Moral Theology Part 126

(c) For procreation nature requires heteros.e.xual intercourse, a condition disregarded by sodomy, which is the l.u.s.tful commerce of male with male (pederasty, uranism), or of female with female (tribadism, sapphism, Lesbian love). This sin is worse than unnatural coition, for it is a greater perversity to neglect one of the two needed life elements than to neglect the right process for their union (see Gen., xix. 24, 25; Lev., xx. 13; Rom., i. 26, 27),

(d) Finally, for procreation nature requires h.o.m.ogeneous intercourse, a law violated by b.e.s.t.i.a.lity, which is coition of a human being, male or female, with a brute animal. This is the worst of unnatural impurities, since it sins against the most fundamental condition for the s.e.xual act, namely, that the partic.i.p.ants be of the same nature (see Lev., xx.

15, 16). Similar to b.e.s.t.i.a.lity is the crime of necrophilism (intercourse with a corpse).

2535. Pollution.--Pollution is the voluntary emission of s.e.m.e.n apart from coition.

(a) It is an emission, that is an external discharge. The internal secretion in the so-called female semination is also included by many under the head of pollution. The carnal motions spoken of in 2497 b are a preparation for pollution.

(b) It is a discharge of s.e.m.e.n, that is, of the male fluid that fertilizes the female ovum. But equivalent pollution, from the moral viewpoint, is found in the discharge of certain non-prolific fluids that are accessory to generation or that produce in their movement a venereal satisfaction, such as the v.a.g.i.n.al fluid in females (female semination), the urethral fluid in males capable or incapable of procreation (distillation). There is no pollution, however, in natural discharges such as menstruation and urination.

(c) It is apart from coition, and thus it differs from other consummated sins. But pollution may be committed either alone (solitary vice), or with another, and in the latter case it pertains reductively to adultery, fornication, sodomy, etc., as the case may be.

(d) It is voluntary directly or indirectly: directly, when one intends it as an end (e.g., for the sake of the pleasure) or as a means (e.g., as a relief from temptation or bodily itching, to obtain a specimen of s.e.m.e.n for medical diagnosis); indirectly, when one unjustifiably does something from which one foresees that pollution will result. In all these cases pollution is formal or sinful, and it is not to be confused with material or natural pollution, which is a discharge of s.e.m.e.n or distillation that is involuntary or unimputable.

2536. Cases of Material or Non-Sinful Pollution.--(a) Involuntary pollution is pa.s.sive or active. The former happens even when one is awake. It is evoked by such slight causes as physical movement and exertion, and is unaccompanied by pleasure; when habitual, it is a disease due to organic debility The latter happens during sleep, and may be caused by a superfluity of fluid. It is accompanied by pleasure and often by libidinous dreams. It is a means used by nature to relieve the system, and is therefore healthful and beneficial, unless the discharges are too frequent (e.g., nightly). There is no obligation of repressing the continuance of a pollution that began involuntarily during sleep, since it may be regarded as an act of nature; but consent must be withheld (2498 sqq.). Moreover, if merely natural pollution be considered, not as to its venereal gratification but solely as to its good effects (e.g., that it ends a temptation, that it benefits the mind or the health), there is no sin in rejoicing at its accomplishment or in desiring its fulfillment, provided nothing is done to produce it and the intention is good; for then the object of the will is indifferent and the end is good.

(b) Unimputable pollution is caused by a lawful act from which one foresees that pollution will ensue, there being no proximate danger of consent to sin, and the pollution being only permitted, and that for a proportionately grave reason.

2537. Unimputable Pollution.--In reference to unimputable pollution the following distinctions should be noted:

(a) the danger risked by an act may be either of formal pollution (i.e., with consent to sin) or of material pollution (i.e., without consent to sin);

(b) the danger of pollution is either proximate or remote, the former being that from which pollution naturally and usually results and the latter that from which it does not naturally or usually result.

Remotely dangerous are acts of a non-venereal kind, such as horseback riding, gymnastics, drinking alcoholic beverages, and also acts of a s.e.xual kind that are only mildly exciting, such as conversations or books that are slightly "off color" when the parties are of mature age (see 2517, 2518). Proximately dangerous are acts of a venereal kind that notably inflame pa.s.sion, such as warm and lingering kisses between persons of opposite s.e.xes (see 2517, 2518);

(c) the reason for running the danger of pollution is either grave, serious, or slight. A grave reason is real necessity (e.g., the removal of disease or pain or of a very painful or troublesome itch due to the blood or disease) or great utility (e.g., the preservation of health, cleanliness of body); a serious reason is an important convenience of soul or body (e.g., the exercise of common politeness, the enjoyment of reasonable comfort); a slight reason is one in which none of the mentioned motives is found (e.g., the satisfaction of an idle curiosity, the removal of a trifling irritation or itch).

