Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George the Third Volume II Part 29

I have forwarded your letter to Tom, who will, I think, probably set out from Vienna soon after the receipt of it. I should have been very glad if I could have engaged him to stay there, but that, I think, seems out of the question. I am not more sanguine in his success than he is himself; and if my conjecture is right, at least you will have the satisfaction of knowing that a subsidy is not given to Austria. I own myself that if the situation of affairs there had been such that one could, with propriety, have been given, with a reasonable hope of adequate exertion in return, I should never have signed any other instrument with as much pleasure as the warrant for ratifying that agreement, whatever had been the consequences of it. I have no other view of the contest in which we are engaged, nor ever have had, than that the existence of the two systems of Government is fairly at stake, and in the words of St.

Just, whose curious speech I hope you have seen, that it is perfect blindness not to see that in the establishment of the French Republic is included the overthrow of all the other Governments of Europe. If this view of the subject is just, there can be worse economy than that which spares the expense of present exertion, and incurs the probability of increased risk, and the necessity of protracted efforts. I believe, however, that all this reasoning applies, in this instance at least, to a case which will not exist.

Our letters from Holland yesterday announced the execution of Barrere and Co.; but so many false reports have come from thence, that I do not give much faith to this, except from the probability of the thing itself. The weakness which this state of things at Paris occasions, in their efforts in the Low Countries, is very encouraging, and would be much more so, if we were but in a situation to profit of it.

Mulgrave's expedition has, I believe, completely performed its object, and averted all danger for the present from that quarter.

The corps will now be broken up. In that event, Nugent has been thought of to go to the West Indies with the command of a brigade, and the local rank of Brigadier-General. I have taken it for granted that this will be a thing agreeable to him, and have therefore promoted it as far as I could, because it gives him the opportunities of showing himself both in service and in command. If you see it in the same light, perhaps, you would prefer throwing out the idea to him before it is formally proposed to him, as he might have difficulty in declining any proposal of service, even if for any reason that I do not foresee this destination was not agreeable to him.

I rejoice to think that your King's guard is almost over, which I imagine must have been a troublesome business enough.

G.o.d bless you, my dearest brother.

The straw was now beginning to move in the direction of Ireland. Mr.

Ponsonby and his friends made no concealment of the expectations they founded upon the advent of Lord Fitzwilliam; and reports were creeping out, that with the change of men would come an entire change of measures.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Dropmore, Sept. 27th, 1794.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I received your letter here yesterday, and write this because what you say on two material points of the public situation of affairs, impels me to it, though I well know how impossible it is within the compa.s.s of a letter to discuss such questions, or even to state the mere grounds of the considerations on which they depend. I see so much all around us of the gloomiest colour, that I am on that account, perhaps, more sensible to the manner in which you seem to view our situation. I cannot, however, be much surprised at the confidence which you seem to feel as to the possibility of our seeing the storm break all round us, and remaining untouched by it, because such appears to be the prevailing sentiment here, as well as in every other part of Europe: every country, and almost every individual, seeming to reason and to act in the hope of such an exception being made in their favour during the general ruin which they see impending over others. I am, however, not the less convinced of the truth of my own opinion, which is unhappily already confirmed by too many instances of the effects which this delusive security, as I think it, has produced, and is daily producing. I can see no grounds, in the state of this country, to hope for such an exception in our favour, and I do verily believe that we must prepare to meet the storm here, and that we must not count upon the continuance of a state of domestic tranquillity which has already lasted so much beyond the period usually allotted to it in the course of human events. I trust that we shall at least meet it with more firmness than our neighbours, but even in order to do this, we ought not to blind ourselves at the moment of its approach. It seems too probable that it is decreed by Providence that a stop should be put (for reasons probably inscrutable to us) to the progress of arts and civilization among us. It is a melancholy reflection to be born to the commencement of such a scene, and to be called to bear a princ.i.p.al share in it, but I trust we may hope that our strength may be proportioned to our trial.

