Mexico, Aztec, Spanish and Republican Part 33

Worth soon reunited his division on the main straight road to the capital, and was joined by General Pillow, who, advancing from Coyoacan to attack the rear of San Antonio, as we have already related, soon perceived that the hacienda had fallen, and immediately turned to the left, through a broken country of swamps and ditches, in order to share in the attack on CHURUBUSCO. And here, it was felt on all sides, that the last stand must be made by Mexico in front of her capital.

The hamlet or scattered houses of Churubusco, formed a strong military position on the borders of the stream which crosses the highway, and, besides the fortified and ma.s.sive convent of San Pablo, it was guarded by a _tete de pont_ with regular bastions and curtains at the head of a bridge over which the road pa.s.ses from the _hacienda_ of San Antonio to the city. The stream was a defence;--the nature of the adjacent country was a defence;--and here the fragments of the Mexican army,--cavalry, artillery and infantry, had been collected from every quarter,--panic stricken, it is true,--yet apparently resolved to contest the pa.s.sage of the last outwork of importance in front of the _garita_ of San Antonio Abad.

When Worth and Pillow reached this point, Twiggs had already been sometime hotly engaged in attacking the embattled convent. The two advancing Generals immediately began to manuvre closely upon the _tete de pont_, which was about four hundred and fifty yards east of the convent, where Twiggs still earnestly plied the enemy. Various brigades and regiments under Cadwallader, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, Garland, Clark, Major White and Lieutenant Colonel Scott continued to press onward towards the _tete de pont_, until by gradual encroachments under a tremendous fire, they attained a position which enabled them to a.s.sault and carry the formidable work by the bayonet.

But the convent still held out. Twenty minutes after the _tete de pont_ had been taken, and after a desperate battle of two hours and a half, that stronghold threw out the white flag. Yet it is probable that even then the conflict would not have ended, had not the 3d infantry under Captains Alexander, J. M. Smith, and Lieutenant O. L.

Shepherd, cleared the way by fire and the bayonet to enter the work.

Whilst this gallant task was being performed in front of the Mexican defences, Generals Pierce and Shields had been engaged on our left, in turning the enemy's works so as to prevent the escape of the garrisons, and to oppose the extension of numerous corps from the rear, upon and around our left. By a winding march of a mile around to the right, this division under the command of Shields, found itself on the edge of an open, wet meadow, near the main road to the capital, in the presence of nearly four thousand of the enemy's infantry, a little in the rear of Churubusco. Shields posted his right at a strong edifice, and extended his left wing parallel to the road, to outflank the enemy towards the capital. But the Mexicans extended their right more rapidly, and were supported by several regiments of cavalry, on better ground. Shields, accordingly, concentrated his division about a hamlet, and attacked in front. The battle was long and bravely sustained with varied success, but finally resulted in crowning with victory the zeal and courage of the American commander and his gallant troops. Shields took 380 prisoners, including officers; while at Churubusco seven field pieces, some ammunition, one standard, three Generals, and 1261 prisoners, including other officers, were the fruits of the sharply contested victory.

This was the last conquest on that day of conquests. As soon as the _tete de pont_ fell, Worth's and Pillow's divisions rushed onward by the highway towards the city, which now rose in full sight before them, at the distance of four miles. Bounding onward, flushed and exultant, they encountered Shields' division, now also victorious, and all combined in the headlong pursuit of the flying foe. At length the columns parted, and a small part of Harney's cavalry, led by Captain Kearney of the 1st dragoons, dashed to the front and charged the retreating Mexicans up to the very gates of the city.

Thus terminated the first series of American victories in the valley of Mexico.

