Kant's Theory of Knowledge Part 13

[58] A. 112, Mah. 204.

If we turn to the text for an answer to this question, we find that Kant seems not only to use both starting-points, but even to regard them as equivalents. Thus in introducing the categories[59] Kant begins by appealing to the necessity for knowledge that representations should relate to an object.

[59] A. 110-12, Mah. 203-4.

"Unity of synthesis according to empirical conceptions would be purely contingent, and were these not based on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a confused crowd of phenomena to fill our soul, without the possibility of experience ever arising therefrom. But then also all relation of knowledge to objects would fall away, because knowledge would lack connexion according to universal and necessary laws; it would be thoughtless perception but never knowledge, and therefore for us as good as nothing."

"The _a priori_ conditions of any possible experience whatever are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience. Now I a.s.sert that the above mentioned _categories_ are nothing but _the conditions of thinking in any possible experience_, just as _s.p.a.ce and time_ are the _conditions of perception_ requisite for the same. The former therefore are also fundamental conceptions by which we think objects in general for phenomena, and are therefore objectively valid _a priori_--which is exactly what we wished to know."

The next sentence, however, bases the necessity of the categories on the possibility of self-consciousness, without giving any indication that a change of standpoint is involved.

"But the possibility, nay, even the necessity, of these categories rests on the relation which the whole sensibility, and with it also all possible phenomena, have to original apperception, a relation which forces everything to conform to the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, i. e. to stand under universal functions of synthesis, i. e. of synthesis according to conceptions, as that wherein alone apperception can prove _a priori_ its thorough-going and necessary ident.i.ty."

Finally, the conclusion of the paragraph seems definitely to treat both starting-points as really the same.[60] "Thus the conception of a cause is nothing but a synthesis (of the consequent in the time series with other phenomena) _according to conceptions_; and without such a unity, which has its _a priori_ rule and subjects phenomena to itself, thorough-going and universal and therefore necessary unity of consciousness in the manifold of sense-perceptions would not be met with. But then also these perceptions would belong to no experience, consequently they would have no object, and would be nothing but a blind play of representations, less than a dream."

[60] Cf. A. 113, Mah. 205-6 and A. 108-10, Mah. 202-3.

The fact is that since for Kant the synthesis of representations in accordance with the categories, accompanied by the consciousness of it, is at once the necessary and sufficient condition of the relatedness of representations to an object and of the consciousness of our ident.i.ty with respect to them, it seems to him to be one and the same thing whether, in vindicating the synthesis, we appeal to the possibility of knowledge or to the possibility of self-consciousness, and it even seems possible to argue, _via_ the synthesis, from knowledge to self-consciousness and vice versa.

Nevertheless, it remains true that the vindication of the categories is different, according as it is based upon the possibility of relating representations to an object or upon the possibility of becoming self-conscious with respect to them. It also remains true that Kant vindicates the categories in both ways. For while, in expounding the three so-called syntheses involved in knowledge, he is vindicating the categories from the point of view of knowledge, when he comes to speak of transcendental apperception, of which the central characteristic is the consciousness of self involved, there is a shifting of the centre of gravity. Instead of treating representations as something which can become related to an object, he now treats them as something of which, as belonging to a self, the self must be capable of being conscious as its own, and argues that a synthesis in accordance with the categories is required for this self-consciousness. It must be admitted then--and the admission is only to be made with reluctance--that when Kant reaches transcendental apperception, he really adopts a new starting-point,[61] and that the pa.s.sage which introduces transcendental apperception by showing it to be implied in knowledge[62] only serves to conceal from Kant the fact that, from the point of view of the deduction of the categories, he is really a.s.suming without proof the possibility of self-consciousness with respect to all our representations, as a new basis for argument.

[61] The existence of this new starting-point is more explicit, A. 116-7 (and note), Mah. 208 (and note), and A.

122, Mah. 212.

[62] A. 107, Mah. 200.

The approach to the categories from the side of self-consciousness is, however, more prominent in the second edition, and consequently we naturally turn to it for more light on this side of Kant's position.

There Kant vindicates the necessity of the synthesis from the side of self-consciousness as follows:[63]

[63] The main clauses have been numbered for convenience of reference.