2538. Proximate and Remote Occasions of Pollution.--It is never lawful to expose oneself to the immediate danger of sin, for he who loves the danger loves the sin (see 258, 260); but if one uses means to make the danger remote, one may lawfully encounter it for a good reason (see 258, 260, 261). It is lawful to permit an evil effect when there is sufficient justification according to the principle of double effect (see 103 sqq.).

(a) Hence, if there is proximate danger of formal pollution (that is, of consent to sin), no reason excuses an act even of a non-s.e.xual kind, such as horseback riding. But if the act is necessary, the danger must be made remote by the use of special means, such as prayer, firm resolves, etc. (see 2497 sqq.).

(b) If there is proximate danger of material pollution, a grave reason suffices (e.g., the care of patients by physicians and nurses, a.s.sistance of bathers by attendants, warm soporific drinks taken for the sake of sleep).

(c) If there is remote danger of material pollution, a serious reason suffices (e.g., customary salutations of the country, physical exercises, moderate comfort in posture, seasoning in food.). A slight reason may excuse at times from mortal sin (e.g., unnecessary curiosity about the sciences of anatomy or s.e.xology).

2539. The Theological Malice of Sinful Pollution.--(a) From its nature pollution is a mortal sin, because it is an act of impurity (1494) and a perversion of nature (2534). Moreover, its consequences are most injurious to society (it tends to self-indulgence and the avoidance of the burdens of marriage) and to the individual (when habitual, it weakens mental and will power and often brings on a breakdown of bodily vigor especially among young people), In Scripture it is represented as gravely illicit (I Cor., vi. 10; Gal., v. 19; Eph., v. 3). Hence, pollution is always a mortal sin when directly willed (e.g., when practised deliberately in order to be rid of a temptation or of bodily irritation or itch certainly due to superfluity of s.e.m.e.n or to pa.s.sion), and also when indirectly willed if there is proximate danger of consent to sin (e.g., when one who has always committed formal pollution in certain company goes into that company without necessity, or without use of means to prevent a fall) or grave danger of pollution and no sufficient reason for permitting it (e.g., undue familiarities from which nocturnal pollution is foreseen as most probable).

(b) From the imperfection of the internal act, pollution is sometimes only a venial sin. This happens in case of invincible ignorance (e.g., young children who do not understand the evil of masturbation, students who have been taught by instructors or physical directors that it is necessary for health or that it is unsanitary but not sinful), or of incomplete consent (e.g., when the person is only half awake and does not ordinarily desire pollution, when he is a psychopathic and not fully responsible for his acts).

(c) From the lightness of the matter pollution is venial when willed indirectly and permitted without sufficient reason, if there is only slight danger of it from the nature of the action performed (see 2496).

Examples are the reading for pastime of love stories before falling asleep with the prevision that this may possibly bring on pollution during sleep.

2540. If the action productive of pollution is gravely illicit, as being seriously opposed to chast.i.ty (e.g., lewdness) or to some other virtue (e.g., extreme intemperance in drugs or alcohol), is one thereby guilty of the grave sin of pollution?

(a) If the case be considered in the abstract, the answer is in the negative. For if the action in question is only remotely dangerous as regards pollution (e.g., an action of a non-venereal kind such as intemperance does not necessarily tend to impurity, an act of a venereal kind that is momentary, such as a desire, does not strongly affect the pa.s.sions), the sin is only venial in so far as pollution is concerned (see 2517, 2518).

(b) If the case be considered in the concrete, the answer is in the affirmative as a rule when there is question of a habit. For generally those who act habitually in this way yield consent to the pollution as well as to the sin that precedes. Authorities note, however, that he who repents of the cause of pollution before the pollution results is not guilty of the actual pollution.

2541. The Moral Species of Sinful Pollution.--(a) The general species of pollution is distinct from other consummated sins of impurity, since it is unnatural, and this in a special way (see 2534, and Denzinger, n.

1124), But some authors regard equivalent pollution (see 2493, 2535) as not a consummated sin, since it is without true semination, and hence according to them it may be confessed simply as impure pleasure (see 2519 b).

