Moral Theology Part 45

(c) "Through the help of G.o.d." These words express the formal object or motive of hope.

(d) "The rewards of eternal life." These words express the material object of hope, that is, the thing that is hoped for.

1013. There is a general similarity between the virtue of hope and natural hope as regards their objects and acts.

(a) Natural hope is the result of a love of some good, and so differs from fear, which is the dread of some evil. Similarly, the virtue of hope springs from a love of heavenly goods (Rom., viii. 24, 25).

(b) Natural hope has to do with a good that is absent, and it is therefore desire, not enjoyment. Similarly, the virtue of hope looks forward to goods not as yet attained: "We hope for that which we see not, we wait for it with patience" (Rom, viii. 25).

(c) Natural hope, unlike mere desire, seeks a good whose attainment is not certain or easy, and hence it presupposes courage. Similarly, the virtue of hope demands strength of soul: "Do ye manfully and let your heart be strengthened, all ye that hope in the Lord" (Ps. x.x.x. 25).

(d) Natural hope tends towards an objective, which, while difficult, is not impossible; hence, it expects with confidence, for, when an object of desire is impossible, one does not hope for it, but despairs. The virtue of hope also is confident: "Hold fast the glory and confidence of hope unto the end" (Heb. iii. 6).

1014. Christian hope is superior to natural hope, because it is a supernatural virtue.

(a) It is a virtue, since its acts are commanded by G.o.d, and through it the will is directed to its beat.i.tude and the secure means of realizing its lofty aspirations: "I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications for ever, for the reward" (Ps. cxviii. 112); "Trust in the Lord, and do good" (Ps, x.x.xvi. 3).

(b) Christian hope is a supernatural virtue, since through it man is sanctified and saved: "I (Wisdom) am the mother of holy hope" (Ecclus., xxiv. 24); G.o.d "hath regenerated us into a lively hope" (I Pet., i. 3); "We are saved by hope" (Rom., viii. 24); "Everyone that hath this hope in Him sanctifieth himself" (I John, iii. 3).

1015. Though hope seeks its own reward, it is not therefore mercenary or egotistic. Experience shows that hope produces idealism and self-sacrifice, while the lack of it leads to engrossment in the things of time and sense and to selfishness. (a) Thus, the hope of the just man is not separated from charity, and hence he loves G.o.d above all, and his neighbor as himself: "I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications forever, for the reward" (Ps. cxviii. 112). (b) The hope of the sinner is a preparation for charity, since he must desire charity as a means to the beat.i.tude he wishes: "He that hopeth in the Lord shall be healed" (Prov., xxviii. 25).

1016. Just as faith is divided into living and dead faith, so hope is divided into animated and inanimated hope. (a) Animated hope is that to which is joined the state of grace and charity, and which is thereby perfect as a virtue and meritorious. This hope is stronger, because we hope more confidently from friends. An act of animated hope is more perfect when commanded by the virtue of charity, less perfect when not so commanded--that is, he who makes an act of hope out of love of G.o.d performs a better work than he who makes an act of hope out of some other motive (such as self-encouragement). (b) Inanimated hope is that to which the state of grace and charity is not joined, and which therefore is an imperfect virtue and not meritorious.

1017. The following divisions of hope made by the Quietists are not admissible:

(a) The division of hope into natural hope (which seeks its own good, and which is permitted to the ordinary faithful) and supernatural hope (which is entirely disinterested, and which is necessary for the perfect) contains Rigorism; for since natural hope is of no avail towards justification or for merit, it would follow that without disinterested love of G.o.d one could not obtain forgiveness, nor could an act be meritorious.

(b) The division of hope into two supernatural species, the one disinterested (which desires heavenly goods for the glory of G.o.d alone) and the other interested (which desires heavenly goods for the advantage of self), is useless; for acts of disinterested love belong to charity, not to hope (Denz., 1327-1349).

1018. The Object of Hope.--By the object of hope we mean three things: (a) the good that is hoped for (material object, the end which is intended); (b) the person for whom that good is hoped (the end for whom); (c) the ground or foundation of hope (formal object).

1019. The material object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary object, which is desired for its own sake, and the secondary, which is desired on account of the primary object.

(a) The primary object of hope is G.o.d Himself, the infinite good, considered as our Last End and Beat.i.tude (Ps. lxxii. 25). Connoted in this object is the beatific vision, the finite act by means of which the creature attains to the possession of G.o.d. The primary object of our hope is the imperishable crown (I Cor., ix. 25), glory (Col., i.

