Moral Theology Part 132

(b) If birth control refers to a means of family limitation, it is lawful when that means is continence or abstinence from marital relations, not if it is onanism or the use of mechanical or chemical means to prevent conception. The objection that husbands cannot restrain themselves is really an insult to G.o.d`s grace and is contradicted by numerous facts. A man of manly character should be ashamed to admit that he is the slave of pa.s.sion, and the fact that G.o.d commands chast.i.ty and that millions obey Him both in the wedded and single state is sufficient proof that, even though hard, s.e.xual abstinence is not impossible, if there is a real resolve and the right means are employed, such as rooming apart and concentration on other and higher things.

Continence or abstinence is counselled by the Church should conditions make the conception of children inadvisable. It is counselled, not commanded, since it involves heroic sacrifice which makes it all the more meritorious and praiseworthy: "It is wronging men and women of our times to deem them incapable of continuous heroism. Today, for many reasons--perhaps with the goad of hard necessity and even sometimes in the service of injustice--heroism is exercised to a degree and to an extent which would have been thought impossible in days gone by. Why.

then, should this heroism, if the circ.u.mstances really demand it, stop at the borders established by the pa.s.sions and inclinations of nature?

The answer is clear. The man who does not want to dominate himself is incapable of so doing. He who believes he can do so, counting merely on his own strength without seeking sincerely and perseveringly help from G.o.d, will remain miserably disillusioned" (Pope Pius XII, _Allocution to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives_, Oct. 29, 1951).

Another lawful means of family limitation is "periodic continence" or "rhythm," the deliberate avoidance of conception by restricting intercourse, temporarily or permanently, to the days of natural sterility on the part of the wife. Many of the faithful are under the impression that the system has received the unqualified approval of the Church, that it const.i.tutes a form of "Catholic Birth-Control." This is not completely true.

All theologians agree that the use of marriage during the sterile period is not _per se_ illicit. The act is performed in the natural way; nothing has been done positively to avoid conception; and the secondary ends of matrimony, mutual love and the quieting of temptation, have been fostered. "If the carrying out of this theory means nothing more than that the couple can make use of their matrimonial rights on the days of natural sterility, too, there is nothing against it, for by so doing they neither hinder nor injure in any way the consummation of the natural act and its further natural consequences" (Pope Pius XII, ibid.).

"If, however, there is further question--that is, of permitting the conjugal act on those days exclusively--then the conduct of the married couple must be examined more closely" (ibid).

The following points summarize papal teaching on this aspect:

1) A premarital agreement to restrict the marital right and not merely the use to sterile periods, implies an essential defect in matrimonial consent and renders the marriage invalid. 2) The practice is not morally justified simply because the nature of the marital act is not violated and the couple are prepared to accept and rear children born despite their precautions. 3) Serious motives, (medical, eugenic, economic and social), must be present to justify this practice. When present, they can exempt for a long time, perhaps even for the duration of the marriage, from the positive obligations of the married state. 4) The married state imposes on those who perform the marital act the positive obligation of helping to conserve the human race. Accordingly, to make use of the marital act continuously and without serious reason to withdraw from its primary obligation would be a sin against the very meaning of conjugal life (ibid.).

Pope Pius explicitly confirmed the common teaching of theologians: 1) Rhythm, by mutual consent, for proportionate reasons, and with due safeguards against dangers would be licit. 2) Without a good reason, the practice would involve some degree of culpability. Not expressly confirmed, but simply an expression of common moral principles is the common agreement: 3) That the sin could be mortal by reason of injustice, grave danger of incontinence, serious family discord, etc.

