Loss Of The Steamship 'Titanic' Part 17

POWERS OF THE BOARD OF TRADE AS REGARDS THE SUPERVISION OF DESIGNS OF VESSELS.

The _t.i.tanic_ was efficiently designed and constructed to meet the contingencies which she was intended to meet.

The bulkheads were of ample strength. They were sufficiently closely s.p.a.ced and were carried up in the vessel to a height greater than sufficient to meet the requirements of the 1891 bulkheads committee.

But I am advised that the ship could have been further subdivided so that she would probably have remained afloat longer than she did. The board of trade have, however, apparently no power to exercise any real supervision in the matter of subdivision. All they have express power to insist upon in this connection with respect to any steam vessel is that there shall be four water-tight bulkheads--a provision quite inadequate for safety in a collision damaging the vessel abaft the collision bulkhead. They can also, if invited by the shipowner (but not otherwise), exercise supervision under rule 12. This supervision, I am told, they have been invited to exercise in only 103 cases over a period of 18 years. In 69 of these cases the board have expressed their satisfaction with the subdivision provided. It seems to me that the board should be empowered to require the production of the designs of all pa.s.senger steamers at an early period of their construction and to direct such alterations as may appear to them to be necessary and practicable for the purpose of securing proper water-tight subdivision.

VII. FINDING OF THE COURT.

It is now convenient to answer the 26 questions submitted by the board of trade.

1. When the _t.i.tanic_ left Queenstown on or about April 11 last: (_a_) What was the total number of persons employed in any capacity on board her, and what were their respective ratings? (_b_) What was the total number of her pa.s.sengers, distinguishing s.e.xes and cla.s.ses, and discriminating between adults and children?

Answer. (_a_) The total number of persons employed in any capacity on board the _t.i.tanic_ was 885.

The respective ratings of these persons were as follows:

Deck department 66 Engine department 325 Victualing department 494 --- 885

N. B.--The eight bandsmen are not included in this number, as their names appear in the second cla.s.s pa.s.senger list.

(_b_) The total number of pa.s.sengers was 1,316. Of these:

------------------+---------+----------+-------- Male. Female. Total.

------------------+---------+----------+-------- First cla.s.s 180 145 325 Second cla.s.s 179 106 285 Third cla.s.s 510 196 706 +-------- 1,316 ------------------+---------+----------+--------

Of the above, 6 children were in the first cla.s.s, 24 in the second cla.s.s and 79 in the third cla.s.s. Total, 109.

2. Before leaving Queenstown on or about April 11 last did the _t.i.tanic_ comply with the requirements of the merchant shipping acts, 1894-1906, and the rules and regulations made thereunder with regard to the safety and otherwise of "pa.s.senger steamers" and "emigrant ships?"

Answer. Yes.

3. In the actual design and construction of the _t.i.tanic_ what special provisions were made for the safety of the vessel and the lives of those on board in the event of collisions and other casualties?

Answer. These have been already described.

4. (_a_) Was the _t.i.tanic_ sufficiently and efficiently officered and manned? (_b_) Were the watches of the officers and crew usual and proper? (_c_) Was the _t.i.tanic_ supplied with proper charts?

Answer. (_a_) Yes. (_b_) Yes. (_c_) Yes.

5. (_a_) What was the number of the boats of any kind on board the _t.i.tanic_? (_b_) Were the arrangements for manning and launching the boats on board the _t.i.tanic_ in case of emergency proper and sufficient?

(_c_) Had a boat drill been held on board, and if so, when? (_d_) What was the carrying capacity of the respective boats?

Answer. (_a_) 2 Emergency boats, 14 lifeboats, 4 Engelhardt boats. (_b_) No, but see page 38. (_c_) No. (_d_) The carrying capacity of the 2 emergency boats was for 80 persons; 14 lifeboats was for 910 persons; 4 Engelhardt boats was for 188 persons; or a total of 1,178 persons.

6. (_a_) What installations for receiving and transmitting messages by wireless telegraphy were on board the _t.i.tanic_? (_b_) How many operators were employed on working such installations? (_c_) Were the installations in good and effective working order, and were the number of operators sufficient to enable messages to be received and transmitted continuously by day and night?

Answer. (_a_) A Marconi 5-kilowatt motor generator with two complete sets of apparatus supplied from the ship's dynamos, with an independent storage battery and coil for emergency, was fitted in a house on the boat deck. (_b_) Two. (_c_) Yes.

