My Four Years in Germany Part 12

It was with the greatest pleasure that I heard from Secretary Baker that he had determined to promote Colonel Kuhn to the rank of General and make him head of our War College, where his teachings will prove of the greatest value to the armies of the United States.

Colonel House and his wife arrived to pay us a visit on March 19, 1915, and remained until the twenty-eighth. During this period the Colonel met all the princ.i.p.al members of the German Government and many men of influence and prominence in the world of affairs, such as Herr von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank, and Dr. Walter Rathenau, who succeeded his father as head of the Allgemeine Elektricitats Gesellschaft and hundreds of other corporations. The Colonel dined at the house of Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, and lunched with von Gwinner.

In April, negotiations were continued about the sinking of the _William_P._Fry_, an American boat loaded with food and destined for Ireland. The American Government on behalf of the owners of the _William_P._Fry_ claimed damages for the boat.

Nothing was said about the cargo, but in the German answer it was stated that the cargo of the _William_P._Fry_ consisting of foodstuffs destined for an armed port of the enemy and, therefore, presumed to be destined for the armed forces of the enemy was, because of this, contraband. I spoke to von Jagow about this and told him that I thought that possibly this would seem to amount to a German justification of the British blockade of Germany.

He said that this note had been drawn by Director Kriege who was their expert on international law, and that he would not interfere with Kriege's work. Of course, as a matter of fact, all foodstuffs shipped to Germany would have to be landed at some armed port, and, therefore, according to the contentions of Germany, these would be supposed to be destined to the armed forces of the enemy and become contraband of war.

At international law, it had always been recognised that private individuals and corporations have the right to sell arms and ammunitions of war to any belligerent and, in the Hague Convention held in 1907, this right was expressly ratified and confirmed.

This same Director Kriege who represented Germany at this Hague Conference in 1907, in the debates on this point said: "The neutral boats which engage in such a trade, commit a violation of the duties of neutrality. However, according to a principle generally recognised, the State of which the boat flies the flag is not responsible for this violation. The neutral States are not called upon to forbid their subjects a commerce which, from the point of view of the belligerents, ought to be considered as unlawful."

(Conference International de la Paix, La Haye, 15 Juin-18 Octobre 1907. Vol. III, p. 859.)

During our trouble with General Huerta, arms and ammunition for Huerta's forces from Germany were landed from German ships in Mexico. During the Boer war the Germans, who openly sympathised with the Boers, nevertheless furnished to England great quant.i.ties of arms and munitions, expressly destined to be used against the Boers; and this, although it was manifest that there was no possibility whatever that the Boers could obtain arms and munitions from German sources during the war. For instance, the firm of Eberhardt in Dusseldorf furnished one hundred and nine cannon, complete, with wagons, caissons and munitions, etc., to the English which were expressly designed for use against the Boers.

At one time the Imperial Foreign Office sent me a formal note making reference to a paragraph in former Amba.s.sador Andrew D.

White's autobiography with reference to the alleged stoppage in a German port of a boat laden with arms and ammunition, for use against the Americans in Cuba during the Spanish War. Of course, former Amba.s.sador White wrote without having the Emba.s.sy records at hand and those records show that the position he took at the time of this alleged stoppage was eminently correct.

The files show that he wrote the letter to the State Department in which he stated that knowledge came to him of the proposed sailing of this ship, but he did not protest because he had been advised by a Naval Attache that the United States did not have the right to interfere. The Department of State wrote to him commending his action in not filing any protest and otherwise interfering.

It seemed as if the German Government expressly desired to stir up hatred against America on this issue in order to force the American Government through fear of either the German Government, or the German-American propagandists at home, to put an immediate embargo on the export of these supplies.

In the autumn of 1914 Zimmermann showed me a long list sent him by Bernstorff showing quant.i.ties of saddles, automobiles, motor trucks, tires, explosives, foodstuffs and so on, exported from America to the Allies and intimated that this traffic had reached such proportions that it should be stopped.

In February, 1915, in the official _Communique_ of the day appeared the following statement: "Heavy artillery fire in certain sections of the West front, mostly with American ammunition;"

and in April in the official _Communique_ something to this effect: "Captured French artillery officers say that they have great stores of American ammunition." I obtained through the State Department in Washington a statement from the French Amba.s.sador certifying that up to that time, the end of April, 1915, no sh.e.l.ls whatever of the French artillery had been furnished from America.