NOTE.--It is ungracious to criticize unfavorably the conduct of a conquered foe, but there are some things in Santa Anna's behavior at Contreras and Churubusco, which must not be pa.s.sed silently. At Contreras, he came with aid, by a short and fine highway, to the field at a late period, when the Americans, moving slowly over an unknown and broken country, had already outflanked with a strong force, Valencia's left, and he then made no effort whatever, with his _large support_, to relieve the beleagured general. If he did not design doing any thing, why did he come at all; and, if as he says, he believed Valencia could, during the night, withdraw all his forces, after spiking his guns, by a secret path of which he apprised him, why did he not take the same path to aid him? Did he believe that it was best to lose Valencia and his division only, without risking the loss of the large support under his own command? In the _morning_ of the 20th it was certainly too late for action, but Santa Anna must have been convinced, when he _ordered the retreat_ from the Hacienda of San Antonio, and thus voluntarily opened a gate for Worth's advance, that now, if ever, had arrived the moment for a general action in front of the city, the key of which, on the main road, was the convent of Churubusco and the adjacent works. The loss of Valencia's army and _materiel_ was undoubtedly disheartening, but, according to his own account, Santa Anna had been prepared for an event which he _foresaw_. This should not have destroyed his self-possession if he sincerely desired victory. When Contreras fell, he had, in reality, only lost a division consisting of five or six thousand men. The whole centre and left wing of his army were untouched, and these must have numbered at least 20,000. Yet, if we admit the brave resistance of the garrison, only hastily thrown into the convent and works at Churubusco, it may then be asked what masterly effort Santa Anna made (at the moment when he had actually drawn the American army into the valley) to bring on a _general action_ with all the fresh troops either under his own command or under that of obedient, brave, skilful, and patriotic officers? The Mexican accounts of these actions, and in fact, his own despatch from Tehuacan, dated 19th Nov. 1847, exhibit no able manuvres on the last field with which he was perfectly and personally familiar. The Americans stormed a single point,--and the battle was over, though bravely fought by those who were under cover and by the traitor battalion of San Patricio, formed of renegades from our army. The despatches of Santa Anna, like most of the Mexican despatches after military or political disaster, seem rather designed to criminate others, and to throw the whole blame of _ultimate_ complete defeat on Valencia, than to point out the causes of conquest in spite of able generalship _after the fall of Contreras_. See Santa Anna's despatches, Mexico 23 Aug. 1847; and Tehuacan, 19 Nov. 1847, in Pillow's Court Martial, pp. 532 and 540. See also _Apuntes para la historia de la guerra_, &c., &c., chapters XVII-XVIII-XIX, and Ripley's History of the War, vol. 2, p. 256; "_No part of the Mexican force was ready for battle_, except Rincon's command," says this writer.

CHAPTER XV.

1847.

WHY THE CITY WAS NOT ENTERED ON THE 20TH--CONDITION OF THE CITY--DELIBERATION OF THE MEXICAN CABINET AND PROPOSALS--REASONS WHY GENERAL SCOTT PROPOSED AND GRANTED THE ARMISTICE--DELIBERATIONS OF COMMISSIONERS--PARTIES AGAINST SANTA ANNA--FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATION--MEXICAN DESIRE TO DESTROY SANTA ANNA.

It was late in the day when the battles ended. One army was wearied with fighting and victory; the other equally oppressed by labor and defeat. The conquered Mexicans fled to their eastern defences or took refuge within the gates of their city. There was, for the moment, utter disorganization among the discomfited, while the jaded band of a few thousand invaders had to be rallied and reformed in their ranks and regiments after the desperate conflicts of the day over so wide a field. It surely was not a proper moment for an unconcentrated army, almost cut off from support, three hundred miles in the interior of an enemy's country, and altogether ignorant of the localities of a great capital containing nearly two hundred thousand inhabitants, to rush madly, at night fall, into the midst of that city. Mexico, too, was not an ordinary town with wide thoroughfares and houses like those in which the invaders had been accustomed to dwell. Spanish houses are almost castles in architectural strength and plan, while from their level and embattled roofs, a mob, when aroused by the spirit of revenge or despair, may do the service of a disciplined army. Nor was it known whether the metropolis had been defended by works along its streets,--by barricades, impediments and batteries,--among which the entangled a.s.sailants might be butchered with impunity in the narrow pa.s.sages during the darkness and before they could concentrate upon any central or commanding spot. Repose and daylight were required before a prudent General would venture to risk the lives of his men and the success of his whole mission upon such a die.