Since the Allocution, the more common opinion in this country a.s.serts that the Holy Father taught: 1) that married people who use their marital right have a duty to procreate; 2) that this duty is binding under pain of sin; 3) there are, however, reasons that excuse the couples from this obligation and, should they exist for the whole of married life, the obligation does not bind them at all; 4) the sin does not consist in the exercise of marital rights during the sterile periods; but in abstention from intercourse during the fertile periods precisely to avoid conception, when the couple could have and should have made its positive contribution to society. Sin is present when the practice is unjustifiedly undertaken; 5) the formal malice of illicit periodic continence is not against the sixth commandment; i.e., against the procreation of children or the use of the generative faculty, but against the seventh commandment, i.e., against social justice. The couple is not making its contribution to the common good of society; 6) from 4 and 5 above, it follows that the individual acts of intercourse during a period of unjust practice of rhythm do not const.i.tute numerically distinct sins. Rather, granting the continuance of a single will act to practice rhythm, there is one sin for the whole period of illicit abstention during the fertile periods.

Since the Pope abstained from an explicit statement on the gravity of the sin, the controversy of whether the practice intrinsically is a mortal sin or not continued. The opinion in this country which holds the greatest authority states that mortal sin is involved in the case of continued practice with a total exclusion of children and frequent use of marital rights during the sterile period.

Diversity of opinion has arisen as to the means of estimating when a serious sin has been committed. Some have used a temporal norm, e.g., unjustified use of rhythm for five or six years would const.i.tute a serious matter. Undoubtedly most of the proponents of this norm would not accuse a couple of certain mortal sin if they already have one or more children; after that, indefinite use of the practice without excusing causes would not be a mortal sin. (This is admitted by most theologians.) Others have proposed a numerical norm as a basis to determine whether or not a couple has made its contribution to the conservation of the race. Concretely the proponents of this theory regard four or five children as sufficient to satisfy the obligation in such a way;

a) that the use of rhythm to limit the family to this number is licit provided the couple is willing and morally able to practice it;

b) that the limitation through rhythm to less than four requires a serious justifying cause. The intention involved to prevent conception would be seriously sinful in itself, since it causes great harm to the common good and involves in practice subordination of the primary to the secondary end or ends of matrimony. At the present time this opinion seems to be more favored in America than the first which places the gravity of the sin in the unjustified practice of rhythm for five years. (For a survey of recent opinion, see the _Conference Bulletin of the Archdiocese of New York_, Vol. x.x.xIV, No. 1, pp. 36 ff.)

On the other hand, some European theologians have denied that the practice const.i.tutes a mortal sin in itself, independently of circ.u.mstances such as injustice and danger of incontinence.

The present state of opinion, then, is definitely undecided and calls for caution both in dealing too severely with penitents or too readily recommending the practice. The response of the Sacred Penitentiary of June 16, 1880, affords a safe guide in practice: "Married couples who use their marriage rights in the aforesaid manner are not to be disturbed, and the confessor may suggest the opinion in question, cautiously, however, to those married people whom he has tried in vain to dissuade from the detestable crime of onanism."

As to the theological censure to be attached to "rhythm," it is not approved, nor recommended, but seems to be tolerated for sufficiently grave reasons. "Instead of being freely taught and commended, it is rather to be tolerated as an extreme remedy or means of preventing sin"

(Official Monitum, Patrick Cardinal Hayes, Sept. 8, 1936, _Conference Bulletin of Archdiocese of New York_, Volume XIV, No. 2, p. 78).

2623. Coperatio Uxoris ad Onanismum vel Contraceptionem.--(a) Coperatio formalis graviter illicita est, quum includat approbationem ipsius peccati. Unde graviter peccat uxor qu suis quremoniis de molestiis graviditatis virum cogit ad congressum onanistic.u.m, vel quae nec interdum conatur eum avertere ab iniquo consilio onanistice congrediendi, vel qu active adjuvat abruptionem copul, vel quae interne gaudet de ipso peccato (1513).

(b) Coperatio materialis ad onanismum ex gravi causa (e.g., ex metu fundato rixarum, molest cohabitationis, adulterii viri) licet; nam actio mulieris, scil. copulam habere naturalem, honesta est, atque causa sufficiens adest permittendi abusum factum a comparte (1515 sqq.). Imo uxor debitum petere potest a suo viro onanistico, si secus diu abstinere cogeretur ab omni usu conjugii c.u.m periculo incontinenti, quia caritas erga virum non obligat ad abstinentiam c.u.m tanto incommodo.

