Moral Theology Part 57

1301. The Gravity of Hatred of G.o.d.-(a) It is a mortal sin from its nature, and can never be venial on account of the smallness of the injury, but only on account of lack of deliberation or consent. Dislike of even one attribute of G.o.d is a grave injury, for everything pertaining to G.o.d is perfect and infinitely lovable. (b) Hatred of G.o.d is the worst of all mortal sins; for it is directly opposed to G.o.d (the supreme good) and to charity (the most excellent virtue in a creature), whereas other mortal sins offend against these goods only indirectly.

1302. The comparison just made between hatred of G.o.d and other sins supposes that the other sins do not include hatred of G.o.d, for it is clear that simple hatred of G.o.d existing in the will is less serious than a composite sin, such as external blasphemy uttered to manifest internal hatred of G.o.d. (a) Thus, hatred of G.o.d without unbelief is worse than unbelief without hatred of G.o.d; (b) hatred of G.o.d without hatred of the neighbor is worse than hatred of the neighbor without hatred of G.o.d.

1303. Degrees of Malice in Hatred of G.o.d.--(a) A new species of sin is added to hatred of G.o.d, when out of hatred one proceeds to sin against creatures, or to commit other offenses against G.o.d Himself. Example: t.i.tus hates G.o.d, and therefore persecutes those who believe in G.o.d, and also blasphemes G.o.d. (b) A new degree of malice is added to hatred of G.o.d when one proceeds from dislike to enmity, or when the circ.u.mstances of person, place, manner, etc., aggravate the malice. Example: Hatred of G.o.d outwardly manifested adds the evil of scandal; not so hatred of G.o.d that is concealed.

1304. Hatred of Creatures.--All dislike of G.o.d is sinful, because there is nothing in G.o.d that merits dislike. But in creatures imperfections are found as well as perfections.

(a) Hence, dislike of the imperfections of our neighbor (i.e., of all that is the work of the devil or of his own sinfulness), is not against charity, but according to charity; for it is the same thing to dislike another's evil as to wish his good. Thus, G.o.d Himself is said to hate detractors, that is, detraction (Rom., i. 30), and Christ bids His followers hate their parents who would be an impediment to their progress in holiness, that is, the sinful opposition of those parents (Luke, xiv. 26). Only when dislike is carried beyond reason is it sinful. Thus, a wife who dislikes her husband's habit of drunkenness so much that she will not give him a necessary medicine on account of the alcohol it contains, carries her dislike to extremes.

(b) Dislike of the perfections of nature or of grace in our neighbor (i.e., of anything that is the work of G.o.d in him), is contrary to charity. Thus, G.o.d does not hate the detractor himself, nor should children ever hate the person of a parent, or the natural relationship he holds to themselves, no matter how bad the parent may be. As St.

Augustine says: "One should love the sinner, but hate his vices."

1305. The same principles apply to dislike of self. (a) Thus, one should dislike one's own imperfections, for they are the enemies of one's soul. So, contrition is defined as a hatred and detestation of one's vices, and it is a virtue and an act of charity to self. (b) One should not dislike the good one has, except in so far as it is a.s.sociated with evil. Thus, one should not regret one's honesty, even if by reason of it one loses an opportunity to make a large sum of money; but one may regret having married, if one's choice has been unfortunate and has made one's life miserable.

1306. Should a person dislike in others their opposition to himself?

(a) If their opposition is unjust, he should dislike it, for it is then a sin in them and an injury to himself, and charity to them and to self requires that he should dislike what is harmful to all concerned. (b) If their opposition is just, he should like it, for it is virtuous in them and beneficial to himself: "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy" (Prov., xxvii. 6).

1307. Direct enmity to self is not possible, for nature inclines each one so strongly to love of self that it is impossible for anyone to wish evil to himself as evil: "No one hateth his own flesh" (Ephes., v.