Accordingly the army was halted; the dispersed recalled, the wounded succored, the dead prepared for burial, and the tired troops ordered to bivouack on the ground they had wrested from the enemy.

[Ill.u.s.tration: VIEW OF THE VOLCANOES FROM TACUBAYA.]

Meanwhile the greatest consternation prevailed within the city. When Santa Anna reached the Palace, he hastily a.s.sembled the Ministers of State and other eminent citizens, and, after reviewing the disasters of the day and their causes, he proclaimed the indispensable necessity of recurring to a truce in order to take a long respite. There was a difference of opinion upon this subject; but it was finally agreed that a suspension of arms should be negotiated through the Spanish Minister and the British Consul General. Senor Pacheco, the Minister of Foreign Relations, accordingly addressed Messrs. Mackintosh and Bermudez de Castro, entreating them to effect this desired result.

During the night the British Consul General visited the American camp, and was naturally anxious to spare the effusion of blood and the a.s.sault by an army on a city in which his country had so deep an interest. On the morning of the 21st, when General Scott was about to take up battering or a.s.saulting positions, to authorize him to summon the capital to surrender or to sign an armistice with a pledge to enter at once into negotiations for peace, he was met by General Mora y Villamil and Senor Arrangoiz, with proposals for an armistice in order to bury the dead, but without reference to a treaty. Scott had already determined to offer the alternative of a.s.sault or armistice and treaty to the Mexican government, and this resolution had been long cherished by him. Accordingly he at once rejected the Mexican proposal, and, without summoning the city to surrender, despatched a note to Santa Anna, expressing his willingness to sign, on reasonable terms, a short armistice, in order that the American Commissioner and the Mexican Government, might amicably and honorably settle the international differences, and thus close an unnatural war in which too much blood had already been shed. This frank proposal, coming generously from the victorious chief, was promptly accepted.

Commissioners were appointed by the commanders of the two armies on the 22d; the armistice was signed on the 23d, and ratifications exchanged on the 24th; and thus, the dispute was for a while transferred once more from the camp to the council chamber. On the morning of the 21st, the American army was posted in the different villages in the vicinity. Worth's division occupied Tacubaya. Pillow's Mixcoac, Twiggs's San Angel, while Quitman's remained still at San Agustin, where it had served during the battles of the 19th and 20th in protecting the rear and the trains of the army. Tacubaya became the residence of General Scott, and the headquarters of the commander-in-chief were established in the Bishop's Palace.

There are critics and politicians who are never satisfied with results, and, whilst their prophecies are usually dated after the events which they claim to have foreseen, they unfortunately find too much favor with the ma.s.s of readers who are not in the habit of ascertaining precisely what was known and what was not known at the period of the occurrences which they seek to condemn. General Scott has fallen under the heavy censure of these writers for offering the armistice and avoiding the immediate capture of the capital, the practicability of which they _now_ consider as demonstrated. We propose to examine this question, but we believe that the practicability or impracticability of that event does not become one of the primary or even early elements of the discussion.

If we understand the spirit of this age correctly, we must believe that mankind, purified by the progressive blessings of Christianity and modern civilization, desires the mitigation rather than the increase of the evils of war. It does not seek merely to avert danger or disaster from the forces of one party in the strife, but strives to produce _peace_ with as little harm as possible to all who are engaged in warfare. It is not the mission of a soldier to kill, because his profession is that of arms. It is ever the imperative duty of a commander to stop the flow of human blood as soon as he perceives the slightest chance of peace; and if his honorable efforts fail entirely, through the folly or obstinacy of the foe, he will be more fully justified in the subsequent and stringent measures of coercion.

The Mexican ma.s.ses, mistaking vanity for true national pride, had hitherto persevered in resisting every effort to settle the international difficulties. Diplomacy, with such a nation, is extremely delicate. If we exhibited symptoms of leniency, she became presumptuous;--if we pushed hostilities to the extreme, she grew doggedly obstinate. On the 21st of August her capital was in Scott's power. His victorious army was at her gates. Two terrible battles had been fought, and the combatants on both sides had shown courage, skill and endurance. The Mexican army was routed, but not entirely dispersed or destroyed. At this moment it doubtless occurred to General Scott, and to all who were calm spectators of the scene, that before the last and fatal move was made, it was his duty to allow Mexico to save her point of honor by negotiating, ere the city was entered, and while she could yet proclaim to her citizens and the world, that her capital had never been seized by the enemy. This a.s.suaged national vanity, and preserved the last vantage ground upon which the nation might stand with pride if not with perfect confidence. It still left something to the conquered people which was not necessary or valuable to us.

