Moral Theology Part 134

3) The strike would be called by proper authority. The decision to strike should be made by the men themselves freely and Without intimidation. Organized labor must have the backing of a responsible union in its strike, for this is the channel of bargaining or arbitration that the employer must use, and it should be used by the workers also. Accordingly, "wildcat" strikes are unlawful unless the unions have ceased to represent the men and have been repudiated by them.

4) The benefits expected from the strike must compensate for the evils inseparable from it. In this matter not only the worker's personal gains are to be considered, but also the welfare of others, namely the employers and the public. Thus, in a long-drawn-out strike the economic advantage gained in a small salary increase for the worker can never be proportionate to the financial losses inflicted on the workers themselves in loss of income, on the employers, and particularly on a community which suffers the loss of purchasing power of a number of its members. Many strikes in which the products or services of the workers are necessary to the public (transportation, food distribution, etc.) seem to be more a strike against the community than against an employer; and the harm inflicted on the innocent public is not incidental as it must be in order to be justified. Only extraordinarily grave reasons can justify such strikes.

5) The means employed must be just. The common means are work stoppage, persuasion of other workers to keep the work stopped until the demands are met, and picketing in a peaceful manner. Sabotage and violence against an employer's person or property const.i.tute unjust means.

"Scabs," or professional strike-breakers, may be prevented from depriving the workers of their jobs to which the workers keep their rights; but violence in defense of this right seems illicit, unless violence is begun by the strike-breakers and the workers are forced to defend themselves.

(c) Kinds of Strike. Thus far the a.n.a.lysis has been concerned with a direct strike. Other kinds of strike demand special consideration.

1) Slow-down strike. Since it does not involve cessation from work, but simply a reduction in production or services while the worker is receiving full pay under contract, the strike seems to be immoral. The striker is not giving the work paid for.

2) Sit-down strikes. Some authors justify these strikes by a.n.a.logy with an act of self-defense in which the person attacked seizes the weapon from the attacker. The a.n.a.logy seems defective since the place of work is hardly a weapon. This strike seems to be immoral since it involves an unjust invasion of property rights by way of excluding an owner from the use of his property.

3) Sympathy strikes. There is a great diversity of opinion in this kind of strike. A moderate view distinguishes between strikes of several groups against the same employer and one or several groups against different and una.s.sociated employers. The first kind seems justified, for it is directed against the same unjust employer, and the workers are coperators to defend the rights of one group against him. In the second case of striking against different employers, the "sympathizers"

are striking against a just employer and are violating their work contract which binds in commutative justice. Hence this type of strike seems to be essentially unjust.

(d) The lockout is the employer's strike. Unwilling to grant the worker's demand, the employer shuts down his plant, thus terminating employment of both strikers and non-strikers. The same conditions and restrictions that apply to the strike are applicable to lockouts. That the lockout itself is not unjust, but at least morally indifferent, appears to be evident in this, that as workers are not bound to submit to injustice, neither is the employer. He cannot be expected to pay wages when essential employers have quit or stalled production.

(e) A boycott is a ma.s.s refusal to patronize a certain business with the effort to persuade others to join in the refusal. Historically it has been used by labor to gain support from the public against an employer or by elements of the public itself to protest some evil practice of a business establishment, e.g., Legion of Decency boycotts of indecent pictures, NODL boycotts of literature, etc. In itself, a boycott is not immoral, since no one is obliged to trade in one place in preference to another and may refuse to trade with persons who are unjust or otherwise immoral. There seems to be no reason also to prevent a person from lawfully persuading others to follow his cause.

The principles of a just strike are applicable to the justification of boycotts, and the conditions of a sympathy strike are to be applied to secondary boycotts, i.e., against other firms doing business with a boycotted firm. These other firms are not themselves unjust and should not be made to suffer for the injustice of another. Hence, a very grave cause, co-operation in injustice, for example would be necessary to bring pressure against them.