"[1.] It must be possible that the 'I think' should accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would be either impossible or at least for me nothing. [2.] That representation which can be given before all thought is called _perception_. All the manifold of perception has therefore a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. [3.] But this representation[64] [i. e. the 'I think'] is an act of _spontaneity_, i. e. it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it _pure apperception_, to distinguish it from _empirical apperception_, or _original apperception_ also, because it is that self-consciousness which, while it gives birth to the representation 'I think', which must be capable of accompanying all others and is one and the same in all consciousness, cannot itself be accompanied by any other.[65] [4.] I also call the unity of it the _transcendental_ unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of _a priori_ knowledge arising from it. For the manifold representations which are given in a perception would not all of them be _my_ representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even though I am not conscious of them as such), they must necessarily conform to the condition under which alone they _can_ stand together in a universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all belong to me.

From this original connexion much can be concluded."

[64] This is an indisputable case of the use of representation in the sense of something represented or presented.

[65] I. e. consciousness of our ident.i.ty is final; we cannot, for instance, go further back to a consciousness of the consciousness of our ident.i.ty.

[5.] "That is to say, this thorough-going ident.i.ty of the apperception of a manifold given in perception contains a synthesis of representations,[66] and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis.[67] [6.] For the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary, and without relation to the ident.i.ty of the subject. [7.] This relation, therefore, takes place not by my merely accompanying every representation with consciousness, but by my _adding_ one representation to another, and being conscious of the synthesis of them. [8.] Consequently, only because I can connect a manifold of given representations _in one consciousness_, is it possible for me to represent to myself the _ident.i.ty of consciousness in these representations_; i. e. the _a.n.a.lytical_ unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a _synthetical_ unity. [9.]

The thought, 'These representations given in perception belong all of them to me' is accordingly just the same as, 'I unite them in one self-consciousness, or at least can so unite them;' [10.] and although this thought is not itself as yet the consciousness of the _synthesis_ of representations, it nevertheless presupposes the possibility of this synthesis; that is to say, it is only because I can comprehend the manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I call them all _my_ representations; for otherwise I should have as many-coloured and varied a self as I have representations of which I am conscious.

[11.] Synthetical unity of the manifold of perceptions, as given _a priori_, is therefore the ground of the ident.i.ty of apperception itself, which precedes _a priori_ all _my_ determinate thinking. [12.]

But connexion does not lie in the objects, nor can it be borrowed from them through perception and thereby first taken up into the understanding, but it is always an operation of the understanding which itself is nothing more than the faculty of connecting _a priori_, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception, which principle is the highest in all human knowledge."

[66] I understand this to mean 'This through and through identical consciousness of myself as the identical subject of a manifold given in perception involves a synthesis of representations'.

[67] The drift of the pa.s.sage as a whole (cf. especially -- 16) seems to show that here 'the synthesis of representations' means 'their connectedness' and not 'the act of connecting them'.

[13.] "Now this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is indeed an identical, and therefore an a.n.a.lytical, proposition, but nevertheless it declares a synthesis of the manifold given in a perception to be necessary, without which the thorough-going ident.i.ty of self-consciousness cannot be thought. [14.] For through the Ego, as a simple representation, is given no manifold content; in perception, which is different from it, a manifold can only be given, and through _connexion_ in one consciousness it can be thought. An understanding, through whose self-consciousness all the manifold would _eo ipso_ be given, would _perceive_; our understanding can only _think_ and must seek its perception in the senses. [15.] I am, therefore, conscious of the identical self, in relation to the manifold of representations given to me in a perception, because I call all those representations _mine_, which const.i.tute _one_. [16.] But this is the same as to say that I am conscious _a priori_ of a necessary synthesis of them, which is called the original synthetic unity of apperception, under which all representations given to me stand, but also under which they must be brought through a synthesis."[68]

[68] B. 131-5, M. 81-4.

Though this pa.s.sage involves many difficulties, the main drift of it is clear. Kant is anxious to establish the fact that the manifold of sense must be capable of being combined on principles, which afterwards turn out to be the categories, by showing this to be involved in the fact that we must be capable of being conscious of ourselves as the identical subject of all our representations. To do this, he seeks to prove in the first paragraph that self-consciousness in this sense must be possible, and in the second that this self-consciousness presupposes the synthesis of the manifold.

Examination of the argument, however, shows that the view that self-consciousness must be possible is, so far as Kant is concerned,[69] an a.s.sumption for which Kant succeeds in giving no reason at all, and that even if it be true, it cannot form a basis from which to deduce the possibility of the synthesis.

[69] Cf. p. 204, note 3.

