My Four Years in Germany Part 13

July twenty-first, the American Government rejected the proposals of Germany saying, "The lives of noncombatants may in no case be put in jeopardy unless the vessel resists or seeks to escape after being summoned to submit to examination," and disposed of the claim that the acts of England gave Germany the right to retaliate, even though American citizens should be deprived of their lives in the course of retaliation by stating: "For a belligerent act of retaliation is _per_se_ an act beyond the law, and the defense, of an act as retaliatory, is an admission that it is illegal." Continuing it said: "If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals, as well as their property, humanity, as well as justice and a due regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should dictate that the practice be discontinued."

It was also said: "The United States cannot believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the _Lusitania_ or from offering reparation for the American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for the needless destruction of human life by an illegal act." And the meat of the Note was contained in the following sentence: "Friendship itself prompts it (the United States) to say to the Imperial Government that repet.i.tion by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as being deliberately unfriendly."

There the matter has remained so far as the Lusitania was concerned until now. In the meantime, the attack of the American ship, _Nebraskan_, was disavowed; the German Note stating that "the torpedo was not meant for the American flag and is to be considered an unfortunate accident."

The diplomatic situation with regard to the use of the submarine and the attack on many merchant ships without notice and without putting the pa.s.sengers in safety was still unsettled when on August nineteenth, 1915, the British ship _Arabic_, was torpedoed, without warning, not far from the place where the _Lusitania_ had gone down. Two Americans were among the pa.s.sengers killed.

The German Government, after the usual quibbling, at length, in its Note of September seventh, claimed that the Captain of the German submarine, while engaged in preparing to sink the _Dunsley_, became convinced that the approaching _Arabic_ was trying to ram him and, therefore, fired his torpedo. The Imperial Government refused to admit any liability but offered to arbitrate.

There followed almost immediately the case of the _Ancona_, sunk by a submarine flying the Austrian flag. This case was naturally out of my jurisdiction, but formed a link in the chain, and then came the sinking of the _Persia_ in the Mediterranean. On this boat our consul to Aden lost his life.

In the Note of Count Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing, dated September first, 1915, Count Bernstorff said that liners would not be sunk by German submarines without warning, and without putting the pa.s.sengers in safety, provided that the liners did not try to escape or offer resistance; and it was further stated that this policy was in effect before the sinking of the _Arabic_.

There were long negotiations during this period concerning the _Arabic_. At one time it looked as if diplomatic relations would be broken; but finally the Imperial Government consented to acknowledge that the submarine commander had been wrong in a.s.suming that the _Arabic_ intended to ram his boat, offered to pay an indemnity and disavowed the act of the commander. It was stated that orders so precise had been given to the submarine commanders that a "recurrence of incidents similar to the _Arabic_ is considered out of the question."

In the same way the Austrian Government gave way to the demands of America in the _Ancona_ case at the end of December, 1915.

Amba.s.sador Penfield, in Austria, won great praise by his admirable handling of this case.

The negotiations as to the still pending _Lusitania_ case were carried on in Washington by Count Bernstorff and Secretary Lansing, and finally Germany offered to pay an indemnity for the death of the Americans on the _Lusitania_ whose deaths Germany "greatly regretted," but refused to disavow the act of the submarine commander in sinking the _Lusitania_ or to admit that such act was illegal.

About this time our State Department sent out a Note proposing in effect that submarines should conform to "cruiser" warfare, only sinking a vessel which defended itself or tried to escape, and that before sinking a vessel its pa.s.sengers and crew should be placed in safety; and that, on the other hand, merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be prohibited from carrying any armaments whatever. This suggestion was not followed up.

Zimmermann (not the one in the Foreign Office) wrote an article in the _Lokal_Anzeiger_ of which he is an editor, saying that the United States had something on their side in the question of the export of munitions. I heard that von Kessel, commander of the _Mark_of_Brandenburg_ said that he, Zimmermann, ought to be shot as a traitor. Zimmermann hearing of this made von Kessel apologise, but was shortly afterwards mobilised.

Colonel House had arrived in Germany at the end of January, 1916, and remained only three days. He was quite worried by the situation and by an interview he had had with Zimmermann in which Zimmermann expressed the readiness of Germany to go to war with the United States.