27), the glory of the children of G.o.d (Rom., v. 2), salvation (I Thess., v. 8), eternal life (t.i.t., i. 2), entrance into the holy of holies (Heli, x. 19, 23), the inheritance incorruptible and undefiled that cannot fade, reserved in heaven (I Pet., i. 4), the vision of G.o.d (I John, iii. 3). It is this object especially that distinguishes supernatural from natural hope (I Cor., xv. 19). "From G.o.d," says St.

Thomas (II-II, q. 17, a. 2), "we should expect nothing less than G.o.d Himself."

(b) The secondary object of hope embraces all those created things that a.s.sist one to attain one's Last End. We may hope for all those things for which we may pray, as St. Augustine remarks.

1020. The primary object of hope includes: (a) essential beat.i.tude, that is, the beatific vision; (b) accessory beat.i.tude, that is, all resultant joys, such as glory of soul and body, the companionship of the Saints, security from harm, and the like.

1021. The secondary object of hope includes: (a) spiritual goods, such as graces; (b) temporal goods, such as health and the means that will enable us, at least indirectly, to work for the life to come and acquire merit; (c) deliverance from evils that would hinder spiritual goods; (d) all that promotes one's salvation, such as labors for G.o.d.

1022. The person for whom eternal life is hoped may be either oneself or one's neighbor. (a) Absolutely speaking (i.e., apart from the supposition of friendship towards a neighbor), a person can hope only for himself; for the salvation of others is not attained by him, but by them; and thus, if there is no bond of affection, it cannot arouse in him that feeling of courageous confidence which belongs to hope. (b) Accidentally (i.e., on the supposition of friendship or charity towards others), one can hope for them; for love makes a person regard the good of others as his own. Thus, St. Paul is hopeful for the perseverance of the Philippians (Phil., i. 6), and he labors for the Corinthians that his hope for them may be steadfast (II Cor., i. 7).

1023. The formal object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary object, which is the princ.i.p.al cause that effects our salvation, and the secondary object, which is a secondary or instrumental cause of salvation. (a) The primary motive of hope is G.o.d Himself, the Author of salvation, and hence it is said: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man" (Jer, xvii. 5). (b) The secondary motive of hope are creatures by whom one is a.s.sisted in obtaining the means for salvation (such as the Saints, who aid us by their intercessions). Thus, in the _Salve Regina_, our Lady is addressed as "our hope." The merits of Christ and our own merits, since they are instruments used by G.o.d, are motives of hope.

1024. On what divine attribute is the virtue of hope based?

(a) Essentially, hope is based on G.o.d's character of omnipotent helper; for the specific and differentiating note of this virtue is its courageous confidence, and this, in view of the surpa.s.sing height one expects to attain and the feebleness of all created efforts, must rely on the a.s.sistance of One who is equal to the task: "The Lord is my rock and my strength. G.o.d is my strong One, in Him will I trust" (II Kings, xxii. 2, 3); "You have hoped in the Lord Mighty forever" (Is., xxvi.

4); "The name of the Lord is a strong tower; the just runneth to it and shall be exalted" (Prov. xviii. 10).

(b) Secondary (i.e., as regards acts that it presupposes, or that are connected with it), hope is concerned with other divine attributes.

Thus, a person does not hope unless he first believes that G.o.d has promised beat.i.tude and that He is true to His promises, unless he regards beat.i.tude as something desirable; and so he who hopes has placed his dependence on the loyalty of G.o.d to His given word, and on the desirability of G.o.d as the prize of life's efforts: "Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for He is faithful that hath promised" (Heb., x. 23); "Unto the hope of life everlasting, which G.o.d, who lieth not, hath promised before the times of the world"

(t.i.t., i. 2); "The Lord is my portion, therefore will I wait for Him"

(Lam., iii. 24); "Fear not, I am thy reward, exceeding great" (Gen., xv. 1). Just as faith presupposes a beginning of belief and a pious inclination towards it, so does hope presuppose faith and the love of G.o.d, as He is our beat.i.tude.

1025. Omnipotent divine help as the foundation of hope can be understood in two senses:

(a) It may be taken for some created help, that is, for some gift of G.o.d possessed by us (such as habitual or actual grace, merits, virtues, etc). It is not in this sense that divine help is called the motive of hope; for even a sinner can and should hope, and the just man's merits, while they are dispositions for beat.i.tude, are not a princ.i.p.al cause that will conduct him to it.

(b) This divine help may be taken for uncreated help, that is, for the act by which G.o.d confers His gifts upon us. In this sense only is divine aid the basis of hope. For if a person is asked why he is confident of salvation, he will not answer, "Because I am in the state of grace and do good works," but "Because I know that G.o.d will help me."