With respect to what you say of Ireland, I am not ignorant of the reports upon the subject, though perhaps a little mortified at the facility with which you seem to have given credit to them. I know of no such measure as you say we _have adopted_. I have never varied in my opinion as to the impolicy of the conduct held in Ireland during the time of Lord Rockingham's Administration, nor do I believe that any one is disposed to repeat that conduct now.

On the other hand, I must say that I think we, least of all people, and yourself less than any man existing, have reason to feel any particular interest in a system which experience has always shown, at least in our time, to be neither able nor disposed to carry any support to English Government whenever England can think such support material. It has long appeared to me, and I believe to you also, that to make the connexion with Ireland permanently useful to Great Britain, that connexion must be strengthened by a systematic plan of measures, well considered and steadily pursued. Whether the present moment, or any other moment that is in near prospect, would be favourable to such a plan, is another and a more difficult question; but I am sure that every year that is lost increases the hazard of our situation as with respect to Ireland. These points I feel as those which are truly important to England, are not questions of power or advantage to Lord Shannon, or Mr. Ponsonby, or any other individual, or set of individuals there. And with this impression, I certainly have not for one consented, as you express it, to surrender Ireland to the Duke of P. and Lord F. under the government of Mr. Ponsonby; but neither can I conceive what other interest you or I have, or ought to have, on that subject, except that Ireland should be so managed, if possible, as not to be an additional difficulty in our way, when so many others are likely to occur.

I have not often as much leisure as I have found to-day to put these ideas on paper. Do not think me dispirited by what has happened. I see the extent of our danger, and think that danger much greater than it is commonly apprehended; but the effect of that opinion on my mind is no other than that of increasing the conviction with which I was before impressed, of the necessity of perseverance and exertion. France and Spain and the Netherlands, and Geneva, most of all (small as it is), show us that this danger is not to be lessened by giving way to it, but that courage and resolution are in this instance, as in most others, the surest roads to self-preservation.

I have written this with more than usual seriousness, because such is the state of my mind, which I am accustomed to open to you without reserve, and such as it is at the moment of my writing or conversing with you.

When are we likely to meet? I suppose that your campaign will not last much beyond the King's journey. You will not, I hope, forget that this place is your best inn, whether you go to Stowe or to town; but you must give me a few days' notice, that I may be sure to be here. G.o.d bless you.

The progress of the negotiations on the continent, and the weakness of Austria and Prussia, mixed up with no inconsiderable amount of indecision and duplicity, are freely commented upon in letters from Mr.

Grenville and Lord Malmesbury. Want of power, and want of will--fear, hesitation, and imbecility--were so conspicuous in the conduct of these Courts, as to destroy all confidence in their professions. The character drawn by Lord Malmesbury of the King of Prussia--which the reader will find confirmed in the subsequent communications of Mr. Grenville--shows how little reliance, under any circ.u.mstances, could be placed on His Majesty's co-operation.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

(Private.) Vienna, Sept. 22nd, 1794.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

The course of this last week has been employed--as you will have seen from our despatch--in very long, but fruitless arguments on our parts. The proposal which we send to you, has no other recommendation than that of its having been strenuously resisted by us, and steadily persisted in by them. If the fact really was, as they are disposed to consider it, that England--at no risk and no expense--could, in the shape of this guarantee, furnish means to Austria, without which they must consider themselves as beat, and act too under that impression, to their own certain ruin, and to the great probable danger of Holland; if, I say, all this mischief could be prevented without any real expense to England, the question would seem to me very different from what it now is. But, I confess, that I have not been able to make out of their conversation on this subject any of that security on these points which they must insist upon. They say, provision can be made by which the interest of this money can be punctually secured, to be paid strictly when due to the commissaries of the English army, or any other persons appointed to receive it; yet what those provisions are which provide for that security, I do not make out, nor do they seem able to describe. I state to them that Mr. Pitt must find ways and means for the payment of the interest of this loan, which must increase the first shape of our annual expenses, whether they are afterwards honestly repaid or not; but they maintain that M. Desardroui can settle this somehow or other, though how they have not by any means explained; perhaps M.