29). But indirectly a person may be at enmity with himself, inasmuch as he wishes evil under the guise of good; and hence St. Augustine, commenting on the words, "He that loveth his life shall lose it" (John, xii, 25), says: "If you love self wrongly, you hate it; if you hate self rightly, you love it." This indirect enmity to self happens in two ways. (a) A person sometimes wishes himself what is not a true, but only an apparent good, as when he chooses the satisfaction of revenge rather than that of pardon of injuries. (b) A person sometimes chooses what is good, not for his true, but for his lower self, as when he decides to gratify the body at the expense of the soul.

1308. Is it ever lawful to wish evil to self or to others? (a) It is not lawful to wish anyone evil as evil, for even G.o.d in punishing the lost does not will their punishment as it is evil to them, but as it contains the good of justice. Hence, it is contrary to charity to wish that a criminal be put to death, if one's wish does not go beyond the sufferings and loss of life the criminal will endure. (b) It is lawful to wish evil as good, or, in other words, to wish misfortunes that are blessings in disguise. Thus, one may wish that a neighbor lose his arm, if this is necessary to save his life.

1309. One may easily be self-deceived in wishing evil to one's neighbor under the pretext that it is really good one desires, for the true intention may be hatred or revenge. Hence, the following conditions must be present when one wishes evil as good:

(a) On the part of the subject (i.e., of the person who wills the evil), the intention must be sincerely charitable, proceeding from a desire that the neighbor be benefitted. Thus, it is lawful to wish that a gambler may meet with reverses, if what is intended is, not his loss, but his awakening to the need of a new kind of amus.e.m.e.nt. St. Paul rejoiced that he had made the Corinthians sorrowful, because their sorrow worked repentance in them (II Cor., vii. 7-11). Of course, the desire of a neighbor's good does not confer the right to wrong him, for the end does not justify the means.

(b) On the part of the object (i.e., of the evil which is wished to another), it must he compensated for by the good which is intended. It is not lawful to desire the death of another on account of the property one expects to inherit, for the neighbor's life is more important than private gain; but it is lawful to wish, out of interest in the common welfare, that a criminal be captured and punished, for it is only by the vindication of law that public tranquillity can be secured (Gal., v. 12).

1310. Is it lawful to wish the death of self or of a neighbor for some private good of the one whose death is wished? (a) If the good is a spiritual one and more important than the spiritual good contained in the desire to live, it is lawful to desire death. Thus, it is lawful to wish to die in order to enter into a better life, or to be freed from the temptations and sinfulness of life on earth. But it is not lawful to wish to die in order to spare a few individuals the scandal they take from one's life, if that life is needed by others as a source of edification (Philip., i. 21 sqq.). (b) If the good is a temporal one but sufficiently important, it does not seem unlawful to desire death.

Thus, we should not blame a person suffering from a painful and incurable disease, which makes him a burden to himself and to others, if, with resignation to the divine will, he prays for the release of death; for "death is better than a bitter life" (Ecclus., x.x.x, 17). But lack of perfect health or a feeling of weariness is not a good reason for wishing to die, especially if one has dependents, or is useful to others.

1311. Is it ever lawful to wish spiritual evil to anyone? (a) Spiritual evil of iniquity may never be desired, for the desire of sin, mortal or venial, is a sin itself (see 242), and it cannot be charitable, for charity rejoiceth not with iniquity (I Cor., xiii. 6). It is wrong, therefore, to wish that our neighbor fall into sin, offend G.o.d, diminish or forfeit his grace, or lose his soul. On the contrary, we are commanded to pray that he be delivered from such evils. (b) The good that G.o.d draws out of spiritual evil may be desired. Some are permitted to fall into sin, or be tempted, that they may become more humble, more charitable, more vigilant, more fervent. It seems that the permission of sin in the case of the elect is one of the benefits of G.o.d's predestination, inasmuch as G.o.d intends it to be an occasion of greater virtue and stronger perseverance. It is not lawful to wish that G.o.d permit anyone to fall into sin, but it is lawful to wish that, if G.o.d has permitted sin, good will follow after it.

1312. Gravity of the Sin of Hatred of Neighbor.--(a) Hatred, whether of dislike or of enmity, is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is directly opposed to the virtue of charity, which is the life of the soul.