(c) Coperatio mere materialis ad contraceptionem, non videtur possibilis; nam copula contraceptiva est intrinsece et ab initio mala (1517, 1527). Unde uxori nec petere debitum licet, nec pa.s.sive se habere. Sed qualibet vice tenetur positive pro viribus resistere. Sin autem gravissima causa sit actum permittendi, ut puta periculum mortis, eam tantum resistentiam opponere debet ad quam obligatur virgo oppressa (2497), consensu ut patet denegato (See _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_, June, 1940, pp. 634 ff., and March, 1948, pp. 244 ff.)

2624. Recapitulatio de Licitis et Illicitis in Conjugio.--(a) Illicita graviter sunt extra matrimonium facta, v.g., moechia, mollities solitaria, alien conjugis concupiscentia; sed probabiliter actus imperfecti et solitarii in proprium corpus exerciti leve non excedunt, citra periculum pollutionis, siquidem in delectationem veneream qu in conjugio licita est natura sua ordinentur, sicque minus indecentes fiant.

(b) Illicita graviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed contra finem, i.e., natur matrimonii seu generationi prolis repugnantia, ut sunt pollutio mutua, onanismus, impudicitia qu non in copulam sed in pollutionem tendit.

(c) Illicita leviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed prter finem, i.e., qum generationi nec prosunt, nec obsunt, sed in circ.u.mstantiis aliquam prae se ferunt inordinationem (e.g., copula ob solam voluptatem habita), imprudentiam (e.g., copula tempore parum apto habita), immoderantiam (e.g., impudicitia pudori nociva, situs innaturalis, ut si stent vel vir succubet, ex levitate electus).

(d) Licita sunt intra matrimonium facta, qu tum ex parte objecti (scil., quia actus ordinatur ad finem matrimonii), tum ex parte circ.u.mstantiarum (scil., quia debito tempore, loco, modo, etc., ut prudentia exigit, exercentur) rationi rectae concordant. Unde non peccant conjuges sibi licita concupiscendo vel de iis gaudendo. Immo mulier onanist licite coperata non est peccati arguenda si gavisa sit de ipsa copula vel de bonis ejus effectibus, vel (saltem quando probabile videtur se s.e.m.e.n excip.i.s.se) si ad completam voluptatem se excitaverit.

2625. Regulae pro Confessariis.--(a) Interrogationes.--Si nulla ratio est suspicandi copulam modo innaturali exerceri, prstat ut plurimum de circ.u.mstantiis (v.g., de motivo copul) non qurere, ne conjuges tdio afficiantur vel bona fide inutiliter priventur. Si tamen fundata suspicio est abusum matrimonii celari, hac de re confessarius inquirere debet, sed prudenter, ne scandalo sit poenitentibus verbis indiscretis.

(b) Monitiones.--Si deprehenditur poenitentem onanistam esse, per se severe reprehendendus est (quod de viro praesertim dicitur) nec absolvendus nisi signa contritionis prius dederit; per accidens autem, si datur ignorantia invincibilis et monitio nullatenus profutura prvidetur, poenitens in bona fide relinquatur.

2626. Marriage as a Sacrament.--The third benefit of marriage is that of the Sacrament. The union of man and wife is not merely a physical union, but also a social one, and it should be modelled on the union of Christ and the Church: "This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and the Church" (Eph., v. 32).

(a) Christ abides with the Church, and so the husband should dwell with his wife (Matt., xix. 5). The cohabitation of the parties is demanded by the very nature of the promises made in marriage, and hence it is wrong for the husband to be absent from the home for notable periods of time, or, what is worse, to drive his wife from home--or vice versa.