Desardroui has been more fortunate with Mr. Pitt.

One considerable difficulty in regard to this proposition seems to be the influence which this loan might have upon their wish to regain the Low Countries--a wish which we already think too weak in their minds, and which would probably become weaker from the reflection that the income of those revenues was already mortgaged for a considerable sum. It was with a view to this that I dropped to them the notion of their giving a larger security, and asking a smaller loan, as well as complying with the requisitions of augmented force and British command. The general security you see they do consent to give; but, until I hear some more distinct explanation, I shall still fear that they mean to throw the whole security upon the Netherlands. They are still quarrelling more every day with everything that is Prussian: they have stopped a large magazine of blue cloth from Prussia to Switzerland, which they say they know is destined to France; and the King of Prussia threatens, in consequence, to stop some of their supplies in their pa.s.sage to their armies. Thugut said of the King of Prussia to-day, with some truth and some humour, that all he wanted was to save the whole of his army, to conquer Poland without the loss of a man, and in reward to receive from us a pension of a million and a half per annum. If half that sum would purchase from him thirty thousand troops absolutely at our disposal, to make with British, Hessian and Dutch an army under English orders of one hundred thousand men, for the side of Holland; and that the other half--viz.: 700,000--given in the way of subsidy to Austria, could give it good heart to make a vigorous offensive campaign, I know not whether my inclinations would not lead me to the experiment; but their wants here are so great, and their resources, or at least their spirit and exertions, so reduced, that the prospect is certainly very discouraging. They seem full of new fears about the Turks, and express much expectation that our Minister at Constantinople will make great efforts to keep all quiet there.

I believe I told you there were apprehensions of the Poles, under Kosciusko, breaking with the Austrians. A small affair had taken place, but it is said to be amicably settled, and to be, for the present, safe on that side. We are anxiously expecting our permission to return; and I depend now upon seeing you so soon, that I will not unnecessarily protract this letter.

I know not who you are sending here; but we have taken great pains to keep alive in them here the most favourable dispositions that we could; and as far as appearances can be depended on--if the pecuniary demands were out of the question--nothing can be more promising than their general language and professions are, of earnestly desiring to establish the most intimate union between the two Courts.

G.o.d bless you, my dearest brother.

LORD MALMESBURY TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Frankfort, Oct. 2nd, 1794.

DEAR GRENVILLE,

I have written to Lord Spencer all I have to write officially. I fear I have mixed up a little bile with my intelligence; but the times are bilious, and it is beyond the compa.s.s of my patience to see the great stake we are playing for lost by imbecility, treachery, and neglect, without betraying a few symptoms of discontent. It is really deplorable that we should be the only nation in Europe who are up to the danger of the moment, and that the minds of all the other Cabinets are either so tainted with false principles, or are so benumbed, that it is impossible to work upon them. It is manifest, from the most undoubted information, that the interior of France is in a state of the greatest disorder and confusion; that the successes of the armies are the only cause of this confusion not breaking out in the shape of a civil war; and that if we could at this moment obtain any one brilliant success, that the whole fabric would fall to pieces.

It is said that H. P. M. will come here, and that when he does come, things will take another turn. I doubt one and the other. Any means will be employed at Berlin to keep him there, and if these should not succeed, any means will be employed here to persuade him to approve all that has been done, and to follow up the same line of conduct. I know from experience the weakness of his character, and the facility with which he gives way to the last advice. I know also by experience that his a.s.surances cannot be depended on, and that his conduct does not always correspond with his promises. It is from your mission and from your Court that I expect any good. I am free to confess (still under the influence of that vile thing called experience) that my hopes are not very sanguine.

Lord Howe is returned to Torbay. This is all I hear from England.

n.o.body writes to me, since everybody supposes me on the road. Mr.