(b) Dislike, if enmity is not joined to it, is rarely in fact a mortal sin. Aversions and antipathies for others usually are either indeliberate, or have to do with what are real or fancied defects in others. Dislike is a mortal sin only when one despises another so much that one deliberately loathes even that which is of divine provenance in the other, or dislikes a real imperfection so immoderately as to inflict serious injury (e.g., by refusing pardon or the common signs of charity, by giving grave scandal, etc.)

(c) Enmity in fact is often only a venial sin, either because one wishes only a small harm (e.g., the loss of a small sum of money), or because one wishes harm, even a great harm (e.g., the commission of mortal sin), without full deliberation. Enmity is a mortal sin, however, when one deliberately wishes a grave evil (e.g., mortal sin or the loss of reputation) to one's neighbor.

1313. Hatred Compared with Other Sins Against the Neighbor.--(a) Hatred is a graver sin than other internal sins against the neighbor, such as envy, anger; for, while each of these latter attacks some particular kind of good of the neighbor or only to a limited degree, hatred may be directed against any good and knows no measure. Thus, covetousness is directed against the external goods or possessions of a neighbor, while hate may extend to either internal or external goods. Envy is opposed to the neighbor's good relatively, in so far as it is considered an obstacle to one's own glory, but hate detests another's good absolutely. The hater finds his satisfaction, not in any profit derived for self, but in his aversion for another's good, and the harm that is wished his neighbor. This comparison here made should be understood, other things being equal, so that hatred of another's life is contrasted with envy of his life, etc.; for, if the goods are not the same, hatred may be a lesser sin, as when hatred of a neighbor's temporal good is compared with envy of his spiritual good. (b) Hatred of a neighbor is a more serious sin than external offenses done against him, for hatred sets the will wrong, and it is in the will that sin takes root: "He who hates his brother is a murderer" (I John, iii. 15).

The external act, on the contrary (e.g., killing an innocent man), is not a formal sin when the will is guiltless. (c) Hatred is a less harmful sin to the neighbor than external offenses; for example, internal dislike and malevolence will not break any bones, as may happen from a severe blow.

1314. Why is hatred not numbered among the capital vices? As was said above (see 269), a capital vice is one from which naturally and usually other species of sin take their origin. Now, hatred of G.o.d or the neighbor, in the natural and usual course of sin, does not precede, but rather follows other sins. Hence, hatred is not a capital sin. This will appear more clearly if we distinguish two kinds of hatred:

(a) Hate of that which is truly evil and opposed to the true good of man (e.g., hate of vice), is naturally prior to other disinclinations, since rational nature first inclines one to love its good and hate its evil (see 1106).

(b) Hate of that which is not evil (as hate of G.o.d or of the neighbor), is naturally subsequent to other sins, for it is only a nature already corrupt that detests true goodness. This does not mean, however, that the whole catalogue of lesser sins must have been committed before hatred is arrived at, nor that in individual cases a sinner has not the freedom to hate before he has committed less grave sins.

1315. In a certain wide sense, however, it may be said that hatred of the neighbor goes before all other sins against the neighbor, just as was remarked above (1299) concerning sins against G.o.d.

(a) Hence, interpretative hate--i.e., a feeling against another that makes one act in effect as if there were hatred--does precede the other sins. Thus, if t.i.tus, who bore no ill-will to Balbus, becomes enraged against him and inflicts death, the murder is traced back to anger, but this anger may be called hate, inasmuch as dislike of the life of Balbus is included in the desire of revenge.

(b) Formal hate--i.e., dislike of another that is absolute, and not modified by such considerations as desire of revenge or sorrow over one's own inferiority--does not precede, but rather follows the other sins, as was explained in the previous paragraph. It is only this sin of formal hate that is a special sin. t.i.tus in the example murdered Balbus, not because he had an absolute dislike for him, but because the thirst for revenge made Balbus displeasing to him.

