Moral Theology Part 76

1680. The gravity of the sins of astuteness, trickery and fraud depends on the character of the object, end and circ.u.mstances. (a) Thus, on account of the object the sin is grave when the means chosen are very bad (e.g., serious calumnies), venial when the means are slightly evil (e.g., lies about unimportant matters); (b) on account of the end the sin is mortal when one intends to perpetrate a serious offense (e.g., clever ruses to get into a house in order to rob it), venial when the purpose is not so bad (e.g., cheating at cards in order to win a small sum); (c) on account of the circ.u.mstances the sin is made mortal by some grave defect or disorder in the act resulting from the condition of time, place, person, etc. Thus, there might easily be great scandal if a person of authority were known to lie habitually, as it suited his interests.

1681. Solicitude.--Another form of spurious prudence is solicitude, that is, an inordinate carefulness about temporal things or about the future. Its sinfulness appears from the following considerations.

(a) Our Lord condemns solicitude: "Be not solicitous therefore saying: 'What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?' . . . Be not solicitous for the morrow, for the morrow will be solicitous for itself. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof"

(Matt, vi. 31, 34).

(b) Solicitude seeks temporal things without the moderation that reason requires, does not duly esteem the spiritual, and does not confide in Divine Providence. Without any human care G.o.d bestows upon man the gift of life itself, provides for the animals and plants, directs the whole inanimate creation, and it is therefore unreasonable to fret and fume over the temporal things of one individual as if G.o.d were unable or unwilling to see to them (Matt, vi. 25 sqq.).

1682. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about Temporalities.--(a) Solicitude is sinful on account of the things sought if one makes temporal things the end of life, as when a person follows religion purely as a business matter, for the sake of the living and worldly advantages this secures.

(b) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate desire of obtaining some good, when one pursues the temporal with such avidity that the spiritual is made to suffer, as when a person devotes so much time and thought to business, politics, society or science that religion is more and more set aside in his life: "The cares of this world choked up the word" (Matt., xiii. 22).

(c) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate fear of losing a temporal good, when one is deterred from religion by the thought that fidelity to virtue means the sacrifice of the necessaries of life.

Examples of this immoderate solicitude are persons who never attend church or contribute to religion, lest they lose time or money, or who practise race-suicide to escape the burden of supporting a family.

1683. Cases of Lawful Solicitude.--(a) When the end is a genuine temporal good, moderate solicitude is not only lawful but is a duty dictated by prudence. Thus, a man who labors industriously and who saves, spending economically for the support of himself and his dependents and the upkeep of his home and business, is prudent in the true sense of the word, provided he is not too much absorbed in money-making or too anxious about financial affairs: "Work must be attended to, but worry must be banished" (St. Jerome).

(b) When the end is a spiritual one, moderate solicitude is also a duty. Thus, St. Paul was solicitous for his Churches (II Cor., xi. 28), Timothy for the Philippians (Phil., ii. 20); those who have charge as almoners should be solicitous for the goods given for the poor, etc.

1684. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about the Future.--(a) Solicitude is unlawful on account of the end that is intended, when one makes temporal things one's G.o.d, and is therefore perturbed about the future, as when a person has set his heart upon obtaining some honor by fair means or foul, and is restless and disturbed in mind lest it escape him.

(b) Solicitude is unlawful on account of immoderate desire, when one seeks for more than one should, as when a person who has sufficient means busies himself about too many things and deprives himself of peace and health in order to be wealthier in the future.

(c) Solicitude is unlawful on account of the unsuitability of the time, when one antic.i.p.ates the season for care, as when a farmer worries during planting season about the harvest, and during harvest time about the next planting. Those who willingly occupy and disquiet themselves with forebodings of dire calamities that are uncertain (e.g., the imminent destruction of the world) or of evils that cannot be prevented (e.g., their death), are also guilty of sinful solicitude.

1685. Cases of Lawful Solicitude about the Future.--(a) When the end is a lawul temporal good, moderate solicitude about the future is good, for providence for the future is a part of prudence (see 1654).

Scripture praises the ant which gathers its food in the summer against the winter (Prov., vi. 6). Joseph stored up a reserve of grain (Gen., xii. 34 sqq.); Our Lord appointed Judas to act as treasurer for Himself and His followers (John, xii. 6); the Apostles kept for future expenses offerings made from the sale of fields (Acts, iv. 34, 35). (b) When the end is spiritual, reasonable solicitude is also good, and this is seen in the conduct of the early Christians who gathered alms in advance that they might have the means to bestow a.s.sistance during a famine which had been predicted (Acts, xi. 27 sqq.).

1686. False Prudence and Avarice.--The sins of false prudence are caused chiefly by avarice. (a) They are sins in which reason plays a great part, though it is not put to a good use; and hence they do not naturally spring from carnal vices or cowardice, which obscure reason.

