Moral Theology Part 66

(c) Seduction through the imagination is seen in hypnotism or suggestion when used to produce a vivid and strong impression of something dangerous to be thought on. A spirit of bigoted uniformity which demands that all dress, think and act alike even in matters where there should be liberty, may also be very seductive; for, rather than commit the unpardonable sin of seeming queer, a person may take to drunkenness or whatever vice is popular in his crowd or group.

1506. Coperation in Sin.--Coperation or partic.i.p.ation in sin, strictly understood, is help afforded another, whom one has not seduced, to carry out his purpose of sinning.

(a) Hence, coperation differs from scandal and solicitation, for these lead into sin one who had not decided on sin, while coperation supposes that the other party had already made up his mind to sin. The scandalizer leads into sin, but does not help in its commission; the coperator does not lead into sin but he helps in its commission.

(b) Coperation, however, may include scandal and solicitation as regards future sins or as regards third parties. Example: Balbus, who had decided on his own initiative to steal, finds to his surprise that his conduct receives aid and comfort from t.i.tus, a person of some authority. This coperation will act as an example or incitement to Balbus to repeat the offense, and will likewise be an occasion of sin to others.

1507. Coperation is also different from complicity as follows: (a) The coperator acts as a.s.sistant or subordinate agent to the one who commits sin, providing him with moral or physical help, or supplying him with the means requisite for the act of sin. Thus, he whose services are commandeered by robbers and who carries away the stolen goods, or who puts a revolver into the hand of one bent on murder or obscene books into the hands of one bent on the corruption of youth, is a coperator. (b) The accomplice acts as an equiprinc.i.p.al or coordinate agent with another in the commission of the same sin, performing his own proper part or share of the joint act of sin. Thus, he who enlists as a member of a robber band and acts as their chauffeur or lookout at the time of "hold-ups," or who fights a duel, or who carries on an obscene dialogue, or listens willingly to obscene talk, is an accomplice. The accomplice is always guilty, but the coperator may be guiltless.

1508. Kinds of Coperation.--Divisions of Coperation according to Different Kinds of Acts.--(a) From the viewpoint of the internal act, coperation is either formal or material, according as one does or does not intend the sin whose external commission one is aiding. Examples: Caius offers a burglar information as to ways of climbing into a second-story window. Claudius, being covered by a revolver, makes no resistance or outcry while bandits are rifling his employer's office.

Caius is an abettor of crime and a formal coperator on account of his guilty intent; Claudius aids the commission of burglary, but he is only a material coperator, since he does not intend what the criminals intend.

(b) From the viewpoint of the external act, coperation is positive or negative, according as one does something to help the princ.i.p.al agent, or does nothing to impede him. In the examples given above, Caius was a positive, Claudius a negative coperator. Positive coperation is given in a moral manner, as when one votes for an unjust law or sentence, or cheers a sinful remark; or in a physical manner, as when one helps bandits to bind and gag their victims, or leaves doors and windows unfastened for the convenience of thieves.

1509. Divisions of Coperation according to its Degree of Influence.--(a) From the viewpoint of its activity, coperation is either occasional or effective. By occasional coperation is understood that which leads another into sin, or allows him to be drawn into sin, but does not a.s.sist him to commit sin (e.g., scandalous example, failure to give a fraternal correction or admonition). By effective coperation is understood a.s.sistance given another enabling him to carry out, or to carry out more easily, an act of sin on which he had resolved. As is clear from the explanation given above (see 1506), there is question here only of effective coperation.

(b) From the viewpoint of its nearness to the act of the princ.i.p.al agent, coperation is either immediate or mediate, according as one shares in the sinful act of the princ.i.p.al agent, or in some act that preceded or followed it. Thus, he who helps a thief to carry away stolen goods is an immediate coperator, while he who supplied the thief with necessary keys before the theft, and he who offered refuge to the thief or concealment for the stolen goods after the theft, are mediate coperators.

(c) From the viewpoint of the dependence on it of what is done, coperation is either indispensable or not indispensable, according as the princ.i.p.al agent cannot act without it, or can. Example: Balbus supplies intoxicants to t.i.tus and Semp.r.o.nius, who are intemperate.

t.i.tus cannot secure intoxicants except from Balbus; Semp.r.o.nius can secure them elsewhere. Balbus' coperation is indispensable for t.i.tus, but not for Semp.r.o.nius.

1510. Coperation is also divided from the viewpoint of responsibility or of the consequences incurred through it, into unjust coperation and merely unlawful coperation.