1316. The causes of the sin of hatred are as follows: (a) causes that dispose one to hate are anger and envy, for to desire evil to another, for revenge or on account of one's own glory, prepares the way to desire evil to him absolutely, which is hatred. Envy, however, disposes to hate more than anger, since it is more akin to hatred: anger wishes evil to another as something owed to justice, but both envy and hatred look upon the neighbor's good as a thing distasteful. (b) The cause that induces sinful hatred of the neighbor is envy; for one cannot hate that which is good unless one regards it as in some way disagreeable, and it is the vice of envy that makes one regard one's neighbor's good as one's own evil. Hatred of G.o.d also indirectly results from envy, for, while the creature does not envy G.o.d, his envy of his neighbor breeds hatred of his fellow-man, and this in turn may produce hatred of G.o.d.

1317. Various Species of the Sin of Hatred.--(a) Hatred of G.o.d and hatred of the neighbor are sins specifically distinct, and hence to be declared specifically in confession. They are opposed to the same virtue of charity, but, on account of the generical difference of sin against G.o.d and sin against the creature, they must be cla.s.sed as different species of sin.

(b) Hatred of the neighbor in itself is but one species of sin, since all its acts have this one essential character in common, that evil is wished to a neighbor as evil--that is, one wishes another evil in general or every kind of evil, but does not specify particular evils, such as d.a.m.nation or death.

(c) Hatred of the neighbor on account of its circ.u.mstances or results may be connected with sins of other species. Thus, he who hates his neighbor because the latter is pious, adds irreligion to his hatred; he who out of hatred wishes the death of his neighbor, adds the guilt of murder to hatred; he who out of hatred wishes to destroy his neighbor's property, adds the guilt of injustice to his hatred: he who hates his parents, adds impiety to uncharitableness; he who calls down a curse on another, adds malediction to hate.

1318. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred often have in mind a sin specifically distinct from the sin of hatred, or an act not sinful at all.

(a) Thus, "hatred of G.o.d" is sometimes used to signify a want of resignation to the divine will.

(b) "Dislike of the neighbor" is sometimes used to signify uncongeniality on account of difference of character, etc., or positive disapproval of qualities or acts that deserve dislike or censure. Thus, a penitent who always feels ill at ease in the company of a neighbor on account of some natural incompatibility or of some fear which he himself does not understand, or who dreads meeting an individual whose manners are boorish or whose conversation is distasteful, may accuse himself of sinful dislike.

(c) "Wishing evil to the neighbor" is sometimes used to signify one's desire that justice take its course or that the order of charity be observed. Thus, a penitent who wished for the common good that a criminal be punished, or according to charity that his friend would defeat others in compet.i.tion for a prize, may accuse himself that he wished harm to the criminal or had luck to the compet.i.tors against his friend.

1319. Circ.u.mstances of hatred should be mentioned in confession as follows: (a) when they add a new species--thus, the person hated (e.g., one's father) or the evil wished (e.g., a fall into mortal sin, loss of reputation, death, etc.) may add a new sin to that of hate; (b) when they multiply the number of sins within the species of hate, as when one hates a large number of persons (see 219).

1320. The Sin of Sloth.--Sloth is a sadness or dejection of the will about the divine good one possesses, and arises from a want of esteem for one's Last End and the means thereto.

(a) Sloth is a sadness of the will. Hence, the sin of sloth differs from the pa.s.sion of sadness, and also from bodily weariness. The pa.s.sions (as said in 121) are not evil in themselves, but become evil when exercised immoderately, or turned to an evil object. Weakness or weariness of body is not sinful, but it disposes one for the pa.s.sion of sadness, and this in turn may tempt the will to sloth, when duties owed to G.o.d are to be attended to.

(b) Sloth is a sadness about good, and so it differs from sadness about the smallness of one's good. Humility demands that one be sensible of one's own shortcomings and of the greater merits of those who are better. But it is not humility but ingrat.i.tude and sloth to depreciate and grieve over the good which one has received from G.o.d, such as the gift of faith, membership in the Church, etc.

(c) Sloth is sadness about the divine good, which is loved by charity.