Avarice, on the contrary, reasons much on how it may get and keep; it is shrewd, cunning, deliberate, foresighted. (b) They are sins that have recourse to stealth and secrecy, and thus are unlike pride, vainglory, and anger, which incline to display and openness. But avarice puts utility above considerations of glory or revenge, and prefers to be without fame or to bear with slights rather than lose profits.

1687. Commandments of Prudence.--Prudence is not expressly commanded in the Decalogue, but there are precepts concerning this virtue in other parts of Scripture.

(a) Prudence is not enjoined in the Decalogue, because the ten commandments are concerned with those ends of virtue that are manifest to all, whereas prudence is about the means to practise virtue.

(b) Prudence is commanded in many places of Scripture: "Get wisdom and with all thy possession purchase prudence" (Prov., iv. 7); "Walk in the ways of prudence" (ibid, ix. 6); "Purchase prudence, for it is more precious than silver" (ibid, xvi. 16); "Be ye prudent as serpents"

(Matt., x, 16); "Speak the things that become sound doctrine, that the aged men be sober, chaste, prudent" (t.i.t., ii. 1, 2); "Be prudent and Watch in prayers" (I Peter, iv. 7).

Art. 2: THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 57-60.)

1688. After prudence follows justice. This virtue regulates human actions and renders to others their due, and so it has preeminence over fort.i.tude and temperance, which govern the pa.s.sions and make man virtuous as regards his own acts only and not as regards his neighbor.

The logical order, then, is that justice should precede fort.i.tude and temperance.

1689. Nature of Justice.--In G.o.d justice is an attribute in virtue of which He so treats His creatures that they can have no well-founded complaint against Him: "His own justice supported Him. He put on justice as a breastplate" (Is, lix. 16, 17). In man it is goodness towards G.o.d or towards neighbors; and it is called in Scripture by various names, such as "justice," "equity," "truth," "righteousness."

(a) In a wide sense, justice signifies the general virtue of holiness, or the collection of all the virtues, as when Our Lord says: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice (i.e., holiness)" (Matt., v. 6). Holiness, as a supernatural life communicated to the soul, is also called justice or justification: "The justice of G.o.d by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in Him" (Rom., iii. 22).

(b) In a strict sense, it signifies the special moral virtue that consists in a firm purpose of the will to give to everyone his due or right: "Love justice, you that are judges of the earth" (Wis., i. 1); "If in every deed you speak justice" (Ps. lvii. 2). In its strict sense the word "justice" is hereafter used.

1690. Definition of Right.--Right signifies originally that which follows a straight course or does not deviate from the true standard, as in the expressions "right ahead," "to be in the right." But in moral matters right has the derived meaning of that which is good, proper, suitable; and in general it is of two kinds, objective and subjective, the former being the foundation of the latter.

(a) Objective right is that which is prescribed by law, or it is the law itself as the rule and standard of what ought to be done, especially in the relations of men towards one another. In this sense there is a twofold right, natural and positive, according as reason itself or free will imposes a law (see 286, 296).

(b) Subjective right is that relationship introduced between men by reason of the laws governing their conduct one to another, which gives to one an authority to exercise certain capabilities (active right, right properly so-called), and imposes on another the necessity of respecting that authority (pa.s.sive right, duty).

1691. Right properly so called is defined as the moral power of doing or possessing something.

(a) It is a moral power, that is, a power created by the moral law giving one a true t.i.tle and forbidding others to interfere with its enjoyment and use. It is not a physical power, for might does not make right; on the contrary, he who has moral power is sometimes hindered from exercising it by another who has physical power. Nor is it a mere legal power, or capacity to act validly and within human law, but an ethical power that enables one to act licitly before G.o.d and conscience.

(b) It is a power to do (e.g., to labor) or to have (e.g., to own land). The former includes also the moral power to forbear action (e.g., to rest on Sunday), to require that another act (e.g., pay what he owes me), or that he forbear action (e.g., keep off my property); while the latter includes also the power to acquire, to use, to transfer, etc.

1692. Divisions of Right.--(a) By reason of its source, or of the law from which it springs, a right is either natural (e.g. the right to life, liberty, pursuit of happiness), positive-divine (e.g., the right to receive the Sacraments), positive-human (e.g., the right of parishioners that Ma.s.s be said for them by their pastor, the right of citizens to vote and to be voted for). (b) By reason of its term, or of the power which it confers, a right is strict (legal) or non-strict (moral). One has a strict right when something is due one, because it is one's own by a proper and exclusive t.i.tle (e.g., the right to life and property). One has a non-strict right when something is due one, only because it is something common that is to be distributed and one is a deserving member of the community (e.g., the right to receive an appointment from the government), or because virtue (e.g., the right to receive grat.i.tude for benefits shown) or the perfection of virtue (e.g., the right to be treated with liberality or affability or friendship by others) requires it.