(a) Unjust coperation is partic.i.p.ation in the guilt of an injury done to a third party which involves the duty of rest.i.tution or strict reparation. Thus, those who act as "fences" or receivers of stolen goods, coperate in injustice and are bound to rest.i.tution to the rightful owners.

(b) Unlawful coperation is partic.i.p.ation in a sin that contains no injustice to a third party, and that entails only the obligations of repentance and satisfaction, and, if the case requires it, of amends for scandal, proofs of sincerity, avoidance of dangers and submission to penalty. Thus, those who coperate by marrying illegally, or by providing obscene literature to persons who demand it and insist on having it, are guilty of sin and also fall under various punishments prescribed in law. Coperation, in so far as it is unjust, will be treated specially under the head of Justice (see Vol. II); here we are concerned with coperation in general, and as it is a sin against charity.

1511. Formal coperation is either explicit or implicit. (a) It is explicit, when the end intended by the coperator (_finis operantis_) is the sin of the princ.i.p.al agent. Examples: Balbus gives incense money to an idolater, because he approves of idolatry and wishes to see idolatrous rites performed. Caius joins an anarchistic society because he agrees with its aims and wishes to help in their fulfillment.

(b) Formal coperation is implicit, when the coperator does not directly intend to a.s.sociate himself with the sin of the princ.i.p.al agent, but the end of the external act (_finis operis_), which for the sake of some advantage or interest the coperator docs intend, includes from its nature or from circ.u.mstances the guilt of the sin of the princ.i.p.al agent. Examples: Balbus detests idolatry, but in order to show courtesy he helps a pagan to burn incense before an idol, or he a.s.sists in the repairing of a pagan shrine, though his act is looked on as a sign of worship. Caius joins a freethinking society, not because he likes its principles, but because he wishes to obtain through membership certain social or financial advantages which he cannot obtain in any other way.

1512. Mediate coperation is also subdivided into proximate and remote.

(a) It is proximate or remote by reason of nearness, according as the act of sin will follow closely or otherwise on the act of coperation.

Thus, he who gives a ladder to a burglar coperates in a remote preparation; he who holds the ladder while the burglar goes up coperates in a proximate preparation. (b) Mediate coperation is proximate or remote as to definiteness, according as the preparation points clearly or only vaguely to the commission of sin. Proximate coperation is an action which, from its nature or circ.u.mstances, is regarded as morally connected with the evil action of the princ.i.p.al agent, while remote coperation is an action that has no such moral connection with the sin that is committed. Thus, he who sells a revolver to a gunman who is preparing for a murder coperates proximately, while he who sells the materials for this weapon coperates only remotely. Again, if one sells to a burglar a "jimmy," a dark lantern, a mask, a revolver, and explosives, the coperation is definite, since the circ.u.mstances indicate that robbery is contemplated. But if one sells a burglar a pair of soft-sounding shoes, the coperation is indefinite, for the burglar may wish them in order to give no disturbance in his own home, and not in order to attract no attention in the homes of others.

1513. The Sinfulness of Coperation.--The Sinfulness of Formal Coperation.--(a) Formal coperation is always sinful, for it includes the approval of the sin of another and the willing partic.i.p.ation in the guilt of that sin.

(b) Formal coperation is from its nature opposed to charity; for charity disapproves of the sins of others and strives to prevent them, while formal coperation, on the contrary, approves and a.s.sists the sins of others.

(c) Formal coperation is also opposed to the virtue violated by the sin of the princ.i.p.al agent, in so far as the will of the coperator delights in or approves of the circ.u.mstance of help given to the sin of the other (see 1468). Thus, if one opens the door to a caller whom one suspects to be a burglar and at the same time mentally sympathizes with the act of burglary, one is guilty in will of the act one approves.

(d) Formal coperation as to its external act is opposed to the virtue violated by the coperator, when the external act has a malice of its own. Thus, if one swears falsely in order to conceal the presence of a burglar hidden in the house, one is guilty of perjury; if one disobeys the laws of the Church by marrying clandestinely, one is guilty of disobedience; if one scandalizes third parties by coperating with sin, one is guilty of scandal; if one shares in fraud, one is guilty of injustice, etc. Hence, in confession it does not suffice to say that one has coperated in sin, but one must also tell the sin committed and the necessary circ.u.mstances.