There are other matters, unquestionably, that weighed much in the very responsible deliberations of General Scott. If our army entered the city triumphantly, or took it by a.s.sault, the frail elements of government still lingering at that period of disorganization, would either fly or be utterly destroyed. All who were in power, in that nation of jealous politicians and wily intriguers would be eager to shun the last responsibility. If Santa Anna should be utterly beaten, the disgrace would blot out the last traces of his remaining prestige.

If so fatal a disaster occurred, as subsequent events proved, the Americans would be most unfortunately situated in relation to peace, for there would be no government to negotiate with! Santa Anna's government was the only _const.i.tutional_ one that had existed in Mexico for a long period, and with such a legalized national authority peace must be concluded. It was not our duty to destroy a government and then gather the fragments to reconstruct another with which we might treat. If a revolutionary, or _provisional_ authority existed, what prospect had we of enduring pacification? What guaranty did we hold in a treaty celebrated with a military despot, a temporary chief, or a sudden usurper, that such a treaty could be maintained before the nation? What const.i.tutional or legal right would an American general or commissioner have, to enter into such a compact? Was it not, therefore, Scott's duty to act with such tender caution as not to endanger the fate of the only man who might still keep himself at the head of his rallied people?

Besides these political considerations, there are others, of a military character, that will commend themselves to the prudent and the just. The unacclimated American army had marched from Puebla to the valley of Mexico during the rainy season, in a tropical zone, when the earth is saturated with water, and no one travels who can avoid exposure. Our men were forced to undergo the hardships of such a campaign, to make roads, to travel over broken ground, to wade marshes, to bivouack on the damp soil with scarce a shelter from the storm, to march day and night, and finally, without an interval of repose, to fight two of the sharpest actions of the war. The seven or eight thousand survivors of these actions,--many of whom were new levies--demanded care and zealous husbanding for future events. They were distant from the coast and cut off from support or immediate succor. The enemy's present or prospective weakness was not to be relied on. Wisdom required that what was in the rear should be thought of as well as what was in advance.

May it not then be justly said that it was a proper moment for a heroic general to pause in front of a national capital containing two hundred thousand people, and to allow the civil arm to a.s.sume, for a moment of trial, the place of the military? Like a truly brave man, he despised the eclat of entering the capital as Cortez had done on nearly the same day of the same month, three hundred and twenty-six years before. Like a wise man, he considered the history and condition of the enemy, instead of his personal glory, and laid aside the false ambition of a soldier, to exhibit the forbearance of a christian statesman.[73]

The American Commissioner unquestionably entered upon the negotiations in good faith, and it is probable that Santa Anna was personally quite as well disposed for peace. He, however, had a delicate game to play with the politicians of his own country, and was obliged to study carefully the posture of parties as well as the momentary strength of his friends and enemies. Well acquainted as he was with the value of men and the intrigues of the time, he would have been mad not to guard against the risk of ruin, and, accordingly, his first efforts were directed rather towards obtaining the _ultimatum_ of the United States, than to pledging his own government in any project which might prove either presently unpopular or destroy his future influence. The instructions, therefore, that were given to General Jose J. de Herrera, Bernardo Couto, Ignacio Mora y Villamil and Miguel Atristain, the Mexican commissioners, were couched in such extreme terms, that much could be yielded before there was a likelihood of approaching the American demands. In the meanwhile, as negotiations progressed, Mexico obtained time to rally her soldiers, to appease those who were discontented with the proposed peace, and to abjure the project if it should be found either inadmissible or impossible of accomplishment without loss of popularity.