(b) The particular species of pollution is derived from circ.u.mstances that give it a new essential malice. If it is solitary, and committed by one who is under no bond of marriage or vow, and accompanied by no thought or desire except in reference to self or self-gratification (autoerotism, narcissism), there is the single sin of pollution. But there are other sins if it is committed by one under special obligation (i.e., adultery or sacrilege), or if committed with another person (e.g., seduction, coperation, rape), or if committed with impure thoughts or desires about others (e.g., mental adultery, fornication, sodomy, b.e.s.t.i.a.lity). The manner in which pollution is performed (e.g., whether coperative pollution is active or pa.s.sive, by irrumation or concubitus or touch, with or without an instrument) is _per se_ an accidental circ.u.mstance. According to some authors, coperative pollution brought on by touch alone is not diversified in species, if there is no special affection for the other person, but only the desire of carnal gratification, and hence it may be declared simply as pollution from touch.

2542. Penalties for Immorality Decreed in Canons 2357-2359.--(a) Laymen who are guilty of certain offenses against the sixth commandment become infamous on conviction and are excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts. In case of adultery, the injured spouse may obtain a separation, temporary or perpetual, from the offending spouse (Canon 1129). (b) Clerics in minor orders are subject to special punishments, and may even be dismissed from the clerical state. (c) Clerics in major orders are subject to penalties named in law (e.g., suspension, infamy, deposition) for graver crimes such as concubinage, adultery, and to penalties decreed by the lawful superior for other delinquencies.

2543. The Potential Parts of Temperance.--The appet.i.tes of pleasure are the most difficult to restrain, and there is need of a perfect virtue like temperance to rule over them and keep them within the bounds of reason. The a.n.a.logous or potential virtues of temperance are that one which is able to check, though it does not tame, the animal appet.i.tes (continency), and those that preside and rule over the less violent appet.i.tes for vengeance, exercise of authority, superior excellence, knowledge, amus.e.m.e.nt and display (meekness, etc.). See above, 2465 c.

2544. Continence.--(a) Its Nature.--This quality, as here taken, is the state of one who has not gained mastery over the pa.s.sions sufficient to keep down strong, frequent and persistent rebellions, but whose will is firmly disposed to resist their attacks. It is less than a moral virtue, then, since it does not tranquillize the lower appet.i.tes. The temperate man has already subdued his pa.s.sions, and hence he is less disturbed by them, or at least he has less trouble in rejecting their onsets.

(b) Its Relation to Temperance.--Greater difficulty increases merit, if it is due to the presence of a corporal or external impediment (e.g., a man of sickly const.i.tution or one who suffers great opposition deserves more credit for his work than a man of vigorous const.i.tution or one who enjoys great favors and opportunities); not, however, if it is due to the absence of a spiritual excellence (e.g., a man who finds work hard because he is lazy does not deserve more credit than another who finds it easy because he is industrious). Hence, temperance is more deserving than continence, for it controls pa.s.sion with greater ease simply because it has subjected not only the higher but also the lower appet.i.te to the dictates of reason.

(c) Its Opposite.--The vice opposed to continence is incontinence, which does not follow the dictate of reason to resist the onslaughts of pa.s.sion; it sees and approves the higher things, but it follows the lower. This sin is less grievous than intemperance, just as a pa.s.sing indisposition is less harmful than a settled malady. For pa.s.sion comes and goes, and the incontinent man quickly regrets his weakness; but a sinful habit of gluttony or impurity is permanent, and is so like a second nature that its votaries rejoice when they have satisfied their desires (Prov., ii. 14). Incontinence in pleasure is more disgraceful than incontinence in anger, for anger is less distant from reason; but on the other hand the irascible man usually sins more grievously by the greater harm he does to others. It is more difficult to contain oneself from wrath than from intemperance in the sense that wrath storms the soul by a more vehement and compelling attack; yet, it is harder to be unconquered by pleasure, because it lays persistent siege to the soul and demands a more unwearied vigilance.

2545. Meekness.--Meekness or mildness is the virtue that moderates anger.

(a) It is a virtue, since it consists in moderation according to right reason. Our Lord proclaims it blessed (Matt., v. 4). and St. Paul numbers it among the Fruits of the Spirit (Gal., v. 23). Ill.u.s.trious models of mildness are Joseph (Gen., l. 20), Moses (Num., xii. 3), David (I Kings, xxiv), Christ (Luke, xv; John, i. 29, viii. 11), St.

Paul (Acts, xx. 31).

(b) Its office is moderation, and hence in its manner, though not in its matter, it is like temperance. It follows the middle way between the extremes of sinful indignation and sinful indulgence.

