Memoirs, Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette Part 28

As you have been pleased to consult me on the choice of an adjutant-general, I will repeat here, my dear general, that though I have a claim upon General Hand, in every other point of view, his zeal, obedience, and love of discipline, have given me a very good opinion of him.

Colonel Smith has been by me wholly employed in that line, and I can a.s.sure you that he will perfectly answer your purpose.

Unless, however, you were to cast your eye on a man who, I think, would suit better than any other in the world. Hamilton is, I confess, the officer whom I should like to see in that station. With equal advantages, his services deserve from you the preference to any other.

His knowledge of your opinions and intentions on military arrangements, his love of discipline, the superiority he would have over all the others, princ.i.p.ally when both armies shall operate together, and his uncommon abilities, are calculated to render him perfectly agreeable to you. His utility would be increased by this preferment; and on other points he could render important services. An adjutant-general ought always to be with the commander-in-chief. Hamilton should, therefore, remain in your family, and his great industry in business would render him perfectly serviceable in all circ.u.mstances. On every public or private account, my dear general, I would advise you to take him.

I shall, on my arrival at Philadelphia, write you how those matters are going, upon which I build my private schemes. But I heartily wish that some account or other from Europe may enable you to act this winter on maritime operations. I hate the idea of being from you for so long a time; but I think I ought not to stay idle. At all events, I must return when your army takes the field.

I flatter myself with the hope of meeting Mrs. Washington on the road.

Adieu, my dear general, most affectionately and respectfully yours.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.~[1]

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, December 5th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--By my letter of yesterday I have mentioned to you that a Spanish expedition was intended against St. Augustine. They mean to set out at the end of December, which will certainly delay them till the middle of January. It consists of twelve ships of the line, some frigates, bomb ketches, and a large number of troops. I have advised the minister to communicate officially to you this intelligence, and also to Count de Rochambeau, that proper means, if convenient, may be taken to improve it.

For my part, my dear general, I have conducted myself agreeably to what you said to me in our last conversations, that if, in the course of the winter, a naval superiority was obtained, our business should be to push for the southward, and that you would take for that purpose four thousand French and two thousand Americans. Nothing against New York can be undertaken before the end of May. Anything, therefore, that could employ us during February, March, and April, is worthy of our attention.

The confederacy was going to sail for some clothing which we have in the West Indies. No time was left to wait for an answer from you. I knew perfectly your sense of this affair. I therefore, with the advice of Chevalier de la Luzerne, wrote him a letter dated from Camp, wherein I explained to him that something might be done in conjunction for the public good. My opinion is strengthened by your sentiments on this matter, without, however, bringing myself, and still less yourself, to make any formal application to the Spanish generals.

Inclosed you will find a copy of this letter, the first part of which mentions that if, after having landed their troops in Florida, they would send their ships of the line for us, we might, at three weeks notice before the departure of the squadron, have in readiness six thousand men for a powerful diversion in Carolina. Their own interest is the only thing I seem to consider in this business, and I endeavour to invite Spanish caution in this measure; but, unless a more particular application is made, I do not believe that this part of my letter will have any effect.

The second part will, I hope, be productive of some good for America.

I urge the necessity immediately to open a correspondence with General Greene that he may, by his manoeuvres, facilitate the operation of Spain. I tell them, that unless they land a corps of troops on the boundaries of Georgia, with a view at least to threaten Augusta and Savannah, their expedition will run a great risk. I advise the measure of cruizing off Charleston Harbour, the whole under the idea of their own interest.

I have also written to the naval French commander in the West Indies, advising him to succour Chevalier de Ternay, which I know he will not do. But I take this opportunity of condemning their foolish neglect, in not appearing on our coasts when they return to Europe; and I do also advise that, in their cruizes from St. Domingo, they may sometimes appear off Savannah and Charlestown Harbour. Inclosed you will find a copy of this letter.

Though I always speak of the beginning of February, it is, however, certain, that any time in February would be convenient to go to the southward. March and April are more than sufficient for the taking of Charlestown; and in all cases, I know, from our last conversations, that you wish for a naval superiority this winter, in order to succour the southern states.

I had this morning, my dear general, a long conversation with the Chevalier de la Luzerne, relating to a southern operation. He is, as well as myself, clearly of opinion, that unless a formal application and a plan of campaign be proposed to them, they will not send their ships to us. In this last case their coming ought still to be questioned.

But if you thought it better to try, you might propose to the French generals to send a frigate there, and see, with them, what might be done in conjunction. Suppose they were to take four thousand men, leaving some, and the militia, at Rhode Island. We could on our part muster two thousand Americans. However, the Spaniards are so positive and strict in following literally their instructions that I do not believe anything will engage them to come. But my letter, which I look upon as a mere cipher on the first proposition, will, I hope, engage, them to impart their projects to General Greene, and of course this diversion will become useful to us.