For several days consultations took place between Mr. Trist and the commissioners, but it was soon found that the American pretensions in regard to the position of Texas, the boundary of the Rio Grande and the cession of New Mexico and Upper California, were of such a character that the Mexicans would not yield to them at the present moment. The popular feeling, stimulated by the rivals of Santa Anna, his enemies, and the demagogues, was entirely opposed to the surrender of territory. Sensible as the President was, that the true national interests demanded instantaneous peace, he was dissuaded by his confidential advisers from presenting a counter projet, which would have resulted in a treaty. Congress, moreover, had virtually dissolved by the precipitate departure of most of its members after the battles of the 20th.

All the party leaders labored diligently at this crisis, but none of them with cordiality for Santa Anna, in whose negotiations of a successful peace with the United States, they either foresaw or feared the permanent consolidation of his power. The _puros_, or democrats, still clung to their admiration of the const.i.tution of our Union; to their opposition to the standing army; to their desire for modifying the power and position of the church and its ministers, and to their united hostility against the President. They were loud in their exhortations to continue the war, while Olaguibel, one of their ablest men and most devoted lovers of American inst.i.tutions, issued a strong manifesto against the projected treaty. This was the party which, it is a.s.serted, in fact desired the prolongation of the war until the destroyed nationality of Mexico took refuge from domestic intrigues, misgovernment and anarchy, in annexation to the United States.

The _monarquistas_, who still adhered to the church and the army, proclaimed their belief in the total failure of the republican system.

Revolutions and incessant turmoils, according to their opinions, could only be suppressed by the strong arm of power, and in their ranks had again appeared General Mariano Paredes y Arrellaga, who, returning from exile, landed in disguise at Vera Cruz, and pa.s.sing secretly through the American lines, proceeded to Mexico to continue his machinations against Santa Anna, whom he cordially hated.

The _moderados_ formed a middle party equally opposed to the ultraisms of monarchy and democracy. They counted among their number, many of the purest and wisest men in the republic, and although they were not as inimical to the United States as the _monarquistas_, or as many of the _puros_ pretended to be, yet they cordially desired or hoped to preserve the nationality and progressive republicanism of Mexico. In this junto Santa Anna found a few partizans who adhered to him more from policy than principle, for all cla.s.ses had learned to distrust a person who played so many parts in the national drama of intrigue, war, and government. As a party, they were doubtless unwilling to risk their strength and prospects upon a peace which might be made under his auspices.

In this crisis the President had no elements of strength still firmly attached to him but the army, whose favor, amid all his reverses, he generally contrived to retain or to win. But that army was now much disorganized, and the national finances were so low that he was scarcely able to maintain it from day to day. The mob, composed of the lower cla.s.ses, and the beastly _leperos_, knowing nothing of the principles of the war, and heedless of its consequences,--plied moreover by the demagogues of all the parties,--shouted loudly for its continuance, and thus the president was finally forced to yield to the external pressure, and to be governed by an impulse which he was either too timid or too weak to control.

The armistice provided that the Americans should receive supplies from the city, and that no additional fortifications should be undertaken during its continuance; nevertheless the American trains were a.s.sailed by the populace of the city, and, it is alleged, that Santa Anna disregarded the provision forbidding fortifications. When it became evident to the American commissioner and General Scott, that the Mexicans were merely trifling and temporizing,--that the prolongation of the armistice would be advantageous to the enemy, without affording any correspondent benefits to us,--and when their supplies had been increased so as to afford ample support for the army during the antic.i.p.ated attack on the city,--it was promptly resolved to renew the appeal to arms. Accordingly, on the 6th of September, General Scott addressed Santa Anna, calling his attention to the infractions of the compact, and declaring that unless satisfaction was made for the breaches of faith before noon of the following day, he would consider the armistice terminated from that hour. Santa Anna returned an answer of false recriminations, and threw off the mask. He a.s.serted his willingness to rely on arms;--he issued a bombastic appeal to the people, in which he announced that the demands of the Americans would have converted the nation into a colony of our Union. He improved upon the pretended patriotic zeal of all the parties--puros, moderados, monarquistas and mob--who had proclaimed themselves in favor of the war. Instead of opposing or arguing the question, he caught the war strain of the hour, and sent it forth to the mult.i.tude in trumpet tones. He was determined not to be hedged or entrapped by those who intrigued to destroy him, and resolved that if he must fall, his opponents should share the political disaster. Nor was he alone in his electioneering gasconade, for General Herrera--a man who had been notoriously the advocate of peace, both before and since the rupture,--addressed the clergy and the people, craving their aid by prayer, money, fire and sword, to exterminate the invaders! All cla.s.ses were, thus, placed in a false and uncandid position.

