Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George the Third Volume II Part 25

At your request, I certainly will do a thing extremely disagreeable to myself, by putting into Mr. Pitt's hands the letter you desire me to show him. In any case where _you_ or _yours_ could have the smallest interest, I should never consider whether a compliance with your wishes is or is not pleasant to me; but I freely own, that I hardly think you would be repaid, by Mr. Pigott's getting his company, for the uneasiness I feel in being made (unprofitably, too, as I think, even to the object) the channel of such a communication between two persons whom I have so much reason to love and value.

The accounts of the Duke of Brunswick's victory, though they have not come to us from any channel that we can consider as strictly official, are such as to leave no doubt of the fact. There appears to have been different actions for three days, from the 29th of November to the 1st of December; and on the last of these days the victory was obtained, which persons, pretty well informed, seem to consider as decisive of the fate of Landan. The great object of the French was to relieve that place, and surround Wurmser; and in both they have failed, having been repulsed in a last attack they made on the latter the 1st instant. It appears likely now that little more will be done on that frontier till Landan is obliged to surrender; nor anything after that.

All our expectations are turned towards Brittany; but the news from that quarter is by no means favourable, as far as it goes. The Royalist army appears unable to make any siege, or even to continue twenty-four hours in the same place; and this for want of provisions. There is, besides, among them much disunion, and a total want of discipline; and they seemed to have formed the resolution of retiring inwards into France. Whether they will be deterred from this by the communications since made to them, and by the knowledge of our force being actually at their doors, remains to be seen.

I did not send you the account of the failure of all our hopes, from Lord Howe. I was not in town; and if I had been, I do not know whether I was not too much vexed to write. He is still off Ushant; so that the idea of sending out the second fleet is, for the moment, at least, out of the question. Some of those ships are, as you know, destined for other services; and the whole, without Lord Howe, would not be strong enough to meet the Brest fleet; and with him, would be much too strong.

The business of St. Domingo is highly important. The possession of the Mole, though not beyond what we had looked to, is much beyond my hopes. Dansey's letter to Williamson expresses much confidence of maintaining himself there, with such a force, as I trust, by this time, and long before, he actually has there.

Ever most affectionately yours, G.

At the close of the year France was stronger than at the commencement.

The destruction of her navy at Toulon was the princ.i.p.al reverse she suffered. On the other side the allies had encountered defeat at almost every point; the Prussians compelled to retreat to Mentz, the Imperialists driven beyond the Rhine, and the English forced to raise the siege of Dunkirk. The enthusiasm of the ma.s.ses, sustained by these successes, and acted upon by the popular appeals of the Jacobins, placed at the disposal of the Republic an enormous physical force, which the whole winter was occupied in augmenting and organizing for the campaigns of the ensuing year.

1794.

PREPARATIONS IN ENGLAND FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR--INACTIVITY OF THE AUSTRIANS--LORD SPENCER AND MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE SENT ON A MISSION TO VIENNA--HOSTILE RESOLUTIONS OF THE OPPOSITION--SEVERAL OF THE LEADING WHIGS JOIN THE ADMINISTRATION--LORD CORNWALLIS APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND ON THE CONTINENT--PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS--LORD FITZWILLIAM NOMINATED TO THE LORD-LIEUTENANCY OF IRELAND--HIS CONDUCT ON THAT OCCASION.

Parliament was convened on the 21st of January, 1794; and the Speech from the Throne expressed a sanguine hope on the part of His Majesty that the resources of France would be speedily exhausted. There was certainly little in the operations of the last year upon which the country could be congratulated; and the only remaining encouragement that could be held out was in reference to the future. The prodigious exertions of the Republic undoubtedly justified the expectation, that she could not long continue to meet the increasing demands which the extension of the war was making upon her means and energies; but it was difficult, in the heat and excitement of the conflict, to form an adequate estimate of the devotion with which the French were prepared to follow up their successes. A series of fortunate incidents and some brilliant achievements had inflamed the national vanity to such a height of exultation as to produce a perfect military mania in all parts of the country; and when Mr. Pitt, in the course of the opening debate, declared that "France had been converted into an armed nation,"--an expression that elicited much criticism at the time--he described accurately the exact state of the people, and the lengths they were prepared to go in the a.s.sertion of the principles they had baptized in the blood of the Sovereign.