In February, 1916, the Junkers in the Prussian Lower House started a fight against the Chancellor and discussed submarine war, a matter out of their province. The Chancellor hit back at them hard and had the best of the exchange. At this period it was reported that the Emperor went to Wilhelmshafen to warn the submarine commanders to be careful.

About March first it was reported that a grand council of war was held at Charleville and that in spite of the support of von Tirpitz by Falkenhayn, the Chief of Staff, the Chancellor was supported by the Emperor, and once more beat the propositions to recommence ruthless submarine war.

In March too, the "illness" of von Tirpitz was announced, followed shortly by his resignation. On March nineteenth, his birthday, a demonstration was looked for and I saw many police near his dwelling, but nothing unusual occurred. I contemplated a trip to America, but both the Chancellor and von Jagow begged me not to go.

From the time of the _Lusitania_ sinking to that of the _Suss.e.x_ all Germany was divided into two camps. The party of the Chancellor tried to keep peace with America and did not want to have Germany branded as an outlaw among nations. Von Tirpitz and his party of naval and military officers called for ruthless submarine war, and the Conservatives, angry with Bethmann-Hollweg because of his proposed concession as to the extension of the suffrage, joined the opposition. The reception of our last _Lusitania_ Note in July, 1915, was hostile and I was accused of being against Germany, although, of course, I had nothing to do with the preparation of this Note.

In August, 1915, the deputies representing the great industrials of Germany joined in the attack on the Chancellor. These men wished to keep Northern France and Belgium, because they hoped to get possession of the coal and iron deposits there and so obtain a monopoly of the iron and steel trade of the continent.

Accelerators of public opinion, undoubtedly hired by the Krupp firm, were hard at work. These Annexationists were opposed by the more reasonable men who signed a pet.i.tion against the annexation of Belgium. Among the signers of this reasonable men's pet.i.tion were Prince Hatzfeld (Duke of Trachenberg) head of the Red Cross, Dernburg, Prince Henkel Donnersmarck, Professor Delbruck, von Harnack and many others.

The rage of the Conservatives at the _Arabic_ settlement knew no bounds, and after a bitter article had appeared in the _Tageszeitung_ about the _Arabic_ affair, that newspaper was suppressed for some days,--a rather unexpected showing of backbone on the part of the Chancellor. Reventlow who wrote for this newspaper is one of the ablest editorial writers in Germany. An ex-naval officer, he is bitter in his hatred of America. It was said that he once lived in America and lost a small fortune in a Florida orange grove, but I never succeeded in having this verified.

In November, 1915, after the _Arabic_ settlement there followed a moment for us of comparative calm. Mrs. Gerard was given the Red Cross Orders of the first and third cla.s.ses, and Jackson and Rives of the Emba.s.sy Staff the second and third cla.s.s. The third cla.s.s is always given because one cannot have the first and second unless one has the third or lowest.

There were rumours at this time of the formation of a new party; really the Socialists and Liberals, as the Socialists as such were too unfashionable, in too bad odour, to open a campaign against the military under their own name. This talk came to nothing.

The Chancellor always complained bitterly that he could not communicate in cipher _via_ wireless with von Bernstorff.

On one occasion he said to me, "How can I arrange as I wish to in a friendly way the _Ancona_ and _Lusitania_ cases if I cannot communicate with my Amba.s.sador? Why does the United States Government not allow me to communicate in cipher?" I said, "The Foreign Office tried to get me to procure a safe-conduct for the notorious von Rintelen on the pretense that he was going to do charitable work for Belgium in America; perhaps Washington thinks you want to communicate with people like that." The Chancellor then changed the subject and said that there would be bad feeling in Germany against America after the war. I answered that that idea had been expressed by a great many Germans and German newspapers, and that I had had private letters from a great many Americans who wrote that if Germany intended to make war on America, after this war, perhaps we had better go in now. He then very amiably said that war with America would be ridiculous. He asked me why public opinion in America was against Germany, and I answered that matters like the Cavell case had made a bad impression in America and that I knew personally that even the Kaiser did not approve of the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_. The Chancellor said, "How about the _Baralong_?" I replied that I did not know the details and that there seemed much doubt and confusion about that affair, but that there was no doubt about the fact that Miss Cavell was shot and that she was a woman. I then took up in detail with him the treatment of British prisoners and said that this bad treatment could not go on. This was only one of the many times when I complained to the Chancellor about the condition of prisoners. I am sure that he did not approve of the manner in which prisoners of war in Germany were treated; but he always complained that he was powerless where the military were concerned, and always referred me to Bismarck's memoirs.

