Memoirs, Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette Part 49

_August_.--The Americans refusing to descend in front of Portsmouth, a portion of the English army embarks and proceeds by water to Yorktown and Gloucester. General Lafayette takes a position at the Fork of Pamunkey and Mattapony River, having a detached corps upon both sides of York River. The Pennsylvanians and some new levies receive orders to remain on James River, and think them selves intended for Carolina. An a.s.sembly of militia on Moratie or Roanoke River; the fords and roads south of James River destroyed on various pretence; movements to occupy the attention of the enemy. As in the event prepared by Lafayette, the means of escape would remain to the garrison of Portsmouth, Lafayette threatened that point. General O'Hara thinks he ought to nail up thirty pieces of cannon, and join the largest part of the army. The whole was scarcely united, when the Count de Gra.s.se appears at the entrance of Chesapeak Bay. General Wayne crosses the river, and places himself in such a manner as to arrest the enemy's march, if he should attempt to retreat towards Carolina. The French admiral is waited for at Cape Henry by an aide-de-camp of Lafayette, to report to him the respective situations of the land troops, and ask him to make the necessary movements to cut off all retreat to the enemy. He anchors at Cape Henry, sends three vessels to York River, and fills James River with frigates; the Marquis de Saint Simon, with three thousand men, lands at James Island or Jamestown.

_September_.--The river thus defended, General Wayne receives the order to cross it; the Marquis de Lafayette marches upon Williamsburg, and a.s.sembles together, in a good position, the combined troops, to the number of seven thousand three hundred men. He had left one thousand rive hundred militia in the county of Gloucester, and sends to hasten some troops coming from the north. This station, which closes all retreat to Lord Cornwallis, (our advance posts nine miles from York,) is retained from the 4th to the 28th of September. Lord Cornwallis reconnoitres the position of Lafayette, and despairs of forcing it.

The 6th September, the Count de Gra.s.se, quitting the defended rivers, goes out with the remainder of his fleet, pursues Admiral Hood, who had presented himself, beats him, and sinks the _Terror_; he takes the _Iris_ and _Richmond_ frigates; the 13th, he joins, in the bay, the squadron of M. de Barras, which had sailed from Rhode Island, with eight hundred men and the French artillery: the fleet of the Count de Gra.s.se consists, at this period, of thirty eight ships of the line.

Admiral de Gra.s.se and General Saint Simon, commanders of the French under Lafayette, urge him to attack Lord Cornwallis and offer him a reinforcement from the ship garrisons. He prefers acting on more secure grounds, and waiting for the troops from the north. General Washington succeeded in reality, in completely deceiving General Clinton as to his intentions; he was advancing towards Virginia with an American detachment, and the army of the Count de Rochambeau embarked at the head of the Chesapeak; they proceeded upon transports, to Williamsburg.

The 28th, they march upon New York, and the combined army commences investing it; the 29th, reconnoitring the place; the 30th, the enemy evacuates the advance posts, and retires into the works of York.

_October_.--The 1st, a new reconnoitre; the 3rd, a skirmish between the legion of the Duke of Lauzun and that of Tarleton, in which the former gained the advantage. That legion and eight hundred men from the ships under M. de Choisy, had joined the militia at Gloucester. The night of the 6th, the trenches were opened; that of the 11th, the second parallel. The night of the 14th, the redoubts of the enemy's left were taken, sword in hand, the one by the grenadiers and French light hors.e.m.e.n, the other by the light infantrymen of the Americans. The first directed by the Baron de Viomenil, a field-marshal; the 2nd by the Marquis de Lafayette. The morning of the 17th, Lord Cornwallis asked to capitulate; that same evening the firing ceased. The English Army, reduced to eight thousand men, comprising 900 militia gave themselves as prisoners of war.

APPENDIX II.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Havre, 18th July, 1779.

SIR,--You ask me for some ideas respecting an expedition to America. As it is not a fixed plan which you require, nor a memorial addressed in form to the ministry, it will be the more easy to comply with your wishes.

The state of America, and the new measures which the British appear to be adopting, render this expedition more than ever necessary. Deserted coasts, ruined ports, commerce checked, fortified posts whence expeditions are sent, all seem to call for our a.s.sistance, both by sea and land. The smallest effort made now, would have more effect on the people than a great diversion at a more distant period; but besides the grat.i.tude of the Americans, and particularly of the oppressed states, a body of troops would insure us a great superiority on that continent.

