superior left station on August 9 to confer with Turner and Vandegrift about the sightings of j.a.panese ships and the imminent withdrawal of Fletcher's carriers. Making contact with a mysterious squadron, then taken under fire and torpedoed in the bow, Bode's ship had steamed away from the action, searching for phantoms as Gunichi Mikawa made his lethal run. was a blooded veteran of these waters, too, having served, on the night it all began, as the interim flagship of Rear Admiral Crutchley's southwestern cruiser screen. Her captain at the time, Howard D. Bode, had a.s.sumed temporary command when his British superior left station on August 9 to confer with Turner and Vandegrift about the sightings of j.a.panese ships and the imminent withdrawal of Fletcher's carriers. Making contact with a mysterious squadron, then taken under fire and torpedoed in the bow, Bode's ship had steamed away from the action, searching for phantoms as Gunichi Mikawa made his lethal run.

Now, under a new captain, the Chicago Chicago stood in harm's way again. The flames on the water from the fuel of the crashed Betty cast her as a lucrative silhouette for other pilots. They lined up on her and dropped. Two of their torpedoes struck the cruiser on the starboard side, collapsing compartments and stilling three of her four screws. The ship's crew labored to flood port side tanks to bring her back from a starboard list. The stood in harm's way again. The flames on the water from the fuel of the crashed Betty cast her as a lucrative silhouette for other pilots. They lined up on her and dropped. Two of their torpedoes struck the cruiser on the starboard side, collapsing compartments and stilling three of her four screws. The ship's crew labored to flood port side tanks to bring her back from a starboard list. The Louisville Louisville took her in tow. took her in tow.

The following morning, Task Force 18 huddled around the Chicago Chicago as relays of Wildcats from the two escort carriers, and the as relays of Wildcats from the two escort carriers, and the Enterprise, Enterprise, too, tried to shield her from follow-up attacks. But there was no denying the j.a.panese this prize. After an early-afternoon chess match between search planes from Rabaul and the American combat air patrol, j.a.panese strike aircraft found the too, tried to shield her from follow-up attacks. But there was no denying the j.a.panese this prize. After an early-afternoon chess match between search planes from Rabaul and the American combat air patrol, j.a.panese strike aircraft found the Chicago Chicago again around 4 p.m. It was unfortunate that most of the other ships of the group had been ordered to withdraw to Efate. The again around 4 p.m. It was unfortunate that most of the other ships of the group had been ordered to withdraw to Efate. The Chicago Chicago needed help against the planes. The j.a.panese bombers put four more torpedoes into the stricken cruiser. She rolled over and sank within twenty minutes, taking sixty-two officers and men to their graves. needed help against the planes. The j.a.panese bombers put four more torpedoes into the stricken cruiser. She rolled over and sank within twenty minutes, taking sixty-two officers and men to their graves.

THE REMOVAL OF GIFFEN'S cruiser group from the order of battle on February 1 was a boon to Operation KE. That day a force of twenty destroyers under Rear Admiral Hashimoto, who had succeeded Raizo Tanaka as commander of the Reinforcement Unit a