During this winter of submarine controversy an interview with von Tirpitz, thinly veiled as an interview with a "high naval authority," was published in that usually most conservative of newspapers, the _Frankfurter_Zeitung_. In this interview the "high naval authority" advocated ruthless submarine war with England, and promised to bring about thereby the speedy surrender of that country. After the surrender, which was to include the whole British fleet, the German fleet with the surrendered British fleet added to its force, was to sail for America, and exact from that country indemnities enough to pay the whole cost of the war.

After his fall, von Tirpitz, in a letter to some admirers who had sent him verses and a wreath, advocated holding the coast of Flanders as a necessity for the war against England and America.

The successor of von Tirpitz was Admiral von Holtzendorff, whose brother is Ballin's right hand man in the management of the Hamburg American Line. Because of the more reasonable influence and surroundings of von Holtzendorff, I regarded his appointment as a help towards peaceful relations between Germany and America.

I have told in another chapter how the Emperor had refused to receive me as Amba.s.sador of a country which was supplying munitions to the Allies.

From time to time since I learned of this in March, 1915, I kept insisting upon my right as Amba.s.sador to be received by the Emperor; and finally early in October, 1915, wrote the following letter to the Chancellor:

"Your Excellency:

Some time ago I requested you to arrange an audience for me with his majesty.

Please take no further trouble about this matter.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES W. GERARD."

This seemed to have the desired effect. I was informed that I would be received by the Emperor in the new palace at Potsdam on October twenty-second. He was then to pay a flying visit to Berlin to receive the new Peruvian Minister and one or two others.

We went down in the train to Potsdam, von Jagow accompanying us, in the morning; and it was arranged that we should return on the train leaving Potsdam a little after one o'clock. I think that the authorities of the palace expected that I would be with the Emperor for a few minutes only, as when I was shown into the room where he was, a large room opening from the famous sh.e.l.l hall of the palace, the Peruvian Minister and the others to be received were standing waiting in that hall.

The Emperor was alone in the room and no one was present at our interview. He was dressed in a Hussar uniform of the new field grey, the parade uniform of which the frogs and tr.i.m.m.i.n.gs were of gold. A large table in the corner of the room was covered with maps, compa.s.ses, scales and rulers; and looked as if the Emperor there, in company with some of his aides, or possibly the chief of staff, had been working out the plan of campaign of the German armies.

The Emperor was standing; so, naturally, I stood also; and, according to his habit, which is quite Rooseveltian, he stood very close to me and talked very earnestly. I was fortunately able to clear up two distinct points which he had against America.

The Emperor said that he had read in a German paper that a number of submarines built in America for England had crossed the Atlantic to England, escorted by ships of the American Navy. I was, of course, able to deny this ridiculous story at the time and furnish definite proofs later. The Emperor complained because a loan to England and France had been floated in America. I said that the first loan to a belligerent floated in America was a loan to Germany. The Emperor sent for some of his staff and immediately inquired into the matter. The members of the staff confirmed my statement. The Emperor said that he would not have permitted the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_ if he had known, and that no gentleman would kill so many women and children. He showed, however, great bitterness against the United States and repeatedly said, "America had better look out after this war:" and "I shall stand no nonsense from America after the war."

The interview lasted about an hour and a quarter, and when I finally emerged from the room the officers of the Emperor's household were in such a state of agitation that I feel sure they must have thought that something fearful had occurred. As I walked rapidly towards the door of the palace in order to take the carriage which was to drive me to the train, one of them walked along beside me saying, "Is it all right? Is it all right?"

The unfortunate diplomats who were to have been received and who had been standing all this time outside the door waiting for an audience missed their train and their luncheon.

At this interview, the Emperor looked very careworn and seemed nervous. When I next saw him, however, which was not until the end of April, 1916, he was in much better condition.