1026. The divine perfections included in the t.i.tle of helper now given to G.o.d are:

(a) essentially, the almighty power of G.o.d; for this is the immediate and sufficient reason for the confident expectation that one will at last possess the same object of felicity as G.o.d Himself. The higher and more difficult the goal one sets before oneself, the greater must be the resources on which one counts for success;

(b) secondarily, these perfections include the infinite kindness of G.o.d; for it is the goodness of G.o.d that prompts Him to employ His omnipotence in a.s.sisting creatures to attain their Last End. Man has hope, therefore, of attaining supreme felicity, because he relies on supreme power to aid him, while this supreme power aids him, because it is directed by infinite goodness and mercy. Thus, the Psalmist says: "I have trusted in Thy mercy" (Ps. xii. 6). Just as faith rests proximately on the reliability of G.o.d and remotely on His perfection of being, so hope rests proximately on G.o.d's almighty power and radically on His goodness and perfection.

1027. The Excellence of Hope.--Hope is a theological virtue, and is therefore superior to the moral virtues.

(a) It is a theological virtue, inasmuch as it tends immediately to G.o.d Himself. As was said above (see 1019, 1023), we hope for G.o.d and we hope in G.o.d: "In G.o.d is my salvation and my glory. He is the G.o.d of my help, and my hope is in G.o.d" (Ps. lxi. 8); "What is my hope? Is it not the Lord?" (Ps. x.x.xviii. 8); "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped" (Ps. x.x.x.

1). Hence, the Apostle numbers hope along with the other theological virtues (I Cor., xiii. 13). "By faith the house of G.o.d receives its foundations, by hope it is reared, by charity it is completed" (St.

Augustine, Serm. xxvii., 1).

(b) The two moral virtues that most resemble hope are longsuffering and magnanimity, for the former is the expectation of good that is distant, while the latter is the readiness to encounter difficulties in the quest of high ideals. But these two virtues belong to courage, rather than to hope; for the goods they seek are finite, and the difficulty they encounter is external struggle, whereas the good which hope seeks is infinite, and the difficulty lies in the very greatness of that good.

1028. There are various points of view from which virtues may be compared one with another.

(a) One virtue is prior to another in duration, when it precedes the latter in time. Thus, the natural virtues that pagans have before their conversion are prior in duration to the supernatural virtues that are received in Baptism.

(b) One virtue is prior to another by nature, or in the order of generation, when it is the necessary preparation or disposition for that other, which essentially presupposes it. Thus, the intellectual virtues are naturally prior to justice, for a man cannot will to give others their due, unless he first knows that this is his duty.

(c) One virtue is prior to another virtue in excellence as a habit, when it has an object that is more elevated and comprehensive, and when it is fitted to be the guide of the other virtue. For the standard of comparison of habits must be taken from the objects to which they tend, and from which they derive their specific character (see 134). Thus, the habit of philosophizing is in itself more n.o.ble than the habit of acc.u.mulating wealth, for truth is better than money.

(d) One virtue is prior to another in excellence according to the general concept of virtue, when it does more to set the will right. For the standard of comparison then is to be taken from the influence exercised on one's acts (as the word "virtue" or "power" intimates), and the will is the motor power that sets the other faculties in motion. Thus, for one who has debts to pay, it is better that he give his time to earning money than to storing his mind with the lore of scientists; justice has more of a claim on him than knowledge.

1029. Comparison of Hope with Faith.--(a) These virtues are not the same, for, while faith makes us cling to G.o.d as the giver of truth and a.s.sent to what is obscure to us, hope makes up turn to Him as the author of beat.i.tude and strive for that which is difficult for us.

(b) Faith and hope are normally equal in duration, since as a rule they are infused at the same time (as in Baptism). Accidentally, however, faith may precede hope, as when one who preserves his faith loses hope on account of despair, and later recovers it.

(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, faith being prior to hope, since both glory and grace--the objects of hope--must be known through faith (Heb., xi. 6).

(d) They are unequal in their excellence as habits, faith being superior to hope, as the intellectual habits are superior to the moral; for faith is regulative and directive of hope, and has an object more abstract and universal.

(e) They are unequal in their excellence according to the general concept of virtue, hope being superior to faith, as the moral virtues are superior to the intellectual (see 156). For hope includes a rightness of the will towards G.o.d that is not included in the concept of faith, which is chiefly intellectual, and it is the will that moves the other powers to action.

1030. Comparison of Hope with Charity.--(a) These virtues are not the same, for, while faith and hope adhere to G.o.d as the principle from which one derives truth or goodness, charity adheres to G.o.d for His own sake. Hope tends towards G.o.d as our good, from whom beat.i.tude and the means thereto are to be expected; but charity unites us to G.o.d so that we live for G.o.d rather than for self.