Before, however, we attempt to prove this, it is necessary to draw attention to three features of the argument. In the _first_ place, it implies a somewhat different account of self-consciousness to that implied in the pa.s.sages of the first edition which we have already considered. Self-consciousness, instead of being the consciousness of the ident.i.ty of our activity in combining the manifold, is now primarily the consciousness of ourselves as identical subjects of all our representations, i. e. it is what Kant calls the a.n.a.lytical unity of apperception; and consequently it is somewhat differently related to the activity of synthesis involved in knowledge. Instead of being regarded as the consciousness of this activity, it is regarded as presupposing the consciousness of the product of this activity, i. e.

of the connectedness[70] of the manifold produced by the activity, this consciousness being what Kant calls the synthetical unity of apperception.[71] In the _second_ place, it is plain that Kant's view is not that self-consciousness involves the consciousness of our representations as a connected whole, but that it involves the consciousness of them as capable of being connected by a synthesis.

Yet, if it is only because I can connect (and therefore apprehend as connected) a manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I can represent to myself the ident.i.ty of consciousness in these representations, self-consciousness really requires the consciousness of our representations as _already_ connected; the mere consciousness of our representations as _capable_ of being connected would not be enough. The explanation of the inconsistency seems to lie in the fact that the synthetic unity of which Kant is thinking is the unity of nature. For, as Kant of course was aware, in our ordinary consciousness we do not apprehend the interconnexion of the parts of nature in detail, but only believe that there is such an interconnexion; consequently he naturally weakened the conclusion which he ought to have drawn, viz. that self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of the synthesis, in order to make it conform to the facts of our ordinary consciousness. Yet, if his _argument_ is to be defended, its conclusion must be taken in the form that self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of the actual synthesis or connexion and not merely of the possibility of it. In the _third_ place, Kant twice in this pa.s.sage[72] definitely makes the act of synthesis, which his argument maintains to be the condition of _consciousness of the ident.i.ty_ of ourselves, the condition of the _ident.i.ty_ of ourselves. The fact is that, on Kant's view, the act of synthesis of the representations is really a condition of their belonging to one self, the self being presupposed to be a self capable of self-consciousness.[73]

[70] More accurately, 'of the possibility of the connectedness'.

[71] The same view seems implied A. 117-8, Mah. 208. Kant apparently thinks of this consciousness as also a self-consciousness (cf. -- 9), though it seems that he should have considered it rather as a condition of self-consciousness, cf. p. 204, note 2.

[72] Sections 6 and 10.

[73] Cf. pp. 202-3.

We may now turn to the first of the two main points to be considered, viz. the reason given by Kant for holding that self-consciousness must be possible. In the first paragraph (---- 1-4) Kant appears twice to state a reason, viz. in ---- 1 and 4. What is meant by the first sentence, "It must be possible that the 'I think' should accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible or at least for me nothing"? It is difficult to hold that 'my representations' here means objects of which I am aware, and that the thesis to be established is that I must be capable of being conscious of my own ident.i.ty throughout all awareness or thought of objects. For the next sentence refers to perceptions as representations which can be given previously to all thought, and therefore, presumably, as something of which I am not necessarily aware. Again, the ground adduced for the thesis would be in part a mere restatement of it, and in part nonsense. It would be 'otherwise something would be apprehended with respect to which I could not be aware that I was apprehending it; in other words, I could not apprehend it [since otherwise I could be aware that I was apprehending it]', the last words being incapable of any interpretation. It is much more probable that though Kant is leading up to self-consciousness, the phrase 'I think' here refers not to 'consciousness that I am thinking', but to 'thinking'. He seems to mean 'It must be possible to apprehend all my 'affections' (i. e. sensations or appearances in me), for otherwise I should have an affection of which I could not be aware; in other words, there could be no such affection, or at least it would be of no possible importance to me.'[74] And on this interpretation self-consciousness is not introduced till -- 3, and then only surrept.i.tiously. On neither interpretation, however, does Kant give the vestige of a _reason_ for the possibility of self-consciousness. Again, it seems clear that in -- 4 'my representations', and 'representations which belong to me' mean objects of which I am aware (i. e. something presented); for he says of my representations, not that I may not be conscious of them--which he should have said if 'my representations' meant my mental affections of which I could become conscious--but that I may not be conscious of them as my representations. Consequently in -- 4 he is merely a.s.serting that I must be able to be conscious of my ident.i.ty throughout my awareness of objects. So far, then, we find merely the _a.s.sertion_ that self-consciousness must be possible.[75]

[74] A third alternative is to understand Kant to be thinking of all thought as self-conscious, i. e. as thinking accompanied by the consciousness of thinking. But since in that case Kant would be arguing from thinking as _thinking_, i. e. as apprehending objects, the possibility of self-consciousness would only be glaringly a.s.sumed.

[75] The same is true of A. 116 and A. 117 note, Mah. 208, where Kant also appears to be offering what he considers to be an argument.