I was so fearful in reporting the dangerous part of this interview, on account of the many spies not only in my own Emba.s.sy but also in the State Department, that I sent but a very few words in a roundabout way by courier direct to the President.

The year, 1916, opened with this great question still unsettled and, in effect, Germany gave notice that after March first, 1916, the German submarines would sink all armed merchantmen of the enemies of Germany without warning. It is not my place here to go into the agitation of this question in America or into the history of the votes in Congress, which in fact upheld the policy of the President. A proposal as to armed merchantmen was issued by our State Department and the position taken in this was apparently abandoned at the time of the settlement of the _Suss.e.x_ case to which I now refer.

In the latter half of March, 1916, a number of boats having Americans on board were torpedoed without warning. These boats were the _Eaglejoint_, the _Englishman_, the _Manchester_Engineer_ and the _Suss.e.x_. One American was killed or drowned on the _Englishman_, but the issue finally came to a head over the torpedoing of the channel pa.s.senger boat, _Suss.e.x_ which carried pa.s.sengers between Folkstone and Dieppe, France.

On March twenty-fourth the _Suss.e.x_ was torpedoed near the coast of France. Four hundred and thirty-six persons, of whom seventy-five were Americans, were on board. The captain and a number of the pa.s.sengers saw the torpedo and an endeavour was made to avoid it. After the boat was struck the many pa.s.sengers took to the boats. Three Americans were injured and over forty persons lost their lives, although the boat was not sunk but was towed to Boulogne.

I was instructed to inquire from the German Government as to whether a German submarine had sunk the _Suss.e.x_. The Foreign Office finally, at my repeated request, called on the Admiralty for a report of the torpedoing of the _Suss.e.x_; and finally on the tenth of April the German Note was delivered to me. In the meantime, and before the delivery of this Note I had been a.s.sured again and again that the _Suss.e.x_ had not been torpedoed by a German submarine. In this Note a rough sketch was enclosed, said to have been made by the officer commanding the submarine, of a vessel which he admitted he had torpedoed, in the same locality where the _Suss.e.x_ had been attacked and at about the same time of day. It was said that this boat which was torpedoed was a mine layer of the recently built _Arabic_ cla.s.s and that a great explosion which was observed to occur in the torpedoed ship warranted the certain conclusion that great amounts of munitions were on board. The Note concluded: "The German Government must therefore a.s.sume that injury to the _Suss.e.x_ was attributable to another cause than attack by a German submarine." The Note contained an offer to submit any difference of opinion that might develop to be investigated by a mixed commission in accordance with the Hague Convention of 1907. The _Englishman_ and the _Eaglepoint_, it was claimed, were attacked by German submarines only after they had attempted to escape, and an explanation was given as to the _Manchester_Engineer_. With reference to the _Suss.e.x_, the note continued: "Should the American Government have at its disposal other material at the conclusion of the case of the _Suss.e.x_, the German Government would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material also to investigation."

In the meantime, American naval officers, etc., had been engaged in collecting facts as to the sinking of the _Suss.e.x_, and this evidence, which seemed overwhelming and, in connection with the admissions in the German note, absolutely conclusive, was incorporated in the note sent to Germany in which Germany was notified: "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect abandonment of this present method of submarine warfare against pa.s.senger and freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

The issue was now clearly defined.

I have already spoken of the fact that for a long time there had been growing up two parties in Germany. One party headed by von Tirpitz in favour of what the Germans called _rucksichtloser_, or ruthless submarine war, in which all enemy merchant ships were to be sunk without warning, and the party then headed by the Chancellor which desired to avoid a conflict with America on this issue.

As I have explained in a former chapter, the military have always claimed to take a hand in shaping the destinies and foreign policies of Germany. When the Germans began to turn their attention to the creation of a fleet, von Tirpitz was the man who, in a sense, became the leader of the movement and, therefore, the creator of the modern navy of Germany. A skilful politician, he for years dominated the Reichstag and on the question of submarine warfare was most efficiently seconded by the efforts of the Navy League, an organization having perhaps one million members throughout Germany. Although only one of the three heads of the navy (he was Secretary of the Navy), by the force of his personality, by the political position which he had created for himself, and by the backing of his friends in the Navy League he really dominated the other two departments of the navy, the Marine Staff and the Marine Cabinet.