In short, sir, without entering into tedious details, you know that my opinions on this point have never varied, and my knowledge of this country convinces me, that such an expedition, if well conducted, would not only succeed in America, but would be of very essential service to our own country.

Besides the advantage of gaining the affection of the Americans, and that of concluding a good peace, France should seek to curtail the means of approaching vengeance. On this account it is extremely important to take Halifax; but as we should require foreign aid, this enterprise must be preceded by services rendered to different parts of the continent; we should then receive a.s.sistance, and, under pretext of invading Canada, we should endeavour to seize Halifax, the magazine and bulwark of the British navy in the new world.

Well aware that a proposition on a large scale would not be acceded to, I will diminish, as much as possible, the necessary number of troops.

I will say four thousand men, a thousand of them to be grenadiers and cha.s.seurs; to whom I will add two hundred dragoons and one hundred hussars, with the requisite artillery. The infantry should be divided into full battalions, commanded by lieutenant-colonels. If commissions of higher rank should be desired for the older officers, you are aware that the minister of marine has it in his power to bestow such, as when the expedition returns to Europe, will have no value in the land service. We want officers who can deny themselves, live frugally, abstain from all airs, especially a quick, peremptory manner, and who can relinquish, for one year, the pleasures of Paris. Consequently we ought to have few colonels and courtiers, whose habits are in no respect American.

I would ask, then, for four thousand three hundred men, and, as I am not writing to the ministry, allow me, for greater ease in speaking, to suppose myself for a moment the commander of this detachment. You are sufficiently acquainted with my principles to know that I shall not court the choice of the king. Although I have commanded, with some success, a larger body of troops, and I frankly confess I feel myself capable of leading them, yet my intention is not to put forth my own claims; but to answer for the actions of a stranger would be a folly, and as, setting talents apart, it is on the political conduct of the leader, the confidence of the people and of the American army, that half the success must depend, I am obliged, reluctantly, to set forth a character that I know, in order to establish my reasonings upon some basis.

Leaving this digression, I come to the embarkation of these four thousand three hundred men. As the coasts of Normandy and Brittany have been much hara.s.sed, I should propose sailing from the Island of Aix; troops and provisions might be obtained in the vicinity. The ports between Lorient and the channel would furnish transport vessels.~[1]

Lorient has some merchant ships of a pretty large burthen. The caracks of the channel are still larger, and these vessels have, moreover, guns of large calibre, which may be of use, either in battle, or in silencing batteries onsh.o.r.e; besides, they might be ready in a very short time. I would embark the soldiers, a man to every two tons, and would admit the dragoons, with their cavalry equipage only. There are many details I would give if the project be decided upon, but would be superfluous to mention here. After the experience of Count d'Estaing, who found himself straitened with biscuit for four months, and flour for two, I would take the latter, adding biscuit for six months, which would make in all eight months' provision for the marine and the troops. As to our escort, that must be decided upon by the marine; but our transports being armed vessels, three ships of the line, one of fifty guns for the rivers, three frigates and two cutters, would appear to me to be more than sufficient. As the expedition is especially a naval one, the commander of the squadron should be a man of superior abilities; his character, his patriotism, are important points. I have never seen M. de Guichen, but the reports I have heard of his worth and modesty prepossess me strongly in his favour. Being then at the Island of Aix with our detachment, and the squadron that is to transport it, the next question is how to act, and our movements must depend entirely upon circ.u.mstances. According to the first project, we were to sail by the first of September, and by the second to remain here until the last of January;~[2] it might, however, be possible to sail in October. This even appears to me better than remaining until the close of January; but the different operations are included in the other plan. The enemy's fleet is to be reinforced, and, as we are a.s.sured that four or five weeks' preparation will be sufficient for the transports and the troops, there is nothing unreasonable in forming our projects for this autumn, and even for the month of September.

The advantages of commencing our operations in that month would be, first, to deprive the enemy of Rhode Island; secure to ourselves, till spring, a fine island and harbour, and have it in our power to open the campaign when we please. Secondly, to establish our superiority in America before the winter negotiations. Thirdly, if peace should be desired, to place an important post in our side of the balance.

Fourthly, in case the enemy should have extended their forces over any one of the states, to drive them away with the more ease, as we should take them by surprise.