Nothing, however, would satisfy the Germans. They seemed determined that the export of every article, whether of food or munitions which might prove of use to the Allies in the war, should be stopped. Newspapers were filled with bitter attacks upon America and upon President Wilson, and with caricatures referring to the sale of munitions.

It never seemed to occur to the Germans that we could not violate the Hague Convention in order to change the rules of the game because one party, after the commencement of hostilities, found that the rule worked to his disadvantage. Nor did the Germans consider that America could not vary its international law with the changing fortunes of war and make one ruling when the Germans lost control of the sea and another ruling if they regained it.

From early in 1915 until I left Germany, I do not think I ever had a conversation with a German without his alluding to this question. Shortly before leaving Germany, in January, 1917, and after I had learned of the probability of the resumption of ruthless submarine war, at an evening party at the house of Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, a large German who turned out to be one of the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, planted himself some distance away from me and addressed me in German saying, "You are the American Amba.s.sador and I want to tell you that the conduct of America in furnishing arms and ammunition to the enemies of Germany is stamped deep on the German heart, that we will never forget it and will some day have our revenge." He spoke in a voice so loud and slapped his chest so hard that everyone in the room stopped their conversation in order to hear. He wore on his breast the orders of the Black Eagle, the Red Eagle, the Elephant and the Seraphim, and when he struck all this menagerie the rattle alone was quite loud. I reminded him politely of the Hague Convention, of the fact that we could not change international law from time to time with the change in the situation of the war, and that Germany had furnished arms to England to use against the Boers. But he simply answered, "We care nothing for treaties,"

and my answer, "That is what they all say," was a retort too obvious to be omitted.

The German press continually published articles to the effect that the war would be finished if it were not for the shipment of supplies from America. All public opinion was with the German Government when the warning was issued on February fourth, 1915, stating that the blockade of England would commence on the eighteenth and warning neutral ships to keep out of the war zone. From then on we had constant cases and crises with reference to the sinking of American boats by the German submarine. There were the cases of the _Gulfflight_ and the _Cushing_ and the _Falaba_, an English boat sunk without warning on which Americans were killed. On May sixth, 1915, Director Kriege of the Foreign Office asked Mr. Jackson to call and see him, and told him that he would like to have the following three points brought to the attention of the American public:

"1. As the result of the English effort to stop all foreign commerce with Germany, Germany would do everything in her power to destroy English commerce and merchant shipping. There was, however, never at any time an intention to destroy or interfere with neutral commerce or to attack neutral shipping unless engaged in contraband trade. In view of the action of the British Government in arming merchant vessels and causing them to disguise their national character, the occasional destruction of a neutral ship was unavoidable. Naval officers in command of submarines had been instructed originally, and new and more stringent instructions had been issued repeatedly, to use the utmost care, consistent with their own safety, to avoid attacks on neutral vessels.

"2. In case a neutral ship should be destroyed by a submarine the German Government is prepared to make an immediate and formal expression of its regret and to pay an indemnity, without having recourse to a prize court.

"3. All reports with regard to the destruction of a neutral vessel by a German submarine are investigated at once by both the German Foreign Office and Admiralty and the result is communicated to the Government concerned, which is requested in return to communicate to the German Government the result of its own independent investigation. Where there is any material divergence in the two reports as to the presumed cause of destruction (torpedo or mine), the question is to be submitted to investigation by a commission composed of representatives of the two nations concerned, with a neutral arbiter whose decision will be final. This course has already been adopted in two cases, in which a Dutch and a Norwegian vessel, respectively, were concerned. The German Government reserves its right to refuse this international arbitration in exceptional cases where for military reasons the German Admiralty are opposed to its taking place."

Director Kriege told Mr. Jackson that a written communication in which the substance of the foregoing would be contained, would soon to be made to the Emba.s.sy.

Mr. Jackson put this conversation down in the form above given and showed Director Kriege a copy of it. Later in the day Geheimrat Simon called on Mr. Jackson at the Emba.s.sy and said that Dr.

Kriege would like to have point two read as follows:

"In case _through_any_unfortunate_mistake_a_neutral_ship_,"

and continuing to the end; and that Dr. Kriege would like to change what was written on point three beginning with "Where there is" so that it should read, as follows:--"Where there is any material divergence in the two reports as to the presumed cause of destruction (torpedo or mine), the German Government has already in several instances declared its readiness to submit the question to the decision of an international commission in accordance with the Hague Convention for the friendly settlement of international disputes."

This had been suggested by Director Kriege in case it should be decided to make a communication to the American Press. Mr.