1693. Natural rights are subdivided as follows:

(a) in respect of their object, some rights are absolute, as being based on nature alone (e.g., the right of a child to support from its parent arises from natural origin); or they are relative, as being based on nature in its relation to concrete and contingent facts (e.g., the right of an owner to private possession of his land arises from the nature of land, which was made to serve man, and from the contingent fact that it cannot serve man as a rule without private ownership);

(b) in respect of their source, some rights are innate, that is, they are had from birth by the very fact of human nature (e.g., the right of life in the newborn child); others are acquired, that is, obtained in course of time through some contingent fact. Thus, t.i.tles to goods of fortune which the owner is the first to possess (original t.i.tles) are obtained by occupation and accession; t.i.tles to goods obtained from others (derivative t.i.tles) are obtained through prescription, inheritance, contract;

(c) in respect to their firmness, some rights are alienable, that is, they are such as may be renounced or superseded lawfully, since they are not obligatory (e.g., the right to marry, the right to drink alcohol); while others are inalienable, that is, not subject to renunciation or deprivation, as being obligatory (e.g., the right to repel temptation, the right to serve G.o.d).

1694. Signs by which Strict and Non-Strict Rights May Be Distinguished.--(a) That to which one has a strict right belongs to one as one's own, and hence it must be determinate or determinable. The right of a beggar to receive some a.s.sistance from someone is not a strict right, since it cannot be urged against any particular thing or any individual person; but the right of a creditor is a strict right, since it can be urged against the debtor for a definite amount.

(b) That to which one has a strict right is owed in justice, and hence it may be enforced by legal means, or in case of need by physical force. The right of a child not to be slighted in the distribution of presents made by its parents, the right of a person who has had a falling out with another that the latter shall accept advances for a reconciliation, and the right of a benefactor that the beneficiaries show signs of grat.i.tude, are not strict rights, because they cannot be enforced in courts of justice, but the right of a laborer against his employer is a strict right, since it can be vindicated by legal means.

It should be noted that a strict right is one that is granted as a proper, exclusive and enforceable power by any law, whether natural or positive, and hence the fact that human law will not vindicate a right (e.g., the right arising from a contract naturally good, but legally not defensible, the right of a parent to his child's respect) does not prove that the right is not strict.

1695. A strict right to have or to own is either _in re_ or _ad rem_.

(a) A right _in re_ (real or complete right) is the right to that which one already lawfully has as one's own (e.g., the right that Caius has to the wages paid him by Balbus). (b) A right _ad rem_ (personal or inchoate right) is the right to that which one is ent.i.tled to obtain as one's own (e.g., the right that Caius has to receive the wages promised him by Balbus).

1696. Legal Enforcement of Strict Rights.--(a) The right _in re_ authorizes recourse to a real action (_actio in rem_), that is, to a suit against the thing itself, no matter where it be or by whom it be held, as when one sues to recover one's property through the ejectment of a wrongful possessor; for the thing is immediately and juridically bound to him who has the right, as being his own.

(b) The right _ad rem_ enables one to enforce one's claim by a personal action (_actio in personam_), that is, to bring a suit against a definite person on whom one has a claim by reason of contract, domestic relationship, fiduciary position, etc., as when one sues for recovery on account of the non-fulfillment of the conditions of a compact.

1697. The right _in re_ to property is either perfect or imperfect.

(a) A perfect right (right of full dominion) is that which enables one to exercise all the prerogatives of ownership, that is, to dispose at will of an object (e.g., to sell, lend, give away, etc.), to use it (e.g., to occupy a house, to make alterations in it, to tear it down, etc.), and to exclude others (e.g., to put a fence about one's property to exclude the public).

(b) An imperfect right (right of partial dominion) is had when one is restricted as to the right of the disposition of one's goods, for example, when one is forbidden to sell; or when one has the right of disposition without the right of use, for example, when one is forbidden on account of the vows of religion to use property one owns (radical dominion); or when one has the right of use without the right of disposition, for example, when one is forbidden to make permanent alterations in a house one occupies as tenant (indirect or useful dominion); or when one has the other rights of ownership but lacks the right of exclusion, for example, when one may not exclude a neighbor's flock from grazing in one's pasture (ownership subject to servitude).

1698. The Subject of Justice, or the Faculty of the Soul in Which It Exists.--(a) Justice is not in the intellect, for we are not called just because we know a thing rightly, but because we act rightly; (b) nor is it in the sensitive appet.i.te, since a sense faculty does not apprehend the relations between rights and duties; (c) hence, justice is in the rational appet.i.te or will.

1699. The Objects or Subject-Matter of Justice.--(a) The material object of justice (i.e., all those things with which it deals) is remotely the external things which are the objects of exchange and distribution among men, and proximately the actions by which they are exchanged or distributed.