Memoirs, Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette Part 24

You will find amongst us a great deal of good will, a great deal of sincerity, and above all, a great desire to be agreeable to you.

I send a duplicate of this letter to the Chevalier de Ternay, and I shall send the same to Point Judith and Seaconnet; so that in case you should make land at Rhode Island, you may at once sail for Sandy Hook.

The next letter which I shall have the honour to write to you, will be dated at headquarters. The confidence of General Washington, which M.

de Galvan has deserved, and the means which he has of fulfilling his instructions, all a.s.sure me that you will be satisfied with our choice.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Footnote:

1. The instructions given to M. de Lafayette by the minister of foreign affairs, (5th March, 1780), were, that, to prevent any mistake or delay, he was to place, both on Rhode Island and on Cape Henry (the mouth of the Chesapeake), a French officer, to await the arrival of the French squadron, which was to land at one of those two points, and to give it all the information it might require on its arrival. This letter was consequently given to M. de Galvan, and he repaired to Cape Henry, but vainly expected those frigates: they landed at Rhode Island, they left Brest the 2nd of May, under the orders of the Chevalier de Ternay, and appeared before Newport the 10th of July. This letter was delivered afterwards to M. de Rochambeau, as well as several others, which want of s.p.a.ce and interest do not allow us to insert.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp at Preakness, July 4th, 1780.

You know, my dear general, that I am very anxious to see the army well clothed for this campaign; the importance of such a measure is on every account obvious, and from the knowledge I have of the auxiliary troops that are coming, I can so well demonstrate its necessity that I shall for the present but attend to the means of executing it.

In the s.p.a.ce of six months (we know from experience) the coats of our soldiers begin to be worn out, so that there is no great inconvenience in giving some new clothes to the draftsmen, and after they shall be discharged, the number of the remaining soldiers will not much exceed six or seven thousand men; as those very men will have been completely clothed by the middle of July, I think I make full allowance for them by keeping in store the seven thousand unmade suits that have been shipped by Mr. Ross.

If more are wanted in the course of next summer, I engage to go over to France and bring back ten thousand complete suits properly conveyed.

Excluding wagoners, servants, and all such people who do not want to be uniformly clothed, we may calculate the continental army to consist of fourteen thousand men in the field. There may be found in the army four thousand coats and waistcoats which are not absolutely bad, four thousand stocks or cravats, and one thousand pretty good hats.

We may get from the stores fifteen thousand overalls, ten thousand pairs of shoes, three thousand round hats, and some few shirts.

There are also six or seven hundred coats of every colour, to which may be added about three or four hundred of the same kind, and some indifferent hats found in the army, &c.

A small quant.i.ty of buff and red cloth to be bought for the facings of the Pennsylvanian and Jersey lines.

The four thousand good hats in the stores or in the army to be cut round, or c.o.c.ked in the form of caps, but to be in an uniform manner.

All the articles now in the possession of the clothier-general, to be immediately ordered to North River, and, if necessary, wagons should be pressed for their speedy transportation.

I will write a letter to the Chevalier de Ternay, wherein I will desire him to send to the most convenient place the clothing which has been put under his convoy.

We shall then have ten thousand new coats and waistcoats, and four thousand old ones, the whole of an uniform ground, ten thousand new hats and stocks, and four thousand old ones, five and twenty thousand overalls, more than twenty thousand shirts, and thirty thousand pairs of shoes.

Each soldier enlisted for the war, let them even be ten thousand, shall have, if you choose, a new complete suit, one hat, one stock, two shirts, two pairs of overalls, and two pairs of shoes.

Each draftsman, if he has not the same, will at least receive a decent uniform coat, one stock, one hat, one pair of overalls, and two pairs of shoes; he will not certainly come out but well provided with shirts.

By the above mentioned arrangement, there remain about a thousand coats of every colour, a thousand hats, which are not absolutely bad, and two thousand pairs of shoes; these I propose to give to such men as will not appear under arms in the field, and, if necessary, some hunting-shirts may be added to the said clothing.

The dragoons are generally better clothed than the infantry, and we might very easily complete their coats or stable-jackets, as each different regiment could adopt a different colour.