This is a sad picture of political hypocrisy based upon the misnamed popular will of a country which had for twenty years been demoralized by the very chieftain who was about to reap the direful harvest he had sown in the hearts of his people. Every man, every party, acknowledged, privately, the impolicy of continued hostilities, yet all men and all parties were resolved that _Santa Anna_ should not make the peace whilst an American army remained in the country to sustain it, or an American government dispensed millions to pay for the ceded territory. Distrusting his honesty and patriotism, they believed that the money would only be squandered among his parasites, or used for the prolonged corruption and disorganization of their country. With gold and an army they believed him omnipotent; but, stripped of these elements of power in Mexico, the great magician dwindled into a haggard and harmless witch.

Combinations arose readily and bravely against the man whose sway was irresistible _as long as he dealt with his countrymen alone_ or preserved a loyal army and dependant church, whose strength and wealth were mutual supports. The sky was dark and lowering around him, and he must have acknowledged secretly, that the political parties of his country, if not his countrymen universally, were more anxious to destroy him than the Americans. The army of the invaders, they hoped, might perform a task in this drama, which the Mexicans themselves could not achieve; and there are mult.i.tudes who would have been glad to see its end become tragic by the death of one whom they feared in prosperity, and despised in adversity.

[Footnote 73: It will be remembered that even Cortez had paused in the precincts of the ancient capital of the Aztecs, in order to give them a chance of escape before striking the fatal blow. See Prescott, vol.

3, p. 199. It is a little remarkable also, that the dates of Scott's and Cortez's victories coincide so closely. Cortez's victory was on the 13th of August, 1521, Scott's on the 20th of August, 1847. The date of Cortez's achievement is given according to the Old Style, but if we add ten days to bring it up to New Style, it will be corrected to the 23d of August!]

CHAPTER XVI.

1847.

MILITARY POSITION OF THE AMERICANS AT THE END OF THE ARMISTICE--MEXICAN DEFENCES--PLAN OF ATTACK--RECONNOISSANCES OF SCOTT AND MASON--IMPORTANCE OF MEXICAN POSITION AT MOLINO DEL REY--SCOTT'S SCHEME OF CAPTURING THE CITY--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY--REFLECTIONS AND CRITICISM ON THIS BATTLE--PREPARATIONS TO ATTACK CHAPULTEPEC--STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC AND OF THE CITY GATES OF SAN COSMe AND BELEN--RETREAT OF THE MEXICAN ARMY AND GOVERNMENT--AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE CITY OF MEXICO.

At the termination of the armistice the position of the American forces was greatly changed from what it had been on the morning of the 20th of August. The occupation of San Agustin had been followed by that of Contreras, San Angel, Coyoacan and Churubusco in the course of that day, and on the next, Mixcoac and Tacubaya were taken possession of. Thus the whole southern and south-western portion of the valley, in front of Mexico, were now held by the Americans; and this disposition of their forces, commanding most of the princ.i.p.al approaches to the capital, enabled them, for the first time to select their point of attack.

In reconnoitering the chief outworks of the Mexicans by which he was still opposed, General Scott found that there were several of great importance. Directly north of his headquarters at Tacubaya, and distant about a mile, arose the lofty, isolated hill of Chapultepec, surrounded by its ma.s.sive edifice, half castle, half palace, crowned with cannon. This point, it was known, had been strongly fortified to maintain the road leading from Tacubaya to the _garita_ of San Cosme on the west of the city. Westwardly, beyond the hill of Chapultepec, whose southern side and feet are surrounded by a dense grove of cypresses, and on a rising ground within the military works designed to strengthen the castle, was the Molino del Rey, or King's Mill, which was represented to be a cannon foundry to which large quant.i.ties of church bells had been sent to be cast into guns. Still further west, but near the Molino or Mill, was the fortified Casa Mata, containing a large deposit of powder.