Grave reasons and mutual consent justify long absences, as when the husband is called away on distant business; but, if he goes away for a considerable part of the year, he should, if possible, take his wife with him, or visit or write to her frequently. Very grave reasons suffice for obtaining a separation, either permanent, on account of adultery, or during the continuance of the reason, as when there is serious unhappiness (Canons 1128 sqq.).

(b) Christ is the head of the Church, and so also the husband is superior to the wife in authority (Eph., v. 23). Ordinarily man excels in the qualities suited for rule of the home (such as physical strength, decision, courage), and hence as every society, no matter how small, must have a head, the husband is the natural head of the home.

But obedience is due a husband in domestic matters in which he is head of the house--for example, the choice of the place of residence, the management of the family income, the discipline of the children, but not in the wife's personal affairs (e.g., her conscience, her politics, her property)--and only in commands that do not exceed his authority, for he has no power to command if he is irrational, and he has no claim to obedience if he orders something sinful or foolish. Moreover, since the wife is a partner and not a servant, and since she usually excels as sympathetic and wise adviser and careful household manager and is naturally more virtuous, the husband should consult with her on important family questions and decide them as far as possible by mutual consent, and should gladly leave to her sole control and direction the many things in which she is more competent than himself.

(c) Christ gave Himself for the Church (Eph., v. 25), and so also the husband has the duty of providing for his wife, spiritually and temporally. Usually the man should attend to the external affairs of the family (such as its support and protection), while the wife should take care of the internal affairs (such as the housekeeping and the training of the children). It is to be regretted that the smallness of the husband's salary often compels the wife to work outside her home.

Women should not be compelled to take up occupations unsuited to their s.e.x, much less those that interfere with the supreme duty of motherhood. Injury done the common personal goods of husband and wife by one of them is unjust, if due to illegal action; it is at least uncharitable, if due to carelessness. The family goods are usually under the control of the head of the family. The wife has no right to use the earnings of her husband without his consent, unless he fails to provide suitably for his family, or uses his money extravagantly.

2627. The Duties of Persons Engaged to Marry.--We shall speak first of the duty of entering into a nuptial engagement, and next of the duties which engagement imposes.

(a) _Per se_, there is no obligation for an individual to marry, for the need of marriage is not a personal but a social one, and social duties do not all fall upon each particular person. Each person must take necessary food, for without it the individual perishes, and eating is thus an individual duty; but each person need not be a soldier, or farmer, or builder, or merchant, or married; for it suffices that these offices be fulfilled, one by one individual, another by another.

Indeed, if marriage is an impediment to a more urgent good of the common welfare (e.g., perilous public service incompatible with married life), or of private good (e.g., the duty of maintaining parents, the wish to remain single because one feels oneself unsuited for marriage or called to continence), marriage should not be chosen.

(b) _Per accidens_, there is sometimes a duty of marrying on account of public or private necessity. Thus, if the community is depopulated by race-suicide, the public good should move suitable persons to marry in order to a.s.sist the birth rate; for, if those are considered slackers who refuse their service or money in war time when the nation is threatened with death from without, are not those also culpable who will not a.s.sist a community threatened with extinction from within?

Marriage is also obligatory on those who feel that they are unable to live continently, and will be lost unless they marry (I Cor., vii. 9).

In case of seduction, marriage is a form of rest.i.tution to the injured girl, but since forced marriages are usually unhappy, the injury should be atoned for in some other way if the seducer does not care for the girl or is not desirable himself (see 1803).

2628. The Duties Imposed by Engagement to Marry.--(a) Before Engagement.--Courtship is lawful for those who intend to marry, for without it the mutual knowledge which is requisite for a prudent choice is impossible. But courtship should be employed, not as a period of pleasure and extravagance, but as an opportunity for learning the suitability of the parties, one for the other, and their desirability in virtue, religion, sanity, intelligence, health, wealth, position, love of children, sobriety, steadiness, etc. Visits are lawful during courtship, but not the same familiarity as is permissible after engagement. The time of wooing should not be protracted, and as a rule after a year the parties should either become engaged or decide they are not well matched.