Jackson told Geheimrat Simon that he would report the subject of his conversation to me, but that it would depend upon me whether any communication should be made to the American Government or to the press upon the subject.

Of course, the news of the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_ on May seventh and of the great loss of American lives brought about a very critical situation, and naturally nothing was done with Kriege's propositions.

It is unnecessary here for me to go into the notes which were exchanged between the two governments because all that is already public property.

Sometime after I had delivered our first _Lusitania_ Note of May 11th, 1915, Zimmermann was lunching with us. A good looking American woman, married to a German, was also of the party and after lunch although I was talking to some one else I overheard part of her conversation with Zimmermann. When Zimmermann left I asked her what it was that he had said about America, Germany, Mr. Bryan and the _Lusitania_. She then told me that she had said to Zimmermann that it was a great pity that we were to leave Berlin as it looked as if diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken, and that Zimmermann told her not to worry about that because they had just received word from the Austrian Government that Dr. Dumba, the Austrian Amba.s.sador in Washington, had cabled that the _Lusitania_ Note from America to Germany was only sent as a sop to public opinion in America and that the government did not really mean what was said in that note. I then called on Zimmermann at the Foreign Office and he showed me Dumba's telegram which was substantially as stated above. Of course, I immediately cabled to the State Department and also got word to President Wilson. The rest of the incident is public property. I, of course, did not know what actually occurred between Mr. Bryan and Dr. Dumba, but I am sure that Dr. Dumba must have misunderstood friendly statements made by Mr. Bryan.

It was very lucky that I discovered the existence of this Dumba cablegram in this manner which savours almost of diplomacy as represented on the stage. If the Germans had gone on in the belief that the _Lusitania_ Note was not really meant, war would have inevitably resulted at that time between Germany and America, and it shows how great events may be shaped by heavy luncheons and a pretty woman.

Before this time much indignation had been caused in Germany by the fact that the _Lusitania_ on her eastward voyage from New York early in February, 1915, had raised the American flag when nearing British waters.

Shortly after this incident had become known, I was at the Wintergarten, a large concert hall in Berlin, with Grant Smith, First Secretary of the Emba.s.sy at Vienna and other members of my staff. We naturally spoke English among ourselves, a fact which aroused the ire of a German who had been drinking heavily and who was seated in the next box. He immediately began to call out that some one was speaking English and when told by one of the attendants that it was the American Amba.s.sador, he immediately cried in a loud voice that Americans were even worse than English and that the _Lusitania_ had been flying the American flag as protection in British waters.

The audience, however, took sides against him and told him to shut up and as I left the house at the close of the performance, some Germans spoke to me and apologised for his conduct. The next day the manager of the Wintergarten called on me also to express his regret for the occurrence.

About a year afterwards I was at the races one day and saw this man and asked him what he meant by making such a noise at the Wintergarten. He immediately apologised and said that he had been drinking and hoped that I would forget the incident. This was the only incident of the kind which occurred to me during all the time that I was in Germany.

Both before and after the sinking of the _Lusitania_, the German Foreign Office put forward all kinds of proposals with reference to American ships in the war zone. On one afternoon, Zimmermann, who had a number of these proposals drafted in German, showed them to me and I wrote down the English translation for him to see how it would look in English. These proposals were about the sailing from America of what might be called certified ships, the ships to be painted and striped in a distinctive way, to come from certified ports at certain certified times, America to agree that these ships should carry no contraband whatever. All these proposals were sternly rejected by the President.

On February sixteenth, the German answer to our note of February tenth had announced that Germany declined all responsibility for what might happen to neutral ships and, in addition, announced that mines would be allowed in waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland. This note also contained one of Zimmermann's proposed solutions, namely, that American warships should convoy American merchantmen.

The German note of the sixteenth also spoke about the great traffic in munitions from the United States to the Allies, and contained a suggestion that the United States should induce the Allies to adopt the Declaration of London and omit the importation not only of food but also of all raw materials into Germany.

February twentieth was the date of the conciliatory note addressed by President Wilson to both Great Britain and Germany; and contained the suggestion that submarines should not be employed against merchant vessels of any nationality and that food should be allowed to go through for the civil population of Germany consigned to the agencies named by the United States in Germany, which were to see that the food was received and distributed to the civil population.

In the meantime the mines on the German coast had destroyed two American ships, both loaded with cotton for Germany; one called the _Carib_ and the other the _Evelyn_.

In America, Congress refused to pa.s.s a law to put it in the power of the President to place an embargo on the export of munitions of war.