1514. The Sinfulness of Material Coperation.--(a) Material coperation, in itself, is sinful; for charity commands that one strive to prevent the sin of another, and much more therefore does it forbid one to help in the sin of another. (b) Material coperation, in case of great necessity, is not sinful; for charity does not oblige under serious inconvenience to self, and it does not forbid one to coperate by an indifferent act to prevent a neighbor from committing a greater evil than the evil he has in mind. He who coperates materially through necessity does not cause sin, but uses his own right, which the bad will of the other abuses and makes an occasion of sin (see 1447 d).

1515. Lawfulness of Material Coperation.--The conditions necessary in order that material coperation be lawful are the same as for any other act that has a double result (see 104); for from the coperation follow two results, one that is bad (viz., the sin of the other person) and one that is good (viz., the avoidance of loss or the retention of good). Two of the conditions required in the principle of double result need not be considered, however, since their presence is manifestly a.s.sured by the very fact that the coperation is merely material. (a) Thus, the condition that the good effect must not be secured through the evil effect is verified; for, if one intends the sin of the other party as a means to the good end, coperation is formal. Hence, if Balbus helps Claudius to get sinfully drunk, so that Claudius may go to confession the sooner, the coperation of Balbus in the drunkenness of Claudius is formal. (b) The condition that the evil effect is not intended is also verified; for the very definition of material coperation excludes the intention of the sin committed by the other party.

1516. Hence, we may confine our attention to the two remaining conditions stated in the principle of double effect, and conclude that material coperation is lawful when and if the act of the coperator is itself good or indifferent, and he has a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the sin of the other party.

1517. The first condition of material coperation is that the act of the coperator must be good or at least indifferent; for, if it is evil, the coperation becomes implicitly formal. But, since it is often difficult to determine in particular instances whether coperation is intrinsically evil or merely indifferent, one must examine the nature and circ.u.mstances of the act.

(a) Thus, according to its nature, an act of coperation is intrinsically evil, if it has no uses except such as are evil; it is indifferent, if, according to the intention of those who use it, it is now good, now evil. Hence, it is intrinsically wrong to a.s.sist in the manufacture or distribution of obscene books or pictures, or of drugs or instruments used exclusively for immoral purposes, since the only use to which such things can be put is sinful. It is also intrinsically wrong to take part even remotely in pagan superst.i.tions, or to give any immediate a.s.sistance to an act which from its nature is opposed to the Sixth Commandment. But it is not intrinsically wrong to a.s.sist in the manufacture of firearms or poisons, which have many good uses, or to act as bodyguard to a person who fears harm from others.

(b) According to its circ.u.mstances, an act of coperation is evil, if by reason of adjuncts it is wrong, as when it signifies approval of evil, gives scandal to others, endangers the faith or virtue of the coperator, or violates a law of the Church. Thus, it is not from the nature of the act wrong to invite a pedestrian to ride in one's car; but it is wrong from the circ.u.mstances when the pedestrian asks to be taken to a spot where he intends to commit robbery. It is not wrong intrinsically to work at building a temple; but it is wrong from the circ.u.mstances, when this act is regarded by the public as a sign of adherence to a false religion, or when the act causes scandal (see 983). The laws of the Church on mixed marriage or neutral schools afford other examples of coperation lawful in one set of circ.u.mstances, but unlawful in another on account of significance, scandal, danger, etc.

1518. But the circ.u.mstance that the coperator knows for certain that the princ.i.p.al agent will use the coperation for sinful purposes, or will take scandal to the extent of being strengthened in his evil designs by reason of the a.s.sistance given, does not necessarily make coperation evil.

(a) Thus, the coperator may know from the declaration of the princ.i.p.al agent just what is to be done, and yet have no will whatever to concur in the evil. Hence, if a person is forced at the point of a revolver to help in robbing his own guests, he knows very well what is being done, but he certainly does not approve of it.

(b) The coperator may know that scandal will be occasioned by the coperation, either to the princ.i.p.al agent or to others, but he may have sufficient reasons for permitting it (see 1478, 1482). Thus, if the employee of an undertaking establishment has orders to a.s.sist at the funeral of an anarchist, and will lose his means of livelihood if he does not comply, he is not obliged to suffer this great detriment to avoid Pharisaic scandal or even scandal of the weak. But he should, if possible, declare his want of sympathy with anarchy, if he knows of some anarchist present who regards his coperation as a mark of sympathy for the principles of the deceased.

1519. The second condition for lawful material coperation is that the coperator should have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the evil connected with his coperation. The standards for judging whether a reason is sufficiently weighty, are the rules given above on permission of an evil effect (see 105).