(b) At the Time of the Engagement.--The parties are gravely bound to make known to each other all personal defects which cannot be concealed without serious injustice, such as the lack of virginity or other quality which one party makes a _conditio sine qua non_, or the presence of a diriment impediment or of a very harmful or displeasing characteristic (such as venereal disease, sterility, disgrace, race, the fact that one is a widow, etc.). There is no duty of justice to manifest defects whose concealment will not be detrimental (such as poverty, lowly origin), but there may be a duty of charity to reveal them, as when their concealment now will lead to an unhappy marriage.

As to fornication, the man is not obliged to confess it, unless perhaps when he has an illegitimate child; nor the woman, unless she is actually pregnant, or cannot keep the matter hidden afterwards and can make it known without serious harm to herself (see Self-defamation, 1577; cfr. 1978, 2132). But those who have been guilty of these mistakes should undergo a test on the question of physical health.

(c) During the Engagement.--Fidelity requires that an engaged person be true to the other party, avoid paying court to a third person (see 2526), and give the signs of affection that are usual between engaged persons. The relationship between the engaged parties does not give them the right to what is intrinsically evil (e.g., voluntary pollution, proximate danger of consent to sin, continuance in a familiarity which is a proximate occasion of sin), or to what is lawful only to married persons (e.g., intercourse and the liberties pertinent to it). But it does give them the right to manifest their affection by acts indifferent in themselves (e.g., visits which are not private, too frequent, or too prolonged; the decent kisses usual between betrothed lovers on meeting and parting), even though unintentionally pollution may follow (2538). Persons who intend to marry soon should acquaint themselves before marriage and from reliable sources with the fundamental physiological facts of s.e.x, so as to avoid the mistakes which often wreck conjugal happiness, beginning with the honeymoon itself; they should have some money or the prospect of being able to support themselves, and the woman should know how to take care of a home.

(d) At the End of the Engagement.--A formal promise to marry (Canon 1017) imposes the duty of marriage within a reasonable time (i.e., at the appointed date, or, if no date was fixed, at the time when one of the parties reasonably requests it), unless the engagement be broken (e.g., by mutual consent, by a circ.u.mstance that makes marriage impossible, such as marriage to a third party or choice of the clerical state; or unnecessary, such as the fulfillment of a resolutory condition, supervening impediment, Papal dispensation given for a just cause); or unless one of the parties has a right not to keep the engagement on account of a notable change in the circ.u.mstances, or a breach of faith, or opposition of parents that will make the marriage inadvisable, etc. The obligation to marry is one of justice, and is grave when the contract was bilateral; it is one of fidelity or justice, and grave or light according to the intention of the promisor, when the contract was unilateral (see 1888). There is no action to enforce an engagement, for forced marriages are unwise (Canon 1017, n.

3); and in practice confessors and pastors should not insist on fulfillment of the promise. But damages can be sued for, and the confessor should deny absolution to one who refuses to make just rest.i.tution in a case of breach of promise (see 1803). An informal promise to marry (i.e., one invalid naturally or positively) produces no obligation to marry in either forum (see 454); but it does produce a duty of rest.i.tution in breach of promise, if there was force, fraud, or deceit.

2629. Conditions for the Signs of Affection between Engaged Persons.--(a) Objectively, these signs must be suited to the condition of merely engaged, not of married persons. Brief and modest kisses are proper for lovers, but greater intimacy, such as long and lone conversations in secluded spots, are wrong.

The chaster the relations between the betrothed, the less occasion for future regrets and recriminations. "Petting" purchases a cheap physical thrill or excitement at the cost of present moral danger for two persons, of the degradation of love to its lowest expression, and of loss of self-respect, with the probable risk of a future ill-fated marital career ending speedily in disillusionment and divorce. It is essentially selfish and unwise.