A few days before our departure, and not sooner (to prevent the consequences of an indiscretion), three corvettes should be despatched to America, with letters to M. de Luzerne, to congress, and to General Washington. We might write that the king, desiring to serve his allies, and agreeably to the requests of Dr. Franklin, intends sending some vessels to America, and, with them, a body of land forces; and that, if congress is in want of their a.s.sistance, they will willingly lend their aid to General Washington, but otherwise they will proceed to the Islands: This form will be perfectly appropriate. On any part, I would write, in my capacity of an American officer, more detailed letters to congress, and to General Washington. To the latter I would say, confidentially, that we have almost a _carte blanche_, and unfold my plans, and request him to make the necessary preparations. It should be reported at our departure that we are destined as a garrison to one of the Antilles, while the troops of these islands act on the offensive, and that, in the summer, we shall be ordered to attempt a revolution in Canada.

The squadron sailing before the 10th of September, would arrive at Sandy Hook, off the coast of Jersey, early in November, one of the finest months of the year in independent America. Our fleet would then seem to threaten New York, and we should find, on our arrival, pilots for different destinations, and the necessary signals and counter signs.~[3]

If Rhode Island should be the proper point of attack, of which I have no doubt, we would steer southward towards evening, and, putting about during the night, land at Block Island, and lay siege to Newport.

There are some continental troops, who might reach Bristol in a day.

There are militia at Tivertown, who might also be mustered. Greenwich having also a body of troops, must have flat-bottomed boats; those at Sledge Ferry would be sent down. All these we should find on the spot.

To escape the inconveniences experienced the last year, the naval commander should send, without a moment's delay, two frigates, to occupy the eastern channel, and force the middle one, a thing of trifling danger. The vessels found there should be destroyed; and as the enemy usually leave at Conanicut Island a body of from six to fifteen hundred men, we might easily seize it, and make our land rendezvous there. If the wind should be favourable, the vessels might return the same night, or the end of the squadron might join them; all these manoeuvres, however, will depend on circ.u.mstances. Thus much is certain, that the same wind which brings us to land will enable us to make ourselves masters of the eastern channel, so as to a.s.sist the Americans at Bristol and Tivertown, and, if possible, to secure the middle channel; at all events, however, it is easy to effect a landing in the manner I describe.~[4]

Newport is strongly fortified on the side towards the land, but all the sh.o.r.e that is behind the town offers great facilities for landing; it is, besides, too extensive to admit of being defended by batteries.

There the French troops might easily disembark, and, reaching at day-break the heights which command the town and the enemy's lines, might seize their outworks and storm all before there, protected, if necessary, by the fire of the ships. The enemy, scattered and confounded by these false attacks on both sides of the island, would suppose that the system of the past year was re-adopted. The bolder this manoeuvre appears, the more confident we may be of its success.

You are aware, moreover, that in war all depends on the moment; the details of the attack would be quickly decided on the spot. I need only say here, that my thorough knowledge of the island leads me to think that, with the above mentioned number of troops, and a very slender co-operation on the part of America, I might pledge myself to gain possession of the island in a few days.~[5]

As soon as we are in possession of the island, we must write to the state of Rhode Island, offering to resign the place to the national troops. Unless the state should prefer waiting for the opinion of General Washington, our offer would be accepted, and we should be invited to establish ourselves there during the winter. The batteries upon Goat Island, Brenton's Point and Conanicut Island, would render the pa.s.sage of the harbour the more secure to us, particularly with the aid of our vessels, as the British are not strong enough to attack us there, and would never attempt it in an unfavourable season. We should be supported by the country, and although it is said to be difficult to procure provisions, I should endeavour to preserve our naval stores, and should obtain more resources than the American army itself.

The same letter that announces to congress our success in Rhode Island, of which, as far as calculations may be relied on, there is little doubt, should also mention our proposed voyage to the West Indies, and inquire whether, our a.s.sistance is further needed. Their reply would open to new fields of service, and, with their consent, we would leave the sick in a hospital at Greenwich, and the batteries manned by the militia, and proceed to Virginia. It might be hoped, without presumption, that James River Point, if still occupied, would yield to the united efforts of our troops and those of the Virginians. The bay of Chesapeak would then be free, and that state might bend its whole force against its western frontiers.~[6]

It is impossible to estimate here the posts which the British occupy in America. Georgia and Carolina appear to need our a.s.sistance, and the precise operation against Rhode Island must be decided on the spot; but to give a general idea, it is sufficient to say that the months of December and January should be employed at the south. As the English are obliged to station some of their vessels, frigates, merchant ships, or transports, in each of their ports, they would amount in the whole to a considerable loss.