Suppose Count de Rochambeau and Chevalier de Ternay were to send to Havanna a copy of your letter, I think they ought to intrust it to Viscount de Noailles, who will soon return to Rhode Island, and whose name is highly respected by the court of Spain for many particular reasons, too long to be mentioned here.

I have seen Mr. Ross, and find that very little clothing is to be for the present expected. They have some arms on board the _Alliance_, and, I think, a hundred bales of cloth on board a vessel under Jones's convoy. The remainder will come with the _Serapis_. Unless the storm has forced Jones to put in some French harbour, he may be expected every minute.

The a.s.sembly of Pennsylvania have before them the affair of the recruits; but proper arrangements are not properly supported. They are fond of voluntary enlistments. I have an appointment for to-morrow with General Mifflin, where I will debate this matter with him.

To-morrow, my dear general, I will go to Brandywine with Chevalier de Chastellux, and also to Red Bank, Fort Mifflin, &c. On my return I hope to find news from France, and I will write you my determination about my going to the southward.

Inclosed you will find a newspaper, wherein congress have printed a letter from General Gates, relating to a new success of Sumpter.

Congress have lately received letters from Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams, but nothing very particular. They have more fully written by other opportunities that are expected. Portugal has entered into the convention of neutrality, and with such conditions as to shew their partiality to our side of the question.

Adieu, my dear general, most respectfully and affectionately.

Footnote:

1. The winter, according to custom, causing the dispersion of the army, M. de Lafayette repaired to Philadelphia to be nearer arrivals and intelligence from Europe. It was there he first conceived the project of going to serve in the south under General Greene, who was to make a winter campaign. As regards the project of making a division in Florida, with the co-operation of the Spaniards, he seconded it with ardour, and to General Washington, M. de la Luzerne, and the Spanish commanders, he wrote long letters on the subject, which have but little interest, owing to the project not having been attended with any important result: those letters have been omitted.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

New Windsor, 14th December, 1780.

My dear Marquis,--Soon after despatching my last letter to you, your favour dated at Paramus was put into my hands by Colonel Gouvion. The Chevalier de la Luzerne's despatches came in time for the post, which is the only means left me for the conveyance of letters; there not being so much money in the hands of the quartermaster-general (I believe I might go further, and say in those of the whole army,) as would bear the expense of an express to Rhode Island. I could not get one the other day to ride so far as Compton.

I am now writing to the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay, on the subject of your several letters. When their answer arrives, I will communicate the contents to you. You must be convinced, from what pa.s.sed at the interview at Hartford, that my command of the French troops at Rhode Island stands upon a very limited scale, and that it would be impolitic and fruitless in me to propose any measures of co-operation to a third power, without their concurrence; consequently an application from you, antecedently to an official proposition from the minister of France, the gentlemen at the head of the French armament at Rhode Island, congress, or myself, could only be considered as coming from a private gentleman; it is, therefore, my advice to you to postpone your correspondence with the Spanish generals, and let your influence come in hereafter, as auxiliary to something more formal and official.

I do not hesitate to give it clearly as my opinion to you, (but this opinion and this business should be concealed behind a curtain,) that the favourable moment of the Spanish operations in the Floridas ought to be improved to the utmost extent of our means, provided the Spaniards, by a junction of their maritime force with that of his most Christian Majesty, under the command of the Chevalier de Ternay, will give us a secure convoy, and engage not to leave us until the operations shall be at an end, or it can be done by consent of parties.

I am very thankful to the minister for permitting, and to you for communicating to General Greene, intelligence of the Spanish movement towards the Floridas. It may have a happy influence on his measures, and it may be equally advantageous to the Spaniards. Your expressions of personal attachment and affection to me are flattering and pleasing, and fill me with grat.i.tude. It is unnecessary, I trust, on my part, to give you a.s.surances of mutual regard, because I hope you are convinced in your own choice to go to the southern army or to stay with this, circ.u.mstances and inclination alone must govern you. It would add to my pleasure if I could encourage your hope of Colonel Nevill's exchange.

I refused to interest myself in the exchange of my own aide. General Lincoln's were exchanged with himself, and upon that occasion, for I know of no other, congress pa.s.sed a resolution, prohibiting exchanges out of the order of captivity.

Under one general head, I shall express my concern for your disappointment of letters, our disappointment of clothes, and disappointment in the mode of raising men; but I shall congratulate you on the late change of the administration of France,~[1] as it seems to be consonant to your wishes, and to encourage hope. I am much pleased at the friendly disposition of Portugal. Much good, I hope, will result from the combination of the maritime powers. I am in very confined quarters; little better than those at Valley Forge, but such as they are I shall welcome into them your friends on their return to Rhode Island.

I am, &c.

Footnote:

1. Footnote 1: The Marquis de Castries had succeeded, as minister of the navy, to M. de Sartine. This change gave rise to the hope that France would send the promised succours, and that expectation induced M. de Lafayette to renounce his journey to the south.