These,--together with the strong citadel, lying near the _garita_ of Belen in the south-western corner of the city,--were the princ.i.p.al external defences still remaining beyond the immediate limits of the capital. The city itself stands on a slight swell between lake Tezcoco and the western edge of the valley, and, throughout its greater extent, is girdled by a ditch or navigable ca.n.a.l extremely difficult to bridge in the face of an enemy, which serves the Mexicans not only as a military defence but for drainage and protection of their customs. Each of the eight strong city gates were protected by works of various character and merit. Outside and within the cross fires of these gates there were other obstacles scarcely less formidable towards the _south_. The main approaches to the city across the flat lands of the basin are raised on causeways flanked by wide and deep ditches designed for their protection and drainage. These causeways, as well as the minor cross roads which are similarly built, were cut in many places and had their bridges destroyed so as to impede the American's advance and to form an entangling net work; while the adjacent meadows were in this rainy season either filled with water in many places or liable to be immediately flooded by a tropical storm.

With these fields for his theatre of action, and these defences still in front of him, it was an important and responsible question, whether General Scott should attack Mexico on the west or on the south.

There can be hardly a doubt that the capture of the hill and castle of Chapultepec, before a.s.saulting the city, was imperatively demanded by good generalship. If the capital were taken _first_, the Mexicans instead of retreating towards Guadalupe and the north, when we attacked and captured from the _south_, would of course retire to the avoided stronghold of Chapultepec; and, if our slender forces were subsequently obliged to leave the city in order to take the fortress, our sick, wounded and thinned regiments would be left to the mercy of the mob and the _leperos_. Chapultepec would thus become the nucleus and garrison of the whole Mexican army, and we might be compelled to fight two battles at the same time,--one _in_ the city, and the other at the castle. But, by capturing the castle first, and seizing the road northward beyond it, we possessed all the most important outworks in the lap of the valley, and cut off the retreat of the Mexicans from the city either to the west, to the castle, or towards our rear in the valley. We obtained, moreover, absolute command of two of the most important entrances to the capital, inasmuch as from the eastern foot of the hill of Chapultepec two causeways, and aqueducts raised on lofty arches, diverged northeastwardly and eastwardly towards the city. The northernmost of these entered Mexico by the _garita_ of San Cosme, while the other reached it by that of Belen near the citadel.

In attacking Chapultepec, it was important to consider the value of the Molino del Rey or King's Mill, and Casa Mata, both of which, as we noticed, lie on rising ground within the works designed to protect Chapultepec. Upon examination it will be found that the Molino del Rey, or King's Mill, bears the relation of a very strong western outwork both to the castle of Chapultepec and its approaches by the inclined plain which serves to ascend its summit. As the Molino del Rey is commanded and defended by the castle, so it reciprocally, commands and defends the only good approach to the latter.[74] As long as the Molino was held by the Mexicans, it would of course, form an important stronghold easily reached from the city around the rear of Chapultepec; so that if Scott attacked the castle and hill from the south, where the road that ascends it commenced, he would be in danger of an attack on his left flank from the Mexicans in the defences at Molino and Casa Mata.

If the King's Mill fell, the result to the enemy would be that, in addition to the loss of an important outwork and the consequent weakening of the main work, its occupants or defenders would be driven from a high position above the roads and fields into the low grounds at the base of Chapultepec, which were completely commanded from the Molino, and thus the Mexicans would be unable to prevent the American siege pieces from taking up the most favorable position for battering the castle. It was important, therefore, not only that the foundry should be destroyed, but, in a stratagetic view, it was almost indispensable in relation to future operations that the position should be taken. It is undeniable, as following events showed, that the Mexicans regarded it as one of their formidable military points.

The capture of Chapultepec and the destruction of the post at Molino del Rey were, accordingly, determined on as preliminary to the final a.s.sault upon the city.