In the next paragraph[76]--which is clearly meant to be the important one--Kant, though he can hardly be said to be aware of it, seems to _a.s.sume_ that it is the very nature of a knowing self, not only to be identical throughout its thoughts or apprehendings, but to be capable of being conscious of its own ident.i.ty. -- 6 runs: "The empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary, and without relation to the ident.i.ty of the subject."

Kant is saying that if there existed merely a consciousness of A which was not at the same time a consciousness of B and a consciousness of B which was not at the same time a consciousness of A, these consciousnesses would not be the consciousnesses belonging to one self. But this is only true, if the one self to which the consciousness of A and the consciousness of B are to belong must be capable of being aware of its own ident.i.ty. Otherwise it might be one self which apprehended A and then, forgetting A, apprehended B. No doubt in that case the self could not be aware of its own ident.i.ty in apprehending A and in apprehending B, but none the less it would _be_ identical in so doing. We reach the same conclusion if we consider the concluding sentence of -- 10. "It is only because I can comprehend the manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I call them all my representations; for otherwise I should have as many-coloured and varied a self as I have representations of which I am conscious."

Doubtless if I am to _be aware of_ myself as the same in apprehending A and B, then, in coming to apprehend B, I must continue to apprehend A, and therefore must apprehend A and B as related; and such a consciousness on Kant's view involves a synthesis. But if I am merely to _be_ the same subject which apprehends A and B, or rather if the apprehension of A and that of B are merely to _be_ apprehensions on the part of one and the same subject, no such consciousness of A and B as related and, therefore, no synthesis is involved.

[76] ---- 5-11.

Again, the third paragraph a.s.sumes the possibility of self-consciousness as the starting-point for argument. The thought[77]

seems to be this: 'For a self to be aware of its own ident.i.ty, there must be a manifold in relation to which it can apprehend itself as one and the same throughout. An understanding which was perceptive, i. e.

which originated objects by its own act of thinking, would necessarily by its own thinking originate a manifold in relation to which it could be aware of its own ident.i.ty in thinking, and therefore its self-consciousness would need no synthesis. But our understanding, which is not perceptive, requires a manifold to be given to it, in relation to which it can be aware of its own ident.i.ty by means of a synthesis of the manifold.' If this be the thought, it is clearly presupposed that _any_ understanding must be capable of being conscious of its own ident.i.ty.[78]

[77] Cf. B. 138 fin.-139 init., M. 85 fin.

[78] B. 139 init., M. 85 fin. also a.s.sumes that it is impossible for a mind to be a unity without being able to be conscious of its unity.

Further, it is easy to see how Kant came to take for granted the possibility of self-consciousness, in the sense of the consciousness of ourselves as the identical subject of all our representations. He approaches self-consciousness with the presupposition derived from his a.n.a.lysis of knowledge that our apprehension of a manifold does not consist in separate apprehensions of its elements, but is one apprehension or consciousness of the elements as related.[79] He thinks of this as a general presupposition of all apprehension of a manifold, and, of course, to discover this presupposition is to be self-conscious. To recognize the oneness of our apprehension is to be conscious of our own ident.i.ty.[80]

[79] It is in consequence of this that the statement that 'a manifold of representations belongs to me' means, with the probable exception of -- 1, not, 'I am aware of A, I am aware of B, I am aware of C,' but, 'I am aware, in one act of awareness, of A B C as related' (= ABC are 'connected in' or 'belong to' one consciousness). Cf. ---- 4, 8 ('in one consciousness'), 9, 10 ('in one consciousness'), and A. 116, Mah. 208 ('These representations only represent anything in me by belonging with all the rest to one consciousness [accepting Erdmann's emendation _mit allen anderen_], in which at any rate they can be connected').

[80] The above criticism of Kant's thought has not implied that it may not be true that a knowing mind is, as such, capable of being aware of its own unity; the argument has only been that Kant's proof is unsuccessful.

Again, to pa.s.s to the second main point to be considered,[81]

Kant has no justification for arguing from the possibility of self-consciousness to that of the synthesis. This can be seen from the mere form of his argument. Kant, as has been said, seems first to establish the possibility of self-consciousness, and thence to conclude that a synthesis must be possible. But if, as it is his point to urge, consciousness of our ident.i.ty only takes place through consciousness of the synthesis, this method of argument must be invalid. It would clearly be necessary to know that the synthesis is possible, _before_ and _in order that_ we could know that self-consciousness is possible. An objector has only to urge that the manifold might be such that it could not be combined into a systematic whole, in order to secure the admission that in that case self-consciousness would not be possible.

[81] Cf. p. 198.