(b) Subjectively, the signs of affection must not be a proximate occasion of sin; nor may they be accompanied by consent to sin, or be used for the sake of venereal pleasure. Joy at the thought of future marriage intercourse and sensual pleasure in present kisses (2514) are in themselves not sinful, but in practice they are as a rule gravely dangerous. _Motiones carnales, quales sunt erectiones, signa sunt delectationis venereae quando conjuguntur eum pollutione vel proxime prviis ad eam; sunt signa delectationis mere sensualis, quando amorem sensibilem sequuntur ex motu sanguinis, quin in resolutionem seminis ex se tendant_ (2497 b).

2630. The Duties of Parents and Children.--In addition to the duties that belong to all superiors and subjects (see 2635 sqq.) there are special obligations inc.u.mbent on parents and children by reason of the special relationship between them. The duties of the parents are of two kinds.

(a) Duties of Charity.--Parents should give their children special love and special signs of affection, as the order of charity requires (see 1158 sqq.). Hence, those parents sin grievously who hate or curse their children, even the illegitimate or wayward, or who drive the children from home by unkindness.

(b) Duties of Piety.--Parents should, as far as they are able, give their children the honor and help that belongs to members of the family (see 2346 sqq.), though illegitimate children have not the right to dwell in the home of the legitimate children or to share in the family inheritance (see 1803 b). The help owed to children is spiritual and material, and the obligation, which is natural and divine, is most grave (Canon 1113). Spiritual help includes religious and moral training and example (see 867 sqq.); material help includes food, clothing, lodging, medical care, means to learn a necessary trade, art or profession or to enter marriage or take up a suitable state in life, protection and defense. Parents are bound to help their children, at least in necessities, as long as the latter are in need. Sins are committed also against the unborn (e.g., when the pregnant mother does not take care of her health, or when she is ill-treated by her husband) and young infants (e.g., when the child is unnecessarily suckled by strangers and thus exposed to danger, or is placed in a foundling asylum or other inst.i.tution because the parents are unwilling to be bothered). On the other hand, those parents sin through excess who spoil or "sissify" their children by luxury and idleness, or who are too indulgent to give needed correction and even moderate chastis.e.m.e.nt.

2631. Compensation of Children.--A child, even though subject to parental authority, seems to have a right to compensation for extraordinary services given his parents, and also to at least a fair commission for gains made in the course of extraordinary services for which he is receiving no compensation. In their wills, after satisfying just debts and expenses, parents should leave their offspring who need it enough to maintain their state in life.

2632. s.e.x Education of Children.--(a) Necessity.--Some moralists believe that s.e.x education of the young should be indirect. They hold that it is dangerous to speak of venereal matters to the young; that silence itself is to them a lesson of modesty; that the practice of piety and mortification, along with parental watchfulness, will keep them pure; that sufficient knowledge will come at the proper time as G.o.d will provide. Others reject this theory as opposed to the tradition of the Church as well as to experience. The defenders of direct s.e.xual education point to the evil of silence: the bad habits contracted and grown strong before their sinfulness is understood, or the scruples and misery into which ignorance will plunge young people entering the crisis of p.u.b.erty, the false and corrupt ideas with which unavoidably the minds of the innocent will be indoctrinated by immoral companions or physicians, the loss of confidence in parents who have refused important knowledge and advice, and the ruin of innocent lives by seducers which a timely word of warning would have prevented. Hence, there is an invincible ignorance which cannot be removed without direct education, and which is more harmful at least to well-reared children than any evil that may be caused by the education.

(b) Preparation for Direct Education.--Training for purity should be directed both to will and intellect, for knowledge without character is powerless against temptation. Children should be trained from the beginning morally (i.e., they should be kept as far as possible from sources of contamination; should be taught to have implicit confidence in parents and to bring to them their questions and difficulties; should be trained to practise continual mortification and restraint and to struggle against evil tendencies until the habit of self-control becomes a second nature) and religiously (i.e., to use prayer, the Sacraments and other means of grace until they are well formed in piety). This previous moral education and religious conviction will stand on guard as a protection against the suggestions of indulgence which initiation into s.e.x matters may suggest.