Braddye gave me your letter an hour ago, I will do all I can to make Frankfort pleasant to him, but this is almost as impossible as to make the Prussians act.

I probably shall be here still a fortnight. I will write again soon.

Ever yours most truly and sincerely, MALMESBURY.

The curious revelations that are made in the next letter respecting Ireland are of infinite value in enabling us to estimate correctly the events that afterwards took place in that country under Lord Fitzwilliam's government, and the circ.u.mstances which led to its abrupt termination. Two important facts are authenticated in this communication: the first, that Lord Fitzwilliam, before he a.s.sumed the government, and even before his appointment to it was advanced so far as the removal of his predecessor, had not only determined upon the introduction of a new system, involving extensive changes of policy and persons, but that he had made known his determination to the heads of that party in Ireland who had obstructed Lord Buckingham on the Regency question; and the second, that this determination was formed without any previous concert with Mr. Pitt and the Cabinet, and to a great extent in opposition to their known and avowed principles.

LORD GRENVILLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

(Private.) Dover Street, Oct. 15th, 1794.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I think it probable that you may receive with this letter, others mentioning to you the unhappy misunderstanding which has clouded all our prospects, and which seems to threaten the worst consequences to that system, from the permanence of which I had looked, as you did, for the safety of this country, under all the difficulties of our present situation. Everything has continued up to this hour to go on in the most satisfactory manner, with the single exception of this unfortunate subject of Ireland, which now is brought to that sort of point which must, as I fear, unavoidably produce the immediate dissolution of the union, which we were both so anxious to maintain and perpetuate.

It would be difficult for me to give you an exact account how this mischief has originated, because I am of course ignorant of the manner in which the Duke of P. and Lord F. received the impressions, on which they appear to have acted. About the time I wrote my last letter to you, or rather earlier, reports came round to Pitt and myself that the party who had acted in opposition in Ireland, and particularly Ponsonby and Grattan, had held the strongest language respecting a.s.surances received by them from the Duke of P. and Lord F., that the latter was immediately to be declared Lord-Lieutenant, that Mr. Pitt had given Ireland over entirely to them, and that a new system of measures and men was to be adopted. In these reports particular persons were mentioned as being to be dismissed, and amongst these the Chancellor. The only impression which these produced on my mind was, that Lord F. had talked too soon of his intended appointment, as it had been uniformly explained that he could not be named till some provision was found for Lord W., the fact being that when the latter went to Ireland he accepted that situation, on an express engagement that he should return to one not less advantageous than the Post-Office, which he then quitted. I imagined also that in his communications with persons, whose support to a new Government in Ireland we all wished to secure, he had been less guarded than he might have been, and had given in his conversation more way to ideas stated by them than it could be prudent to do. And in this impression I wrote to you, thinking all the rest to proceed only from the usual exaggeration of reports of this nature, particularly in Ireland; and feeling confident that before any measure was really determined upon, we should have an opportunity of discussing it fully, and of weighing the proposed advantages of it against the very great objections which naturally and at first sight occur.

Soon after this we heard that Lord F. had actually taken such steps in Ireland as marked his persuasion of his being immediately to be appointed, and as gave on that account great offence to Lord W., to whom no communication of that nature had yet been made on our part, because we saw no such opening as it would have been necessary to hold out to him when such communication was made.

While we were doubting what step it might be best to take on this subject, to avoid giving any ground of uneasiness or dissatisfaction, the Duke of P. wrote to Pitt to urge the immediate appointment of Lord F. as a thing already determined upon, and without taking any notice of the necessity of the previous arrangement for Lord W. This led to intercourse upon the subject, and it is only since that time that we have found ourselves apprized of all the difficulties of the subject, and of the extent of the misunderstanding which prevails respecting it.

It appears that Lord F. has (on whatever grounds) announced to his friends in Ireland his immediate destination for that country, in such a manner as makes him now think that his appointment cannot even be postponed without discredit to himself, and that he cannot any longer continue in the King's service in any other situation than that of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.