As soon as the French clothing comes, I wish the whole army to be clothed at once, in observing to give the round hats to some particular brigades, for the sake of uniformity, and to turn up the facings according to the plan agreed.

There will be then no excuse for the officers who, out of neglect, should suffer their men to lose a single article, and the most strict orders may be given for that purpose.

The French arms that are coming might be put in the hands of soldiers enlisted for the war.

I wish that there was a distinction of one woollen epaulette for the corporal, and two for the serjeant.

As to the feathers, (become a distinction of ranks,) I wish such as have been pointed out might be forbidden to other officers, and for the light division I shall beg the leave of wearing a black and red feather, which I have imported for the purpose.

These ideas, my dear general, are not given to you as a great stroke of genius, but I heartily wish something of the kind may be thought proper.

TO MM. LE COMTE DE ROCHAMBEAU, AND LE CHEVALIER DE TERNAY.~[1]

Camp, before Dobb's Ferry, Aug. 9, 1780.

Gentlemen,--I arrived two days ago at head quarters, and in consequence of the mission I was charged with, my first care was to render an account of our conversations; but the most minute details of them are so important, and the fate of America, and the glory of France, depend so completely upon the result of our combinations here, that, in order to feel more certain of having perfectly understood your meaning, I will submit to you a summary of our conversations, and entreat you to write me word immediately whether I have rightly understood your meaning.

Before quitting Rhode Island, gentlemen, I should have taken this precaution, if General Washington's march against New York had not obliged me to join my division, at the very moment when, from our further arrangements, you most required some information.

1st. I have described to you the actual situation of America, the exhausted state in which I found her, and the momentary efforts she had made, which could only have been produced by the hope of being delivered, by one decisive blow, from the tyranny of the English.

I told you those efforts were so enormous, when we consider the state of our finances, and the failure of all our resources, that I do not expect to see them renewed during another campaign. I added that on the 1st of November we should no longer have any militia, that the 1st of January one half of our continental army would be disbanded, and I took the liberty of saying, in my own name, that I thought it necessary, as a political measure, to enter into action this campaign; and this I had ascertained also to be the case, by sounding, on my journey, the wishes of the people.

2nd. I confirmed what I have already had the honour of writing to you respecting the continental troops, and the militia whom we are to have with us. I told you that by counting the enemies in New York at fourteen thousand men, of which ten thousand are regulars, and four thousand very bad militia, I thought their numbers were somewhat exaggerated, and that it was necessary to begin by deducting the sailors employed by Admiral Arbuthnot. As to the fortifications, I said that the American troops would take charge of New York, and that the fort of Brooklyn (upon which you might operate in concert with a division of our troops) is merely an earthen work of four bastions, with a ditch and a shed, containing from a thousand to fifteen hundred men, and having in front another smaller work, which cannot contain more than a hundred men. I added that nothing could prevent a regular approach upon Brooklyn, and that that post is the key of New York.

3rd. I explained to you General Washington's plan, and told you that the moment you began your march, he would repair to Morrisania, where, I again repeat, he would establish batteries that would close the pa.s.sage of h.e.l.l's Gate, and secure the one from the continent to Long Island, so as to have nothing to fear from the enemy's ships. Whilst awaiting your arrival, gentlemen, our army would entrench itself at Morrisania, or, if possible, on the Island of New York, and would place itself in a situation to detach a corps of troops, as soon as you shall have approached us, either by coming by land to Westchester, and pa.s.sing afterwards under favour of our batteries, or by repairing by sea to Wistown, or any other bay in that neighbourhood. General Washington would furnish a sufficient corps of Americans, and fifteen large cannon, to co-operate with your troops, and he believes that with these forces, and united with artillery, the point of Brooklyn might soon be taken, and consequently the town of New York.

4th. I represented to you that Long Island was a rich country, which, even alter the destruction effected by the English, still possesses some resources; that we might feel certain of being joined there by the militia of the island; and, in short, that with the a.s.sistance of our Morrisanian under-batteries, and still more with a battery on the Island of New York, we should a.s.sure the communication between Long Island and the continent. From these various circ.u.mstances, my own private opinion would decidedly be to commence our action, if the fleet could be placed in security, before we possessed any superiority of naval force.