In April, Count Bernstorff delivered his note concerning the alleged want of neutrality of the United States, referring to the numerous new industries in war materials being built up in the United States, stating, "In reality the United States is supplying only Germany's enemies, a fact which is not in any way modified by the theoretical willingness to furnish Germany as well."

To this note, Secretary Bryan in a note replied that it was impossible, in view of the indisputable doctrines of accepted international law, to make any change in our own laws of neutrality which meant unequally affecting, during the progress of the war, the relations of the United States with the various nations at war; and that the placing of embargoes on the trade in arms which const.i.tuted such a change would be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States.

But all these negotiations, reproaches and recriminations were put an end to by the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_, with the killing of American women and civilians who were pa.s.sengers on that vessel.

I believed myself that we would immediately break diplomatic relations, and prepared to leave Germany. On May eleventh, I delivered to von Jagow the _Lusitania_ Note, which after calling attention to the cases of the sinking of American boats, ending with the _Lusitania_, contained the statement, "The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercises and enjoyments."

During this period I had constant conversations with von Jagow and Zimmermann, and it was during the conversations about this submarine warfare that Zimmermann on one occasion said to me: "The United States does not dare to do anything against Germany because we have five hundred thousand German reservists in America who will rise in arms against your government if your government should dare to take any action against Germany." As he said this, he worked himself up to a pa.s.sion and repeatedly struck the table with his fist. I told him that we had five hundred and one thousand lamp posts in America, and that was where the German reservists would find themselves if they tried any uprising; and I also called his attention to the fact that no German-Americans making use of the American pa.s.sports which they could easily obtain, were sailing for Germany by way of Scandinavian countries in order to enlist in the German army. I told him that if he could show me one person with an American pa.s.sport who had come to fight in the German army I might more readily believe what he said about the Germans in America rising in revolution.

As a matter of fact, during the whole course of the war, I knew of only one man with American citizenship who enlisted in the German army. This was an American student then in Germany who enlisted in a German regiment. His father, a business man in New York, cabled me asking me to have his son released from the German army; so I procured the discharge of the young man who immediately wrote to me and informed me that he was over twenty-one, and that he could not see what business his father had to interfere with his military ambitions. I thereupon withdrew my request with reference to him, but he had already been discharged from the army. When his regiment went to the West front he stowed away on the cars with it, was present at the attack on Ypres, and was shot through the body. He recovered in a German hospital, received the Iron Cross, was discharged and sailed for America.

What has since become of him I do not know.

I do not intend to go in great detail into this exchange of notes and the public history of the submarine controversy, as all that properly belongs to the history of the war rather than to an account of my personal experiences; and besides, as Victor Hugo said, "History is not written with a microscope." All will remember the answer of Germany to the American _Lusitania_ Note, which answer, delivered on May twenty-ninth, contained the charge that the _Lusitania_ was armed and carried munitions, and had been used in the transport of Canadian troops. In the meantime, however, the American ship, _Nebraskan_, had been torpedoed off the coast of Ireland on the twenty-sixth; and, on May twenty-eighth, Germany stated that the American steamer, _Gulfflight_, had been torpedoed by mistake, and apologised for this act.

Von Jagow gave me, about the same time, a Note requesting that American vessels should be more plainly marked and should illuminate their marking at night.

The second American _Lusitania_ Note was published on June eleventh, 1915; and its delivery was coincident with the resignation of Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State. In this last Note President Wilson (for, of course, it is an open secret that he was the author of these Notes) made the issue perfectly plain, referring to the torpedoing of enemy pa.s.senger ships. "Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy." On July eighth the German answer to this American _Lusitania_ Note was delivered, and again stated that "we have been obliged to adopt a submarine war to meet the declared intentions of our enemies and the method of warfare adopted by them in contravention of international law".

Again referring to the alleged fact of the _Lusitania's_ carrying munitions they said: "If the _Lusitania_ had been spared, thousands of cases of munitions would have been sent to Germany's enemies and thereby thousands of German mothers and children robbed of breadwinners." The note then contained some of Zimmermann's favourite proposals, to the effect that German submarine commanders would be instructed to permit the pa.s.sage of American steamers marked in a special way and of whose sailing they had been notified in advance, provided that the American Government guaranteed that these vessels did not carry contraband of war. It was also suggested that a number of neutral vessels should be added to those sailing under the American flag, to give greater opportunity for those Americans who were compelled to travel abroad, and the Note's most important part continued: "In particular the Imperial Government is unable to admit that the American citizens can protect an enemy ship by mere fact of their presence on board."