2650. Is There Any Obligation of Giving Employment?--(a) The State certainly has an obligation in legal justice of offering opportunities of work to those who cannot find it, if the public welfare is compromised by widespread unemployment. Even if only one worker were without work through no fault of his own, the duty of helping him would seem to devolve on the State, since the laborer has a right to work and the State has the duty of promoting the temporal welfare of its subjects when they are unable to provide for themselves.

(b) Employers have a duty of commutative justice to give work to men with whom they have made a contract of labor and not to keep work from men unfairly; hence, arbitrary dismissal or blacklisting is a crime against justice. They should also try to secure other employment for good workers whom they are unable to keep, so as to tide over for the men the slack seasons when some have to be laid off. Industry, organized labor and individuals should interest themselves practically in private movements and plans to remedy unemployment situations, for these are matters that should not be left entirely to the State and charity. Employment and honest wages are in the long run to the advantage of employers as well as of employees, and are therefore good business as well as good morals.

2651. Duties of Certain Professions.--(a) Judges and Lawyers.--The duties of men of the law were discussed already in 1940 sqq. Clients on their part owe their lawyers fair treatment and just compensation for services, while those who have part in a judicial process must give respect to the judge and other officials of the court and due obedience to their directions.

(b) Teachers and Students.--Teachers must make themselves proficient in their matter and in the art of pedagogy; must take care that their teaching is accurate and beneficial; must be steady, punctual, orderly; must give no example or advice but what is good; must be neither too lenient nor too exacting; must preserve discipline in their cla.s.ses by correcting, punishing, or expelling as need requires; must be just, neither petting nor bullying, and must award honors and averages according to merit. There may be grave harm and sin in denying important academic degrees (such as S.T.M., S.T.D., J.D.C., M.D.) to the worthy or in conferring them on the unworthy. Students on their part owe to their teachers respect and obedience in cla.s.s matters, to their parents and themselves diligence in study, and to their school avoidance of cheating and of disorderly conduct. In athletics they should not aim at winning for winning's sake, or playing for playing's sake, but at the true goal of a sound mind in a sound body. In the selection of preferred studies they should remember that nothing worth while is won without hard work, and that the true objectives of learning are not mere utility, or gain or diversion, but the culture of mind and of spirit.

(c) Physicians, Surgeons, Nurses, and Druggists.--These persons must have sufficient knowledge and skill, and must keep up with the progress of medical science; they must not deny their services or delay to come when there is urgent need; they must give a case diligence proportionate to its seriousness; they must consult in case of doubt, follow the safer opinions, and use the more likely remedies. In his relations with his patient a doctor must be chaste (e.g., avoiding immoral advice or operations, unnecessary psychoa.n.a.lytic conversations, or bodily exposures); loyal to the confidences received; honest and charitable, not prescribing useless remedies, or overcharging, or refusing service to the poor; mindful of the religious needs of his patients, being not too ready to exempt them from church duties nor slow to remind them when they should send for the priest. Patients on their part should honor the physician, call him in need, obey his directions, and properly compensate him for his services. What is here said of physicians and surgeons is true also of nurses in their duties and capacities. Pharmacists are bound to exercise great care in filling prescriptions; they should not cooperate with abortion or contraception by selling medicines, instruments or appliances to be used for those purposes; they should not sell drugs, dopes, poisons, liquors, etc., forbidden by law.

Question IV

THE SACRAMENTS

2652. In the three Questions that preceded we spoke of the means by which man is sanctified and is enabled to secure supernatural rewards through the merits of his own works; for the virtues make their possessor as well as his acts morally righteous, while through G.o.d's grace the good deeds done for His sake ent.i.tle the doer to the crown of eternal life. In the present Question we pa.s.s on to consider certain means by which G.o.d is honored by man and man is sanctified through the application to his soul of the merits and pa.s.sion of Christ; for the Sacraments were inst.i.tuted by Christ both as external acts of religion (2175, 2244) and as most powerful agencies to begin, restore, and increase the life of holiness.