7. (_a_) At or prior to the sailing of the _t.i.tanic_ what, if any, instructions as to navigation were given to the master or known by him to apply to her voyage? (_b_) Were such instructions, if any, safe, proper, and adequate, having regard to the time of year and dangers likely to be encountered during the voyage?

Answer. (_a_) No special instructions were given, but he had general instructions contained in the book of Rules and Regulations supplied by the company. (See p. 24.) (_b_) Yes, but having regard to subsequent events they would have been better if a reference had been made to the course to be adopted in the event of reaching the region of ice.

8. (_a_) What was in fact the track taken by the _t.i.tanic_ in crossing the Atlantic Ocean? (_b_) Did she keep to the track usually followed by liners on voyages from the United Kingdom to New York in the month of April? (_c_) Are such tracks safe tracks at that time of the year? (_d_) Had the master any, and if so, what discretion as regards the track to be taken?

Answer. (_a_) The outward southern track from Queenstown to New York, usually followed in April by large steam vessels. (See page 24.) (_b_) Yes, with the exception that instead of altering her course on approaching the position 42 N. 47 W., she stood on on her previous course for some 10 miles farther southwest, turning to S. 86 W. true at 5.50 p.m. (_c_) The outward and homeward bound southern tracks were decided on as the outcome of many years' experience of the normal movement of ice. They were reasonably safe tracks for the time of year, provided, of course, that great caution and vigilance when crossing the ice region were observed. (_d_) Yes. Capt. Smith was not fettered by any orders to remain on the track should information as to the position of ice make it, in his opinion, undesirable to adhere to it. The fact, however, of lane routes having been laid down for the common safety of all would necessarily influence him to keep on (or very near) the accepted route, unless circ.u.mstances as indicated above should induce him to deviate largely from it.

9. (_a_) After leaving Queenstown on or about the 11th April last, did information reach the _t.i.tanic_ by wireless messages or otherwise by signals of the existence of ice in certain lat.i.tudes? (_b_) If so, what were such messages or signals and when were they received, and in what position or positions was the ice reported to be, and was the ice reported in or near the track actually being followed by the _t.i.tanic_?

(_c_) Was her course altered in consequence of receiving such information, and, if so, in what way? (_d_) What replies to such messages or signals did the _t.i.tanic_ send, and at what times?

Answer. (_a_) Yes. (_b_) See particulars of ice messages already set out (pp. 26-28). (_c_) No; her course was altered as hereinbefore described, but not in consequence of the information received as to ice. (_d_) The material answers were--

At 12.55 p.m. steamship _t.i.tanic_:

To COMMANDER, _Baltic_.

Thanks for your message and good wishes. Had fine weather since leaving.

SMITH.

At 1.26 p.m. steamship _t.i.tanic_:

To CAPTAIN, _Caronia_.

Thanks for message and information. Have had variable weather throughout.

SMITH.

10. (_a_) If at the times referred to in the last preceding question or later the _t.i.tanic_ was warned of or had reason to suppose she would encounter ice, at what time might she have reasonably expected to encounter it? (_b_) Was a good and proper lookout for ice kept on board?

(_c_) Were any, and, if so, what, directions given to vary the speed--if so, were they carried out?

Answer. (_a_) At, or even before, 9.30 p.m. ship's time, on the night of the disaster. (_b_) No. The men in the crow's nest were warned at 9.30 p.m. to keep a sharp lookout for ice; the officer of the watch was then aware that he had reached the reported ice region, and so also was the officer who relieved him at 10 p.m. Without implying that those actually on duty were not keeping a good lookout, in view of the night being moonless, there being no wind and perhaps very little swell, and especially in view of the high speed at which the vessel was running, it is not considered that the lookout was sufficient. An extra lookout should, under the circ.u.mstances, have been placed at the stemhead, and a sharp lookout should have been kept from both sides of the bridge by an officer. (_c_) No directions were given to reduce speed.

11. (_a_) Were binoculars provided for and used by the lookout men?

(_b_) Is the use of them necessary or usual in such circ.u.mstances? (_c_) Had the _t.i.tanic_ the means of throwing searchlights around her? (_d_) If so, did she make use of them to discover ice? (_e_) Should searchlights have been provided and used?