5th. I strongly insisted upon the necessity of taking possession, as soon as possible, of the New York harbour. I requested M. de Ternay to examine that point with the pilots I gave him, and by the immense advantages of that measure I hoped that, either with the aid of land forces on the side of Sandy Hook, or merely by the superiority of his own naval force, he would be enabled to accomplish the object we had feared his attempting when we expected him with Admiral Graves.

6th. When proposing to you to send your magazines to Providence, I told you that Rhode Island was completely useless to the Americans, but very important for the succours arriving from France, in case, however, no army should be necessary to preserve it; that if the English were to commit the fault of taking it, a superior fleet, aided by forces from the continent, would always have the power of retaking it.

7th. I ended by having the honour of telling you, gentlemen, that in order to operate upon New York it would be necessary not to commence later than the first days of September; and, after this explanation, I said that General Washington, feeling the most perfect confidence in you, was very desirous of having your opinion upon the subject, and would only undertake what might appear to you most advantageous.

This, gentlemen, is what I had the honour of saying to you, and this is what you did me the honour to reply to:--

1st. That the succour sent to the United States was anything rather than trifling; that the second division was to set out a short time after you, and, that it might justly be expected every instant; that it would consist at least of two thousand five hundred, and, in all probability, of a still greater number of troops; that it was to be sent by three ships, but that, according to all appearances, a larger number of vessels would be granted; that the only reason which could prevent its arriving before the 1st of September, would be the impossibility of a junction between the French and Spanish fleets, and that, in the latter case, it would arrive, at farthest, by the end of autumn, and would then be a great deal stronger; that M. de Guichen has been apprised of our projects, and has received the order to facilitate them; that, consequently, the Chevalier de Ternay has written to him for the five promised vessels; and that, from all these circ.u.mstances, you hoped to be able to act before the end of the campaign, but did not doubt, at least, having the power of furnishing us with very superior forces for this winter, and for the next campaign.

2nd. The project of attacking Brooklyn was extremely agreeable to you, and appeared to you the most proper measure for the reduction of New York; but you think that we ought to have upon that Island a force at least equal to that which the enemy may offer us, and you added that by leaving a counterfeit at New York, they may fall on the corps of Long Island, with nearly their whole army, which contingency, you will perceive, had been already provided for by Washington's arrangements.

3rd. You appeared to me doubtful whether it would be possible to stop the enemy at the pa.s.sage of Morrisania, but on this point I can give you no decisive information. The idea of repairing by land to Westchester appeared less agreeable to you than that of going by sea into a bay of Long Island. As to the landing, the Count de Rochambeau looks upon it as a very long operation, and, from his own experience on the subject, he believes that it would require nearly three weeks to land an army, with all its accoutrements, for a campaign and siege. You desired to have every possible information concerning Brooklyn, in order to be able to make calculations accordingly for the artillery and engineer service.

You appeared to me to consider a naval superiority as necessary, even at the commencement of the campaign; but it is true that this idea may partly proceed from your doubts relating to the communication concerning Morrisania.

5th. The Chevalier de Ternay conceives it would be difficult to take possession of New York harbour, and hopes to accomplish the same object by the situation in which he has placed his cruisers. He does not think that his seventy-fours can enter, but from the difference of opinion which I ventured to express, as to the importance at least of occupying the harbour, he told me he would again attend to this project. As to his manner of protecting the disembarkation, it would be to cruise in the Sound, and his frigates, and one or two vessels, would enter into the bay at the place where the troops should land.

6th. Rhode Island appears to you a very important point to preserve; but if M. de Ternay should have the superiority, you think, as we do, that it would be unnecessary to leave a garrison there during the attack of New York. The Count de Rochambeau desired me to a.s.sure General Washington that, in every case, upon receiving an order, he would instantly repair to that spot which the commander-in-chief should appoint. I told him, also, that the French generals wished that it were possible to have an interview with him.