If this difficulty stood alone, it would be sufficiently great. The principle on which Pitt had always acted in forming this junction, and the justification which he has used to those of his friends who disapproved or doubted about the measure, was, that he sacrificed to it the situation of none of the former Government, or its supporters; but that he used such openings as presented themselves, and such as he could create without removals, for the purpose of bringing into the public service a large and respectable description of persons, actuated by the same view as himself of the present state and circ.u.mstances of the country. Yet it hardly seems possible that, without breaking in upon this principle, Lord F.

could now be appointed. I am, however, persuaded that if this had been the only difficulty, some expedient would have been found to remove it, though it is not easy to say what that expedient could have been. But certainly for such an object as the maintenance of a system on which the fate of the country seems so much to rest, great sacrifices would and ought to have been made.

But it now appears that the reports which had reached us were in a very great degree, if not indeed wholly, founded in the real truth of what had happened. There is, I fear, no reason to doubt that some of the very expressions I have mentioned have actually been used, and that Lord F. has pledged himself too far to recede, with respect to a total new system, both of men and measures. The first point of this system goes to no less than the dismission of the Chancellor, who was, as I understand, to be replaced by Adair. On this subject, Pitt and myself cannot but feel that the only ground on which the Ponsonbys can desire the Chancellor's removal, is the conduct he held during the Regency in support of Lord Buckingham's Government, and that our consent to such a step must therefore be utterly dishonourable and degrading to us. But independent of this consideration, it is my sincere opinion that there cannot be adopted any measure more certainly destructive of the peace and tranquillity of that country. The system of introducing English party into Ireland, the principle of connecting changes of Government here with the removal of persons high in office there, and particularly the marking that system in the instance of a person of Fitzgibbon's situation, weight, and character, are all so utterly irreconcilable with every view that I have of the state of that country, that I should really be inexcusable if I could make myself a party to such a measure; and in this opinion Pitt entirely concurs.

On every principle, therefore, of duty and character, we are obliged to say that we cannot consent to this step, and we can only regret that, if it was originally intended, so capital a feature in the new arrangement was not brought forward earlier. The same observation applies to the whole idea of holding out a new system of men and measures in Ireland. If that was meant before the junction was made, it ought surely to have been stated then, in order that we might judge whether it did not oppose an insurmountable bar to the whole scheme. If it has only been conceived since that period, it ought certainly to have been communicated and concerted here, before any pledge or a.s.surance was given to individuals who might be concerned in it there.

When I say this, you must not suppose that there enters into our minds anything like warmth or resentment on the subject. The manner in which everything else has been conducted since we acted together, convinces me that the evil has arisen from precipitation and indiscretion, and not from any concerted plan of committing us, without our knowledge, to measures which we could not be supposed willing to adopt. And if it were still possible that the thing could be settled without discredit to either party, not only my sense of the public interest, but my personal feeling towards them, would make me think that no means ought to be left untried for that purpose. I am, however, obliged to confess to myself that I see no possibility of this. The publicity which has been given to the whole business seems to render it utterly impracticable. The a.s.surances which have been given are well known, and the breach or performance of them must be discreditable to one of the _two_ parties, for such, unfortunately, they now are again.

I never can enough regret your absence from this country while this has been going on. I am sure if you had been here the whole thing would have been avoided. As it is, what determination you will take respecting your own line I know not, and I feel myself too deeply interested in it to think myself a fair or competent adviser.

Nothing can be more unfortunate to the public interest than this incident; but the sense of it would certainly be very much aggravated to me if it were to lead, which I still hope it may not, to the placing us two again on different lines, and in opposite systems. Whatever you decide in that respect, I cannot help flattering myself that you will do justice to our conduct; and without calling upon you to condemn others, I cannot help entertaining the belief that you will think no part of this great misfortune imputable to us. With respect to my own personal opinions of the importance of forming and maintaining the union, you were, I am sure, enough a witness to them to make it very unnecessary for me, in writing to you, to dwell much on that point.