TO M. DE VERGENNES.~[1]

New Windsor, on the North River, Jan. 30th, 1781.

The letters which I had the honour of writing to you, sir, and which were dated the 20th May, 19th July, 4th and 16th December, have, I hope, reached you safely. Since the arrival of the squadron, your despatch of the 3rd of June is the only one I have received. The Chevalier de la Luzerne has only received one letter of the same month, and none have yet reached the officers of the army and squadron.

The first copy of this letter will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, aide-de-camp to General Washington, who is charged by congress with a private mission. Permit me to recommend to you this officer as a man who, by his integrity, frankness, and patriotism, must be extremely acceptable to government.

According to the instructions of congress, he will place before you the actual state of our affairs, which demand, I think more than ever, the most serious attention. As to the opinions which I may allow myself to express, sir, they entirely correspond with those I have hitherto expressed, and the very slight alterations observable in them have been occasioned by a change of time, prejudices, and circ.u.mstances.

With a naval inferiority, it is impossible to make war in America. It is that which prevents us from attacking any point that might be carried with two or three thousand men. It is that which reduces us to defensive operations, as dangerous as they are humiliating. The English are conscious of this truth, and all their movements prove how much they desire to retain the empire of the sea. The harbours, the country, and all the resources it offers, appear to invite us to send thither a naval force. If we had possessed but a maritime superiority this spring, much might have been achieved with the army that M. de Rochambeau brought with him, and it would not have been necessary to have awaited the division he announced to us. If M. de Guichen had stopped at Rhode Island, on his way to France, Arbuthnot would have been ruined, and not all Rodney's efforts could have prevented our gaining victories. Since the hour of the arrival of the French, their inferiority has never for one moment ceased, and the English and the Tories have dared to say that France wished to kindle, without extinguishing the flame. This calumny becomes more dangerous at a period when the English detachments are wasting the south; when, under the protection of some frigates, corps of fifteen hundred men are repairing to Virginia, without our being able to get to them. On the whole continent, with the exception of the Islands of Newport, it is physically impossible that we should carry on an offensive war without ships, and even on those Islands the difficulty of transportation, the scarcity of provisions, and many other inconveniences, render all attempts too precarious to enable us to form any settled plan of campaign.

The result, sir, of all this is, that the advantage of the United States being the object of the war, and the progress of the enemy on that continent being the true means of prolonging it, and of rendering it, perhaps, even injurious to us, it becomes, in a political and military point of view, necessary to give us, both by vessels sent from France, and by a great movement in the fleet in the Islands, a decided naval superiority for the next campaign; and also, sir, to give us money enough to place the American forces in a state of activity; fifteen thousand of the regular army, and ten thousand, or, if we choose it, a still greater number of militia in this part of the country; a southern army, of which I cannot tell precisely the extent, but which will be formed by the five southern states, with all means of supporting in this country such a considerable force. Such, sir, are the resources that you may employ against the common enemy; immense sums of money could not transport resources of equal value from Europe to America, but these, without a succour of money, although established on the very theatre of war, will become useless; and that succour, which was always very important, is now absolutely necessary.

The last campaign took place without a shilling having been spent; all that credit, persuasion, and force could achieve, has been done,--but that can hold out no longer: that miracle, of which I believe no similar example can be found, cannot be renewed, and our exertions having been made to obtain an army for the war, we must depend on you to enable us to make use of it.

From my peculiar situation, sir, and from what it has enabled me to know and see, I think it is my duty to call your attention to the American soldiers and on the part they must take in the operations of the next campaign. The continental troops have as much courage and real discipline as those that are opposed to them. They are more inured to privation, more patient than Europeans, who, on these two points, cannot be compared to them. They have several officers of great merit, without mentioning those who have served during the last wars, and from their own talents have acquired knowledge intuitively; they have been formed by the daily experience of several campaigns, in which, the armies being small, and the country a rugged one, all the battalions of the line were obliged to serve as advance-guards and light troops. The recruits whom we are expecting, and who only bear, in truth, the name of recruits, have frequently fought battles in the same regiments which they are now re-entering, and have seen more gun-shots than three-fourths of the European soldiers. As to the militia, they are only armed peasants, who have occasionally fought, and who are not deficient in ardour and discipline, but whose services would be most useful in the labours of a siege. This, sir, is the faithful picture that I think myself obliged to send you, and which it is not my interest to paint in glowing colours, because it would be more glorious to succeed with slighter means. The Chevalier de la Luzerne, who, having himself seen our soldiers, will give you a detailed and disinterested account of them, will doubtless tell you, as I do, that you may depend upon our regular troops. The result of this digression, sir, is, to insist still more earnestly on the necessity of sending money to put the American troops in movement, and to repeat that well-known truth, that a pecuniary succour and a naval superiority must be the two princ.i.p.al objects of the next campaign.