(c) Its matter is the pa.s.sion of anger, that is, the sensitive appet.i.te that inclines one to avenge an evil by punishing its author. Like other pa.s.sions (121), anger is indifferent in itself, but it is made good or evil by its reasonableness or unreasonableness. The meek man is angry at times, but only when and where and as he should be (Ps. iv. 5); his anger is not a blind impulse, but a righteous zeal that attacks a wrong only after reason has shown that this is the proper course.

2546. Anger.--Anger is sinful when it deviates from reason, as to its matter or its manner.

(a) Thus, it is unreasonable as to its matter (i.e., its vengeance) when it punishes unjustifiably (e.g., when the person punished is innocent, when the penalty is excessive, when the legal order is not followed, when the motive is not justice or correction, but hatred, etc).

(b) It is unreasonable as to its manner (i.e., the degree of excitement felt or shown) when temper goes beyond measure. Great anger is not sinful when a great evil calls for it (e.g., the anger of Our Lord against the money-changers in John, vi. 14 sqq.; that of Mathathias against the idolatrous Jew in I Mach., ii. 24); but to fly into a rage at nothings or trifles is sinful.

2547. Gravity of the Sin of Anger.--(a) If anger is sinful on account of its matter, it is mortal from its nature as being opposed to charity and justice. He that is angry against his brother is worthy of h.e.l.l fire (Matt., v. 21, 22). It may be venial, however, on account of imperfection of the act (e.g., the sudden impulse to strike down those who do not agree with one's opinions) or the lightness of the matter (e.g., a slap or push or box on the ears given a naughty child when a word of reproof would have sufficed).

(b) If anger is sinful on account of its manner, it is venial from its nature; for excess in an otherwise indifferent pa.s.sion is not a serious disorder (see 2450). But the sin may be mortal by reason of circ.u.mstances, as when an angry person acts like a wild man, curses and swears, breaks the furniture, gives serious scandal on account of his position, or the time or place, or injures his health by the violence of his paroxysm.

2548. Is Anger a Graver Sin than Hatred and Envy?--(a) As to its matter, anger is less grave than hatred and envy, for it pursues evil under the guise of spiritual good, pretending at least that the harm it intends is just, whereas hatred and envy pursue evil precisely as it is injurious to another, or as it is a means to one's own temporal and external good or glory. Likewise, anger is less grave objectively than concupiscence, for the voluptuous man aims at utility or pleasure, whereas the revengeful man aims at what he makes believe is just.

(b) As to its manner, anger surpa.s.ses the vices mentioned in certain of its violent manifestations. The infuriated man, when crossed, creates a scene and makes a fool of himself; his blood boils, his face is flushed, his eyes dart fire, he froths at the mouth and trembles, he pounds, stamps and bellows like an enraged bull.

2549. Anger as One of the Seven Capital Vices.--(a) It has a certain preeminence in evil. Its matter is quite attractive, for revenge is sweet and the cloak of just retaliation makes it seem good; its manner is powerful, for it drives one on to dare even the most shocking crimes.

(b) It is the spring of many sins. In the heart anger produces indignation against the object of displeasure, whom the angry man looks upon as base and unworthy, and soreness about the treatment of self, which fills the mind with plans of revenge. Sins of the mouth due to anger are incoherent cries of rage, words of contumely and blasphemy (Matt., v. 22), while its sinful deeds include quarrels and every kind of injury.

2550. Sinful Indulgence.--Sinful indulgence, which is opposed to meekness by excess, is often a mortal sin on account of the grave harm it inflicts upon the common welfare and the protection it affords to crime. Thus, Heli was seriously reproved and punished because he winked at grave disorders, or at least was too easy-going in his corrections (I Kings, ii, iii).

2551. Clemency.--Clemency is a virtue that inclines one, from a spirit of kindness and moderation, to be as easy in inflicting punishments as the claims of justice will allow.

(a) Clemency is a virtue, because it is reasonable, does good to others, and makes the doer good. It is beneficial to public as well as private interest: "Mercy and truth preserve the king, and his throne is strengthened by clemency" (Prov., xx. 28).

(b) It inclines one to be easy, that is, to temper or relax the severity of the law. Thus, it differs from the virtues of legal justice and of charitable forgiveness, the former of which, when necessary, insists on the full rigor of the law (see 2381 sqq.), whereas the latter, when permissible, grants an enemy a full pardon (see 1198).

(c) Its matter is punishment, that is, the external evil of chastis.e.m.e.nt visited on wrongdoers. Hence, it differs from meekness, which deals with the internal emotion of anger, and from mercy, which deals with external goods bestowed upon the suffering.