(a) Hence, the graver the sin that will be committed, the graver the reason required for coperation. Thus, a greater reason is required for coperation in a.s.sault than for coperation in theft.

(b) The nearer the coperation is to the act of sin, the greater the reason required for coperation. Thus, he who sells paper to the publisher of obscene books coperates remotely; he who sets the type or reads the proofs of such books coperates proximately. A greater reason is necessary for the latter than for the former coperation.

(c) The greater the dependence of the evil act on one's coperation, the greater the reason required for coperation. Thus, a more serious reason is needed to justify giving intoxicants to a person who abuses liquors, if he is unable to procure them elsewhere, than if he can easily get them from others. But the fact that, if you deny intoxicants or other coperation, another person will grant what you deny, is not of itself a sufficient reason for coperation.

(d) The more certain the evil act, the greater the reason required for coperation. Example: t.i.tus gets drunk frequently, Balbus at intervals.

Hence, a greater reason is needed for providing liquor to t.i.tus than to Balbus.

(e) The more obligation one is under to avoid the act of coperation or to prevent the act of sin, the greater the reason must be for coperation. Hence, a much greater reason is necessary for lawful coperation by those who are bound _ex officio_, from piety or justice, to prevent a sin (such as parents, spiritual directors, and policemen) than on the part of those who are not so bound.

1520. Reasons for coperation correspond in gravity with the importance of the goods or evils involved (see 1163 sqq.).

(a) Hence, a grave reason for coperation exists when, if one refuses it, a great good will be lost or a great evil incurred. A day's wages or income is generally a great good; a severe or long-continued pain, great anger of an employer or other superior, things that bring on notable annoyance, shame, repugnance, etc., are examples of great evils.

(b) A very grave reason for coperation is the gain or retention of a very great good or the avoidance of a very great evil. A notable percentage of the goods of one's station in life should be considered as a very great good. A severe and long-continued illness, unemployment on the part of the breadearner of a needy family, serious detriment to one's honor, reputation or peace of mind, etc., are examples of very great evils.

(c) Graver reasons for coperation are those that surpa.s.s the very grave without being supreme, such as the loss of one's station in life, incurable disease, loss of an eye or other princ.i.p.al member, severe or perpetual imprisonment.

(d) Most grave reasons for coperation are the public safety of Church or State, loss of all one's property, death, extreme disgrace, and the like.

1521. When the sin committed by the princ.i.p.al agent is grave, but contains no injustice to a third party, the reasons for coperation need not be so serious as when the sin is grave and unjust.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable coperation is justified in order to avoid grave loss to self; for example, one may ask absolution from an unworthy minister, in order to recover the state of grace more quickly.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable coperation, or mediate and indispensable coperation, is lawful when it is necessary in order to avoid a moderate loss. Examples: One may receive Communion from an unworthy minister in order to make the Easter duty more conveniently.

One may supply intoxicants to a drunkard in order to avoid a brawl, if there is no time to call in the strong arm of the law to subdue the drunkard.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable coperation is justified even by avoidance of a slight loss. Example: A butcher may sell meat on Friday to a cook who will serve it to some persons bound by abstinence, if the cook can easily get the meat from others and the profit will go elsewhere, unless the butcher sells her the meat.

1522. When the sin committed by the princ.i.p.al agent is a grave injustice to a private party, the reasons for coperation need not be so serious as when the sin is against the public good.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable coperation is permissible, if without it one cannot avoid a loss to self that is both certain and of a higher kind, or at least a greater one of the same kind than that which will be suffered by the injured party; for this latter would be unreasonable, if he expected one to suffer a greater loss in order to spare him. Example: Mercurius, a servant, is threatened with instant death if he does not open a safe of his employer, take from it certain papers, and deliver them to a burglar.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable coperation, or mediate and indispensable coperation, is allowed if necessary for the avoidance of an equal loss to self. Examples: The burglar mentioned above can blow open the safe if Mercurius refuses to open it, but, if he is put to this trouble, he will steal from Mercurius valuables comparable to the papers in the safe. Claudius, a servant, opens a backdoor, the only way through which a burglar can enter secretly, because he is taken by surprise, and refusal on his part will inevitably cost him the loss of papers equally as valuable as those the burglar wishes to secure.

Semp.r.o.nius wishes to rob a house, but he cannot get there without the a.s.sistance of Caius, a chauffeur. Caius understands the purpose of Semp.r.o.nius, but, if he refuses to take him to the house, Semp.r.o.nius will give out information that will do almost as much harm to Caius as the robbery would do to the owner of the house.