There were not wanting persons in England who sympathized with the republicans of France, and regarded their martial spirit with something of the admiration which the impa.s.sioned and the thoughtless bestow upon gallantry and heroism. But the bulk of the nation entertained a different opinion, and viewed with alarm and detestation the sanguinary excesses by which the war was initiated and sustained. While the former cla.s.s, few in number, and confined chiefly to the lowest dregs of the population, continued to give occupation to the Government at home, the latter were ready to make any sacrifices the exigency of circ.u.mstances required to support the policy of the Government abroad.

Parliament unanimously voted an augmentation of eighty-five thousand men to the navy, and sixty thousand to the army. Ample preparations in other respects were made for the approaching operations; and, amongst the extraordinary measures resorted to, arrangements were made for augmenting the Militia, and raising voluntary subscriptions for the maintenance of the war. The spirit of the country was awakened to the defence of those const.i.tutional principles which presented the surest safeguard for the public liberties; and the delusions which at first had seized upon the factious and discontented rapidly vanished as the war advanced. Success alone was wanted to confirm the confidence of the people; but as yet the genius and headlong valour of France was in the ascendant, and the solid endurance of England was doomed to a long and hara.s.sing term of fluctuating fortunes.

The Correspondence traces some of the princ.i.p.al events of the year; and maps out in advance the plans and difficulties of Ministers, by which we are admitted, so to speak, to the deliberations of the Cabinet upon nearly every fresh exigency that arose in the course of the campaigns.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Charles Street, Jan. 1st, 1794.

MY DEAR BROTHER,

I had no sooner received your letter, than I communicated it to Lord Grenville; and desired him to write to you as soon as he could. It gives me great pain to see, by the language of it, how very much your mind is oppressed and disturbed in the impression under which you write. Of the proposition which you suggest, it certainly does not in any shape become me to offer any opinion; I am precluded from doing so, both by the magnitude of the question, and by its being of a nature upon which I cannot have either the pretence or the means of exercising any judgment; and I so expressed myself to Lord Grenville, when I read your letter to him; all that, on my part, can be for me to do is, what I am sure you will believe is the honest feeling of my mind, to express to you the anxious and earnest wish of my heart, that all disquietude and uneasiness may vanish from your mind; and that you may heartily and happily continue to co-operate with Lord Grenville and Pitt, at a time when the greatest interests which this country ever knew seem to me to be at stake. For myself, you know that I am but a private man, and have no other concern in these great public questions, than that sense of common danger and common interest, which ought, I think, to produce but one common voice in the country. Mr. Wilberforce, you see, thinks otherwise, but does not change my opinion by having changed his.

I am much obliged to you for the naval letter, which the post of to-day brings me from Stowe; I will make the use of it which you allow me to do, and will then return it to you. I hope Dr. Pegge will find Lady B. better. I take for granted we shall soon meet here.

I hear no news.

G.o.d bless you, my dear brother.

P.S.--As soon as I heard from you to-day (which was very late, as I had gone out before the post came in), I sent to Lord G., to tell him that if he wrote to-day, he must direct to Stowe.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Jan. 30th, 1794.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I believe Pitt's budget is finished, as it is to be opened on Wednesday. I have, however, sent him your project; though I do not conceive favourably of it, as the object appears so small, and such a nest of hornets to be brought upon one by it.

The French seem certainly disposed to try their scheme of invasion.

This leads to the necessity of some augmentation of interior force, and possibly some of our last year's plans will be resorted to. Our best defence is unquestionably our water-guard, which is very strong, and will, I trust, every day get stronger. In the meantime, Lord Moira's force stationed at Cowes, and with its transports ready to put to sea at the shortest notice, is no inconsiderable check upon them.

I have no faith in their attacking Flanders; but rather believe they will wait our attack. But two Dutch, and as many Flanders mails are due.

Mack returns to the army to the great joy of every one. We expect him over here every day.

Ever my dear brother's Most affectionately, G.

The Budget was brought forward by Mr. Pitt on the 2nd of February. It estimated the total supply for the year at twenty millions; and proposed for the ways and means a loan of eleven millions, and the imposition of some new taxes.