2653. It should be observed, first, that the present work is concerned with Moral Theology; and, secondly, that it must be confined within the limited number of pages which a two-volume production of convenient size necessitates. Hence the reader will understand why in the Question now beginning we speak only of man's duties in reference to the Sacraments, and omit other points that do not so strictly pertain to Moral. (a) Thus, the nature, inst.i.tution, number and effects of the Sacraments belong to Dogma, which the authors hope to treat later in a similar work. (b) The administration of the Sacraments, their rites, rubrics, ceremonies are set forth in ritual books and works on liturgy.

(c) The legal rights of ministers, canonical requirements on registration, penal and processual legislation in reference to the Sacraments, and like juridical questions are treated fully in commentaries on pertinent sections of the Code.

Art. 1: THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL; THE SACRAMENTALS

(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 60-65.)

2654. Nature of a Sacrament.--In the New Law a Sacrament is an outward sign inst.i.tuted permanently by Christ to signify and convey grace.

(a) The internal cause or essence of a Sacrament is the outward sign, which has two parts. The indeterminate part or matter is a visible object (e.g., the water of Baptism, the chrism of Confirmation, the bread and wine of the Eucharist, the oil of Extreme Unction, the imposition of hands in Orders) or a perceptible act that looks to another act for its perfectionment (e.g., the confession, etc., of the penitent in penance; the giving of oneself as spouse in Matrimony).

The determining part, or form, is either the sacred formula spoken over the material element (e.g., in Baptism the words "I baptize thee, etc.") or an act that completes another act (e.g., the acceptance of another as spouse in Matrimony). As the matter must be visible or otherwise sense-perceptible, so the form must be audible or at least (in Matrimony) equivalently audible; for a Sacrament is a sensible sign. The words are audible when they are heard or are capable of being heard at least by the minister.

(b) The external efficient cause or inst.i.tuter of the Sacraments is Christ, the founder of the New Testament religion and the productive and meritorious author of grace as our G.o.d and Saviour.

(c) The external final cause or purpose of the Sacraments is to symbolize outwardly by their rite and to work inwardly by their instrumental virtue the application of Christ's redemption in the soul of properly disposed recipients. It is the nature of Baptism and Penance (Sacraments of the Dead) to produce first grace or forgiveness, of the others to produce second grace or increase of holiness (Sacraments of the Living). Furthermore, three of the Sacraments (Baptism, Confirmation, Orders) have a second effect, since they sign the soul with the indelible character of member or soldier or minister of Christ, and hence these Sacraments cannot be repeated.

2655. Rules on the Invalid Use of the Matter and Form of the Sacraments.--(a) Since the matter and form are essential const.i.tuents without which the Sacraments are not had, it is sacrilegious to invalidate a Sacrament by substantial changes in either of these parts.

The matter is changed substantially when it is so modified as currently to be considered and called something different from the element appointed by Christ. Thus, wine is unfit for the Eucharist if corrupted into vinegar, or made unsuitable as a drink (e.g., probably as long as it remains frozen), or notably adulterated (e.g., when it is mixed half and half with water). The form is changed substantially when it is so modified that to a listener it no longer conveys the sense intended by Christ. This happens when the changed form does not express the chief ideas of the correct form, as when it does not determine who is the minister of Penance (e.g., "You are absolved"), or who is the subject of Baptism (e.g., "Ego baptizo in nomine, etc."), or what is the effect of the Eucharist (e.g., "Hoc non est corpus meum," "Hoc est corpus,"

"Hic meum est corpus"), or the action of the minister of Penance (e.g., "Ego abluo te a peccatis"), or the profession in Baptism of faith in the Trinity (e.g., "Ego te baptizo, Amen").