In the month of February we would return to Newport, where we might employ ourselves in interchanges with New York; and the French sailors, exchanged for soldiers, might be sent under a flag of truce to M.

d'Orvillers. Political interests might be treated of with congress, and the commander of the detachment go to Philadelphia to make arrangements with the minister plenipotentiary for the next campaign, and to lay some proposals before congress and General Washington. I should propose sending for deputies from the different savage nations, making them presents, endeavouring to gain them over from the side of the English, and to revive in their hearts that ancient love of the French nation which, at some future day, it may be important for us to possess.

It is needless to say here, that if we should wait until the month of October, the season would be too far advanced to think of Rhode Island, but the southern operations would be equally practicable, and their success more certain, as we should take the enemy by surprise.

In that case, instead of proceeding to Newport, we should winter at Boston, where we should be well received, and provided with every accommodation. We could open the campaign when we pleased, and might make preparations beforehand for a great expedition against Rhode Island, procuring, at the same time, from the inhabitants of the ports of the north of Boston, and especially that of Marble Head, all the information they may have acquired about Halifax.

But let us suppose ourselves established at Newport. The campaign opens by the close of April, and the British will be in no haste to quit New York. The fear of leaving himself unprotected on our side will prevent his executing any design against the forts on the North River. It may even be in our power to a.s.sist General Washington in making an attack on New York. Count d'Estaing, before his departure, thought that he had discovered the possibility of a pa.s.sage through the Sound. This question I leave to naval officers; but, without being one myself, I know that Long Island might be captured, the troops driven off, and, whilst General Washington made a diversion on his side, batteries might be erected that would greatly annoy the garrison of New York. At all events, preparations should be made to act against Halifax in the month of June. With the claims which the other expedition would give us, I will pledge myself that we should be a.s.sisted in this by the Americans.

I could find at Boston, and in the northern parts, trust-worthy persons who could go to Halifax for us, and procure all the necessary information; the town of Marble Head, in particular, would furnish us with excellent pilots. The inhabitants of the north of New Hampshire and Cascobay should be a.s.sembled under the command of their general, Stark, who gained the victory at Bennington, ready to march, if circ.u.mstances require it, by the route of Annapolis. The country is said to be inhabited by subjects ill affected to British government; ~[7] some of them have entered into a correspondence with the Americans, and have given a.s.surances that they will form a party in our favour.

With regard to ourselves, I suppose that we sail the 1st of June, and that we are accompanied by some continental frigates, and such private vessels as might be collected in Boston. Congress would undoubtedly furnish us with as many troops as we should require, and those very brigades which lately belonged to my division, and whose sole object at present is to keep the enemy at Rhode Island in check, having no longer any employment, would be able to join us without impairing the main army. They would come the more willingly, as the greater part of the regiments belonging to the northern part of New England would be averse to crossing the Hudson River, and would prefer a service more advantageous to their own country.~[8] We should find at Boston cannon and mortars. Others, if necessary, might be sent from Springfield, and the corps of American artillery is tolerably good.

The enemy would suspect our designs the less, as their ideas run wholly upon an invasion of Canada; the movements of the militia in the north would be considered as a plan for uniting with us at Sorel, near the River St. Francis, as we ascended the St. Lawrence: this opinion, which, with a little address, might be strengthened, would awaken apprehensions and excite disturbances at Quebec;~[9] and if a vessel of war should by chance be at Halifax ready for sea, they would probably despatch it to the threatened colony.

I have never seen the town of Halifax, but those persons who, before the war, were in the English service, and had spent most of the time in garrison, inform me that the great point is, to force to the right and left the pa.s.sage of George's Island, and that a landing might be effected without difficulty, either on the side towards the eastern battery, in order to seize that battery and Fort Sackville, or, which appears to be a shorter way, on the side towards the town. The northern suburb, where the magazines are, is but slightly defended. The basin, where vessels are repaired, might also be secured. Several officers, worthy of confidence, have a.s.sured me, that Halifax is built in the form as of an amphitheatre; that all the houses might be cannonaded by the vessels that had forced the pa.s.sage, and in that case, the town would compel the garrison to surrender. As the troops might destroy all the works on the sh.o.r.e, and the vessels of war easily carry the batteries on the islands, I am well persuaded, and the accounts of all who have been there convince me still more, that Halifax would be unable to withstand the united power of our forces and those of America.~[10]