Here was the first great pressure of the war on the industry of the people. It was a trying moment with Government; but the demands of the Minister were, nevertheless, heartily responded to. The interior force of the kingdom at this time amounted to one hundred and forty thousand men; and the foreign troops in British pay to forty thousand more. The augmentation of the Militia, which was not carried into effect till the following month, was now occupying the consideration of Government.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Feb. 1st, 1794.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

The idea of augmentation which I think most practicable, is that of militia cavalry, to be raised by volunteers, in the same manner as the additional companies in the last war, but to a much larger extent than you mention in your letter. Dundas told me two days since that he had been looking for your plan of last year, but had mislaid it. Have you a copy? It does not seem advisable to broach this idea much in conversation or discussion with Lord-Lieutenants and Colonels till it is to a degree matured; for the St. Albans'

meeting, though very good for supporting a measure resolved upon, or even for arranging particular details of a plan, of which the outlines are already fixed, is but a bad place to prepare the plan itself. As far as I am capable of judging, I think that the natural defence of this country against an enemy once landed, is by the immense irregular cavalry that might be collected, and formed round small bodies of disciplined horse. This, of course, does not exclude the necessity of some infantry to oppose the enemy in front, while the cavalry hara.s.s his flanks and rear, and while your naval force, even supposing it unable to have prevented the landing, cuts off all possibility of supplies from France. We are preparing, partly with the latter view, and partly as a means of defence where frigates cannot act, a formidable force of gun-boats.

You say that all this is superfluous, and that the attempt will not be made. I think its being made or not depends wholly on the other employment which we can find for their force, and this depends on points which we cannot command; viz.: internal commotion, and the exertions of the German Powers on the side of the Rhine.

That they are making preparations with a view to having the thing in their power is unquestionable, and we should be very deficient in our duty if we did not put the country in a state to be prepared for all events.

The employment of Lord Moira's force, and its future destination, depend on plans of continental operations, but in the meantime its effect is almost beyond calculation in its present position, menacing everything from Dunkirk to Brest, and defending everything from Yarmouth to the Land's End. You will see this in a minute, if you compare the facility of moving that force, either by land or sea, with the efforts of the same sort that the enemy can make, either offensively or defensively.

We cannot have too much force anywhere, but if I am not very sanguine, Sir C. Grey has already a force beyond what the service requires; and it is likely that he will still be reinforced without breaking up Lord Moira's army, which I consider as the most usefully employed, and telling the most effectually against the enemy of any troops now in our service.

I will send your artillery plan to Dundas.

Ever most affectionately yours, G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, July 9th, 1794.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I am sincerely sorry to see that you do not entertain the same hopes as I do of good from the new arrangements. I confess I think it so great an object to have annihilated all distinction of parties in this country among those who are attached to the present order of things; and I feel that the late events abroad have given so much more importance to this point, with a view to the internal situation of this country, than it had before, that I cannot help feeling very sanguine as to the consequences of the steps now taken with that view. G.o.d only knows which of us is right, and time only can show. In the meantime, _jacta est alea_, and we must abide by it.

On the subject of war and peace, you state very truly, that nothing is less probable than that peace should now be in our option. The retreat to Antwerp has been decided, not by opinions here, nor even by those of the Duke of York and Lord Cornwallis, but by the necessity consequent upon the Austrian movements. Whether those movements were right, I am not enough of a soldier, nor enough informed as a statesman, to pretend to form an opinion. The immediate effect of them is not necessarily the abandoning the towns taken last year, which are in a state to maintain themselves long, and to impede many of the operations of the enemy. Nor, as long as the Austrians maintain their line from Louvain to Namur, is the possibility of succouring them considered as desperate. What I most fear in the present moment is the effect of despondency here and abroad, without which I should see no reason why we should not, as you suggest, fight the country over and over again, inch by inch, with means and resources for carrying on the war, such as are out of all comparison superior to those of the enemy. It would have been a flattering and glorious thing, and a brilliant success, to have terminated the war by the favourable result of a plan of offensive operation in Flanders. If that has failed, I am very far from thinking this a reason for abandoning a cause in the issue of which I consider our existence as implicated. If we listen to the ideas of peace in the present moment (even supposing it were offered), it can be only because we confess ourselves unable to carry on the war. Such a confession affords but a bad security against the events which must follow, in Flanders, in Holland, and (by a very rapid succession) in this island.