(b) Since the matter and form are parts of a single composite sign, it is sacrilegious to invalidate a Sacrament by substantial separations, which destroy the continuity or unity of signification. There is a substantial separation within the form when such long intervals occur between the p.r.o.nunciation of its syllables or words that it is not in common estimation a united sentence or proposition; for example, if the celebrant says, "Hoc est cor-," then sneezes two or three times, and (instead of repeating the words) concludes "-pus meum," or says "Hoc est corpus" and after an interruption of several minutes (instead of repeating) finishes with: "meum." There is substantial separation between the matter and form, if the former is applied by one minister and the latter is spoken by another, although the form declares that the matter is applied by the speaker of the form: for example, if t.i.tus pours the water while Claudius says: "I baptize thee, etc." Even when the same minister applies both matter and form, there is a substantial separation between these parts when the form is not spoken at the same time or for the same time that the matter is posited, and thereby, from the special character of the Sacrament, leaves the signification of the sacramental matter unsettled. This happens when the form is spoken too long before or too long after the presence or application of the matter, or when the form is limited by a future condition which will not be verified during the continuance of the matter (see 2668).

2656. Simultaneity of Matter and Form.--The simultaneity of matter and form which validity requires must be either moral or physical according to the character of the Sacrament.

(a) There is physical simultaneity when matter and form are present in the same instants of time. This kind of union is demanded in the Eucharist, for it has the character of a transubstantiation of bread and Wine present at the moments the words of consecration are said over them. There would be no Sacrament if the bread were absent even during a part of the consecration.

(b) There is a moral simultaneity like to the physical contemporaneousness when the matter and form are partly present in the same instants of time, and perhaps also (as some hold) when one follows the other with such close succession that not more than a Pater or Ave could be said between them. This kind of union is the maximum in Penance and Matrimony, for absolution must follow after confession, and conjugal acceptance must follow after conjugal offer. It suffices in Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Orders; for these four Sacraments do not consecrate the matter (and hence some little separation is allowed), but they do signify in the present tense the bestowal of grace through the application of the matter (and hence any separation must be of the slightest).

(c) There is a purely moral simultaneity when the form follows the matter after a somewhat considerable interval of time has elapsed, but with a connection between the two based on human usage which carries the matter on in human estimation over to the time the form is employed. This suffices in Penance and Matrimony. Penance has the character of a judicial process, whose unity is not destroyed by some little delay between the discussion and the sentence; and hence it seems that absolution could be given validly an hour after confession.

Matrimony has the character of a contract, whose unity is preserved even in spite of a long interval between the date of consent of the first party and the date of consent of the second party.

2657. Lawfulness of Moral Simultaneity in the Sacraments Other than the Eucharist.--(a) In Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Orders, it would seem on account of the danger of nullity to be a serious sin to exclude all physical simultaneity between matter and form (e.g., to pour all the water and then to begin the words: "I baptize thee, etc.,"

or vice versa). In practice the Rubrics should be followed.

(b) In Penance and Matrimony it is more or less sinful to make needless, though not invalidating, delays. In ordinary practice the confessor should absolve as soon as the confession has been heard and the penance accepted, and the bride should express her consent immediately after the bridegroom has expressed his.

2658. Accidental Changes or Separations as to Matter and Form.--(a) These administrations are not invalid, for they preserve the essence of the elements or the sense of the words appointed by Christ. Examples of accidental change of matter are baptismal water to which a relatively very small quant.i.ty of wine has been added, or wine for the Eucharist to which a relatively trifling amount of water has been added. The form is accidentally modified if translated into the vernacular or rendered by synonymous words (e.g., "Ego abluo te, etc."), or if an unimportant word (e.g., "enim") is added or subtracted, or if the words are transposed or partially repeated or unintentionally misp.r.o.nounced without detriment to sense (e.g., "Hoc est meum corpus," "Hoc, hoc, est, est, etc.," "Hoc est copus meum"). There is accidental separation when slight pauses are made between words, or when an interval not destructive of the sense falls between the use of the matter and the use of the form (see 2655, 2656).