The idea of a revolution in Canada is gratifying to all good Frenchmen; and if political considerations condemn it, you will perceive that this is to be done only by suppressing every impulse of feeling. The advantages and disadvantages of this scheme demand a full discussion, into which I will not at present enter. Is it better to leave in the neighbourhood of the Americans an English colony, the constant source of fear and jealousy, or to free our oppressed brethren, recover the fur trade, our intercourse with the Indians, and the profit of our ancient establishments, with out the expenses and losses formerly attending them? Shall we throw into the balance of the new world a fourteenth state, which would be always attached to us, and which, by its situation, would give us a superiority in the troubles that may, at some future day, agitate America? Opinions are very much divided on this topic. I know yours, and my own is not unknown to you; I do not, therefore, dwell on it, and consider it in no other light than as a means of deceiving and embarra.s.sing the enemy. If, however, it should at any time be brought under consideration, it would be necessary to prepare the people beforehand; and the knowledge which I was obliged to obtain when a whole army was about to enter that country has enabled me to form some idea of the means of succeeding there But to return to Nova Scotia: part of the American troops, who will accompany us, and such of the inhabitants as take up arms in our favour, might be left there as a garrison. It would be easy to destroy or take possession of the English establishments on the banks of Newfoundland, and after this movement we should direct our course according to circ.u.mstances. Supposing that we could return to Boston or Rhode Island during the month of September, and that New York had not yet been taken, we might still be enabled to a.s.sist General Washington. Otherwise St. Augustine, the Bermudas, or some other favourable points of attack, might engage our attention; on the other hand, if we should be ordered home, we might reach France in three weeks or a month from the banks of Newfoundland, and alarm the coasts of Ireland on our way.

If the September plan, which combines all advantages, appears too near at hand, if it were decided even not to send us in October, it would be necessary to delay our departure until the end of January. In this case, as in the former, we should be preceded fifteen days only by corvettes; we should pa.s.s the month of April in the south, attack Rhode Island to May, and arrive at Halifax the last of June. But you are aware that the autumn is, on many accounts, the most favourable time for our departure; at all events, you will not accuse me of favouring this opinion from interested motives, as a winter at Boston or Newport is far from equivalent to one spent at Paris.~[11]

These views, in obedience to your request, I have the honour to submit to your judgment; I do not affect to give them the form of a regular plan, but you will weigh the different schemes according to circ.u.mstances. I trust that you will receive these remarks with the greater indulgence, as my American papers, those respecting Halifax excepted, are at Paris, and, consequently, almost all my references are made from memory; beside, I did not wish to annoy you with details too long for a letter, and if you are desirous to converse more freely on the subject, the impossibility of leaving the port of Havre, at present, will allow me time to spend three days at Versailles.

I am thoroughly convinced, and I cannot, without violating my conscience, forbear repeating, that it is highly important for us to send a body to America. If the United States should object to it, I think it is our duty to remove their objections, and even to suggest reasons for it. But on this head you will be antic.i.p.ated, and Dr.

Franklin is only waiting a favorable occasion to make the propositions.

Even if the operations of the present campaign, with the efforts of Count d'Estaing or some other fortunate accident should have given affairs a favorable turn, there will be a sufficient field for us, and one alone of the, proposed advantages would repay the trouble of sending the detachment.

A very important point, and one on which I feel obliged to lay the greatest stress, is the necessity of perfect and inviolable secrecy.

It is unnecessary to trust any person, and even the men who are most actively employed in fitting out the detachment and the vessel need not be informed of the precise intentions of government. At farthest, the secret should be confided to the naval commander, and to the leader of the land forces, and not even to them before the last moment.

It will certainly be said that the French will be coldly received in that country, and regarded with a jealous eye in their army. I cannot deny that the Americans are difficult to be dealt with, especially by the Frenchmen; but if I were intrusted with the business, or if the commander chosen by the king, acts with tolerable judgment, I would pledge my life that all difficulties would be avoided, and that the French troops would be cordially received.

For my own part, you know my sentiments, and you will never doubt that my first interest is to serve my country. I hope, for the sake of the public good, that you will send troops to America. I shall be considered too young, I presume, to take the command, but I shall surely be employed. If, in the arrangement of this plan, any one, to whom my sentiments are less known than to yourself, in proposing for me either the command or some inferior commission, should a.s.sign as a reason, that I should thereby be induced to serve my country with more zeal either in council or in action, I took the liberty (putting aside the minister of the king) to request M. de Vergennes to come forward as my friend, and to refuse, in my name, favors bestowed from motives so inconsistent with my character.

I have the honor to be, &c.

LAFAYETTE.

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