Thus, the sin of sloth differs from the circ.u.mstance of sloth, which is found in every sin. There is no sin that does not contain a sadness or disgust about the act of the opposite virtue; the very thought of moderation is depressing to the glutton, and religion is a.s.sociated with gloom by the irreligious. But what is special to the sin of sloth is, that it grieves about that divine good itself over which charity rejoices, and which is the end of all the other virtues.

(d) Sloth is a sadness about the divine good as shared by self, that is, about the end offered oneself and the means thereto, such as eternal beat.i.tude, the friendship of G.o.d, the Sacraments, the Commandments, good works and other divine gifts which should be esteemed and received with gladness. Sloth thus differs from hatred of G.o.d, which is a sadness over G.o.d's own goodness; and from envy, which is a sadness over the good of the neighbor.

(e) Sloth is a sadness over the divine good, which is considered by one as an evil. The sin of sloth looks upon the joys of heaven or the practice of virtue with contempt; it directly spurns them as unworthy of love (cfr. Num., xxi. 4). Hence, sloth differs from laziness or idleness, for this latter sin dislikes the exercise of virtue, not because it considers virtue as evil, but because it has a dread of the labor and exertion which virtue entails, and is overmuch in love with repose and ease.

1321. Sloth is a sin. (a) It is forbidden by G.o.d: "Bow down thy shoulder and bear wisdom, and be not grieved with her bands" (Ecclus., vi. 26). (b) It is an evil sorrow, for it grieves over good. (c) It has evil effects, since it keeps man from his duty, swallowing him up with overmuch sorrow (II Cor., ii. 7).

1322. Qualities of the Sin of Sloth.--(a) Sloth is a special sin, since, as explained above, its individual objects differentiate it from the general slothfulness that is found in every sin, as well as from hatred, envy and laziness. But it is a sin, by comparison, rarely committed. (b) It is a mortal sin, from its nature, since it is a horror and detestation for the divine good. It is implicitly forbidden in the Third Commandment, (c) It is a capital sin (i.e., a vice naturally productive of others), for sadness inclines man to many evils as means of escape from sorrow or of consolation in sorrow.

1323. In the following cases sloth is not a mortal sin. (a) It is not a mortal sin if in the object there is not grave matter. When a person is grieved at the thought that he will be forced to some spiritual good which is not of precept but of counsel, he does not sin thereby, for one does not sin by not choosing the counsels. Strictly speaking, however, this grief is not the sin of sloth, which is a sorrow over the divine good that one is bound to accept with joy. (b) Sloth is not a mortal sin, if in the subject there is not sufficient reflection or full consent. Hence, mere bodily weariness in serving G.o.d, is no sin at all, and a feeling of disgust for spiritual things, not consented to, is only a struggle of the flesh against the spirit, and at most a venial sin.

1324. Sins that Spring from Sloth.--(a) To escape his sadness about divine things, the slothful man avoids or flees the things that sadden him--his last end (sin of despair) and the means thereto (sins of cowardice and carelessness). He also attacks the causes of his grief--the persons who would lead him to G.o.d (sin of rancor) or the spiritual things themselves (sin of malice). (b) To console himself for the want of joy in spiritual things, he seeks comfort in forbidden things: his mind is unquiet and curious about that which does not concern him, his talk is excessive, his bodily movements are restless, and he must be continually moving from place to place.

1325. The Conquest of Sloth.--(a) Flight is a suitable form of resistance to temptation, whenever the temptation grows stronger by thinking over the matter, as is the case with temptations against purity (I Cor., vi. 18). (b) Attack is a suitable form of resistance, when the temptation becomes weaker as one thinks over the matter (see 257). This is the case with sloth, for, the more one gives oneself to the consideration of spiritual things, the more pleasing do they become.

1326. Laziness, as distinct from the capital vice of sloth, is a generic name given to a number of sins or circ.u.mstances of sin, and hence it will be treated in several places.

(a) Thus, negligence is a want of prompt decision about duties to be performed. It is opposed to the virtue of diligence or solicitude, which pertains to prudence. Hence, negligence will be considered among the sins against prudence.