(b) These administrations are unlawful and from their nature mortally sinful, since they are transgressions of a precept of the Church meant to safeguard respect for the Sacraments of Christ, and they are therefore opposed to the virtue of religion (2147). But the sin may be venial by reason of lightness of matter (e.g., omission of the word "enim"), or of imperfection of the act. Scandal, danger of invalidity, contempt, and bad intention would make even a small change a serious sin. In practice the rule to follow is to observe exactly the prescribed matter and form and entire rite, to p.r.o.nounce the words clearly and slowly, to repeat the form when any involuntary interruption happens between its essential parts, and to unite the matter and form as closely as possible.

2659. Substantial Changes or Separations.--Substantial changes or separations _a fortiori_ are grave sins. They offend against religion (since they make a mockery of the sacred signs appointed by Christ), against obedience (since they disregard a most serious precept of the Church), against charity (since they deprive the recipient of sacramental grace), and against justice (at least when the minister is bound _ex officio_ to confer the Sacrament, since there is then a quasi-contract with the recipient to administer the Sacrament correctly).

2660. Doubtful Matter.--It is sometimes probable but not certain that an element suffices for the matter of a Sacrament (e.g., coffee or tea for Baptism, chrism for Extreme Unction). Hence the question: "Is it lawful to use probable matter in the administration of a Sacrament?"

(a) If certain matter cannot be had and the Sacrament is urgently necessary or very useful, probable matter may be used. For the Sacraments were inst.i.tuted by Christ to benefit man ("The Sacraments are for men"), and hence it is not irreverent to give to one in need a probably valid Sacrament when a certainly valid Sacrament is impossible. Thus, a dying infant may and should be baptized with coffee, if no pure water can be procured in time; the last anointing may be conferred with chrism, if the oil of the sick cannot be had before a dying man will have expired.

(b) If certain matter can be had, or if the Sacrament is not urgently necessary or useful, probable matter may not be used without grave sin; for there is then no reason of necessity to justify the risk to which the Sacrament and perhaps also the recipient are exposed, Thus, it is not lawful to baptize with coffee when pure water can be secured, or to confirm with chrism not blessed by a bishop a dying man who had just received the last Sacraments, even though other chrism is un.o.btainable (see 661, 678, 711, and Denziger, n. 1151).

2661. What Sacraments Have a Necessity of Means (see 360, 786, 2156)?--(a) Those Sacraments have a necessity of means without which sanctifying grace and salvation cannot be had. Hence the necessity for individuals of Baptism (without which there is no regeneration), of Penance (without which there is no reconciliation), of the Eucharist's effect (without which there is no incorporation with Christ), and for the Church the necessity of Orders (without which there are no ministers and dispensers of grace, Prov., xi, 14).

(b) Those Sacraments have no necessity of means without which sanctifying grace and salvation can be had; but they have a necessity of convenience, inasmuch as they perfect grace already had and make salvation more easy. In this sense, then, Confirmation and Extreme Unction may be called necessary for the individual, since the former perfects the grace of Baptism and the latter the grace of Penance; and Matrimony may be called necessary for the Church, since it perfects with a sacramental grace the propagation of the children of the Church.

2662. Reception of Sacraments _in re_ or _in voto_.--The Sacraments that have a necessity of means must be received either in themselves (_in re_) or in desire (_in voto_).

(a) Thus, Baptism _in re_ is necessary for all infants (John, iii. 5), Baptism _in re_ or _in voto_ for all adults (John, xiv. 21-23). Baptism of desire consists in an act of perfect charity or contrition made by an unbaptized person, which includes the will to do all that G.o.d has commanded, and consequently at least an implicit or virtual desire of Baptism of water. As is proved in Dogmatic Theology, Baptism may be supplied for, as regards grace, by martyrdom in an infant and by martyrdom joined with attrition in an adult.

(b) Penance _in re_ or _in voto_ is necessary for all who have committed grave sin after Baptism. The desire of the Sacrament is an act of perfect charity or contrition, which includes at least implicitly the wish to receive absolution. Martyrdom joined with attrition also suffices.